What is the next government securities auction?

Wednesday 11 November 2026, offering a 10-year Treasury bond.

Amran Bhuzohera - TICGL | Tanzania Investment and Consultant Group Ltd

Reading guide

Data-driven: figures are tied to named sources, mainly the Bank of Tanzania (BoT) Annual Financial Inclusion Report 2025 (read from the primary PDF), BoT payment-system releases, the 2026 draft Credit Guarantee Corporation Regulations, company and product documentation, and TICGL research; derived figures are marked "TICGL calculation". Series report: this is the third report in the digital value-addition series: From Digital Payments to Digital Value Addition (the system), From Payments to Markets (the P2B layer) and this study (the P2B-to-capital link). Sizing is illustrative: the credit-capacity model in Sections 5 and 7 is built from stated assumptions so that readers can change them; it is not a forecast. One correction for earlier work: the BoT report shows 578,692 MSME loan accounts at end-2025, which supersedes the 176,213 figure used in the P2B report. Prepared by TERI for research and strategic-information purposes; not investment, legal, tax or financial advice.

00 — Overview & VerdictExecutive Summary: Visibility Has Doubled, but MSME Credit Value Has Fallen

The answer

Person-to-business (P2B) payments created an unusually rich record of MSME activity in 2025: TZS 37.52 trillion across 2.30 billion transactions, received by 2.79 million merchants. In the same two years, however, the value of bank loans to MSMEs did not rise. The BoT Annual Financial Inclusion Report 2025 shows MSME loans of TZS 10.41 trillion, down from TZS 13.55 trillion in 2024 and 13.13 trillion in 2023, even though MSME loan accounts more than doubled to 578,692.

The central finding: Tanzania has solved the visibility problem for MSME finance faster than the conversion problem. Lenders can now see more of merchants' revenue than ever before; what is missing is data access, products in the right ticket range, guarantees that fit, and rules that connect formalisation to credit.

The opportunity is real but bounded. P2B can become a capital gateway, but on realistic assumptions it is a complement to the loan book rather than a replacement for it. If 50% of P2B value is "credit-visible" and lenders advance one month of receipts, P2B-based credit capacity in 2025 is about TZS 1.6 trillion (range 0.4–4.7 trillion), 15% of the MSME bank loan stock. By 2030 the value-addition pathway (B) implies capacity of TZS 5.6 trillion and a realised stock of about TZS 1.4 trillion; the downside implies almost none.

P2B value 2025

TZS 37.52T

index 206 (2023 = 100)

MSME bank loan value

TZS 10.41T

13.13T in 2023 (index 79)

MSME loan accounts

578,692

282,514 in 2023 (×2.05)

Average MSME bank loan

TZS 18.0M

46.5M in 2023 (−61%)

MSME share of bank loans

21.5%

39.8% in 2023

P2B ÷ MSME loan stock

3.6×

1.4× in 2023

MSME non-performing ratio

2.8%

3.4% in 2024; total NPL 3.3%

Operator–bureau data reach

120,000

0.16% of 75.8M mobile-money accounts

P2B-based credit capacity, 2025

TZS 1.6T

range 0.4–4.7T; 15% of MSME loans

Capacity 2030, pathway B

TZS 5.6T

realised stock ≈ TZS 1.4T

Pathway C stock, % of 2030 GDP

0.49%

a complement, not a replacement

SME-CGS cumulative approvals

TZS 174bn

minimum loan TZS 50 million

The Scissors: P2B vs MSME Credit (2023 = 100)

P2B value reached 206 and MSME loan accounts 205, total bank loans 147, but the value of MSME bank loans fell to 79. Sources: BoT NPS reports; BoT Annual Financial Inclusion Report 2025 (Tables 2.2, 2.3); TICGL calculation.

Average MSME Bank Loan and MSME Share of Bank Loans

Bars: average MSME bank loan, TZS million (left). Line: MSME share of the bank loan book, % (right). Accounts are loan accounts, not unique borrowers. Sources: BoT AFIR 2025; TICGL calculation.

MSME Bank Loans vs Total Bank Loans (TZS Trillion)

Total bank loans rose 47% to TZS 48.43 trillion while MSME loans fell to TZS 10.41 trillion. Sources: BoT AFIR 2025 (Tables 2.2, 2.3).

P2B Value per Shilling of MSME Bank Loans

Visible revenue is increasingly large relative to the credit lenders extend against it: 1.4× in 2023, 2.0× in 2024, 3.6× in 2025. Source: TICGL calculation.

Eight headline findings

1. Visibility has doubled while MSME credit value has fallen. Between 2023 and 2025 P2B value rose 106% and MSME loan accounts rose 105%, but the value of MSME bank loans fell 21% (index 100 to 79). Total bank loans rose 47%.
2. More accounts, much smaller loans. The average MSME bank loan fell from TZS 46.5 million (2023) to 34.1 million (2024) to 18.0 million (2025), a 61% fall. MSMEs' share of the bank loan book fell from 39.8% to 21.5%.
3. P2B now dwarfs the MSME loan stock. P2B value per shilling of MSME bank loans rose from 1.4 (2023) to 3.6 (2025).
4. There is a missing middle in ticket size. The average digital loan is about TZS 16,600; the average MSME bank loan is TZS 18 million; the BoT SME Credit Guarantee Scheme starts at TZS 50 million. The average enabled merchant receives about TZS 1.1 million a month through P2B, so a typical P2B-based working-capital advance would be TZS 0.5–2 million, below every one of these.
5. The data plumbing is the first bottleneck. In 2025 the operator–bureau collaboration registered more than 120,000 customers, 0.16% of 75.8 million active mobile-money accounts. The IFC–BoT agreement of October 2026 on alternative data is the right next step but is only starting.
6. Guarantees do not yet reach P2B-sized borrowers. The SME-CGS covers loans of TZS 50 million to 1 billion; the 2026 draft regulations for an independent Credit Guarantee Corporation (CGC) do not yet show a micro-ticket window. Cumulative SME-CGS approvals since resumption are only TZS 174 billion.
7. The opportunity is real but bounded. Central-case capacity is about TZS 1.6 trillion in 2025 (15% of the MSME bank loan stock); by 2030 pathway B implies capacity of TZS 5.6 trillion and a realised stock of about TZS 1.4 trillion.
8. The prize is value addition, not credit-to-GDP. Even in pathway C, P2B-based credit is about 0.5% of 2030 GDP. The reasons to pursue it are inclusion and productivity: cheaper working capital for micro-merchants, a bridge to formal registration, and demand for local tools.

Headline indicators, 2023–2025

Indicator	2023	2024	2025	Source
P2B value (TZS trillion)	18.25	26.60	37.52	BoT NPS reports
Merchants enabled (million)	0.66	1.33	2.79	BoT NPS reports
MSME bank loan accounts	282,514	397,814	578,692	BoT AFIR 2025
MSME bank loan value (TZS billion)	13,131	13,552	10,409	BoT AFIR 2025
Average MSME bank loan (TZS million)	46.5	34.1	18.0	TICGL calculation
MSME share of bank loans	39.8%	35.9%	21.5%	TICGL calculation
P2B value ÷ MSME bank loan stock	1.4×	2.0×	3.6×	TICGL calculation
MSME loan non-performing ratio	n/a	3.4%	2.8%	BoT AFIR 2025
Overall bank lending rate	n/a	n/a	≈ 15.4%	BoT AFIR 2025

Table 1. n/a = not reported on a comparable basis. MSME loan value is from BoT Table 2.3 and the text (Table 2.2 shows 10,498; see Sources & Data Notes).

Bottom line

The next phase of MSME finance policy is not a search for liquidity (banks lent heavily to other sectors) but a project in data standards, product windows and guarantee design that converts a visible revenue record into affordable working capital, and then into investment capital as firms formalise.

01 — Question & FrameworkCan the Digital Trail That P2B Creates Become Working Capital and Investment?

The companion reports showed that Tanzania's payment rails are strong and its productive layers thin, and identified the weak data-to-credit link as the single highest-leverage gap. This report examines that link for the enterprises that matter most. MSMEs number five million or more, contribute roughly 35% of GDP and employ roughly half the workforce (TICGL), yet only about one in five has access to formal finance.

Central research question

Can the digital trail that P2B creates be converted into working capital and investment capital for MSMEs, and if so, by what mechanisms, at what scale, and with what safeguards?

1. Working capital is the binding constraint

For most micro and small firms the need is stock, supplies, wages and transport, not long-term investment.

2. Survival is at stake

60–70% of new businesses fail within three years (TICGL). Better access to short-term capital can raise survival.

3. Local value addition

P2B-based lending would raise demand for local scoring, collections and bookkeeping software and services.

Why the question is urgent in 2026

Private-sector credit reached TZS 44.6 trillion in December 2025 (+23.5%) and grew 31.2% in the year to July 2026 (about TZS 53.8 trillion). The Central Bank Rate was raised in July 2026 to 6.25% and held there for the fourth quarter. A Bill tabled in Parliament aims to let banks accept movable assets as collateral and to raise private-sector credit from 22.5% of GDP (2024) to 50% by 2030. The BoT is turning its credit guarantee schemes into an independent corporation. The policy window for P2B-based finance is open now.

Private-Sector Credit (TZS Trillion)

TZS 44.6 trillion in December 2025 (+23.5%) and about TZS 53.8 trillion in July 2026 (+31.2% in the year). Sources: BoT via The Chanzo and Daily News.

Private Credit to GDP: 2024 and the 2030 Bill Target (%)

The Movable Property Security Rights Bill aims to raise private-sector credit from 22.5% of GDP (2024) to 50% by 2030, about 28 percentage points. Source: TanzaniaInvest.

Six links from payment to capital

Link 1Visibility

→

Link 2 · gapVerification

→

Link 3 · gapUnderwriting

→

Link 4 · earlyDisbursement & collection

→

Link 5Productive use

→

Link 6Repayment & graduation

Link	What happens
Visibility	The merchant's sales are captured digitally (P2B).
Verification	The merchant is identified and the record is consented and portable.
Underwriting	A lender converts the record into a credit decision.
Disbursement and collection	Funds are delivered and repaid through the same payment rails.
Productive use	The loan finances stock, equipment or labour that raises sales.
Repayment and graduation	A repaid loan builds a credit file that unlocks larger, cheaper credit.

Where Tanzania stands

Tanzania is strong on the first link, weak on the second and third, and has early examples of the fourth. The last two cannot be measured with current data.

Working capital versus investment capital

Working capital

Stock, supplies, wages, transport.
Short-tenor and revolving; can be underwritten on recent cash-flow.
A P2B record is a strong signal.

Investment capital

Equipment, premises, vehicles, expansion.
Longer-tenor; needs collateral or a strong credit history and in most cases formal registration.
A P2B record is a useful but insufficient signal.

Four diagnostics used in this report

Diagnostic	Definition	What it tests
Visibility-to-credit ratio	P2B value ÷ MSME bank loan stock	Whether visible revenue is being matched by credit
Ticket ladder	Typical loan or receipt size at each rung of the system (TZS)	Where the missing middle lies
Data reach	Customers registered in credit-bureau data ÷ active mobile-money accounts	How far consented data sharing has progressed
Credit capacity	P2B ÷ 12 × credit-visible share × advance multiple of monthly receipts	The scale of P2B-based credit that could be underwritten

Try it: visibility-to-credit calculator

Defaults are the 2025 figures. Computed in your browser; no data is sent anywhere.

P2B value (TZS tn)

MSME bank loan value (TZS tn)

MSME loan accounts

Total bank loans (TZS tn)

Merchants enabled (million)

P2B ÷ MSME loans

3.6×

visibility-to-credit ratio

Average MSME loan

18.0

TZS million

MSME share of bank loans

21.5%

of total bank loans

Avg monthly P2B per merchant

1.12

TZS million a month

Data and method

Evidence	What was used
MSME credit	BoT Annual Financial Inclusion Report 2025 (National Council for Financial Inclusion, July 2026), read from the primary PDF: MSME loan accounts and values, personal loans used for business, credit guarantee schemes, credit reference system, lending rates and non-performing loans.
Payments	BoT National Payment Systems reports for P2B, merchants and digital credit, as used in the companion P2B report.
Credit conditions	BoT monetary policy and monthly economic review releases (December 2025 and July 2026 credit data; Central Bank Rate), as reported by The Citizen, Daily News, The Chanzo and TanzaniaInvest.
Policy and law	BoT draft Banking and Financial Institutions (Credit Guarantee Corporation) Regulations 2026; Budget 2026/27 summary; the Movable Property Security Rights Bill; IFC–BoT agreement (5 October 2026); Personal Data Protection Act, Financial Consumer Protection Regulations (amended 2025) and the 2024 Guidance Note on Digital Lenders.
Product evidence	Medical Credit Fund and Vodacom Afya Mkopo documentation; Vodacom Tanzania reports; press coverage of Tanzanian lending fintechs.
TICGL research	MSME structure, informality and credit-scoring data use, including Structural Barriers to MSME Capital Survival in Tanzania.

Method: index P2B and MSME credit series to 2023, compute average loan sizes and shares, build a ticket ladder, size P2B-based credit capacity from stated assumptions, test five hypotheses, and build 2030 pathways that reuse the P2B value paths of scenarios A–D in the P2B report. Two limits matter: MSME loan data cover accounts reported by banks, not unique borrowers; and no data link individual merchants' P2B receipts to their borrowing, so credit capacity is a model, not an observation.

02 — Look-back 2023–2025Visibility Doubled, MSME Credit Value Fell: The Scissors, the Thin Portfolio and the Cost of Credit

The scissors

Index the series to 2023. P2B value reached 206 by 2025. MSME bank loan accounts reached 205. Total bank loans reached 147. But the value of MSME bank loans fell to 79. The business sector's visible revenue doubled while the stock of bank credit to MSMEs shrank by about a fifth, in a year (2025) when overall private-sector credit grew 23.5%. The BoT attributes the lower MSME loan value mainly to repayments and notes that MSME non-performing loans fell to 2.8% from 3.4%. The accounts increase is linked to business formalisation and the expansion of microfinance. The result is a portfolio that has become broader and thinner: more borrowers, smaller loans, and a smaller share of the bank loan book.

MSME Loan Accounts (Bars) and Loan Value (Line)

Bars: MSME bank loan accounts, thousand (left). Line: MSME loan value, TZS trillion (right). Accounts grew +41%, then +45.5% in 2025; value rose 3% and then fell 23.2%. Source: BoT AFIR 2025 (Tables 2.2, 2.3).

Growth in 2025: Credit Fell Where Payments Rose (%)

Year-on-year change in 2025: P2B +41.0%, private-sector credit +23.5%, total bank loans +28.1%, MSME loan accounts +45.5%, MSME loan value −23.2%. Sources: BoT; BoT AFIR 2025; TICGL calculation.

Average loan size has collapsed

Dividing MSME loan value by accounts gives an average of TZS 46.5 million in 2023, 34.1 million in 2024 and 18.0 million in 2025 (−61%). MSMEs' share of the bank loan book fell from 39.8% to 35.9% to 21.5% (see the charts on the Overview tab). Part of this is a mix effect: new accounts are likely to be smaller microfinance-type facilities. But it also means that the "growth" in MSME accounts is not growth in the capital available to each enterprise.

Read with care

Accounts are loan accounts, not unique borrowers. One enterprise can hold several accounts, so account growth overstates reach. Unique MSME borrowers by size, sector, region and gender are not published (see Risks & Data Gaps).

Personal loans are still standing in for business loans

The BoT reports that personal loans of TZS 1,165 billion were used to finance small businesses in 2025, more than double the TZS 533 billion of 2024, even though the number of such accounts fell from 57,054 to 24,391. The Bank explains this as MSME operators using personal facilities because of collateral challenges. Personal loans remain 35–36% of private-sector credit overall and are described by the BoT as largely extended to small and medium enterprises. The pattern is that entrepreneurs without collateral borrow as individuals at personal-loan terms; P2B records could let them borrow as businesses.

Personal Loans Used for Business: Value Up, Accounts Down

Bars: value, TZS billion (left). Line: accounts, thousand (right). The average personal loan used for business rose from TZS 26.3 million (2023) to 9.3 million (2024) to 47.8 million (2025). Source: BoT AFIR 2025; TICGL calculation.

The chain narrows sharply after payments

There are 75.8 million active mobile-money accounts and 2.79 million enabled merchants, but 578,692 MSME bank loan accounts, and only 120,000 customers registered through operator–bureau collaboration in 2025. Definitions differ (accounts, merchants and customers are not the same units) so the comparison is indicative, but the drop-off of one to two orders of magnitude after the payment layer is clear.

The Conversion Chain on a Log Scale (Million)

Active mobile-money accounts 75.8; merchants enabled 2.79; MSME bank loan accounts 0.58; operator–bureau registrations 0.12. Units and definitions differ. Sources: BoT AFIR 2025; BoT NPS 2025; Vodacom Tanzania quarterly report 2026.

Cost of credit

Formal credit is not cheap, and it is much cheaper than the digital alternative. The BoT reports an overall lending rate of about 15.4% in 2025 (negotiated rate 12.9%). Microfinance Tier 2 institutions and digital lenders price much higher; the BoT has noted high interest rates as a key challenge for Tier 2 borrowers, and TanzaniaInvest reports a BoT-acceptable ceiling of about 4% a month for digital loans (date not stated in the source). The gap of up to three times between bank and digital pricing for the same three-month loan is the opportunity: a P2B-based, automatically repaid facility that lenders can price closer to bank rates because collection risk is low.

Interest on TZS 1 Million for Three Months (TZS)

Simple interest, excluding fees: bank at the 12.9% negotiated rate TZS 32,250; bank at the 15.4% overall rate TZS 38,500; digital or Tier 2 at a reported 4% a month ceiling TZS 120,000. Sources: BoT AFIR 2025; TanzaniaInvest; TICGL calculation.

Source of credit	Rate	Interest, 3 months (TZS)
Bank, negotiated rate (BoT 2025)	12.9% a year	32,250
Bank, overall lending rate (BoT 2025)	15.4% a year	38,500
Digital or Tier 2 lender (reported ceiling)	4% a month	120,000

Table 2. The 4% a month figure is the ceiling reported by TanzaniaInvest; many lenders charge less, and fees are additional.

Appendix data: BoT MSME and bank credit

Indicator	Dec 2023	Dec 2024	Dec 2025
Total bank loan accounts	1,530,711	2,165,812	2,407,720
Total bank loans (TZS billion)	33,007	37,801	48,434
MSME loan accounts	282,514	397,814	578,692
MSME loan value (TZS billion)	13,130.9	13,552.4	10,409.1
Personal loans used for business: accounts	15,254	57,054	24,391
Personal loans used for business: value (TZS billion)	402	533	1,165
Smallholder farmer and fisher loans: accounts	33,720	35,600	97,273

Table A1. Source: BoT Annual Financial Inclusion Report 2025, Tables 2.2 and 2.3, as published.

Derived indicator	2023	2024	2025
Average MSME bank loan (TZS million)	46.5	34.1	18.0
MSME share of bank loans	39.8%	35.9%	21.5%
P2B value ÷ MSME loan value	1.39	1.96	3.60
Index, P2B value (2023 = 100)	100	146	206
Index, MSME loan accounts	100	141	205
Index, MSME loan value	100	103	79
Index, total bank loans	100	115	147

Table A2. Source: TICGL calculation.

03 — Barriers 1–3Where Conversion Breaks: The Ticket Gap, Data Access and Guarantee Fit

What the six barriers have in common

None is a shortage of liquidity: banks have lent heavily to other sectors and credit growth was 31% in the year to July 2026. They are barriers of information, product and rules. That is why the solutions are about data standards, product windows and guarantee design, not about new funds.

Barrier 1: the ticket gap

Credit products in Tanzania cluster at two ends. At the bottom are digital loans averaging about TZS 16,600 and small state programmes (the NEEC funds averaged about TZS 280,000 per beneficiary in 2025, reaching 8.7 million MSMEs with TZS 2.44 trillion). At the top are bank MSME loans averaging TZS 18 million, local-government 4-4-2 loans averaging about TZS 9.7 million, and the SME Credit Guarantee Scheme, which covers loans of TZS 50 million to TZS 1 billion. A P2B-typical merchant, receiving about TZS 1.1 million a month on average (or about TZS 3 million a month for an active Vodacom merchant, indicative), sits in between.

The Ticket Ladder: Where P2B-Based Lending Would Sit (TZS Million, Log Scale)

Digital loan 0.017; NEEC average 0.28; average P2B per merchant per month 1.1; Vodacom active merchant per month ≈3; LGA 4-4-2 average 9.7; MSME bank loan 18; SME-CGS minimum 50. The "missing middle" between about TZS 0.3 million and TZS 18 million is where a one-month-of-receipts advance would fall. Sources: BoT AFIR 2025; BoT NPS 2025; NEEC and PMO-RALG (via BoT); Vodacom Tanzania (>TZS 2 trillion a month over 650,000 active merchants, 2026, indicative); TICGL calculation.

A product gap, not an information gap

The missing middle is where a working-capital advance of 0.5–2 times monthly receipts (TZS 0.5–2 million for a typical merchant) would fall. No mainstream product is designed for it.

Barrier 2: data access and credit infrastructure

Merchants' P2B records sit with e-money issuers. The BoT has made progress on infrastructure: it reviewed the Credit Reference System Regulations (2019) in 2025, deployed a Credit Reference Data system with bank onboarding under way, and cooperation between mobile network operators and credit bureaus registered 120,000 customers. National ID coverage reached about 81% of eligible adults, with 138 institutions integrated for e-KYC. The IFC agreement of October 2026 will explore alternative data in credit assessments. But a consented, portable merchant record that any licensed lender can use does not yet exist at scale.

Registered via operator–bureau

120,000

customers, 2025

As % of mobile-money accounts

0.16%

of 75.8 million active accounts

National ID coverage

≈81%

of eligible adults; 138 institutions on e-KYC

Data Reach: How Far Consented Data Sharing Has Gone (%)

The 120,000 operator–bureau registrations equal 0.16% of 75.8 million active mobile-money accounts and 4.3% of the 2.79 million enabled merchants. National ID coverage (≈81% of eligible adults) shows the identity layer is far ahead of the data layer. Sources: BoT AFIR 2025; TICGL calculation.

The legal base exists (Personal Data Protection Act Cap. 44 and its 2023 regulations; Financial Consumer Protection Regulations amended in 2025; the 2024 Guidance Note on Digital Lenders). Recent legal analysis identifies two gaps relevant here: no requirement for transparency in automated credit scoring, and coordination between the BoT, the Personal Data Protection Commission and self-regulatory associations.

Barrier 3: collateral and guarantee fit

Collateral is the stated reason MSME operators use personal loans. The Movable Property Security Rights Bill, if enacted, will let banks take movable assets (stock, equipment, receivables) as security. The guarantee architecture is being rebuilt: seven schemes operate, the BoT SME-CGS has approved a cumulative TZS 173.98 billion since resumption (TZS 42.89 billion in 2025), and the 2026 draft regulations would create an independent CGC jointly owned by Government and the private sector. The problem is fit. The SME-CGS targets loans from TZS 50 million to 1 billion for firms with turnover up to TZS 10 billion; the average enabled merchant's annual P2B receipts are about TZS 13 million.

The guarantee that would matter most

A portfolio guarantee on loans below TZS 50 million, scored on P2B data. None yet exists.

Credit Support Instruments by Scale (TZS Billion)

NEEC funds TZS 2,440 billion to 8.66 million MSMEs (2025) after TZS 759.7 billion to 6.18 million (2024); LGA 4-4-2 loans TZS 157.8 billion to 16,256 beneficiaries (2024/25); SME-CGS TZS 42.9 billion approved in 2025 and TZS 174.0 billion cumulative. Source: BoT AFIR 2025.

Instrument	Scale	Source
SME Credit Guarantee Scheme (BoT)	TZS 42.89 bn approved in 2025; TZS 173.98 bn cumulative; loans TZS 50 m–1 bn, turnover up to TZS 10 bn	BoT AFIR 2025
NEEC funds and programmes	TZS 2.44 trn to 8.66 m MSMEs (2025); TZS 759.7 bn to 6.18 m (2024)	BoT AFIR 2025
LGA 4-4-2 loans	TZS 157.83 bn to 16,256 beneficiaries (2024/25); TZS 72.83 bn to 7,891 (Jul–Dec 2025)	BoT AFIR 2025
Credit Reference Data system	Deployed; bank onboarding under way; 120,000 customers registered via operator–bureau collaboration	BoT AFIR 2025
CGC (draft regulations 2026)	Independent corporation, jointly owned by Government and private sector	BoT; Daily News; Guardian
Movable Property Security Rights Bill	Targets private credit/GDP 50% by 2030 (22.5% in 2024)	TanzaniaInvest

Table A3. Credit support instruments.

04 — Barriers 4–6Product Design and Consumer Protection, Informality, and Tools and Capability

Barrier 4: product design, pricing and consumer protection

Digital lending has expanded fast, with women holding 46.3% of digital loan accounts, but conduct problems have accompanied it. The BoT closed 69 unlicensed digital lenders in 2024 and legal analysis documents unclear pricing, short repayment periods and automatic wallet deductions that can empty a borrower's wallet. A P2B-based advance repaid by deduction from incoming payments is efficient, but the deduction rate must be visible and adjustable. The Afya Mkopo product allows borrowers to choose a repayment share of 33% to 100% of each incoming payment, with 33% as default, which is a useful design benchmark.

Women's share of digital loan accounts

46.3%

BoT AFIR 2025

Unlicensed digital lenders closed

BoT, 2024

Afya Mkopo ticket

TZS 0.2–100M

based on 3 months of Lipa Na M-Pesa revenue

Afya Mkopo repayment share

33–100%

of each incoming payment; 33% default

Try it: revenue-share repayment illustration

A simplified flat-fee advance repaid as a share of each incoming payment. Illustrative only; it is not a product quotation and not a pricing rule.

Monthly P2B receipts (TZS million)

Advance (× monthly receipts)

Repayment share of each payment (%)

Flat fee on advance (%)

Advance

1.10

TZS million

Total to repay

1.16

TZS million, incl. fee

Days to repay

at the chosen share

Fee in TZS

55,000

flat, before any other charges

Design benchmark

A repayment share that the borrower can see and adjust turns an automatic deduction from a risk into a feature: the faster the shop sells, the faster the advance is repaid.

Barrier 5: informality

Only about 12.5% of MSMEs are formally registered and about 72% of SMEs are informal (TICGL). Lenders need a legal entity and a licence, and the mandatory electronic payments regime (GN 158C, in force 1 July 2026) now requires proof of a digital payment facility for business licensing. The BoT notes that formalisation drove the doubling of MSME loan accounts, which suggests that formalisation and credit are linked in practice. For P2B-based lending, the practical design question is whether a merchant with a payment history but no licence can borrow a small amount, or whether the credit file requires formal registration first.

Informality and Access to Finance (%)

Formally registered MSMEs ≈12.5%; informal SMEs ≈72%; MSMEs with access to formal finance ≈20%; TICGL research. Not independently verified here. Sources: TICGL research.

Digital Merchants vs the Registered MSME Base (Million)

2.79 million digital merchants against about 0.63 million registered MSMEs (12.5% of 5 million): about 4.5 times. Indicative, as not every merchant is an MSME. Sources: BoT NPS 2025; TICGL research; TICGL calculation.

Barrier 6: tools and capability

A payment history is hard to underwrite when the merchant has no bookkeeping, no separation between business and personal wallets, and no inventory record. Smartphone penetration was 41.8% in 2025 (feature phones 87.1%), so USSD-first tools matter. MSME e-commerce use was 15% in 2023 against a FYDP IV target of 60% by 2031. The BoT is training Certified Financial Educators (1,167 in 2025) but delivery was concentrated in Dar es Salaam (about half of outreach). Simple bookkeeping embedded in merchant wallets is the missing complement to P2B data.

Capability Indicators (%)

Feature-phone penetration 87.1%; national ID coverage ≈81%; smartphone penetration 41.8%; MSME e-commerce use 15% (2023) against a FYDP IV target of 60% (2031). Sources: BoT AFIR 2025; FYDP IV.

Barrier	What blocks conversion	Key evidence
1. Ticket gap	No product between TZS 0.3 m and 18 m	Digital loan ≈16,600; MSME bank loan 18.0 m; SME-CGS from 50 m
2. Data access	No consented, portable merchant record	120,000 registrations; 0.16% of accounts
3. Collateral and guarantee fit	No guarantee below TZS 50 m; movable-asset law not enacted	SME-CGS TZS 174 bn cumulative; Bill tabled
4. Product and protection	Opaque pricing, short tenors, automatic deductions	69 unlicensed lenders closed; Afya Mkopo 33–100% share
5. Informality	Lenders need a legal entity and licence	12.5% registered; 72% of SMEs informal
6. Tools and capability	No bookkeeping; USSD-first needs	Smartphones 41.8%; e-commerce 15% vs 60% target

05 — Five Pathways & CapacityFive Conversion Pathways and What They Could Be Worth

The research notes provided for this study set out three pathways: transaction-based lending, cash-flow underwriting and embedded finance. The evidence supports those three and suggests two more: portfolio guarantees and asset finance. Each is assessed below.

Pathway	Capital type	Evidence in Tanzania	Main gap
1. Revenue-based working-capital advance (repaid by deduction from receipts)	Working capital, 7–90 days	Afya Mkopo: TZS 0.2–100 million based on three months of Lipa Na M-Pesa revenue; ≥3 months of statements; automated repayment	Limited to sectors with a sponsor; no general merchant product
2. Cash-flow underwriting by banks and fintechs	Working capital and limited growth capital	Fintechs underwrite on Lipa-number history (Black Swan); BoT CRD system; IFC–BoT alternative-data workstream	No consented, portable record; scoring transparency gap
3. Embedded finance and supplier credit	Inventory and receivables	Vodacom Fintech 2.0 extended investment products to merchants; payment-platform lending emerging	Few merchant platforms; supplier data not shared
4. Guaranteed portfolio lending	Working capital to small investment	SME-CGS TZS 50 m–1 bn; CGC regulations drafted May 2026	No sub-TZS 50 m window
5. Asset finance and movable collateral	Investment capital	Movable Property Bill tabled; POS, equipment and vehicle finance by banks	Bill not enacted; no registry; informality

Table 3. Five pathways.

Sizing P2B-based credit capacity

Capacity = (P2B value ÷ 12) × s × a

s is the share of P2B value coming from merchants whose records are credit-visible (active for six months or more, regular inflows, identifiable) and a is the advance as a multiple of monthly receipts. The realised stock is capacity multiplied by take-up. The shares and multiples are assumptions, not observations.

Credit-visible share of P2B (s)	Advance 0.5× monthly receipts	Advance 1.0×	Advance 2.0×
25%	0.39	0.78	1.56
50%	0.78	1.56 (central)	3.13
75%	1.17	2.35	4.69

Table 4. P2B-based credit capacity in 2025, TZS trillion outstanding, from P2B value of TZS 37.52 trillion. Compare MSME bank loan stock of TZS 10.41 trillion. The 5%/10% illustration in the TICGL research note (TZS 190 billion) falls within this range.

Capacity Grid, 2025 (TZS Trillion)

By credit-visible share (25%, 50%, 75%) and advance multiple (0.5×, 1.0×, 2.0×). The central case (50%, 1.0×) is TZS 1.56 trillion. Source: TICGL calculation.

Capacity as % of the MSME Bank Loan Stock (2025)

The grid is 4% to 45% of the TZS 10.41 trillion MSME loan stock, but only if lenders actually use the data. The central case is 15%. Source: TICGL calculation.

Realised Stock in the Central Case by Take-up (TZS Trillion)

Central case capacity TZS 1.56 trillion at 100% take-up; at 20% take-up it would be about TZS 0.3 trillion. Source: TICGL calculation.

Two points follow

First, the capacity is material relative to the MSME loan stock (4–45% across the grid), but only if lenders actually use the data. Second, capacity is not uniform. In a P2B system where receipts are concentrated, a small number of merchants would absorb most of the capacity.

Try it: P2B-based credit capacity calculator

Defaults are the 2025 central case. Change the assumptions to see capacity and the realised stock.

P2B value (TZS tn)

Credit-visible share, s (%)

Advance multiple, a (×)

Take-up (%)

MSME bank loan stock (TZS tn)

Credit capacity

1.56

TZS trillion

Capacity ÷ MSME stock

15.0%

at 100% take-up

Realised stock

0.31

TZS trillion, at the chosen take-up

Realised ÷ MSME stock

3.0%

of the 2025 stock

Two tiers of merchant, two kinds of product

The BoT does not publish the distribution of merchant receipts. As an illustrative test, suppose the top 5% of merchants (about 139,000) hold half of P2B value. Their average receipts would be about TZS 11 million a month and a one-month advance would be about TZS 11 million, in the range of the average MSME bank loan. The other 95% would average about TZS 0.6 million a month, and an advance of 0.5–2 times receipts would be TZS 0.3–1.2 million. The research note's example merchant (TZS 8–15 million a month) is therefore a top-tail merchant, not the typical one. Vodacom's data point the same way: its active merchants receive about TZS 3 million a month on average (2026, indicative), nearly three times the all-merchant average of TZS 1.1 million (2025).

Average Monthly P2B Receipts per Merchant (TZS Million)

All merchants ≈1.1 (2025); Vodacom active merchants ≈3 (2026, indicative); top 5% of merchants ≈11 and other 95% ≈0.6 (illustrative; the distribution is not published). Sources: BoT NPS 2025; Vodacom Tanzania; TICGL calculation.

Tier A: the top few percent

TZS 5–15 million a month.
Banks on cash-flow underwriting; loans of TZS 5–50 million.
Can use portfolio guarantees.

Tier B: the long tail

Below TZS 1 million a month.
Automated, small-ticket, revenue-share advances priced close to bank rates.
Tools that raise their receipts.

Design implication

Treating the two tiers the same would either exclude Tier B or overlend to it.

06 — Capital Ladder & HypothesesFrom Working Capital to Investment, and Five Hypotheses Tested

Working capital is what most P2B-based products can deliver. Investment capital needs more. The table sets out the evidence each rung requires.

The Capital Ladder: Typical Ticket by Rung (TZS Million, Log Scale)

Micro advance 0.2–2; working-capital line 2–20; asset finance 10–100; SME investment loan 50–1,000. Equity and quasi-equity is not ticket-based and is not shown. Source: TICGL research report.

Rung	Typical use	Evidence lenders need	Role of P2B
Micro advance (TZS 0.2–2 m)	Stock, daily operating costs	3–6 months of receipts	Primary underwriting evidence
Working-capital line (TZS 2–20 m)	Seasonal stock, supplier terms	6–12 months of receipts, KYC, licence	Primary evidence; supplements bureau file
Asset finance (TZS 10–100 m)	Equipment, vehicles, POS, cold chain	Registered asset, track record, repayment history	Supporting evidence of ability to repay
SME investment loan (TZS 50 m–1 bn)	Expansion, premises, machinery	Formal registration, financial statements, collateral or guarantee	Supporting evidence; guarantee eligibility
Equity and quasi-equity	Growth, new markets	Business plan, governance, formal records	Revenue growth signal for investors

Table 5. The capital ladder.

The investment rungs depend on formalisation and collateral reform, which are the Movable Property Bill and the BRELA online registration system, more than on payment data. The role of P2B is to make the transition from micro-advance to line-of-credit faster by building a record, and to make the larger loans safer by supplying evidence of cash-flow.

Other sources of capital also matter

NEEC funds

Reached 8.7 million MSMEs with TZS 2.44 trillion in 2025, up more than threefold in value.
Average about TZS 280,000 each: small relative to MSME needs.

LGA 4-4-2 loans

TZS 157.8 billion for 16,256 beneficiaries in 2024/25.
About TZS 9.7 million each.

Development finance

For example the USD 35 million facility to NMB for the Lake Zone (TanzaniaInvest).
Adds wholesale liquidity but does not solve the data and product problems.

Testing five hypotheses

Hypothesis	Evidence	Assessment
H1. P2B visibility is growing faster than MSME credit value	P2B ×2.06 (2023–25); MSME loan value ×0.79; P2B ÷ MSME loan stock 1.4× → 3.6×	Supported
H2. MSME credit growth is breadth without depth	Accounts ×2.05; average loan −61%; MSME share of bank loans 39.8% → 21.5%	Supported (accounts are not unique borrowers)
H3. Data infrastructure is the first bottleneck	120,000 registered through operator–bureau collaboration (0.16% of accounts; 4.3% of merchants); CRD system onboarding; IFC–BoT agreement only signed October 2026	Supported
H4. Existing guarantees do not fit P2B-typical borrowers	SME-CGS minimum TZS 50 m vs average monthly receipts ≈TZS 1.1 m; no micro window in draft CGC regulations	Supported
H5. P2B-based working-capital lending can be done safely	MSME NPL 2.8%; automated repayment in Afya Mkopo; but digital-lender conduct problems and no public loss data for revenue-based advances	Partly supported pilot data needed

Four hypotheses are supported; H5 awaits pilot evidence.

07 — Outlook 2026–2030 & ImpactFour Pathways to 2030: P2B-Based Credit Is Real but Bounded

The pathways reuse the P2B value paths of scenarios A–D in the companion P2B report (TZS 99.4, 121.7, 147.1 and 70.9 trillion in 2030). They add three assumptions for each: the credit-visible share s, the advance multiple a, and take-up u. All are assumptions.

A. Rails-only

s = 30%, a = 0.5, take-up 10%.
Data sharing remains partial; products limited.

B. Value-addition push

s = 55%, a = 1.0, take-up 25%.
Consent framework, bureau integration, micro-ticket guarantee window and tools in place.

C. Mandate plus tools

s = 60%, a = 1.0, take-up 25%.
Payment mandate drives near-universal coverage; same product design as B.

D. Downside

s = 25%, a = 0.5, take-up 8%.
Fee or tax shocks, weak data access, repeated conduct problems.

Indicator, 2030	A. Rails-only	B. Value-addition push	C. Mandate + tools	D. Downside
P2B value (TZS trillion)	99.4	121.7	147.1	70.9
Credit capacity (TZS trillion)	1.24	5.58	7.35	0.74
Realised P2B-based loan stock (TZS trillion)	0.12	1.39	1.84	0.06
Annual disbursement at 4 turns (TZS trillion)	0.5	5.6	7.3	0.2
Stock as % of 2025 MSME bank loan stock	1.2%	13.4%	17.7%	0.6%
Stock as % of 2030 GDP (TZS 377 trillion)	0.03%	0.37%	0.49%	0.02%

Table 6. Source: TICGL scenario model; P2B paths from the companion P2B report; GDP from the companion digital economy report. Capacity = P2B ÷ 12 × s × a. Disbursement assumes an average three-month tenor (four turns a year). Illustrative.

2030 Capacity and Realised Stock vs the 2025 MSME Bank Loan Stock (TZS Trillion)

The 2025 MSME bank loan stock (TZS 10.41 trillion) is shown as the reference line. Pathway B: capacity 5.58, stock 1.39. Source: TICGL scenario model.

P2B Value Paths, 2025–2030 (TZS Trillion)

Reused from the companion P2B report: 99.4 (A), 121.7 (B), 147.1 (C) and 70.9 (D) in 2030. Source: TICGL scenario model.

Credit Capacity Over Time at Constant s and a (TZS Trillion)

P2B path ÷ 12 × s × a for each year, with each pathway's s and a held constant (2026–2030). Illustrative. Source: TICGL calculation.

Realised Stock as % of 2030 GDP

Even in pathway C, P2B-based credit is about 0.5% of 2030 GDP (TZS 377 trillion). Source: TICGL scenario model.

Reading the pathways

The spread between A and B is about TZS 1.3 trillion of loan stock and TZS 5 trillion of annual disbursement, and arises entirely from data, product and guarantee choices, not from payment growth. In pathway B P2B-based advances would be roughly a quarter of the digital credit flow of TZS 20.7 trillion projected for B in the digital-economy report. Pathway C's extra capacity comes from coverage, not design. Pathway D shows the risk of leaving the conversion to chance: payments grow but the credit link stays closed.

Try it: 2030 pathway calculator

Defaults are pathway B. Computed in your browser.

P2B value 2030 (TZS tn)

Credit-visible share, s (%)

Advance multiple, a (×)

Take-up (%)

2030 GDP (TZS tn)

2025 MSME bank loan stock (TZS tn)

Capacity

5.58

TZS trillion

Realised stock

1.39

TZS trillion

Annual disbursement (4 turns)

5.6

TZS trillion

Stock as % of GDP

0.37%

and 13.4% of the 2025 MSME stock

Economic impact and limits

What P2B-based credit can and cannot do

The scale is modest by national standards. Pathway B's realised stock is about 0.4% of 2030 GDP, and the Movable Property Bill's target would require private-sector credit to rise by about 28 percentage points of GDP. P2B-based finance will not deliver that target. Its purpose is different: it widens the base of borrowers, lowers the cost of working capital for micro-merchants, builds credit files and brings enterprises into the formal system.

Scale Check: P2B-Based Stock vs the Credit-Depth Target

Pathway B realised stock = 0.37% of 2030 GDP; the Bill's private-credit target requires about +28 percentage points of GDP (22.5% in 2024 to 50% by 2030). Sources: TICGL scenario model; TanzaniaInvest.

Non-Performing Loan Ratios (%)

MSME NPL 3.4% (2024) and 2.8% (2025); gross NPL ratio 3.3% (2025). Banks gain a lower-risk MSME channel. Source: BoT AFIR 2025.

MSME survival and productivity

The TICGL finding that 60–70% of new businesses fail within three years points to liquidity as a key cause.
No Tanzanian data link revolving credit to sales growth for P2B merchants, so no multiplier is estimated; pilots would produce the evidence.

Financial sector and fiscal effects

MSME NPLs were 2.8% in 2025 and total NPLs 3.3%; lenders also gain from collection efficiency.
The fiscal gain comes through registration and presumptive taxation, but if the trail is used mainly for enforcement, merchants avoid the rails, as the 2021 mobile-money levy showed.

Jobs and local value addition

P2B-based lending requires scoring, collections and bookkeeping software, data engineers and merchant-support staff.
The measurable effect is the number of local firms providing merchant-facing tools and the jobs they create; a baseline needs to be set in 2027.

08 — Policy & KPIsEight Actions and a KPI Dashboard for P2B-Based MSME Finance

Eight actions follow from the evidence. They are aligned with NFIF3 (2023–2028), the 2026/27 Budget measures on credit guarantees, GN 158C and the IFC–BoT agreement.

Implementation Horizon of the Eight Actions

Each bar runs from the start year to the end of the final year. Action 3 (the missing-middle product window) is tested in 2027; action 8 runs to 2030.

#	Action	Lead	Horizon	Indicator
1	Consented, portable merchant data standard: licensed lenders can access a merchant's P2B record with explicit consent through APIs, with a common scoring-transparency rule	BoT, PDPC, MNOs, banks, bureaus	2026–28	Merchants with a consented profile; operator–bureau registrations (120,000 baseline)
2	Integrate merchant records into the Credit Reference Data system and require positive-data reporting by digital lenders	BoT, bureaus	2026–28	Bureau coverage of MSME merchants
3	Create a missing-middle product window (TZS 0.5–10 million revenue-based advances) with disclosure of cost and repayment share, tested in the BoT sandbox	BoT, lenders, fintechs	2027	Loans in the TZS 0.5–10 m band; effective cost
4	Add a micro-ticket portfolio guarantee to the CGC design (loans below TZS 50 million, scored on P2B data)	MoFP, BoT, CGC	2027–28	Guaranteed loans below TZS 50 m; default rate
5	Enable supplier and receivables finance: link e-invoicing and fiscal-device data (with consent) to lenders	TRA, BoT, banks	2027–29	Supplier-credit volume; MSMEs with digital invoices
6	Bundle formalisation with credit: GN 158C compliance linked to simplified BRELA registration, presumptive tax and credit eligibility	MoFP, TRA, BRELA, LGAs	2026–28	Registered merchants (baseline 2027); micro-merchant active rate
7	Enact the Movable Property Bill and build the registry, and promote asset finance for merchant equipment	MoFP, BoT, banks	2026–28	Movable-collateral loans; registry entries
8	Tools and safeguards: embed bookkeeping in merchant wallets; adjustable repayment share; over-indebtedness and conduct supervision; scale financial education beyond Dar es Salaam	BoT, MNOs, FSPs, SIDO	2026–30	MSMEs with digital records; complaints resolved; regional outreach share

Table 7. Policy and market actions.

Proposed KPI dashboard

Rates: Baseline 2025 vs 2030 Target (%)

MSME share of bank loans 21.5% → ≥30%; digital credit as % of P2B value 14.9% → 25%; MSME NPL 2.8% against a guardrail of ≤4%. Targets are TICGL proposals, not official government commitments.

Operator–Bureau Registered Customers (Thousand)

120,000 in 2025; TICGL proposes 2 million by 2028. Target is a TICGL proposal, not an official government commitment.

KPI	Baseline (2025)	2030 target or range
MSME bank loan stock (TZS trillion)	10.41	Track; return toward MSME share of 30% of bank loans
MSME share of bank loans	21.5%	≥30% (TICGL proposal)
Average MSME bank loan (TZS million)	18.0	Report by size band
Operator–bureau registered customers	120,000	2 million by 2028 (TICGL proposal)
P2B-based loan stock (TZS trillion)	Not measured	1.4 (pathway B)
Digital credit as % of P2B value	14.9%	25% (TICGL proposal)
MSME loan non-performing ratio	2.8%	Guardrail: ≤4%
Digital merchants ÷ registered MSMEs	≈4.5×	Falling
Active-merchant rate	Not measured	Baseline 2027

Table 8. Targets are TICGL proposals, not official government commitments.

09 — Risks & Data GapsRisks, Data Gaps and the TICGL/TERI Research Agenda

Risks

Over-indebtedness

Easy small loans can create debt cycles; the BoT and legal analysts already document harmful practices in digital lending.
Repayment-share limits, cost disclosure and a consumer-protection role in every product are essential.

Algorithmic bias and misuse of data

Women hold 46.3% of digital loan accounts but have lower access to larger credit; opaque scoring could reinforce this.
Transparency and audit rules are needed.

Credit boom

Credit grew 31.2% in the year to July 2026 and the policy rate was raised in July 2026.
New products should be underwritten conservatively.

Platform concentration

If a few operators control the merchant data, lenders and fintechs depend on them.
Standards and APIs should be open and non-discriminatory.

Guarantee moral hazard

Portfolio guarantees must share risk (partial cover and first-loss) to protect lender discipline.

Exclusion

Merchants without a digital trail, or with USSD-only phones, would stay outside the system unless products are USSD-based.

Credit Conditions in 2025–2026 (%)

Private-sector credit growth +23.5% (December 2025) and +31.2% (year to July 2026); Central Bank Rate 6.25% (raised July 2026, held for Q4); overall bank lending rate ≈15.4% (2025). Sources: BoT via The Chanzo, Daily News and TanzaniaInvest; BoT AFIR 2025.

Data gaps

Gap	Why it matters	Owner
Unique MSME borrowers (not only accounts), by size, sector, region and gender	Accounts overstate reach; needed for H2 and for targets	BoT, NBS
Link between merchants' P2B receipts and borrowing (consented, anonymised)	Needed to test credit capacity and default	BoT, operators, bureaus
Distribution of merchant receipts	Needed to size Tier A and Tier B	BoT, operators
Loan size, price and default data for digital and revenue-based advances	Needed to set the pricing and guarantee design	BoT
MSME formal status of P2B merchants	Needed to measure the formalisation gap	BRELA, TRA
Reconciliation of MSME loan value (10,409 vs 10,498)	Basic data quality	BoT

Research agenda for TICGL/TERI

Merchant panel survey. About 1,000 merchants in Dar es Salaam, regional towns and rural markets, on receipts, borrowing, tool use and registration.
Pilot of Pathways 1 and 2. Design with one operator and one bank or microfinance lender, on a consented sample, to measure take-up, cost and repayment.
Data annex. Update the P2B report's MSME credit-account figure to the BoT 2025 data and publish a joint three-report data annex.
KPI tracking. Track the KPI dashboard annually and review the credit-capacity assumptions as data become available.

Contribute to the research

TERI is looking for researchers to help with the merchant panel and the pilot design. See Join TICGL as a Researcher.

10 — Sources & Data NotesMethod, Definitions and Reconciliation Notes

Basis

Source report. TICGL/TERI research report "P2B and MSME Capital Access: How Digital Payments Can Be Converted into Working Capital and Investment" by Amran Bhuzohera (November 2026), the third report in the digital value-addition series. BoT figures. MSME credit data are from the BoT Annual Financial Inclusion Report 2025, read from the primary PDF. Calculations. Averages, shares, indices, capacity and pathway figures are TICGL/TERI calculations from stated assumptions; they are illustrative, not forecasts. Targets. KPI targets are TICGL proposals, not official government commitments.

Data reconciliation notes (Appendix B of the report)

Item	Issue	Treatment
MSME loan accounts	The P2B report (November 2026) used 176,213 MSMEs with formal credit accounts (press citing BoT). BoT AFIR 2025 reports 578,692 MSME loan accounts, up 45.5% in 2025.	Use the BoT primary figure (accounts, not unique borrowers). The "under 6%" share in the P2B report becomes about 19% of three million MSMEs (11.6% of five million) on an accounts basis.
"+104.9%"	Press and the BoT text say accounts rose 104.9% to 578,692. This is the change from December 2023 (282,514), not 2025 alone.	Used +45.5% for 2025 and ×2.05 for 2023–25.
MSME loan value	Table 2.2 shows 10,498; Table 2.3 and the text show 10,409.1.	Used 10,409.1.
MSME loan value decline	BoT attributes the −23.2% to repayments and low NPLs; average ticket fell 61% over two years.	Treated as a thinner portfolio; flagged as a data question for the BoT.
Share of mobile-money data used for credit scoring	The Swahili draft states 57%; the companion report and an earlier TICGL source state 5–7%.	Neither used as established fact; source check needed.
TICGL research-note figures	Formal finance ≈20%, personal-savings reliance ≈70%, 25 million livelihoods, 5 m+ MSMEs, 12.5% registered, 72% informal.	Used as TICGL research; not independently verified here.
Digital credit share	5.58 ÷ 255.13 = 2.19% of mobile payment value.	Consistent with the research note (2.2%).
Interest ceiling	TanzaniaInvest reports a BoT-acceptable ceiling of about 4% a month; the article date is not shown.	Used as a reported ceiling with caveat; not a current rule.
Vodacom merchant data	Quarterly report (2026) gives >650,000 active merchants and >TZS 2 trn a month; BoT counts enabled merchants.	Used only for an indicative average receipt; periods differ.
Afya Mkopo	Sector-specific (health) product.	Used as a proof of concept for revenue-based lending, not as market scale.
Pareto illustration	Distribution of merchant receipts is not published.	Labelled illustrative (two tiers of merchant).

Cost and market conditions (Appendix A4)

Indicator	Value	Source
Overall bank lending rate, 2025	≈15.4% (negotiated ≈12.9%)	BoT AFIR 2025
Private-sector credit, Dec 2025	TZS 44.6 trn; +23.5%	BoT via The Chanzo
Private-sector credit, July 2026	≈TZS 53.8 trn; +31.2%	BoT via Daily News
Central Bank Rate, Q4 2026	6.25% (raised July 2026)	BoT via TanzaniaInvest
Gross NPL ratio, 2025; MSME NPL	3.3%; 2.8% (3.4% in 2024)	BoT AFIR 2025
Smartphone / feature phone penetration	41.8% / 87.1%	BoT AFIR 2025
National ID coverage	≈81% of eligible adults; 138 institutions on e-KYC	BoT AFIR 2025

Bank of Tanzania / National Council for Financial Inclusion (2026), Annual Financial Inclusion Report 2025. Dar es Salaam, July 2026.
Bank of Tanzania (2026), National Payment Systems Annual Report 2025, as reported by The Citizen, Daily News and TanzaniaInvest.
Bank of Tanzania (2026), Draft Banking and Financial Institutions (Credit Guarantee Corporation) Regulations, 2026; invitation for comments, May 2026. Bank of Tanzania (2024), Guidance Note on Digital Lenders under Tier 2 Microfinance Service Providers, August 2024.
Medical Credit Fund and Vodacom Tanzania, Afya Mkopo product description (PharmAccess publications). Vodacom Tanzania PLC (2026), quarterly reports and FY2026 results.
TanzaniaInvest (2026), IFC and BoT sign agreement to expand SME credit access (October 2026); Tanzania tables bill to let banks accept movable assets as loan collateral; BoT maintains Central Bank Rate at 6.25% for Q4 2026; Tanzanian government to regulate digital loans and high interest rates.
The Citizen (2026), What Tanzania's credit mix reveals about national economic growth; Tanzanian startup aims to transform access to credit for African SMEs; Bank of Tanzania set to establish credit guarantee firm to boost SME financing. Daily News (2026), Credit growth signals stronger private sector; The big test for Tanzania's credit guarantee scheme. The Chanzo (2026), Private sector credit records robust upswing at the end of 2025.
Guardian (IPP Media), 18 June 2026, Tanzania's 2026/27 budget: key implications for the banking and financial sector. Mrisho, C. (2026), A critical analysis of the legal and ethical challenges of digital lending applications in Tanzania, East African Journal of Law and Ethics 9(4).
TICGL/TERI (2026), From Digital Payments to Digital Value Addition; From Payments to Markets; Structural Barriers to MSME Capital Survival in Tanzania.

11 — Quick AnswersFrequently Asked Questions

Why has MSME bank credit fallen while P2B payments doubled in Tanzania?

Between 2023 and 2025 P2B value rose 106% and MSME loan accounts rose 105%, but the value of MSME bank loans fell 21% to TZS 10.41 trillion (BoT Annual Financial Inclusion Report 2025). The BoT attributes the lower value mainly to repayments. The result is a portfolio that is broader and thinner: more accounts, but the average MSME loan fell 61% to TZS 18.0 million and MSMEs' share of bank loans fell from 39.8% to 21.5%.

What is the missing middle in MSME lending?

The average digital loan is about TZS 16,600, the average MSME bank loan is TZS 18 million and the BoT SME Credit Guarantee Scheme starts at TZS 50 million. An average enabled merchant receives about TZS 1.1 million a month through P2B, so a typical P2B-based working-capital advance would be TZS 0.5 to 2 million, below every one of these products.

How much credit could P2B data support?

If 50% of P2B value is credit-visible and lenders advance one month of receipts, P2B-based credit capacity in 2025 is about TZS 1.6 trillion (range 0.4 to 4.7 trillion), about 15% of the MSME bank loan stock. By 2030 the value-addition pathway implies capacity of TZS 5.6 trillion and a realised stock of about TZS 1.4 trillion.

What is the first bottleneck to P2B-based lending?

Data access. In 2025 the collaboration between mobile network operators and credit reference bureaus registered more than 120,000 customers, 0.16% of 75.8 million active mobile-money accounts and 4.3% of 2.79 million enabled merchants. The IFC and Bank of Tanzania agreement of October 2026 on alternative data in credit assessment is the right next step.

Do credit guarantees reach P2B-sized borrowers?

Not yet. The BoT SME Credit Guarantee Scheme covers loans of TZS 50 million to 1 billion, while the average enabled merchant's annual P2B receipts are about TZS 13 million. The 2026 draft regulations for an independent Credit Guarantee Corporation do not yet show a micro-ticket window. A portfolio guarantee on loans below TZS 50 million is the recommended fix.

How much does digital credit cost compared with a bank loan?

Borrowing TZS 1 million for three months costs about TZS 32,250 at the 12.9% negotiated bank rate, TZS 38,500 at the 15.4% overall bank lending rate and up to TZS 120,000 at a reported digital or Tier 2 ceiling of 4% a month. A P2B-based facility repaid automatically from receipts could be priced closer to bank rates.

Will P2B-based lending close Tanzania's credit gap?

No. Even in the strongest pathway P2B-based credit is about 0.5% of 2030 GDP. Its purpose is inclusion and productivity: cheaper working capital for micro-merchants, a bridge to formal registration and demand for local tools, not a large addition to national credit depth.

What policy actions does TICGL recommend?

Eight actions: a consented, portable merchant data standard; integration into the Credit Reference Data system; a TZS 0.5 to 10 million missing-middle product window; a micro-ticket portfolio guarantee; supplier and receivables finance; formalisation bundled with credit; enactment of the Movable Property Bill; and tools and safeguards including bookkeeping and conduct supervision.

Muhtasari

Muhtasari kwa Kiswahili

P2B na Upatikanaji wa Mtaji kwa MSMEs Tanzania: Kati ya 2023 na 2025, malipo ya mtu kwa biashara (P2B) yaliongezeka kwa asilimia 106 hadi TZS trilioni 37.52, na akaunti za mikopo ya benki kwa MSMEs ziliongezeka kwa asilimia 105 hadi 578,692. Hata hivyo, thamani ya mikopo ya benki kwa MSMEs ilishuka asilimia 21 hadi TZS trilioni 10.41, na wastani wa mkopo wa MSME ulishuka asilimia 61 hadi TZS milioni 18.0.

Ufuatiliaji umeimarika kuliko ubadilishaji: wakopeshaji sasa wanaona mapato ya wafanyabiashara kuliko wakati wowote, lakini kinachokosekana ni upatikanaji wa data, bidhaa zenye ukubwa sahihi wa mkopo, dhamana zinazofaa, na kanuni zinazounganisha urasimishaji na mikopo. P2B ni mara 3.6 ya mikopo ya benki kwa MSMEs, kutoka mara 1.4 mwaka 2023. Sehemu ya MSMEs katika mikopo ya benki ilishuka kutoka asilimia 39.8 hadi 21.5.

Pengo la kati la ukubwa wa mkopo: mkopo wa kidijitali wa wastani ni takriban TZS 16,600; mkopo wa benki kwa MSME ni TZS milioni 18; na mpango wa dhamana wa BoT (SME-CGS) unaanzia TZS milioni 50. Mfanyabiashara wa kawaida anapokea takriban TZS milioni 1.1 kwa mwezi kupitia P2B, kwa hiyo mkopo wa mtaji wa kufanyia kazi ungekuwa TZS milioni 0.5 hadi 2, chini ya bidhaa zote hizo.

Vikwazo sita: pengo la ukubwa wa mkopo; upatikanaji wa data (wateja 120,000 tu waliosajiliwa kupitia ushirikiano wa waendeshaji na ofisi za mikopo, asilimia 0.16 ya akaunti milioni 75.8); dhamana na dhamana mbadala (SME-CGS haina dirisha chini ya TZS milioni 50); muundo wa bidhaa, bei na ulinzi wa watumiaji; urasimishaji (takriban asilimia 12.5 ya MSMEs wamesajiliwa); na zana na uwezo. Hakuna kati ya hivyo ni uhaba wa fedha; ni vikwazo vya taarifa, bidhaa na kanuni.

Gharama ya mkopo: TZS milioni 1 kwa miezi mitatu inagharimu takriban TZS 32,250 (riba ya benki ya asilimia 12.9), TZS 38,500 (asilimia 15.4) na hadi TZS 120,000 kwa kiwango cha juu kinachoripotiwa cha asilimia 4 kwa mwezi kwa wakopeshaji wa kidijitali. Mkopo unaolipwa moja kwa moja kutoka mapato unaweza kuwekewa bei karibu na ya benki.

Njia tano za ubadilishaji na uwezo: mikopo ya mtaji wa kufanyia kazi inayolipwa kutoka mapato, tathmini ya mtiririko wa fedha, fedha zilizojengwa ndani ya majukwaa na mikopo ya wasambazaji, mikopo yenye dhamana ya kikapu, na ufadhili wa mali. Kama asilimia 50 ya P2B inaonekana kwa wakopeshaji na wakopeshaji wanatoa mapato ya mwezi mmoja, uwezo wa mikopo ya P2B mwaka 2025 ni takriban TZS trilioni 1.6 (kati ya 0.4 na 4.7), asilimia 15 ya mikopo ya benki kwa MSMEs.

Mwelekeo wa 2030 (njia nne): mkopo halisi unaotegemea P2B ungekuwa TZS trilioni 0.12 (miundombinu pekee), 1.39 (msukumo wa kuongeza thamani), 1.84 (agizo pamoja na zana) au 0.06 (hali mbaya). Hata katika njia bora, ni takriban asilimia 0.5 ya Pato la Taifa. Lengo ni ujumuishi na tija: mtaji nafuu wa kufanyia kazi, daraja la kurasimisha biashara, na mahitaji ya zana za ndani, si kuongeza kwa kiasi kikubwa kina cha mikopo nchini. Hizi si utabiri bali matokeo ya dhana zilizotajwa.

Hatua nane: kiwango cha data ya wafanyabiashara kwa ridhaa na inayohamishika; kuunganisha kwenye mfumo wa data ya mikopo; dirisha la bidhaa la TZS milioni 0.5 hadi 10; dhamana ya kikapu kwa mikopo ya chini ya TZS milioni 50; ufadhili wa wasambazaji na wadai; kuunganisha urasimishaji na mikopo; kupitisha Muswada wa Mali Inayohamishika; na zana na ulinzi ikiwemo uwekaji hesabu na usimamizi wa maadili ya utoaji mikopo.

P2B 2025: TZS trilioni 37.52 · Wafanyabiashara: milioni 2.79 · Mikopo ya benki kwa MSMEs: TZS trilioni 10.41 (kutoka 13.13 mwaka 2023)
Wastani wa mkopo wa MSME: TZS milioni 18.0 (kutoka 46.5) · Sehemu ya MSMEs: asilimia 21.5 (kutoka 39.8) · Mikopo isiyolipika ya MSME: asilimia 2.8
Uwezo wa mikopo ya P2B 2025: TZS trilioni 1.6 · 2030 njia B: uwezo 5.6, mkopo halisi 1.4 · Lengo la TICGL la wateja waliosajiliwa: milioni 2 ifikapo 2028

Chanzo: Benki Kuu ya Tanzania (Ripoti ya Ujumuishaji wa Kifedha 2025; ripoti za NPS); Vodacom Tanzania; utafiti wa TICGL/TERI (Amran Bhuzohera, Novemba 2026). Kwa maelezo zaidi: economist@ticgl.com.

Reading guide

Data-driven: every figure is tied to a named source (Bank of Tanzania, TCRA, company results, IPA, law-firm and press reports of the 2026 payment mandate, TICGL research); derived figures are marked "TICGL calculation". Companion study: this report narrows the lens of From Digital Payments to Digital Value Addition from the whole mobile-payment system to its fastest-growing layer, person-to-business (P2B) payments. Pathways are not forecasts: Section 6 shows four 2030 outcomes with every assumption stated, aligned with scenarios A–D of the companion study. Prepared by TERI for research and strategic-information purposes; not investment, legal, tax or financial advice.

00 — Overview & VerdictExecutive Summary: P2B Has Grown Wide Faster Than It Has Grown Deep

The answer

Person-to-business payments are where Tanzania's mobile-money system meets real commerce, and they are growing fast. In 2025 P2B payments reached TZS 37.52 trillion across 2.30 billion transactions, up 41% in value. Merchants enabled to accept digital payments rose from 1.33 million to 2.79 million. P2B now equals about 16% of nominal GDP (TICGL calculation) and 14.7% of all mobile payment value, up from 11.8% in 2023.

But the growth is wide, not yet deep. Merchants grew 7.1 times between 2022 and 2025, while annual value per merchant fell from about TZS 30.7 million to 13.5 million (−56%). The average registered merchant now receives about 2.3 P2B payments a day, against 3.6 in 2024. Digital credit is only 14.9% of P2B value, and the average digital loan is about TZS 16,600 (roughly USD 6).

The flow outruns the value added. P2B rose by TZS 10.9 trillion in 2025, while implied ICT value added rose by only about TZS 0.14 trillion. Every 1% of effective fee on P2B is a pool of TZS 375 billion, equal to 10% of the whole ICT sector's value added.

P2B is the right place to win the value-addition argument. Winning it needs deliberate policy on data, fees, tools and formalisation, not more merchant onboarding alone. The 2030 range is wide: TZS 71 trillion (downside) to 147 trillion (mandate plus tools), and the pathway that delivers value added is the one where value per merchant recovers to about TZS 22 million and digital credit reaches 25% of P2B.

P2B value 2025

TZS 37.52T

+41.0%; 2.30 billion transactions

P2B / nominal GDP

16.0%

12.5% in 2024 (TICGL calc.)

Share of mobile payments

14.7%

13.4% in 2024; 11.8% in 2023

Merchants enabled

2.79M

1.33M in 2024; 0.39M in 2022

Value per merchant

TZS 13.5M

from 30.7M in 2022 (−56%)

Payments per merchant a day

2.3

3.6 in 2024

Digital credit / P2B

14.9%

15.9% in 2024; avg loan ≈ TZS 16,600

MSMEs with formal credit accounts

176,213

under 6% of 3 million+ MSMEs

Digital merchants ÷ registered MSMEs

≈ 4.5×

2.79M vs ≈ 0.63M (indicative)

Fee pool per 1% of P2B

TZS 375bn

= 10% of ICT value added

E-money issuers' merchant share

≈ 90%

banks under 1% (BoT, 2024)

P2B in 2030 (A–C range)

TZS 99–147T

downside D: TZS 70.9T

P2B Value and Share of Mobile Payments, 2023–2025

Bars: P2B value, TZS trillion (left). Line: P2B share of total mobile payment value, % (right). Sources: BoT NPS reports (via Daily News, TanzaniaInvest, The Citizen); share is TICGL calculation.

Scale Comparison, 2025 (TZS Trillion)

P2B value against the layers that sit on it. Fee pool is an illustration at a 1% effective fee, not an observed figure; categories overlap and are not additive. Sources: BoT NPS Annual Report 2025; NBS/Economic Survey 2025 (ICT share 1.6% × GDP TZS 234.1 trillion); Vodacom Tanzania FY2026; TICGL calculation.

Growth in 2025: Where P2B Grew Fastest

Percent, 2025 vs 2024. Merchants enabled more than doubled (+110.1%, TICGL calc. from 1,327,803 to 2,789,455); P2B value (+41.0%) outgrew volume (+30.4%) and total mobile payments (+28.3%). The average P2B payment rose 6.7% (TZS 15,287 to 16,313, TICGL calc.). Sources: BoT NPS Annual Report 2025.

Eight headline findings

1. P2B is the fastest-growing payment layer. Value rose from TZS 18.25 trillion (2023) to 26.60 trillion (2024) and 37.52 trillion (2025). Its share of mobile payments rose from 11.8% to 14.7%.
2. Merchants are multiplying faster than the money per merchant. Merchant points grew 7.1 times between 2022 and 2025 (0.39 million to 2.79 million), while annual value per merchant fell from about TZS 30.7 million to 13.5 million (−56%; TICGL calculation). A registered merchant now receives about 2.3 P2B payments a day, against 3.6 in 2024.
3. The flow outruns the value added. P2B rose by TZS 10.9 trillion in 2025; implied ICT value added rose by only about TZS 0.14 trillion (companion report). A 1% effective fee on P2B is a TZS 375 billion pool, equal to 10% of ICT value added.
4. The data-to-credit link is weak and the credit that exists is small-ticket. Digital credit was TZS 5.58 trillion, only 14.9% of P2B value; the average digital loan was about TZS 16,600. Only 176,213 MSMEs hold formal credit accounts, under 6% of a base of three million or more.
5. Digital acceptance is running ahead of formal registration. The 2.79 million digital merchants are about 4.5 times the roughly 0.63 million MSMEs TICGL estimates are formally registered (12.5% of 5 million). The new mandatory electronic payments regime (GN 158C, in force 1 July 2026, transition to 31 December 2026) makes a digital facility a condition of business licensing.
6. Market structure and cost still shape who benefits. E-money issuers account for about 90% of merchants and banks for under 1%. IPA research finds three providers with near-identical fees, layered excise, VAT and levy, and merchant payments at only 3.9% of digital transactions.
7. The 2030 range is wide. P2B could reach TZS 71 trillion (downside), 99 trillion (rails-only), 122 trillion (value-addition push) or 147 trillion (mandate plus tools). The value-adding pathway is the one in which value per merchant recovers to about TZS 22 million and digital credit reaches 25% of P2B.
8. P2B is still largely unmeasured. There is no published split by merchant size, sector, region, formal status, active versus enabled merchants, or retail versus bill payments: the single largest obstacle to evidence-based policy.

Headline P2B indicators, 2023–2025

Indicator	2023	2024	2025	Source
P2B value (TZS trillion)	18.25	26.60	37.52	BoT NPS reports (via Daily News)
P2B growth in value	+71.4%	+45.8%	+41.0%	BoT NPS reports
P2B volume (billion)	1.35*	1.74	2.30	BoT NPS 2025; *TICGL derived
Share of mobile payment value	11.8%	13.4%	14.7%	TICGL calculation
P2B as % of nominal GDP	n/a	12.5%	16.0%	TICGL calculation
Merchants enabled (million)	0.657	1.328	2.789	BoT NPS reports
Value per merchant (TZS million)	27.3	20.3	13.5	TICGL calculation
Average P2B payment (TZS)	13,480	15,287	16,313	TICGL calculation
Digital credit as % of P2B	n/a	15.9%	14.9%	TICGL calculation

Table 1. n/a = not available on a comparable basis. 2023 volume is derived from the 2024 volume (1.74 billion) and the reported 28.52% growth. See Sources & Data Notes for series reconciliation.

Bottom line

P2B is the right place to win the value-addition argument because every P2B payment is a sale that creates a record able to support credit, tax and formalisation. The evidence points to a shift in policy emphasis from merchant counts to merchant outcomes: depth ratios, active-merchant rates, credit conversion and formalisation, not the headline number of merchants enabled.

01 — Question & FrameworkWhy a P2B Payment Is a Sale, Not Value Added, and How to Measure the Gap

The companion report showed that Tanzania's mobile payments (TZS 255.13 trillion, 109% of GDP) coexist with an ICT sector worth only 1.6% of GDP, and that the Digital Value Conversion Ratio fell from 1.81% to 1.47% in 2025. The natural next question is where, inside the payment system, that gap can be narrowed.

Central research question

As P2B scales, does it deepen into higher value added, credit and formal enterprise growth, or does it remain a high-volume, low-margin payment service?

Why P2B is the best candidate: three reasons

1. Payments become commerce

Every P2B payment is a sale, so it creates a record that can support credit, tax and formalisation.

2. Room for domestic firms

It is the layer where local software, reconciliation, inventory and embedded-finance firms can plausibly build products.

3. Public policy is acting on it

TANQR, Lipa Namba and the 2026 mandatory electronic payments regime all work directly on P2B.

A P2B payment is a sale, not value added

A P2B payment is the gross receipt of a business. It includes the cost of the goods the merchant bought elsewhere; the value added by the merchant is only the margin over those inputs. P2B of 16% of GDP is therefore a measure of how much commerce is being settled digitally, not a measure of output. Likewise, the value added by the payment service itself is the fee pool less the provider's intermediate costs, a small fraction of the flow.

How Many Times Larger Is P2B Than Each Layer Above It? (2025)

Multiple of the layer's size, log scale. P2B is 6.7× digital credit, 10× ICT value added, 11.8× digital savings, 51× Vodacom's M-Pesa revenue and 100× a 1% fee pool. Sources: BoT NPS Annual Report 2025; Vodacom Tanzania FY2026; TICGL calculation (37.52 ÷ layer).

The P2B value-addition chain

Link 1Acceptance

→

Link 2Records

→

Link 3 · gap opensCredit & tools

→

Link 4 · gap opensProductivity

→

Link 5Local digital layer

Reading the chain

Tanzania scores very highly on the first link (acceptance) and is building the second (records). The gap opens at the third and fourth links: how much of the digital trail is converted into credit and business tools, whether that raises merchant productivity, and how much of the resulting demand is met by domestic software and service firms rather than captured by a few large operators or imported platforms.

Four diagnostics used in this report

Diagnostic	Definition	Why it matters	2025 reading
Depth ratio	P2B value ÷ merchants enabled (TZS million per merchant per year)	Tests whether growth in merchants is matched by growth in business done through them	13.5 (20.3 in 2024)
Credit conversion	Digital credit ÷ P2B value (%)	Tests whether payment data is turning into capital	14.9% (15.9%)
Fee-pool sensitivity	P2B value × effective fee rate	Sizes the revenue pool created by P2B and compares it with ICT value added	TZS 375bn per 1%
Formalisation gap	Digital merchants ÷ formally registered MSMEs	Tests whether digital trails are running ahead of the formal register	≈ 4.5×

Table 2.1. These complement the Digital Value Conversion Ratio (DVCR = ICT value added ÷ mobile payment value) in the companion report. They are diagnostics, not performance grades: a falling depth ratio can reflect healthy inclusion of very small traders as well as weak activity.

Try it: P2B diagnostics calculator

Change the inputs (defaults are the 2025 figures) to see the four diagnostics. Computed in your browser; no data is sent anywhere.

P2B value (TZS tn)

Merchants enabled (million)

Digital credit (TZS tn)

Effective fee on P2B (%)

Registered MSMEs (million)

ICT value added (TZS tn)

Depth ratio

13.5

TZS million per merchant a year

Credit conversion

14.9%

digital credit ÷ P2B

Fee pool

375

TZS billion (10% of ICT value added)

Formalisation gap

4.5×

digital merchants ÷ registered MSMEs

Data and method

The report computes growth rates and shares from the published series, derives the four diagnostics above, tests five hypotheses, and builds 2030 pathways by varying P2B growth, merchant depth and credit conversion while holding total mobile-payment growth and GDP at the companion report's assumptions (18% and 10% a year respectively).

Evidence	What was used
Payment systems	P2B value and volume, merchants enabled, mobile payments, digital credit and savings from the BoT National Payment Systems Annual Reports for 2023, 2024 and 2025, as published and as reported by The Citizen, Daily News, TanzaniaInvest and Uchumi360.
Firm evidence	Vodacom Tanzania FY2026 results (year to 31 March 2026) and later quarterly reports; Safaricom FY2026 results for a Kenyan comparison.
Policy and law	Electronic Transactions (Mandatory Electronic Payments for Specified Transactions) Order, 2026 (GN 158C), as summarised by EY, Bowmans and Daily News; Finance Act 2026 amendments to business licensing; BoT fee-cap announcements.
Pricing and market structure	IPA/Bank of Tanzania Tanzania Affordable Digital Finance Research Initiative (July 2026).
MSME evidence	TICGL research (2025–2026), including Structural Barriers to MSME Capital Survival in Tanzania, and BoT data on MSME formal credit accounts as cited in The Citizen.

Three data limits matter: P2B is defined more broadly than the "merchant payment system" series (volumes differ by a factor of about four in 2023 although values are close); merchants are counted as "enabled", not "active"; and no breakdown by size, sector or region exists.

02 — Look-back 2022–2025Rapid, Accelerating Growth in Value, and a Merchant Base That Multiplied Sevenfold

Value: +71.4%, +45.8%, +41.0%

P2B value was TZS 18.25 trillion in 2023, 26.60 trillion in 2024 (+45.8%) and 37.52 trillion in 2025 (+41.0%). Volumes rose 30.4% in 2025 to 2.30 billion transactions. Value therefore grew faster than volume, and the average P2B payment rose from about TZS 13,500 (2023) to TZS 16,300 (2025), a sign that larger purchases, not only micro-payments, are moving onto digital rails. Total mobile payments grew by 28.3% in 2025, so P2B's share rose by 1.3 percentage points to 14.7%.

P2B Value and Annual Growth, 2023–2025

Bars: TZS trillion (left). Line: annual growth, % (right). Growth is slowing from +71.4% to +41.0% but off a much larger base. Sources: BoT NPS reports (via Daily News); TICGL calculation.

P2B Volume and Average Payment, 2023–2025

Bars: billion transactions (left; 2023 derived). Line: average P2B payment, TZS (right). Value grew faster than volume, so the average ticket rose. Sources: BoT NPS 2025; TICGL calculation.

P2B as a Share of Mobile Payments and of GDP

Bars: P2B as % of total mobile payment value (2023–2025). Line: P2B as % of nominal GDP (2024: 12.5%, 2025: 16.0%; 2023 not available on a comparable basis). Source: TICGL calculation from BoT and NBS data.

A merchant base that has multiplied sevenfold in three years

Merchants enabled to accept digital payments rose from 393,977 (2022) to 657,346 (2023), 1,327,803 (2024) and 2,789,455 (2025). The BoT attributes the surge to the spread of TANQR and "Pay Bill" (Lipa Namba) solutions. Electronic money issuers, mainly mobile network operators, account for about 90% of merchants and banks for less than 1% (BoT 2024 data).

Breadth has outrun depth

Dividing annual value by year-end merchants gives a depth ratio of about TZS 30.7 million per merchant in 2022, 27.3 million in 2023, 20.3 million in 2024 and 13.5 million in 2025, a fall of 56% (TICGL calculation using the merchant-payment series for 2022–2024 and the P2B series for 2025; an average-merchant basis shows the same direction, 27.1 million falling to 18.2 million between 2024 and 2025). Transactions per merchant fell from about 3.6 a day in 2024 to 2.3 in 2025.

Merchants Enabled and Value per Merchant, 2022–2025

Bars: merchants enabled, million (left). Line: annual value per merchant, TZS million (right). Value per merchant uses the merchant-payment series for 2022–2024 and P2B value for 2025. Sources: BoT NPS reports; TICGL calculation.

Growth Indices, 2023 = 100

Merchants reached 424 while P2B value reached 206, volume 170 and the average payment 121. Merchant growth outran every measure of business done through them. Sources: BoT NPS reports; TICGL calculation (2023 volume derived).

Three readings, consistent with the data

(1) New merchants are overwhelmingly micro-traders (food vendors, bodaboda operators, market sellers) whose sales are small. (2) Many newly enabled merchants are not yet active. (3) Some of the growth is registration ahead of use as providers compete to onboard. The data cannot separate these. What they do show is that the "2.79 million merchants" headline overstates how deeply digital payments have entered business practice; the next phase of policy should be judged by depth ratios and active-merchant rates, not merchant counts.

Concentration on the leading platform

Vodacom Tanzania reports that its active M-Pesa merchant base grew 25.2% to more than 650,000 and that monthly merchant transaction value rose more than 40% to above TZS 2 trillion (latest quarterly report, 2026). Annualised, TZS 2 trillion a month is above TZS 24 trillion, roughly two-thirds of the 2025 national P2B total of TZS 37.52 trillion. The comparison is not like-for-like (different periods, and "active" versus BoT's "enabled" merchants), but it points to a pattern: a minority of merchants (about 23% of the enabled base) on the largest platform appear to carry a majority of the value, with a very long tail of low-value merchants on the rest.

One Platform, a Minority of Merchants, a Majority of Value (Indicative)

Percent. Vodacom active M-Pesa merchants (> 650,000) as a share of 2.79 million enabled merchants, and annualised monthly merchant value (> TZS 2 trillion × 12 = TZS 24 trillion) as a share of TZS 37.52 trillion. Not like-for-like (active vs enabled; different periods). Sources: Vodacom Tanzania quarterly report 2026; BoT NPS 2025; TICGL calculation.

Annual data, 2022–2025

Indicator	2022	2023	2024	2025
P2B value (TZS trillion)	n/a	18.25	26.60	37.52
P2B volume (billion)	n/a	1.35 (derived)	1.74	2.30
Merchant payment system value (TZS trillion)	12.1	17.92	26.91	n/a
Merchant payment system volume (million)	166.4	301.2	n/a	n/a
Merchants enabled	393,977	657,346	1,327,803	2,789,455
Total mobile payment value (TZS trillion)	114.32	154.71	198.86	255.13
Nominal GDP (TZS trillion)	n/a	n/a	211.98	234.1
P2B share of mobile payments	n/a	11.8%	13.4%	14.7%
P2B as % of GDP	n/a	n/a	12.5%	16.0%
Value per merchant (TZS million)	30.7	27.3	20.3	13.5
Average P2B payment (TZS)	n/a	13,480	15,287	16,313
Transactions per merchant per day	n/a	n/a	3.6	2.3
Digital credit as % of P2B	n/a	n/a	15.9%	14.9%
Average digital credit transaction (TZS)	n/a	n/a	15,670	16,582

Tables A1 and A2. Sources: BoT NPS Annual Reports 2022–2025 as reported by The Citizen, Daily News, TanzaniaInvest and The Nation; companion report (GDP, total mobile payments); TICGL calculation. 2022–2024 value per merchant uses the merchant payment system series; 2025 uses P2B value.

03 — Where the Value Goes, Issues 1–3Who Captures the Fee Pool, Why Thin Merchants Matter, and the Weak Data-to-Credit Link

This is the core of the report. For each of six issues it sets out the evidence, what it implies for domestic value added, and what would change it. Issues 1 to 3 are covered here; issues 4 to 6 are in the next tab.

Issue 1: Who captures the fee pool

The BoT does not publish the merchant fee take-rate, so the revenue pool created by P2B can only be sized by assumption. The table shows the pool at four effective fee rates, whoever pays (merchant, customer, or both).

Effective fee on P2B	Fee pool (TZS billion)	As % of ICT value added (TZS 3.75 trn)	As % of Vodacom M-Pesa revenue (TZS 734.8 bn)
0.5%	188	5%	26%
1.0%	375	10%	51%
1.5%	563	15%	77%
2.0%	750	20%	102%

Table 2. Source: TICGL calculation. Effective rates are illustrative assumptions. For reference, Safaricom's FY2026 merchant revenue of KES 13.3 billion against merchant payments of about KES 1.2 trillion in the first half of the year implies a take-rate of roughly 0.5–0.6% in Kenya (rough TICGL calculation; periods differ).

P2B Fee Pool at Four Effective Fee Rates, 2025

Bars: fee pool, TZS billion (left). Lines: the pool as % of ICT value added and as % of Vodacom's M-Pesa revenue (right). Illustration, not an observed figure. Source: TICGL calculation.

Fee Pool at 1% Against Reference Points (TZS Billion)

A 1% effective fee on 2025 P2B is TZS 375 billion: a tenth of the ICT sector's value added and just over half of Vodacom's M-Pesa revenue. Sources: BoT NPS 2025; Economic Survey 2025; Vodacom Tanzania FY2026; TICGL calculation.

Two points follow. The pool is large enough to matter: even at 1%, P2B alone generates revenue equal to a tenth of the ICT sector's value added. But it is earned overwhelmingly by the mobile network operators that issue e-money and by a small number of banks, and Vodacom's own report notes that merchant payments are now a significant contributor to M-Pesa revenue growth (M-Pesa revenue +24.5% to TZS 734.8 billion). This is a legitimate return on heavy infrastructure investment. The value-addition issue is not the profit; it is whether the pool is reinvested in local platforms, tools and jobs, which cannot be tested without published revenue and cost data by use case.

Issue 2: Thin merchants and the depth problem

Value per merchant fell by more than half in three years. For value added, the relevant question is what a merchant does with the digital trail. A merchant with 2.3 payments a day (about TZS 37,000 of receipts a day at the 2025 average) can use a QR code but has little reason to buy inventory software, a bookkeeping app or a working-capital product. Tools and credit products have fixed costs; they only make commercial sense for local providers where merchant throughput is high enough. Raising depth, not just breadth, is therefore a precondition for a domestic tools market.

What an Average Merchant Receives per Day

Bars: P2B payments per merchant per day (left). Line: implied receipts per day, TZS thousand (right; payments × average P2B payment, TICGL calculation). 2024: 3.6 × TZS 15,287; 2025: 2.3 × TZS 16,313 (about TZS 37,000).

Value per Merchant: The Four-Year Slide (TZS Million a Year)

Falling each year from 30.7 to 13.5. The 2030 pathways later assume recovery to about TZS 22 million. Sources: BoT NPS reports; TICGL calculation.

Issue 3: The data-to-credit link

Mobile-money histories are a high-quality signal of business activity, yet the credit system barely uses them for merchants. The evidence:

Digital credit equals 14.9% of P2B value and 2.2% of all mobile payments.
The average digital loan is about TZS 16,600. MSME growth loans are typically orders of magnitude larger.
Only 176,213 MSMEs hold formal credit accounts (BoT 2025, as cited in The Citizen), under 6% of three million or more MSMEs (3.5% if the 5 million figure used in TICGL research is the base).
TICGL research (via Uchumi360) estimates that only 5–7% of mobile-money data feeds credit scoring or tax systems.
Between 60% and 70% of new businesses fail within three years, largely for lack of finance (TICGL, Doing Business in Tanzania 2025–2030).

The highest-leverage link

The BoT itself attributes digital credit growth to alternative scoring using mobile-money histories, so the technology exists. What is missing is a consented, standardised data-sharing framework that lets a merchant take its own P2B history to any lender and lets lenders price MSME risk on cash-flow rather than collateral. In the Digital Value Conversion framework, this is the single highest-leverage link.

P2B, Digital Credit and Digital Savings, 2024 vs 2025

TZS trillion. 2024 savings back-calculated from the reported +263% (TICGL calc.). Credit grew +32.3% and P2B +41.0%, so credit conversion slipped. Source: BoT NPS Annual Report 2025.

Average Digital Loan vs Average P2B Payment (TZS)

The average digital credit transaction (TZS 5.58 trillion over 336.5 million transactions) is about the size of an average P2B payment: consumption-smoothing micro-loans, not growth capital. Sources: BoT NPS 2025; TICGL calculation.

How Few MSMEs Hold Formal Credit Accounts

Percent of MSMEs. 176,213 accounts against a base of 3 million (5.9%) or 5 million (3.5%), compared with the FYDP IV target of 40% formal credit access by 2031. Sources: BoT 2025 (via The Citizen); TICGL research; FYDP IV; TICGL calculation.

04 — Where the Value Goes, Issues 4–6Formal vs Informal Merchants, the Tools Layer, and Cost, Market Structure and the 2026 Mandate

Issue 4: Formal versus informal merchants

No official split of P2B by formal status exists. TICGL research finds that only about 12.5% of MSMEs are formally registered, and that MSMEs number 5 million or more (most of the 98% micro-enterprises). On those figures about 0.63 million MSMEs are registered, so the 2.79 million digital merchants are about 4.5 times the registered base (some merchants are not MSMEs, so the multiple is indicative). Digital acceptance has outrun registration by a wide margin.

Digital Acceptance Has Outrun Registration and Credit (Million)

Million, 2025. Digital merchants enabled (BoT) against Vodacom's active M-Pesa merchants, TICGL's estimate of registered MSMEs (12.5% × 5 million) and MSMEs with formal credit accounts (BoT 2025). Different definitions; indicative. Sources: BoT; Vodacom Tanzania; TICGL research; TICGL calculation.

The opportunity

A digital trail can lower the cost of formalisation: presumptive tax assessment, e-invoicing and registration can be offered to merchants whose sales are already visible.

The risk

The trail is used mainly to enforce. The mandatory payments regime ties digital acceptance to licensing, so how the trail is used will decide whether P2B pulls merchants into the formal economy or pushes the smallest of them away from digital rails.

Issue 5: The software, platform and tools layer

P2B creates demand for reconciliation, inventory, invoicing, analytics and embedded finance. The evidence that this demand is being met locally is thin:

ICT attracted USD 152.1 million of investment in 2025, against USD 442.2 million for mining and USD 401.3 million for finance and insurance (companion report).
MSME e-commerce use was only 15% in 2023 against a FYDP IV target of 60% by 2031.
The major recent platform investment visible in public reporting is operator-led: Vodacom's USD 28 million M-Pesa Fintech 2.0 platform, fully rolled out in 2026, extended investment products to merchants for the first time. This is positive for capacity but is not an independent local software layer.
Smartphones are 41.8% of connections (December 2025), and IPA notes smartphones are only about 32% of connected devices in its sample, so USSD-based Lipa Namba remains essential for many merchants and limits app-based tools.

Investment Attracted in 2025 (USD Million)

ICT drew USD 152.1 million, about a third of mining and well below finance and insurance. Source: companion report (TICGL/TERI, November 2026).

Ambition vs Reality: E-commerce and Devices (%)

MSME e-commerce use of 15% (2023) against the FYDP IV target of 60% (2031); smartphones at 41.8% of connections (TCRA, Dec-25) and about 32% of connected devices in the IPA sample. Sources: FYDP IV; TICGL research; TCRA; IPA.

There is no public series on the number of local firms building merchant-facing software, on public procurement from them, or on ICT services exports. Without them the value-addition effect of P2B on the ICT sector cannot be measured and can only be inferred.

Issue 6: Cost, market structure and the 2026 mandate

Cost and structure. IPA's two-year research programme with the BoT found that three major providers have near-identical fees across most transaction bands, that consumers underestimate the true cost of cash-out and often rate cash as cheaper, and that excise duty, VAT and a transaction levy are layered on provider fees. It cites World Bank Global Findex data showing merchant payments at only 3.9% of digital transactions (by count, as reported by adults), while utility bills are 22.7%. This is consistent with BoT value data (P2B at 14.7% of value): merchant payments are small in number but larger in value. The BoT capped fees on instant payments and automated clearing at TZS 2,000 per transaction from 2024, and the Minister of Finance has told Parliament of further reforms to lower transaction costs.

What People Pay for Digitally: Count vs Value

Share of digital transactions by count (Findex, as reported by IPA): merchant payments 3.9%, utility bills 22.7%. By value, P2B is 14.7% of mobile payments (BoT). The two are not comparable; the gap is count versus value. Sources: IPA (2026); World Bank Global Findex; BoT NPS 2025.

Kenya Segments Its Merchant Base; Tanzania's Is Not Split (Million)

Safaricom FY2026: 3.1 million merchants, 1.04 million formal Lipa na M-PESA tills and 2.09 million micro-merchant Pochi la Biashara tills. Tanzania's 2.79 million are reported as one "enabled" figure. Sources: Safaricom FY2026; BoT NPS 2025.

Kenya's lesson. Safaricom's merchant base grew 71% to about 3.1 million. Kenya zero-rates small merchant payments (up to KES 200) and small P2P transfers (up to KES 100), a design choice that lets micro-merchants accept digital payments at no cost to customers while the operator earns on larger payments. Tanzania's merchant count is similar in scale, but the segmentation of formal tills and micro-merchant wallets, and the pricing of very small payments, are less developed. Segmenting the merchant base by size and tailoring fees and products to each segment matters as much as headline acceptance.

The 2026 mandate

The Electronic Transactions (Mandatory Electronic Payments for Specified Transactions) Order, 2026 (GN 158C) requires specified payments to be made and received electronically, including public transport, goods and services, education, accommodation, food and beverages, and high-value land, building and motor vehicle transactions. Amendments to the Business Licensing Regulations also require proof of a digital payment facility such as Lipa Namba or TANQR for new licences and renewals. The Government has said it will accelerate issuing Lipa Namba and QR codes to food vendors, bodaboda operators and market traders.

30 June 2026: GN 158C published.
1 July 2026: the Order takes effect; new licences and renewals need proof of a digital payment facility.
31 December 2026: transition ends; persons already receiving specified payments must have electronic means in place.
2027: the mandate will almost certainly raise merchant counts and P2B value. Whether it raises value added depends on what accompanies it.

If merchants gain tools, credit and a simple tax regime

The mandate becomes a formalisation engine: more records, cheaper compliance, better credit scoring and more demand for local tools.

If it only adds compliance cost

Micro-traders face a fixed cost with no productivity gain, and the depth ratio will fall further as more very small merchants are enabled.

What the six issues have in common

In each case P2B has delivered reach and not yet conversion. Reach is a product of platform investment and rule changes that have worked. Conversion needs three things that markets are slow to supply on their own: portable merchant data, tools priced for the smallest traders, and clear rules that reward rather than punish formalisation.

The six issues at a glance

#	Issue	Key evidence	What would change it
1	Who captures the fee pool	TZS 375bn per 1% fee; take-rate unpublished; pool earned mainly by MNOs and a few banks	Published revenue and cost data by use case; reinvestment in local platforms
2	Thin merchants	Value per merchant −56%; 2.3 payments a day (about TZS 37,000)	Depth, not just breadth: tools priced for small traders
3	Data-to-credit link	Credit 14.9% of P2B; avg loan ≈ TZS 16,600; 176,213 MSMEs with formal credit	Consented, standardised data-sharing and cash-flow scoring
4	Formal vs informal	2.79m digital merchants ≈ 4.5× registered MSMEs	Presumptive tax, e-invoicing, graduated enforcement
5	Tools layer	ICT investment USD 152.1m; MSME e-commerce 15% vs 60% target	Local procurement, shared platforms, USSD-first design
6	Cost, structure and mandate	Near-identical fees; layered tax; GN 158C from 1 July 2026	Segmented pricing; sequencing of the mandate

05 — Measurement & HypothesesIs It a Measurement Problem? Partly, and the Gaps Are Themselves a Finding

Gross, not net

P2B is a gross receipt; merchant value added is the margin. A 16% P2B-to-GDP ratio is not a share of output.

Definition

The BoT P2B series and the "merchant payment system" series differ in volume by more than four times in 2023, though values are close.

Enabled vs active

BoT counts 2.79m merchants enabled; Vodacom reports more than 650,000 active. The activity rate across the 2.79m is unknown.

No composition

No published split by merchant size, sector, region, bank vs e-money issuer, or formal vs informal.

In 2023, P2B was about 1.35 billion transactions worth TZS 18.25 trillion while the merchant payment system recorded 301 million transactions worth TZS 17.9 trillion. Values are close but volumes differ more than four-fold, which suggests that P2B includes many small payments (bills, airtime and similar) that are not retail purchases. The depth and average-ticket calculations in this report are therefore indicative.

Two Series, Similar Value: P2B vs Merchant Payment System (TZS Trillion)

Merchant payment system: 12.1, 17.92, 26.91 (2022–2024). P2B: 18.25, 26.60, 37.52 (2023–2025). Values track each other closely. Sources: BoT NPS reports (via The Citizen, Daily News).

Same Value, Four Times the Count (2023)

Transactions in 2023, million: P2B about 1,350 (derived) against 301.2 in the merchant payment system. P2B appears to include many small non-retail payments. Sources: BoT NPS reports; TICGL calculation.

Conclusion

Better measurement would sharpen the analysis, particularly of depth and concentration, but it will not change the central finding: P2B's growth is large relative to its measured productive footprint.

Testing five hypotheses

Hypothesis	Evidence	Assessment
H1. P2B growth is deepening, not only widening	Merchants ×7.1 (2022–25); value per merchant −56%; transactions per merchant 3.6 → 2.3 a day	NOT SUPPORTED Breadth is outrunning depth. Active-merchant data needed
H2. Value from P2B is concentrated in a few operators	E-money issuers ≈ 90% of merchants, banks < 1%; Vodacom > 650k active merchants and > TZS 2 trn a month; near-identical fees across three providers (IPA)	SUPPORTED Full test needs revenue and take-rate data
H3. P2B data are not yet converting into MSME credit	Digital credit 14.9% of P2B; average loan ≈ TZS 16,600; 176,213 MSMEs with formal credit accounts	SUPPORTED
H4. Digital acceptance is running ahead of formal registration	2.79 m digital merchants vs ≈ 0.63 m registered MSMEs; licensing now tied to digital facility	SUPPORTED Indicative; no official split
H5. Policy and tools raise value added more than volume growth alone	Section 6: same total payment growth gives P2B of TZS 99–147 trn, but the value-adding pathway differs in depth and credit	SCENARIO-BASED To be confirmed by monitoring

H1: Merchants vs Value per Merchant (2022 = 100)

Merchants reach 708 while value per merchant falls to 44. Sources: BoT; TICGL calculation.

H2: Who Holds the Merchant Base (%)

E-money issuers about 90% of merchants, banks under 1% (shown as 1; BoT 2024 data), other providers the balance. Source: BoT 2024.

H3: Credit Share of P2B vs of All Mobile Payments (%)

Digital credit is 14.9% of P2B value but only 2.2% of all mobile payments. Source: BoT NPS 2025; TICGL calculation.

06 — Outlook 2026–2030Four Pathways: Same Payment Growth, Very Different Depth

The pathways hold total mobile-payment growth (18% a year, reaching TZS 583.7 trillion in 2030, or 12% and TZS 449.6 trillion in the downside) and nominal GDP (10% a year, TZS 377 trillion in 2030) at the companion report's assumptions, so that A–D here match scenarios A–D there. They differ in how fast P2B deepens and how much of that deepening is converted into credit, formalisation and local services. They are illustrative outcomes of stated assumptions, not forecasts.

A. Rails-only

P2B growth 28%, 25%, 22%, 18%, 15% (2026–2030).
Merchants reach 4.5 million.
Digital credit follows the companion report (TZS 13.9 trillion).

B. Value-addition push

P2B growth 32%, 30%, 27%, 24%, 20%.
Merchants reach 5.5 million.
Data-to-credit framework, tools and formalisation incentives; digital credit TZS 20.7 trillion.

C. Mandate plus tools

P2B growth 40%, 38%, 32%, 26%, 22% as the mandate drives near-universal coverage.
Merchants reach 6.5 million; digital credit TZS 25.0 trillion.

D. Downside

P2B growth 18%, 15%, 13%, 12%, 10% (fee or tax shock, weak tools, slower mandate).
Merchants reach 3.8 million; digital credit TZS 9.8 trillion; total payments 12% a year.

P2B outcomes in 2030

Indicator, 2030	A. Rails-only	B. Value-addition push	C. Mandate + tools	D. Downside
P2B value (TZS trillion)	99.4	121.7	147.1	70.9
Average growth, 2025–2030	21.5% a year	26.5% a year	31.4% a year	13.6% a year
Share of mobile payments	17.0%	20.8%	25.2%	15.8%
P2B as % of GDP	26.4%	32.3%	39.0%	18.8%
Merchants enabled (million)	4.5	5.5	6.5	3.8
Value per merchant (TZS million)	22.1	22.1	22.6	18.7
Digital credit (TZS trillion)	13.9	20.7	25.0	9.8
Digital credit as % of P2B	14.0%	17.0%	17.0%	13.8%
Fee pool at 1% (TZS billion)	994	1,217	1,471	709
Cumulative P2B 2026–30 (TZS trn)	367	419	488	288
Cumulative P2B vs A (TZS trn)	—	+52	+121	−79

Table 3. Source: TICGL scenario model. Values are illustrative outcomes of stated assumptions, not forecasts. Credit paths are those of the companion report's scenarios A–D.

P2B Value Outlook to 2030 (TZS Trillion, Nominal)

Actual 2023–2025, then four pathways computed from the stated annual growth rates. 2030: A 99.4, B 121.7, C 147.1, D 70.9. Sources: BoT (actual); TICGL scenario model.

Assumed Annual P2B Growth by Pathway, 2026–2030 (%)

Growth decelerates in every pathway as the base grows; the mandate pathway (C) starts at 40%. Source: TICGL scenario model (assumptions stated in the report).

P2B Value in 2030 vs 2025 (TZS Trillion)

Even the rails-only case multiplies 2025 P2B by 2.6. Sources: BoT (2025 actual); TICGL scenario model.

P2B Share of Mobile Payments and of GDP in 2030 (%)

2025 actual: 14.7% of mobile payments and 16.0% of GDP. Sources: BoT; TICGL scenario model (mobile payments TZS 583.7tn or 449.6tn in D; GDP TZS 377tn).

Merchants Enabled in 2030 (Million)

From 2.79 million in 2025 to 3.8–6.5 million. Source: TICGL scenario model.

Value per Merchant in 2030 (TZS Million a Year)

In all three upside paths value per merchant recovers to about TZS 22 million, roughly the 2024 level (20.3). That is a strong assumption and the one most worth monitoring. Source: TICGL scenario model.

Digital Credit in 2030 (TZS Trillion)

From TZS 5.58 trillion in 2025. Credit paths are those of the companion report's scenarios A–D. Source: TICGL scenario model.

Digital Credit as a Share of P2B Value: 2024–2025 and 2030 Pathways (%)

The 25% line is a TICGL proposed target, not an official commitment. No pathway reaches it: credit growth of 20–35% a year does not by itself close the conversion gap. Sources: BoT NPS Annual Reports 2024–2025; TICGL scenario model.

Cumulative P2B Value, 2026–2030 (TZS Trillion)

Computed from the growth paths: A 367, B 419, C 488, D 288. Source: TICGL scenario model.

Cumulative P2B Relative to Rails-only A (TZS Trillion)

B adds 52, C adds 121, D loses 79 against A over 2026–2030. Source: TICGL scenario model.

P2B Fee Pool at a 1% Effective Fee in 2030 (TZS Billion)

From TZS 375 billion in 2025 to 709–1,471 billion. Illustration at an assumed fee. Source: TICGL scenario model.

ICT Value Added in 2030, from the Companion Report (TZS Trillion)

With the same payment growth, ICT value added is TZS 6.4 trillion (A), 9.4 trillion (B), 11.3 trillion (C) and 5.7 trillion (D), against 3.75 trillion in 2025. Source: companion report (TICGL/TERI, November 2026).

Try it: build your own P2B pathway

Enter a constant annual growth rate and 2030 assumptions. Computed in your browser from the 2025 base (P2B TZS 37.52 trillion); GDP and total mobile payments in 2030 use the report's TZS 377 trillion and TZS 583.7 trillion.

P2B growth a year (%)

Merchants enabled in 2030 (million)

Digital credit as % of P2B, 2030

Effective fee on P2B (%)

P2B in 2030

99.4

TZS trillion; 26.4% of GDP

Value per merchant

22.1

TZS million a year (13.5 in 2025)

Digital credit

13.9

TZS trillion

Fee pool

994

TZS billion; 17.0% of mobile payments

Reading the pathways: three points

First, even the rails-only case is large: P2B reaches about TZS 99 trillion and a quarter of GDP by 2030, because the base is growing fast and the mandate pushes coverage up. Second, on volume alone B and C look better than A, but the difference that matters is not the headline value: in all three upside paths value per merchant recovers to about TZS 22 million, which means merchants added after 2025 are assumed to be at least as productive as today's. Third, digital credit as a share of P2B barely rises in any pathway (14% to 17%), so the 25% TICGL target needs a deliberate data-to-credit framework, not only market growth.

07 — Economic ImpactGDP, MSMEs, Credit, Public Revenue and Jobs

GDP and value added

P2B is not GDP, but it gauges how much of the economy's commercial activity is digitally visible. In pathway B, P2B reaches about 32% of GDP in 2030. The direct ICT value-added effect is the one quantified in the companion report: the same payment growth gives ICT value added of TZS 6.4 trillion (A), 9.4 trillion (B), 11.3 trillion (C) and 5.7 trillion (D), so the B–A difference is about TZS 8 trillion of cumulative GDP over 2026–2030. The wider effect through merchant productivity, lower cash-handling costs and better inventory management would be additional and requires the satellite account proposed in the companion report to measure.

Pathway	P2B 2030 (TZS tn)	P2B % GDP	ICT value added 2030 (TZS tn)	Digital credit (TZS tn)	Fee pool at 1% (TZS bn)
A. Rails-only	99.4	26.4%	6.4	13.9	994
B. Value-addition push	121.7	32.3%	9.4	20.7	1,217
C. Mandate + tools	147.1	39.0%	11.3	25.0	1,471
D. Downside	70.9	18.8%	5.7	9.8	709

Table 7.1. Sources: TICGL scenario model; companion report (ICT value added). Illustrative outcomes of stated assumptions.

MSMEs and credit

MSMEs contribute about 35% of GDP and employ roughly half the workforce (TICGL), yet under 6% hold formal credit accounts. The FYDP IV targets of 40% formal credit access and 60% MSME e-commerce use by 2031 both depend on the P2B data-to-credit link and on digital bookkeeping. If digital credit were 25% of P2B in 2030 in pathway B, it would be about TZS 30 trillion, against TZS 20.7 trillion if current conversion continued, a difference of about TZS 10 trillion (TICGL calculation). Whether that capital reaches MSMEs rather than consumers depends on product design.

MSME share of GDP

≈ 35%

TICGL research

MSME share of workforce

≈ 50%

roughly half (TICGL)

MSMEs with formal credit

< 6%

176,213 accounts (BoT 2025)

New businesses failing within 3 years

60–70%

largely for lack of finance

The Credit Prize in Pathway B, 2030 (TZS Trillion)

B at today's 17% conversion gives TZS 20.7 trillion; at the TICGL 25% target it would be about 30.4 trillion: a difference of about TZS 10 trillion. Whether it reaches MSMEs depends on product design. Source: TICGL calculation (121.7 × 25%).

FYDP IV Targets vs Baselines (%)

MSME e-commerce use 15% (2023) against a 60% target; MSMEs with formal credit accounts 5.9% (3m base) against 40% formal credit access. Both targets are for 2031. Sources: FYDP IV; TICGL research; BoT 2025; TICGL calculation.

Public revenue and compliance

Electronic records lower the cost of presumptive tax, e-invoicing and merchant registration. Experts quoted in Tanzanian press expect the mandate to widen the tax base and curb evasion. The revenue upside is real but depends on administration being proportionate: a small merchant who sees the trail used only for enforcement has an incentive to avoid the rails, as the 2021–22 experience of the mobile-money levy illustrates.

Lesson from the levy episode

GSMA found that P2P and cash-out transfers fell 38% between July and September 2021 following the mobile-money levy. Fee and tax shocks can push small merchants back to cash; pathway D models this risk.

Jobs

No official series exists for digital or ICT jobs, so jobs cannot be projected rigorously. The measurable proxy is the agent and merchant base (1.98 million agents, +34.4% in 2025, and 2.79 million merchants), which is mostly self-employment. The quality question is how many software, data, reconciliation and embedded-finance roles each additional trillion of P2B supports. The companion report proposes "digital jobs per million transactions"; for P2B we propose a narrower version, merchant-facing digital service jobs per million merchants, with a baseline set in 2027.

The Measurable Proxy: Agents and Merchants, 2024 vs 2025 (Million)

Mobile-money agents 1.48 → 1.98 million (+34.4%) and merchants enabled 1.33 → 2.79 million (+110.1%). Mostly self-employment; not a count of digital jobs. Sources: BoT NPS Annual Report 2025; TICGL calculation.

08 — Policy & KPIsFrom Merchant Counts to Merchant Outcomes: Eight Actions and a KPI Dashboard

The evidence points to a shift from merchant counts to merchant outcomes. Eight actions follow, consistent with the Digital Economy Strategic Framework 2024–2034, FYDP IV and the mandatory payments regime.

#	Action	Lead institutions	Horizon	Success indicator
1	Consented P2B data-sharing and credit-scoring framework so merchants can carry their transaction history to any lender	BoT, PDPC, credit bureaus, banks, MNOs	2026–28	Digital credit as % of P2B (14.9% → 25%); share of MSME loans underwritten on P2B flows
2	Publish P2B composition: by merchant size proxy, sector, region, e-money issuer versus bank, formal status, active versus enabled, retail versus bills	BoT, NBS, TCRA	2026–27	Annual publication; active-merchant rate
3	Sequence the mandate to protect micro-traders: presumptive tax, free or low-cost acceptance tools, and graduated enforcement before licence denial	MoFP, TRA, BoT, LGAs	Dec 2026 onward	Micro-merchant active rate; licence renewals; closures
4	Segment merchant pricing: transparent fees and a zero or capped rate for very small merchant payments, using the Kenyan tiered design as a benchmark	BoT, FCC, providers	2026–28	Effective merchant fee; share of sub-TZS 5,000 P2B
5	Interoperable settlement and reconciliation: a single merchant dashboard across wallets and banks through TIPS and TANQR	BoT, providers	2026–28	Merchants using one reconciled view; settlement time
6	Buy local merchant tools: e-invoicing, bookkeeping and inventory apps through public procurement, shared platforms and catalytic capital	MCIT, e-GA, TRA, SIDO, ICT Commission	2026–30	MSMEs using digital records; local share of government ICT spend
7	Embed finance and guarantees: link P2B-based scoring to the SME Credit Guarantee scheme and supplier finance	MoFP, BoT, banks	2027–30	MSME formal credit accounts (176,213 baseline); loan size distribution
8	Monitor value conversion: publish a P2B Value Conversion dashboard annually (depth ratio, credit conversion, formalisation gap, DVCR)	NBS, BoT, TICGL/TERI	2027 onward	Dashboard published; depth ratio recovers to ≈ TZS 22 m

Table 4. Source: TICGL/TERI research report, Section 10.

Policy Action Horizons, 2026–2030

Each bar runs from the start year to the end of the final year. Action 3 runs from December 2026 and action 8 from 2027, both shown to 2030 (open-ended in the report). Source: Table 4.

Proposed P2B KPI dashboard

KPI	Baseline (2025)	2030 range / target
P2B value (TZS trillion)	37.52	99–147 (A–C scenarios)
P2B share of mobile payments	14.7%	17–25%
Merchants enabled (million)	2.79	4.5–6.5
Value per merchant (TZS million a year)	13.5	≈ 22 (recovery)
Active-merchant rate	Not measured	Baseline 2027
Digital credit as % of P2B	14.9%	25% (TICGL proposed target)
MSMEs with formal credit accounts	176,213	Track toward FYDP IV 40% access target
Digital merchants ÷ registered MSMEs	≈ 4.5×	Falling
Merchant-facing digital service jobs per million merchants	Not measured	Baseline 2027

Table 5. Targets are TICGL proposals derived from the pathways and FYDP IV; they are not official government commitments.

KPI Baselines and 2030 Targets: Shares (%)

P2B share of mobile payments (14.7% → 17–25%) and digital credit as % of P2B (14.9% → 25% proposed target). Source: Table 5.

KPI Baselines and 2030 Targets: Scale

Merchants enabled (million; 2.79 → 4.5–6.5) and value per merchant (TZS million; 13.5 → about 22). Source: Table 5.

How the actions fit together

Actions 1, 7 and 8 work on the credit and tools link (data, guarantees, monitoring). Actions 2 and 8 close the measurement gap. Actions 3 and 4 protect micro-traders from the mandate and fee costs. Actions 5 and 6 build the domestic tools layer. Success is a rising depth ratio, credit conversion and formalisation, not a larger merchant count.

09 — Risks & Data GapsWhat Could Go Wrong, What Is Not Measured, and What TICGL/TERI Will Do Next

Risks to the outlook

Fee and tax shocks

New levies or higher excise could push small merchants back to cash, as the 2021 levy episode showed; pathway D models this.

Compliance without capability

A mandate that arrives before tools and credit raises costs for micro-traders without raising productivity, and could cut merchant depth further.

Exclusion

Smartphone penetration of 41.8% and unreliable connectivity outside cities mean USSD-based acceptance must remain a first-class option.

Data protection and misuse

A P2B data-sharing framework without strong consent, security and redress rules would expose merchants to risk.

Platform concentration

If a few operators control merchant onboarding, settlement and data, local developers may be locked out.

Measurement risk

Without composition data, policy will target merchant counts and miss the depth and conversion indicators that matter.

What a Fee or Tax Shock Could Cost: Pathway A minus Pathway D (TZS Trillion of P2B a Year)

Gap between the rails-only path and the downside path, computed from the stated growth rates. The gap widens each year, reaching TZS 28.5 trillion in 2030, and cumulates to TZS 79 trillion over 2026–2030. Source: TICGL scenario model.

Data gaps

Gap	Why it matters	Suggested owner
P2B split by merchant size, sector, region, formal status	Needed to test H1, H2 and H4 and to design tiered fees	BoT, NBS
Active versus enabled merchants	The 2.79 m headline cannot be read without it	BoT, providers
P2B composition (retail, bills, airtime, schools, government)	Explains why P2B and merchant-payment volumes differ by four times	BoT
Merchant fee take-rate and P2B revenue by provider	Needed to size the fee pool and test concentration	BoT, TCRA, FCC
Digital credit split by MSME versus personal, by loan size	Needed to test whether credit reaches businesses	BoT
Local software firms and ICT services exports	Needed to test the local digital-layer link	BRELA, ICT Commission, BoT

Next research steps for TICGL/TERI

Merchant survey: about 1,000 merchants across Dar es Salaam, regional towns and rural markets on activity, fees paid, tool use, formal status and credit access, to replace inference with micro-data.
Primary-source rebuild: obtain the full BoT 2025 report tables on P2B and merchants and rebuild the data tables from the primary source.
Regional benchmark: merchant-payment depth in Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and Ethiopia.
Quarterly publication: the P2B depth ratio and credit conversion on the TICGL dashboard.

Talk to TICGL/TERI

Need a digital-payments briefing, an MSME digital-adoption study, a fintech or merchant-services market-entry assessment, or a feasibility study for a digital platform in Tanzania? Our economists can tailor this analysis to your sector.

What We Do →TICGL Markets →TERI Research →Invest in Tanzania →✉️ economist@ticgl.com

10 — Sources & Data NotesMethod, Definitions and Reconciliation Notes

Basis

Source report. TICGL/TERI research report "From Payments to Markets: What Tanzania's P2B Growth Tells Us About Digital Deepening and Value Addition" by Amran Bhuzohera (November 2026), a companion to From Digital Payments to Digital Value Addition. BoT figures. The Bank of Tanzania National Payment Systems Annual Report 2025 could not be opened directly in preparing the report; BoT figures are taken from the Bank's releases as reported by The Citizen, Daily News, TanzaniaInvest and Uchumi360 and are reconciled below. Calculations. Shares, depth ratios, fee pools, indices and all pathway figures are TICGL/TERI arithmetic on published figures. Pathway results are illustrative outcomes of stated assumptions, not forecasts. This page is a detailed companion to the full report and does not replace it.

Data reconciliation notes (Appendix B of the report)

Item	Issue	Treatment on this page
BoT report access	The BoT NPS Annual Report 2025 PDF could not be opened directly; figures come from press and data-site summaries of the report.	Used BoT figures as reported by at least two outlets; rebuild from the primary source.
P2B versus merchant payment system	2023: P2B 1.35 bn transactions / TZS 18.25 trn; merchant system 301 m / TZS 17.9 trn. 2024: P2B TZS 26.60 trn; merchant transactions TZS 26.91 trn.	Both series shown; P2B used for the headline; depth ratio uses the merchant series for 2022–24 and P2B for 2025 (flagged as indicative).
2023 P2B volume	Not found directly; derived from the 2024 volume and the reported 28.52% growth.	Marked "derived".
2024 P2B growth	Press reports 45.76% value growth for 2024 against TZS 18.25 trn in 2023 (implies TZS 26.6 trn).	Consistent with the 2025 report's 2024 base of TZS 26.6 trn.
Merchants "enabled" versus "active"	BoT: 2.79 m enabled. Vodacom: > 650,000 active M-Pesa merchants.	Not combined into an activity rate; flagged as a gap.
EMI and bank merchant counts	IPA cites over 68,000 EMI-registered and about 5,500 bank-registered merchants; BoT cites millions.	IPA counts not used; BoT shares (EMIs ≈ 90%, banks < 1%, 2024) used.
Formal MSMEs	TICGL: ≈ 12.5% registered and 72% informal; 5 million+ MSMEs.	Used 12.5% × 5 million for the indicative 0.63 m; the 3 million+ base also shown for credit access.
Fee levels	Online blogs quote merchant fees of 0.5–2.2% with inconsistent bases.	Not used as evidence; fee pool shown as an assumption-based sensitivity.
Findex "3.9%" merchant share	Survey-based share of digital transactions; not comparable with the BoT value share (14.7%).	Cited as reported by IPA; explained as count versus value.
Mandate start date	An earlier TICGL note said "mid/late 2026".	GN 158C published 30 June 2026, in force 1 July 2026; transition to 31 December 2026.
Kenya take-rate	Combines H1 FY2026 merchant value with full-year merchant revenue.	Shown as a rough range (0.5–0.6%) only.
Research note versions	Two draft notes differ in length and scenario table.	The report supersedes both; pathway values re-estimated.

Bank of Tanzania (2026, 2025, 2024), National Payment Systems Annual Reports for 2025, 2024 and 2023. Dodoma.
TICGL/TERI (2026), From Digital Payments to Digital Value Addition, November 2026.
TICGL (2026), Structural Barriers to MSME Capital Survival in Tanzania, May 2026; TICGL (2025), Doing Business in Tanzania 2025–2030, as reported in The Citizen.
Innovations for Poverty Action (2026, July), The Cost of Digital Payments: What Two Years of Research Revealed About Pricing of Digital Payments in Tanzania.
Government of Tanzania (2026), Electronic Transactions (Mandatory Electronic Payments for Specified Transactions) Order, 2026, Government Notice No. 158C, 30 June 2026; summaries by EY (14 August 2026), Bowmans (2 August 2026) and Daily News (5 August 2026).
Daily News (2026), Mobile money reshapes economy; Tanzania steps up measures to lower the cost of mobile money transactions; Tanzania takes rapid shift to cashless economy.
The Citizen / The Nation (2026), Merchant digital payments double as cash-lite economy gathers pace; Digital payment: Is Tanzania ready for cash-lite economy?; Cashless economy takes shape as digital payments surge in Tanzania; Iran War, Tanzanian pain: The hidden cost to small businesses (BoT data on MSME formal credit accounts).
TanzaniaInvest (2024–2026), Bank of Tanzania payment systems reports 2023 and 2024; Vodacom Tanzania quarterly results 2026.
Vodacom Tanzania PLC (2026), preliminary condensed consolidated financial results, year ended 31 March 2026; quarterly reports December 2025 and 2026.
Safaricom PLC (2026), FY2026 results, as reported by Techweez, TechMoran, Kenyan News Agency and the NSE.
Cash Matters (n.d.), Tanzania turns to cost-effective cash (GSMA findings on the mobile money levy); FSDT (2023), FinScope Tanzania 2023 key insights.

11 — Quick AnswersFrequently Asked Questions

How large are person-to-business (P2B) payments in Tanzania?

TZS 37.52 trillion in 2025 across 2.30 billion transactions, up 41% in value. That is about 16% of nominal GDP and 14.7% of all mobile payment value, up from 11.8% in 2023. Merchants enabled to accept digital payments rose from 1.33 million to 2.79 million.

Why did value per merchant fall while P2B grew?

Merchants multiplied 7.1 times between 2022 and 2025 while annual value per merchant fell from about TZS 30.7 million to 13.5 million (−56%). The new merchants are mostly micro-traders, many enabled merchants are not yet active, and some growth is registration ahead of use. Transactions per merchant fell from about 3.6 a day in 2024 to 2.3 in 2025.

Is P2B data turning into credit for Tanzanian businesses?

Not yet. Digital credit was TZS 5.58 trillion in 2025, only 14.9% of P2B value (15.9% in 2024), and the average digital loan was about TZS 16,600 (roughly USD 6). Only 176,213 MSMEs hold formal credit accounts, under 6% of a base of three million or more. A consented data-sharing framework is the highest-leverage fix.

What is Tanzania's mandatory electronic payments regime of 2026?

Government Notice 158C took effect on 1 July 2026. It requires specified payments, including public transport, goods and services, education, accommodation, food and beverages and high-value land, building and vehicle transactions, to be made and received electronically. Existing recipients have until 31 December 2026 to comply, and licensing now requires a digital payment facility such as Lipa Namba or TANQR.

How big is the P2B fee pool and who earns it?

The BoT does not publish a merchant take-rate, so the pool can only be sized by assumption: every 1% of effective fee on 2025 P2B is TZS 375 billion, equal to 10% of ICT value added and 51% of Vodacom's M-Pesa revenue (TZS 734.8 billion). It is earned mainly by mobile network operators that issue e-money and a few banks.

How many digital merchants are formally registered?

TICGL estimates about 12.5% of MSMEs are formally registered, roughly 0.63 million of 5 million. The 2.79 million digital merchants are therefore about 4.5 times the registered base (indicative: not every merchant is an MSME, and there is no official split).

What could P2B payments be worth in 2030?

Four pathways give TZS 70.9 trillion (downside), 99.4 trillion (rails-only), 121.7 trillion (value-addition push) and 147.1 trillion (mandate plus tools), equal to 18.8% to 39.0% of GDP. The pathway that delivers value added is the one in which value per merchant recovers to about TZS 22 million and digital credit reaches 25% of P2B.

What does TICGL recommend?

Eight actions: a consented P2B data-sharing and credit-scoring framework; publish P2B composition; sequence the mandate to protect micro-traders; segment merchant pricing; interoperable settlement and reconciliation; buy local merchant tools; embed finance and guarantees; and publish an annual P2B Value Conversion dashboard.

Muhtasari

Muhtasari kwa Kiswahili

Kutoka Malipo hadi Masoko: Ukuaji wa Malipo ya Mtu kwa Biashara (P2B) Tanzania: Mwaka 2025 malipo ya P2B yalifikia TZS trilioni 37.52 kupitia miamala bilioni 2.30, ongezeko la asilimia 41. Idadi ya wafanyabiashara wanaoweza kupokea malipo ya kidijitali iliongezeka kutoka milioni 1.33 hadi milioni 2.79. P2B sasa ni takriban asilimia 16 ya Pato la Taifa na asilimia 14.7 ya malipo yote ya simu (asilimia 11.8 mwaka 2023).

Ukuaji umepanuka kuliko ulivyozama: wafanyabiashara waliongezeka mara 7.1 kati ya 2022 na 2025, lakini thamani kwa mfanyabiashara kwa mwaka ilishuka kutoka takriban TZS milioni 30.7 hadi milioni 13.5 (asilimia 56 chini). Mfanyabiashara wa kawaida sasa anapokea malipo 2.3 kwa siku, kutoka 3.6 mwaka 2024.

Mtiririko unazidi thamani iliyoongezwa: P2B iliongezeka kwa TZS trilioni 10.9 mwaka 2025, wakati thamani iliyoongezwa na ICT iliongezeka kwa takriban TZS trilioni 0.14 tu. Kila asilimia 1 ya ada halisi kwenye P2B ni bwawa la TZS bilioni 375, sawa na asilimia 10 ya thamani iliyoongezwa na sekta nzima ya ICT.

Kiungo cha data hadi mikopo ni dhaifu: mikopo ya kidijitali ni TZS trilioni 5.58, asilimia 14.9 tu ya thamani ya P2B, na mkopo wa kawaida ni takriban TZS 16,600 (karibu USD 6). Ni MSMEs 176,213 tu wenye akaunti rasmi za mikopo, chini ya asilimia 6 ya MSMEs milioni 3 au zaidi.

Kukubali malipo kumezidi usajili rasmi: wafanyabiashara wa kidijitali milioni 2.79 ni takriban mara 4.5 ya MSMEs rasmi (takriban milioni 0.63). Agizo la malipo ya kielektroniki (GN 158C) lilianza tarehe 1 Julai 2026, na kipindi cha mpito kinaisha tarehe 31 Desemba 2026; leseni sasa zinahitaji njia ya malipo ya kidijitali kama Lipa Namba au TANQR.

Muundo wa soko na gharama: watoa pesa za kielektroniki wana takriban asilimia 90 ya wafanyabiashara na benki chini ya asilimia 1. Utafiti wa IPA unaonyesha watoa huduma watatu wenye ada zinazofanana, na kodi za ziada zilizowekwa juu ya ada.

Mwelekeo wa 2030 (njia nne): P2B inaweza kufikia TZS trilioni 70.9 (hali mbaya), 99.4 (miundombinu pekee), 121.7 (msukumo wa kuongeza thamani) au 147.1 (agizo pamoja na zana), sawa na asilimia 18.8 hadi 39.0 ya Pato la Taifa. Njia inayoleta thamani iliyoongezwa ni ile ambapo thamani kwa mfanyabiashara inarudi takriban TZS milioni 22 na mikopo ya kidijitali inafikia asilimia 25 ya P2B. Hizi si utabiri bali matokeo ya dhana zilizotajwa.

Je, ni tatizo la upimaji? Kwa sehemu. P2B ni mapato ghafi, si pato; hakuna mgawanyo uliochapishwa kwa ukubwa wa mfanyabiashara, sekta, mkoa, hali rasmi, au hai dhidi ya walioruhusiwa. Upimaji bora utaboresha uchambuzi lakini hautabadilisha hitimisho kuu.

Hitimisho na hatua: kipaumbele kihame kutoka idadi ya wafanyabiashara kwenda matokeo kwa wafanyabiashara. Hatua nane: mfumo wa kushiriki data ya P2B kwa ridhaa na alama za mikopo; kuchapisha muundo wa P2B; kupanga utekelezaji wa agizo kulinda wafanyabiashara wadogo; ada zilizogawanywa kwa ukubwa wa mfanyabiashara; mfumo mmoja wa malipo na upatanisho; kununua zana za ndani za wafanyabiashara; kuunganisha fedha na dhamana; na ripoti ya kila mwaka ya Ubadilishaji wa Thamani ya P2B.

P2B 2025: TZS trilioni 37.52 · Pato la Taifa: asilimia 16 · Wafanyabiashara: milioni 2.79
Thamani kwa mfanyabiashara: TZS milioni 13.5 (kutoka 30.7) · Mikopo ya kidijitali/P2B: asilimia 14.9 · Ada ya asilimia 1: TZS bilioni 375
P2B 2030: TZS trilioni 70.9 / 99.4 / 121.7 / 147.1 · Lengo la TICGL la mikopo: asilimia 25 ya P2B

Chanzo: Benki Kuu ya Tanzania (ripoti za NPS 2023–2025); Vodacom Tanzania; Safaricom; Innovations for Poverty Action; utafiti wa TICGL/TERI (Amran Bhuzohera, Novemba 2026). Kwa maelezo zaidi: economist@ticgl.com.

00 — OVERVIEWThe Week in One Page

The answer

Stability in price, thinness in volume. The shilling held at TZS 2,640.44 (−0.01% change in the BoT mean rate) while interbank FX turned over only USD 19.10 million against USD 58.50 million the week before. Retail FX fell 15.3% to USD 604.10 million, with mining purchases roughly halving.

Liquidity was ample and rates drifted toward the policy rate. The 7-day interbank rate closed at 6.38% and averaged 6.33%, 8 bps above the 6.25% Central Bank Rate (CBR); the BoT injected TZS 774.96 billion through 7-day reverse repo.

Banks dominated the short end of the bond market. Outstanding government securities are TZS 34,377.78 billion, 90.08% in bonds. At the 2-year auction banks took 98.9% of the allotment, and yields were lower than at the previous auction of the same tenor.

Retail FX turnover

USD 604.1M

713.4M last week (−15.3%)

7-day IBCM volume

TZS 758.7bn

670.1bn last week (+13.2%)

Outstanding securities

TZS 34.38tn

bonds 90.08%, bills 9.92%

Banks' share of 2-yr allotment

98.9%

CIS bid 44.34%, allotted 0%

Daily IFEM Turnover: This Week vs Last Week (USD million)

Mon–Fri. Last week 16.10, 16.50, 13.20, 5.20, 7.50 (58.50); this week 5.20, 5.60, 3.70, 1.20, 3.40 (19.10). Source: BoT.

Week-on-Week Change in Key Indicators (%)

IFEM turnover, retail FX, 7-day IBCM volume, reverse repo injection (TICGL calc.). Source: BoT.

Indicator	Previous week	This week	Change
TZS per USD (mean rate)	2,640.73	2,640.44	−0.01%
IFEM turnover (USD m)	58.50	19.10	−67.4%
Retail FX turnover (USD m)	713.39	604.10	−15.3%
7-day IBCM volume (TZS bn)	670.05	758.65	+13.2%
IBCM closing rate (%)	6.55	6.38	−17 bps
Reverse repo injected (TZS bn)	768.20	774.96	+0.9%
2-year bond yield (%)	8.4033	8.0919	−31 bps

Table 1. Source: BoT; changes are TICGL calculations. The 2-year comparison is with the previous auction of the same tenor.

01 — EXCHANGE RATES & FXA Flat Dollar Rate, Moves in Cross-Rates, and a Thin Interbank Market

The shilling appreciated marginally to TZS 2,640.44 per USD from 2,640.73. Against other majors the picture was mixed: sterling and the euro strengthened against the shilling by 1.06% and 0.89%, the yuan and yen weakened slightly.

Currency (TZS per unit)	30 Oct	6 Nov	Change
British Pound Sterling	3,516.66	3,553.77	+1.06%
Chinese Yuan	396.39	395.94	−0.11%
Euro	2,937.55	2,963.63	+0.89%
Indian Rupee	27.7184	27.9456	+0.82%
Japanese Yen	16.7082	16.6632	−0.27%
Kenyan Shilling	20.2977	20.3111	+0.07%
Rwandan Franc	1.7827	1.7820	−0.04%
Ugandan Shilling	0.6071	0.6520	+7.40%
US Dollar	2,640.73	2,640.44	−0.01%

Table 2. Source: BoT. Positive = foreign currency buys more shillings. The +7.40% Ugandan shilling move is far larger than any other and is worth verifying against the BoT series before it is quoted.

Weekly Change in Mean Rates Against the Shilling (%)

30 Oct to 6 Nov 2026. Source: BoT; the Ugandan shilling bar uses the published figure.

Interbank Foreign Exchange Market (IFEM)

IFEM transactions fell to USD 19.10 million from USD 58.50 million. Daily turnover peaked at USD 5.60 million on Tuesday and dropped to USD 1.20 million on Thursday. The monthly series shows how thin November is so far (a partial month) against the 2026 run of USD 64.6 to 227.1 million.

Monthly IFEM Turnover, 2026 (USD million)

November is partial (first week only: 19.1). Peak: July at 227.1. Source: BoT, Chart 3.

IFEM Turnover by Year-Month, 2025 vs 2026 (USD million)

2026 ran above 2025 in most months to October (e.g. July 227.1 vs 156.15); 2025 November (158.68) is shown for reference against the partial 2026 month. Source: BoT, Chart 3.

Retail Foreign Exchange Market

Retail turnover decreased to USD 604.10 million from USD 713.39 million (−15.3%). Trade (USD 164.80 million), mining (77.23) and agriculture (75.06) contributed USD 317.09 million, or 52.5% of the total (TICGL calc.). Daily retail turnover averaged USD 132.91 million over the past month (sales 63.68, purchases 69.23). Commercial banks bought USD 310.32 million and sold USD 293.77 million, a net purchase of USD 16.55 million, against USD 60.11 million the week before (TICGL calc.).

Retail FX Turnover by Sector (USD million)

Previous week vs this week. Mining fell most in absolute terms (150.96 to 77.23); NGOs more than doubled (6.81 to 14.57). Source: BoT, Table 2.

Sector	Purchases	Sales	Total (this wk)	Total (prev wk)	Change
Trade	71.12	93.68	164.80	201.33	−18.1%
Mining	58.54	18.70	77.23	150.96	−48.8%
Agriculture	62.40	12.65	75.06	61.52	+22.0%
Oil & Energy	6.37	64.00	70.37	69.10	+1.8%
Transport & Communication	28.48	16.91	45.39	49.72	−8.7%
Individual Retail Customers	23.12	21.95	45.07	47.00	−4.1%
Manufacturing	7.59	33.70	41.30	53.30	−22.5%
Construction (Machine & Equip.)	16.28	14.41	30.69	33.09	−7.3%
Tourism	19.60	2.75	22.35	19.53	+14.4%
NGOs	10.50	4.08	14.57	6.81	+114%
Social Services	6.07	7.69	13.76	17.13	−19.7%
Breweries/Beverages	0.24	3.27	3.51	3.91	−10.2%
Total	310.32	293.77	604.10	713.39	−15.3%

Table 3. USD million. Purchases/sales and "this week" totals from BoT; previous-week totals from BoT; changes are TICGL calculations.

Commercial Banks: Purchases vs Sales of FX (USD million)

Banks were net buyers in both weeks; the net position narrowed from 60.11 to 16.55 (TICGL calc.). Source: BoT.

02 — MONEY MARKETInterbank Rates Eased Toward the Policy Rate as Volumes Rose

The 7-day Interbank Cash Market (IBCM) weighted average rate (WAR) closed at 6.38%, down from 6.55%. Total 7-day volume rose to TZS 758.65 billion from TZS 670.05 billion. The weekly average WAR of 6.33% sits inside the CBR corridor of 4.75% to 7.75%, 8 bps above the 6.25% CBR, consistent with the Bank's stance.

This Week: IBCM Volume and Rate

Bars: TZS billion (165.9, 146.5, 61.5, 189.5, 195.3). Line: WAR % (6.26, 6.44, 6.10, 6.28, 6.38). Source: BoT, Chart 7.

Previous Week: IBCM Volume and Rate

Bars: TZS billion (173.9, 167.5, 28.5, 194.9, 105.3). Line: WAR % (6.27, 6.45, 6.24, 6.28, 6.55). Source: BoT, Chart 6.

Daily WAR vs the Central Bank Rate and Corridor (%)

Both weeks, Mon–Fri. CBR 6.25%; corridor 4.75% to 7.75%. Rates stayed within about 0.3 pp of the CBR. Source: BoT; TICGL chart.

7-Day Reverse REPO

Through main operations the Bank injected TZS 774.96 billion at the CBR of 6.25%, up from TZS 768.20 billion (+0.9%, TICGL calc.). Reverse repo injections (TZS 775 billion) were about equal to total 7-day interbank volume (TZS 758.65 billion), so the central bank remained a core source of short-term funding.

Liquidity Snapshot: Interbank Volume vs Reverse Repo (TZS billion)

Source: BoT; TICGL chart.

03 — GOVERNMENT SECURITIESA Bond-Heavy, Bank-and-Pension-Held Market, and Six Auctions Compared

Outstanding government securities stand at TZS 34,377.78 billion: Treasury bonds TZS 30,966.42 billion (90.08%) and Treasury bills TZS 3,411.36 billion (9.92%). In the current fiscal year 4,549 new clients were onboarded, taking registered clients to 36,051.

Investor category	TZS bn	Share
Banks	11,678.76	33.97%
Pension Funds	10,278.63	29.90%
Retail Investors	6,151.39	17.89%
CIS and Other Official Entities	2,777.70	8.08%
Insurance Companies	2,522.51	7.34%
Others	968.79	2.82%
Total	34,377.78	100%

Holders by Investor Category (%)

Table 4. Source: BoT. Banks and pension funds together hold 63.87% (TICGL calc.), which frames how much of the stock is in institutional hands.

The 2-Year Treasury Bond (No. 712), Auctioned 4 November

The auction drew 75 bids (44 successful) for TZS 394.94 billion against TZS 138.95 billion offered; TZS 136.94 billion was allotted. Minimum successful price was 101.3949, weighted average price 102.2098 and the weighted average yield-to-maturity 8.0919%, against 8.4033% at the previous 2-year auction (−31 bps). Banks accounted for 52.92% of subscriptions and 98.9% of allotment (TZS 135.44 billion); collective investment schemes bid 44.34% but received nothing; insurers took TZS 1.50 billion (1.1%).

2-Year Auction: Share of Subscriptions vs Allotment (%)

Banks 52.92 / 98.90; CIS 44.34 / 0; insurance 2.74 / 1.10. Source: BoT, Table 4.

Recent Auctions Across the Curve

Bond	Redemption	Offered (TZS bn)	Tendered	Allotted	Bid-to-cover	WAY (%)	Coupon yld (%)
2-yr No. 712	30-Jul-28	138.95	394.94	136.94	2.84x	8.09	9.29
5-yr No. 700	30-Apr-31	145.63	398.06	143.57	2.73x	9.53	9.99
10-yr No. 711	23-Jul-36	182.90	364.96	149.60	2.00x	10.69	10.89
15-yr No. 696	19-Feb-41	207.27	504.13	196.51	2.43x	10.79	11.08
20-yr No. 710	09-Jul-46	363.01	1,033.09	336.62	2.85x	10.52	10.73
25-yr No. 722	16-Oct-51	414.19	2,495.06	610.61	6.02x	10.84	10.96

Table 5. Source: BoT (Table 5 of the report), ordered by tenor. The report prints the under/oversubscription line in brackets (negative) even where tendered exceeds offered, and the 2-year line shows (258.00) while the text gives TZS 255.99 billion oversubscribed; we use tendered and offered amounts directly. Allotted totals TZS 1,573.85 billion across the six bonds (TICGL calc.).

Yield to Maturity by Tenor (Auction WAY, %)

2-year 8.09% rising to 10.84% at 25 years; the curve flattens between 10 and 25 years. Source: BoT.

Bid-to-Cover Ratio by Tenor (x)

The 25-year bond drew 6.02x cover; the 10-year only 2.00x. Source: BoT.

Offered, Tendered and Allotted by Tenor (TZS billion)

The 25-year allotment (610.61) exceeded the amount offered (414.19). Source: BoT.

Next auction

Wednesday 11 November 2026: a 10-year Treasury bond, per the issuance calendar. The previous 10-year (No. 711) had the lowest bid-to-cover of the six (2.00x) at a 10.69% weighted average yield.

04 — READING THE WEEKWhat the Numbers Suggest, and What to Watch

Price stability is not volume stability. A flat rate on USD 19.1 million of IFEM turnover says less than the same rate on a USD 150-200 million month. The retail market (USD 604 million) did most of the work.
Mining flows are the swing factor. Mining purchases of USD 58.54 million were less than half the previous week's USD 136.98 million; the sector explains a large part of the retail decline.
Policy transmission looks smooth. Daily WAR stayed between 6.10% and 6.44% against a 6.25% CBR, with reverse repo supplying liquidity at the policy rate.
Short-end yields fell, concentration rose. The 2-year yield dropped 31 bps while banks took 98.9% of the allotment. Banks and pension funds hold 63.87% of all outstanding paper, which is relevant to the wider crowding-out debate.
Demand is strongest at the long end. The 25-year bond drew TZS 2,495 billion of bids for TZS 414 billion offered.

Caveats

This is one week of data. Weekly changes in thin markets can reverse. Some derived figures (net purchases, sector changes, shares) are TICGL arithmetic and are marked as such; interpretation is TERI's, not the BoT's. For research and information only; not investment, legal, tax or financial advice.

Talk to TICGL/TERI

Need FX, treasury or fixed-income market briefings, or a tailored data pack on Tanzanian markets? Our economists can help.

What We Do →TERI Research →Invest in Tanzania →✉️ economist@ticgl.com

05 — SOURCESSources & Data Notes

Bank of Tanzania (2026), Domestic Financial Markets Weekly Report, 02–06 November 2026: Tables 1–5 and Charts 1–10.
Monthly IFEM data for 2025 are read from Chart 3 of the report; 2026 November is a partial month.
"TICGL calc." marks percentage changes, shares, net positions and sums derived by TERI from published figures.

06 — QUICK ANSWERSFrequently Asked Questions

What was the TZS/USD exchange rate on 6 November 2026?

TZS 2,640.44 per USD, a 0.01% appreciation from TZS 2,640.73.

What was the interbank cash market rate?

The 7-day rate closed at 6.38% (6.55% the week before) and averaged 6.33%, 8 bps above the 6.25% Central Bank Rate.

How did the 2-year Treasury bond auction go?

TZS 394.94 billion was tendered for TZS 138.95 billion offered; TZS 136.94 billion was allotted at an 8.0919% yield, down from 8.4033%. Banks received 98.9% of the allotment.

When is the next government securities auction?

Wednesday 11 November 2026, a 10-year Treasury bond.

Muhtasari kwa Kiswahili

Masoko ya Fedha ya Ndani ya Tanzania, 2–6 Novemba 2026 (chanzo: Benki Kuu ya Tanzania).

Shilingi: ilifungwa TZS 2,640.44 kwa USD, bila mabadiliko makubwa (asilimia 0.01 juu). Pauni ya Uingereza iliongezeka asilimia 1.06 na Euro asilimia 0.89 dhidi ya shilingi; shilingi ya Uganda iliripotiwa kupanda asilimia 7.40, takwimu inayopaswa kuhakikiwa.

Soko la fedha za kigeni: mauzo ya soko la ndani ya benki (IFEM) yalishuka hadi USD milioni 19.10 kutoka milioni 58.50 (asilimia 67.4 chini). Soko la rejareja lilishuka hadi USD milioni 604.10 kutoka milioni 713.39; sekta za biashara, madini na kilimo zilichangia USD milioni 317.09. Ununuzi wa madini ulishuka kutoka USD milioni 136.98 hadi 58.54.

Soko la fedha: kiwango cha wastani cha siku 7 kati ya benki kilifungwa asilimia 6.38 (6.55 wiki iliyopita), kikiwa kwenye ukanda wa asilimia 4.75 hadi 7.75, pointi 8 juu ya Kiwango cha Benki Kuu (asilimia 6.25). Kiasi kilipanda hadi TZS bilioni 758.65 na BoT iliingiza TZS bilioni 774.96 kupitia Reverse REPO.

Dhamana za Serikali: dhamana zilizobaki ni TZS bilioni 34,377.78 (hatifungani asilimia 90.08, hati fungani za muda mfupi asilimia 9.92). Benki zinashikilia asilimia 33.97, mifuko ya pensheni asilimia 29.90. Hatifungani ya miaka 2 (Na. 712) ilipata mavuno ya asilimia 8.0919 (8.4033 awali); benki zilipewa asilimia 98.9 ya kiasi kilichotolewa. Mnada ujao: Jumatano, 11 Novemba 2026, hatifungani ya miaka 10.

Chanzo: Benki Kuu ya Tanzania; hesabu za TICGL/TERI. Kwa maelezo zaidi: economist@ticgl.com.

Reading guide

Data-driven: every figure is tied to a named source; derived figures are marked "TICGL calculation". Look-back and look-forward: five years of history (2020–2025, with early-2026 indicators) and five years of scenarios (2026–2030, aligned with FYDP IV, 2026/27–2030/31). Scenarios are not predictions: they show what the economy looks like under different value-capture assumptions, all stated explicitly. Prepared by TERI for research and strategic-information purposes; not investment, legal, tax or financial advice.

00 — Overview & VerdictExecutive Summary: The Rails Are Strong, the Value Layers Above Them Are Thin

The answer

Tanzania has built one of Africa's most intensively used digital payment systems, but it has not yet built the economy on top of it. In 2025 mobile payments reached TZS 255.13 trillion (about USD 96 billion) across 7.96 billion transactions, equal to 109% of nominal GDP (TZS 234.1 trillion). Over the same period the Information and Communication sector stayed at 1.6% of GDP: it was 1.6% in 2019, 1.6% in 2025, and never above 1.7% in between.

This is not a statistical error, but it is a genuine development problem. Transaction value is a gross flow; GDP counts only new value created. Even so, the volume of money moving through digital rails has grown far faster than the domestic value added, jobs, exports and MSME capital those rails could support. Payments rose 2.34 times between 2020 and 2025 while ICT real value added rose 1.54 times.

The conversion is getting weaker, not stronger. The Digital Value Conversion Ratio (DVCR) fell from 1.81% in 2024 to 1.47% in 2025: each TZS 100 of mobile payments now corresponds to about TZS 1.5 of ICT value added.

The next five years are a fork. With the same 18% payment growth, ICT value added in 2030 ranges from TZS 6.4 trillion (rails-only) to TZS 9.4 trillion (value-addition push) to TZS 11.3 trillion (the 3%-of-GDP target). The difference between the first two is worth about TZS 8.0 trillion of cumulative GDP over 2026–2030.

Mobile payments 2025

TZS 255.13T

+28.3%; 7.96 billion transactions

Payments / nominal GDP

109.0%

93.8% in 2024 (TICGL calc.)

ICT share of GDP

1.6%

1.7% in 2024; 1.6% in 2019

DVCR

1.47%

from 1.81% in 2024

Active mobile-money accounts

75.78M

+19.9% (63.21M in 2024)

Mobile-money agents

1.98M

+34.4%; 2.79M merchant points

TIPS instant payments

TZS 54.95T

+84.3% in value

4G population coverage

94.2%

5G 32.83% in Mar-26

Digital credit

TZS 5.58T

2.2% of payment value

Digital savings

TZS 3.18T

+263%; 1.2% of payment value

Payments to businesses

TZS 37.52T

14.7% of value (13.4% in 2024)

Smartphone penetration

41.8%

Dec-25; feature phones near 87%

Mobile Payments vs ICT Share of GDP, 2020–2025

Bars: mobile payment value, TZS trillion (left). Line: ICT share of GDP, % (right). Payments more than doubled; the ICT share did not move. Sources: BoT NPS reports; Economic Survey 2025 (2019 base year).

Flows Are Huge; the Value Layers on Them Are Small (2025)

TZS trillion. Categories overlap and are not additive. Sources: BoT NPS Annual Report 2025; NBS; ICT value added = 1.6% × GDP (TICGL calc.).

Growth in 2025: Where the Digital Economy Grew Fastest

Percent, 2025 vs 2024. Amber bars are the digital finance layers growing fastest; ICT value added (nominal, implied) grew only about 4%. Sources: BoT NPS Annual Report 2025; Economic Survey 2025; ICT nominal value-added growth is TICGL calc. (3.75 vs 3.60).

Seven headline findings

1. Flows outran value added. Mobile payment value rose 2.34× between 2020 and 2025 (18.5% a year; 22.0% a year since 2021). ICT real value added rose 1.54×. Even though ICT grew about 9% a year in real terms against GDP growth near 5–6%, its nominal share did not rise.
2. The DVCR fell. ICT value added per TZS of mobile payments dropped from 1.81% in 2024 to 1.47% in 2025 (TICGL calculation).
3. The rails are strong. 75.78 million active accounts, 1.98 million agents, 2.79 million merchant acceptance points, TIPS flows up 84% to TZS 54.95 trillion, 4G coverage at 94.2%.
4. The productive layers are thin. Digital credit is 2.2% of payment value, digital savings 1.2%, payments to businesses 14.7%. Smartphone penetration is 41.8%; there is no official series for ICT service exports.
5. Returns are concentrated. Vodacom Tanzania alone booked TZS 734.8 billion of M-Pesa revenue in FY2026 (+24.5%); the independent software, platform and data layer is small and unmeasured.
6. The next five years are a fork. Same payment growth, ICT value added of TZS 6.4 to 11.3 trillion in 2030; the push scenario is worth about TZS 8.0 trillion of cumulative GDP over 2026–2030.
7. Measurement itself is a policy gap. Official ICT value added (1.6%) captures telecoms and narrow IT services; a broad digital-economy estimate of about 7% is cited in the Tanzania Business Report 2024/25, but no official digital satellite account exists.

Headline indicators, 2024 and 2025

Indicator	2024	2025	Source
Mobile payment value (TZS trillion)	198.86	255.13	BoT NPS Annual Report 2025
Mobile payments as % of nominal GDP	93.8%	109.0%	TICGL calculation
Nominal GDP (TZS trillion)	211.98	234.1	NBS / State of the Economy Report, Jun 2026
ICT share of GDP	1.7%	1.6%	Economic Survey 2025
ICT real growth	11.2%	8.8%	Economic Survey 2025
Implied ICT value added (TZS trillion)	3.60	3.75	TICGL calculation
Digital Value Conversion Ratio	1.81%	1.47%	TICGL calculation
Active mobile-money accounts (million)	63.21	75.78	BoT NPS Annual Report 2025
Mobile-money agents (million)	1.48	1.98	BoT NPS Annual Report 2025
Payments to businesses (TZS trillion)	26.6	37.52	BoT NPS Annual Report 2025
Digital credit (TZS trillion)	4.22	5.58	BoT NPS Annual Report 2025
Smartphone penetration	35.99%	41.82%	TCRA, Dec 2024 and Dec 2025

Table 1. ICT shares are published rounded to one decimal, so implied value added carries a rounding band of roughly ±TZS 0.2 trillion.

Bottom line

The question is no longer whether Tanzanians will use digital rails; they already do, at a scale above GDP. The question is whether the domestic economy will capture the software, platform, data, credit and export layers that sit on those rails. On current trends the answer is no: the conversion ratio is falling. The evidence points to a shift in policy emphasis from volume to value.

01 — Question & FrameworkWhy Transaction Value Is Not Value Added, and How to Measure the Gap

Mobile money is Tanzania's most successful digital product. It has moved the country to the top of Africa's payment-intensity rankings and brought tens of millions of people into a formal payment system. Yet the national accounts record the Information and Communication sector at only about 1.6% of GDP, and the sector is not obviously becoming a bigger part of the economy. The central research question is therefore:

Central research question

Why has rapid growth in digital transactions not translated into a larger digital value-added base: more ICT output, more skilled jobs, more MSME productivity and more digital exports?

Why it matters: four reasons

1. Policy assumptions

FYDP IV (2026/27–2030/31) and the Digital Economy Strategic Framework 2024–2034 both assume digitalisation will drive growth, jobs and formalisation.

2. Wrong scoreboard

An economy that counts transaction value as success may overlook the thinness of the layers above the rails.

3. Youth jobs

The youth employment agenda depends on digital livelihoods being productive, not only numerous.

4. MSMEs

Over 5 million enterprises, 98% of them micro: this is where the conversion from payment use to enterprise growth must happen.

A flow is not value added

Three different measures are often compared as if they were the same.

Measure	What it counts	Tanzania, 2025
Transaction value	Gross money moving through the payment system. A single TZS 1,000 can be counted several times as it changes hands.	TZS 255.13 trillion (mobile payments)
GDP / value added	New value created by production: wages, profits and taxes net of intermediate inputs.	TZS 234.1 trillion (GDP)
ICT sector value added	Value added of firms whose main activity is telecoms, publishing, programming and information services.	≈ TZS 3.75 trillion (1.6% of GDP)

Table 2.1. Source: BoT NPS Annual Report 2025; NBS; Economic Survey 2025; TICGL calculation.

Mobile money moves money; it is not itself output. A useful illustration is velocity: trust-account balances at year end were TZS 2.83 trillion, so each shilling of float turned over about 90 times in 2025 (TICGL calculation). High turnover is a sign of usefulness, but it also means the headline flow is large relative to the money actually held.

The digital value-addition chain

Link 1Adoption

→

Link 2Transactions

→

Link 3 · gap opensRevenue

→

Link 4 · gap opensValue added

→

Link 5Jobs, investment, exports

Reading the chain

Each arrow is a conversion. Tanzania scores very high on the first two links (adoption and transactions). The gap opens at the third and fourth links: how much of the flow becomes domestic revenue, wages, profit and capital formation, and how much of that stays in independent local firms rather than a few large operators or imported software and cloud services.

The Digital Value Conversion Ratio

DVCR = ICT value added ÷ mobile payment value × 100

A diagnostic, not a grade

A falling DVCR can reflect healthy cost reductions in payments (cheaper transfers) as well as weak capture of higher-value activities. The policy question is whether value added is rising in absolute terms and in non-payment layers, not whether the ratio alone goes up.

How Many Times Larger Is the Payment Flow Than Each Value Layer? (2025)

Multiple of the layer's size, log scale. Mobile payments are 68× ICT value added, 46× digital credit, 80× digital savings and 90× trust-account balances. Sources: BoT NPS Annual Report 2025; TICGL calculation (255.13 ÷ layer).

Try it: Digital Value Conversion Ratio calculator

Change the inputs (defaults are the 2025 figures) to see the DVCR and the payments-to-GDP ratio. Computed in your browser; no data is sent anywhere.

Mobile payments (TZS tn)

Nominal GDP (TZS tn)

ICT share of GDP (%)

ICT value added

3.75

TZS trillion

DVCR

1.47%

ICT VA ÷ payments

Payments / GDP

109.0%

gross flow vs output

Payments per TZS 1 of ICT VA

68.1

TZS

Data and method

The report combines five categories of evidence, then computes growth rates and indices from published series, derives implied ICT value added as ICT share × nominal GDP, computes the DVCR, and builds scenarios to 2030 by varying only the assumptions shown in the Outlook tab.

Evidence	What was used
National accounts	ICT share of GDP and real growth for 2019–2025 from the Economic Survey 2025 (2019 base year, post-rebasing); nominal GDP of TZS 211.98 trillion (2024) and TZS 234.1 trillion (2025) from the State of the Economy Report presented to Parliament in June 2026.
Payment systems	Mobile payment value and volume, accounts, agents, merchants, digital credit and savings and TIPS flows from the Bank of Tanzania NPS Annual Report 2025, plus the 2020–2024 series from BoT and the Economic Survey.
Telecoms and devices	TCRA quarterly communication statistics (December 2024 to March 2026).
Firm evidence	Vodacom Tanzania FY2026 results (year to 31 March 2026).
MSME evidence	TICGL Structural Barriers to MSME Capital Survival in Tanzania (May 2026) and the TICGL Entrepreneurship Profile (February 2026).

Three data limits shape the analysis (see Sources & Data Notes): ICT shares are rounded, there is no official ICT jobs or ICT export series, and the transaction-volume series changes definition in 2023.

02 — Look-back 2020–2025Payments Doubled and More; ICT Value Added Grew Fast in Volume but Not as a Share

Payments: a step-change after 2022

Mobile payment value was almost flat between 2020 and 2022 (TZS 109–115 trillion) and then accelerated: +35.3% in 2023, +28.5% in 2024 and +28.3% in 2025. Interoperability, merchant payment acceptance and the Tanzania Instant Payment System (TIPS) are the main drivers cited in BoT and Ministry reporting. Payments to businesses (P2B) grew faster than the total: TZS 26.6 trillion in 2024 to TZS 37.52 trillion in 2025 (+41%), lifting their share of mobile payment value from 13.4% to 14.7%.

Mobile Payment Value and Annual Growth, 2020–2025

Bars: TZS trillion (left). Line: annual growth, % (right). Flat to 2022, then +35.3%, +28.5%, +28.3%. Sources: BoT NPS reports; project data notes for 2020–2023 values.

Growth Indices, 2020 = 100

Payments (nominal) reached 233.6; ICT real value added 154.3. Payments are nominal and ICT is real (2019 prices), so the comparison is directional. Sources: BoT; Economic Survey 2025; TICGL calc.

ICT value added: growing fast in real terms, flat as a share

ICT real growth averaged 9.1% a year over 2020–2025 (9.1, 9.3, 5.4, 10.7, 11.2 and 8.8%), well above real GDP growth of roughly 4.5–6% in the same years. On volume terms the sector therefore grew about 1.54× between 2020 and 2025. Yet its nominal share of GDP stayed at 1.6–1.7%. Two explanations are consistent with the data:

Price deflation inside ICT

Falling effective prices for voice and data mean real output rises faster than nominal revenue, so the sector's nominal weight does not grow with its volume.

Value capture outside the narrow sector

Much of the benefit of connectivity and payments is realised as lower costs and higher activity in trade, transport, agriculture and finance, and is recorded there.

The available data do not allow the two to be separated; it is a priority for the digital satellite account proposed in the Policy tab.

ICT Real Growth and ICT Share of GDP, 2019–2025

Bars: ICT real growth, %. Line: ICT share of GDP, % (right). Fast real growth, a flat nominal share. 2019: share 1.6%, growth 4.2%. Source: Economic Survey 2025 (2019 base year).

The conversion ratio

Multiplying the published ICT share by nominal GDP gives implied ICT value added of TZS 3.60 trillion in 2024 and TZS 3.75 trillion in 2025. Against mobile payment value the DVCR fell from 1.81% to 1.47%. Put differently, mobile payment value rose by TZS 56.3 trillion in one year while implied ICT value added rose by only about TZS 0.14 trillion.

Digital Value Conversion Ratio, 2024 and 2025

Percent, with the rounding band (ICT share ±0.1 percentage point of GDP). The 2025 upper bound (1.56%) is below the 2024 lower bound (1.70%), so the fall holds under any rounding. Source: TICGL calculation.

One Year's Increase: Payments vs ICT Value Added (2024→2025)

TZS trillion added in one year. Payments +56.3; implied ICT value added +0.14. Sources: BoT; Economic Survey 2025; NBS; TICGL calc.

Annual data, 2020–2025

Year	Mobile payments (TZS tn)	Growth	ICT share of GDP	ICT real growth	Payments index (2020=100)	ICT real index (2020=100)
2020	109.21	—	1.7%	9.1%	100.0	100.0
2021	115.23	5.5%	1.6%	9.3%	105.5	109.3
2022	114.32	−0.8%	1.6%	5.4%	104.7	115.2
2023	154.71	35.3%	1.6%	10.7%	141.7	127.5
2024	198.86	28.5%	1.7%	11.2%	182.1	141.8
2025	255.13	28.3%	1.6%	8.8%	233.6	154.3

Table A1. Sources: BoT; Economic Survey 2025; TICGL calculation. 2019: ICT share 1.6%, growth 4.2%.

Scale of the divergence

Payments compounded at 18.5% a year over 2020–2025 (22.0% a year since 2021). ICT real value added compounded at about 9.1%. The payment index (233.6) ended 79 points above the ICT real index (154.3), and the ICT share of GDP ended where it started.

03 — Connectivity & Digital FinanceWide at the Base, Shallow at the Top: Devices, Credit, Savings, Returns and Jobs

Connectivity and devices

Connectivity has expanded rapidly. Telecom subscriptions rose from 86.8 million (December 2024) to 106.9 million (December 2025) and 111.9 million (March 2026); internet subscriptions from 48.0 million to 58.1 million and 58.9 million; 5G population coverage reached 32.83% in March 2026. But the device ceiling remains: smartphone penetration was 41.82% in December 2025 (42.5% in March 2026), up from roughly 25% in 2022, while feature phones remain near 87%. Rich digital services (e-commerce apps, cloud tools, digital bookkeeping) depend on smartphones and data affordability.

Telecom and Internet Subscriptions, Dec 2024 – Mar 2026

Million subscriptions. Telecom +29% and internet +23% in 15 months (TICGL calc.). Source: TCRA Communication Statistics (quarterly); Sep-25 from the TCRA Q3 2025 release.

Smartphone Penetration: The Device Ceiling

Percent of mobile subscriptions on smartphones. About 25% in 2022 (approximate), 35.99% Dec-24, 41.82% Dec-25, 42.5% Mar-26. Source: TCRA.

Digital finance: the productive layers are small relative to the payment base

The financial layers that turn payments into capital are small relative to the payment base. Digital credit reached TZS 5.58 trillion in 2025 (+32.3%), but this is just 2.2% of mobile payment value. Digital savings tripled (+263%) to TZS 3.18 trillion, still 1.2% of payment value. Project notes citing BoT and The Citizen also record 75.78 million active mobile-money accounts against about 2.4 million total loan accounts, a usage gap of more than 30 to 1 (indicative; not independently verified, see Sources & Data Notes).

Value Layers as a Share of Mobile Payment Value (2025)

Percent of TZS 255.13 trillion. TIPS and P2B overlap with total payments and are not additive. ICT value added shown for comparison. Source: BoT NPS Annual Report 2025; TICGL calculation.

Digital Credit, Savings and Payments to Businesses, 2024 vs 2025

TZS trillion. 2024 savings is back-calculated from the reported +263% (TICGL calc.). Source: BoT NPS Annual Report 2025.

Accounts and Agents: the Rails Keep Widening

Active mobile-money accounts (million, left bars) and agents (million, right line). Accounts +19.9%, agents +34.4%. Source: BoT NPS Annual Report 2025.

Mobile Money Reaches MSMEs, but Not Credit or Commerce

Percent of MSMEs / SMEs. TICGL MSME research: 98% micro (capital under USD 2,000), 72% informal, 65% without collateral, 53% use mobile money, 20% formal finance, 15% e-commerce (2023), under 0.2% angel or venture capital.

Related TICGL study

The MSME figures above come from TICGL's Structural Barriers to MSME Capital Survival in Tanzania: about 20% of the 5 million-plus SMEs have formal finance, 72% operate informally, 98% are micro-enterprises with capital below USD 2,000 and 53% use mobile money. Mobile money has become the on-ramp to the financial system, but not yet the bridge to credit, growth capital and formalisation.

The supply side: concentration of returns

Vodacom Tanzania's FY2026 results (year to 31 March 2026) show service revenue of TZS 1,846.7 billion (+21.8%), of which M-Pesa contributed TZS 734.8 billion (+24.5%) and mobile data TZS 546.7 billion (+29.5%). M-Pesa alone is about 40% of service revenue (TICGL calculation). The company describes digital lending, savings and merchant payments as growing contributors to M-Pesa revenue. These are healthy, profitable businesses; they also illustrate that the visible value in the digital economy is concentrated in a handful of large network and mobile-money operators. An equivalent public series for independent software firms, fintechs, platforms and digital service exporters does not exist.

Vodacom Tanzania FY2026: Where Revenue Sits

TZS billion, year to 31 March 2026. Service revenue 1,846.7 (+21.8%); M-Pesa 734.8 (+24.5%); mobile data 546.7 (+29.5%). Source: Vodacom Tanzania PLC FY2026 results.

Investment by Sector, 2025: ICT Lags Mining and Finance

USD million of investment attracted in 2025: ICT 152.1, mining 442.2, finance and insurance 401.3, manufacturing 223.1. Source: project investment data cited in the TICGL report.

Jobs: many livelihoods, few measured digital jobs

The digital economy's employment footprint is real but poorly measured. Observable positions include about 1.98 million mobile-money agents (+34.4% in 2025), 2.79 million merchant acceptance points and a startup ecosystem of 1,041 active ventures in 2024 (+24%). These are mostly micro-enterprises and self-employment, not high-productivity formal ICT employment. Tanzania has no official series for total ICT, software, fintech and digital-content employment, and none for ICT service exports: the single largest evidence gap for the value-addition argument.

Agents

1.98M

+34.4% in 2025 (+19% in 2024)

Merchant acceptance points

2.79M

more than doubled

Active startups, 2024

1,041

+24%

ICT jobs / ICT exports

No series

largest evidence gap

Digital financial services and infrastructure, 2025

Indicator	Value	Growth / note
Mobile payment volume	7,959.4 million transactions	+24.1%
Active mobile-money accounts	75.78 million	+19.9% (63.21m in 2024)
Mobile-money agents	1.98 million	+34.4%
Trust-account balances	TZS 2.83 trillion	+35.7%
Merchant acceptance points	2.79 million	More than doubled
Payments to businesses	TZS 37.52 trillion; 2.30 bn transactions	+41% value; +30.4% volume
TIPS (instant payments)	TZS 54.95 trillion	+84.3% value
Digital credit	TZS 5.58 trillion; 336.5m transactions	+32.3% value
Digital savings	TZS 3.18 trillion; 97.5m transactions	+263% value
Telecom subscriptions (Dec 2025 / Mar 2026)	106.9 million / 111.9 million	Penetration 159.8% (Mar 2026)
Internet subscriptions (Dec 2025 / Mar 2026)	58.1 million / 58.9 million	Penetration 84.2% (Mar 2026)
Smartphone penetration (Dec 2025 / Mar 2026)	41.82% / 42.5%	Smartphones 29.8 million
4G / 5G coverage (Dec 2025)	94.2% / 30.1%	5G 32.83% in Mar 2026

Table A2. Sources: BoT NPS Annual Report 2025 (via TanzaniaInvest, Daily News, uchumi360); TCRA Communication Statistics.

04 — Why the Gap PersistsFive Structural Drivers, and Why Measurement Explains Only Part of It

Five structural drivers

1. Rails without platforms

Success has been concentrated in payments. Domestic e-commerce, logistics, agritech and marketplace platforms that would capture value locally remain small.
MSME e-commerce use was only 15% in 2023, against a FYDP IV target of 60% by 2031.

2. Concentrated returns

Most measured value sits with network operators through transaction fees and data revenue.
This earns legitimate returns on heavy infrastructure investment but does not automatically seed independent software and service firms.

3. Device and affordability ceiling

With 41.8% smartphone penetration, a large part of the market can use USSD payments but not data-heavy services.

4. Skills and capital for the productive layers

Agent and merchant roles scale easily; software engineering, data, cybersecurity and product roles need training pipelines and risk capital.
Fewer than 0.2% of SMEs have ever received angel or venture capital.

5. Weak data-to-credit link

Mobile-money histories are a rich credit signal, yet only an estimated 5–7% of that data is used for credit scoring or tax purposes (TICGL, via uchumi360).
Result: 75.78 million active accounts and very few productive loans.

What the drivers add up to

A payments economy, not yet a production economy: adoption and transactions are world-class, while revenue capture, value added and exports are not.

An external view, to be tested

The Internet Governance Project's June 2026 report adds a wider comparative point: Tanzania's services share of GDP fell from 49% in 2001 to 29% in 2024, against about 55% in Kenya, and Tanzania's broader digital economy is estimated at less than one-fifth of Kenya's. It attributes part of the gap to regulatory architecture that works against a more independent digital sector. TICGL cites this as an external view to be tested, not as an established fact.

Services Share of GDP: Tanzania vs Kenya (Internet Governance Project, June 2026)

Percent of GDP. Tanzania fell from 49% (2001) to 29% (2024); Kenya about 55% (2024). Source: Internet Governance Project, "Tanzania Is Getting Online. Its Digital Economy Isn't Following" (June 2026), as cited in the TICGL report.

Is it a measurement problem? Partly, but not mostly

Narrow definition

The national accounts' Information and Communication activity covers publishing, broadcasting, telecoms, programming and information services. Mobile-money fees may be classified under financial services, not ICT; the financial and insurance sector grew 15.7% in 2025.

Broad estimates

The Tanzania Business Report 2024/25 puts direct ICT at 1.5–2% and the broad digital economy at about 7% of GDP. Even the broad figure is far from 109%.

Rebasing

GDP was rebased to 2019 prices in 2026. A later BoT release reported a combined GDP figure of TZS 243.3 trillion after harmonisation (headline only; year basis not confirmed). If applied to 2025, mobile payments would equal about 105% rather than 109% of GDP, which does not alter the conclusion.

Gross versus net

Every transfer, cash-in and cash-out counts in transaction value, so flows overstate economic activity by construction.

Narrow, Broad and Gross: The Gap Survives Every Measure

Percent of GDP, log scale. Narrow ICT 1.6%; broad digital economy about 7% (indicative, unofficial); payments/GDP 105% on the TZS 243.3tn denominator and 109% on TZS 234.1tn. Sources: Economic Survey 2025; Tanzania Business Report 2024/25; BoT; TICGL calc.

Where the Value May Be Recorded Instead: 2025 Real Growth

Percent real growth in 2025. Financial and insurance activities (15.7%) grew faster than ICT (8.8%); part of the digital dividend may sit in other sectors. Source: Economic Survey 2025.

Conclusion

Measurement refinements can narrow the gap but cannot close it. A broader, official digital-economy satellite account would still show a sector far smaller than the flows it carries.

05 — Hypotheses TestedFive Research Hypotheses Against the Evidence

The report tests five hypotheses. Two are supported on the available data, one is partly supported, one is plausible but lacks data, and one is scenario-based and to be confirmed by monitoring.

Hypothesis	Evidence	Assessment
H1. Transaction value grew faster than ICT value added and formal digital jobs	Payments ×2.34 vs ICT real VA ×1.54 (2020–25); DVCR 1.81% → 1.47%; no formal digital jobs series	Supported for value added Jobs untested (no data)
H2. Mobile money is used mainly for P2P and payments rather than linking MSMEs to credit, e-commerce and formal markets	P2B only 14.7% of value (rising from 13.4%); digital credit 2.2% of payment value; 15% MSME e-commerce use	Partly supported P2P share not published, but about 85% of value is non-P2B
H3. Most mobile-money MSMEs lack formal credit, so payments do not convert into investment and jobs	20% of SMEs with formal finance; 65% lack collateral; 75.78m accounts vs about 2.4m loan accounts	Supported
H4. Thin local software, data infrastructure, skills and export firms make Tanzania a payments economy rather than a production economy	Smartphone 41.8%; no ICT export series; ICT investment USD 152m vs mining USD 442m; concentrated operator revenue	Plausible insufficient data to confirm
H5. Value-addition policies raise ICT contribution more than volume growth alone	Scenarios: same payments growth gives ICT value added of TZS 6.4–11.3 trillion by 2030	Scenario-based to be confirmed by monitoring

Table 3.1. Source: TICGL/TERI research report, Section 7.

H1: Growth Multiples, 2020→2025

Times 2020 level. Payments 2.34×, ICT real value added 1.54×. Source: BoT; Economic Survey 2025; TICGL calc.

H2: P2B vs Everything Else

Share of mobile payment value, %. P2B 13.4% → 14.7%; about 85% is non-P2B. Source: BoT NPS; TICGL calc.

H3: Accounts vs Loan Accounts

Million. 75.78 active mobile-money accounts vs about 2.4 loan accounts (indicative, project notes citing BoT/The Citizen).

What the tests say together

H1 and H3 are supported by the data; H2 is partly supported; H4 is plausible but cannot be confirmed without ICT jobs and export series; H5 is tested through the scenarios in the next tab. The common thread is that the thinness is in the layers above the rails, and that the data to measure it do not yet exist.

06 — Outlook 2026–2030Four Scenarios: Same Rails, Very Different Value Captured

The scenarios isolate one variable: how much value the economy captures from the same digital rails. Scenarios A, B and C share identical payment growth (18% a year, close to the 2020–2025 average of 18.5%); they differ in the ICT share of GDP reached by 2030. Scenario D shows what a slowdown would do.

A. Rails-only (inertia)

ICT share 1.6% → 1.7%
Payments +18% a year

B. Value-addition push

ICT share → 2.5%
Payments +18% a year

C. Policy-target case

ICT share → 3.0% (official target)
Payments +18% a year

D. Downside

ICT share → 1.5%
Payments +12% a year

Common assumptions

GDP: nominal GDP grows 10% a year from TZS 234.1 trillion (2025) to about TZS 377 trillion in 2030 (about 6% real growth plus about 4% inflation/price effects). ICT share: moves in a straight line from 1.6% (2025) to the 2030 value of each scenario. Payments: 18% a year in A–C (TZS 584 trillion in 2030), 12% in D (TZS 450 trillion); a 20% path would match the Daily News/BoT illustration of about TZS 630 trillion within five years, and 22% gives TZS 690 trillion. Digital credit grows at 20% (A), 30% (B), 35% (C) and 12% (D) a year from TZS 5.58 trillion. Smartphone penetration reaches 52%, 58%, 62% and 48% respectively by 2030. Target: the 3% target is the official ICT target set in the Ministry's strategic plan; a further 10%-by-2036 target appeared in earlier notes but could not be verified in a primary source and is not used.

Scenario outcomes in 2030

Indicator, 2030	A. Rails-only	B. Value-addition push	C. Policy-target case	D. Downside
Nominal GDP (TZS tn)	377.0	377.0	377.0	377.0
Mobile payments (TZS tn)	583.7	583.7	583.7	449.6
Payments as % of GDP	155%	155%	155%	119%
ICT share of GDP	1.7%	2.5%	3.0%	1.5%
ICT value added (TZS tn)	6.41	9.43	11.31	5.66
DVCR	1.10%	1.61%	1.94%	1.26%
Digital credit (TZS tn)	13.9	20.7	25.0	9.8
Digital credit as % of payments	2.4%	3.5%	4.3%	2.2%
Smartphone penetration	52%	58%	62%	48%
Cumulative ICT value added 2026–30 (TZS tn)	26.2	34.2	39.2	24.2
Cumulative gain vs A (TZS tn)	—	+8.0	+13.0	−2.0

Table 3. Source: TICGL scenario model. Values are illustrative outcomes of stated assumptions, not forecasts.

ICT Value Added to 2030 Under Four Scenarios

TZS trillion, nominal. 2025 = 3.75 for all. 2030: A 6.41, B 9.43, C 11.31, D 5.66. Source: TICGL scenario model.

Mobile Payment Value Outlook to 2030

TZS trillion. Actual 2020–2025, then dashed paths at 12% (low, 450), 18% (base, 584) and 22% (high, 690) a year. Sources: BoT (actuals); TICGL scenario model.

ICT Share of GDP: the Straight-Line Paths

Percent of GDP. Linear from 1.6% in 2025 to each scenario's 2030 value. Source: TICGL scenario model.

DVCR Path: the Paradox Deepens Under Rails-Only

Percent. Under A the DVCR falls to 1.10%; B holds near 1.6%; C rises to 1.94%. Source: TICGL scenario model.

Cumulative ICT Value Added, 2026–2030

TZS trillion, sum of annual ICT value added. A 26.2, B 34.2, C 39.2, D 24.2. Source: TICGL scenario model.

Annual Extra ICT Value Added vs Rails-Only

TZS trillion a year above scenario A. Scenario B adds about 3.0 trillion to annual GDP in 2030 and 8.0 trillion cumulatively. Source: TICGL scenario model.

Digital Credit: 2025 vs 2030 by Scenario

TZS trillion. From 5.58: A 13.9, B 20.7, C 25.0, D 9.8. Source: TICGL scenario model.

Smartphone Penetration: 2025 vs 2030 by Scenario

Percent. From 41.8% to 52% (A), 58% (B), 62% (C), 48% (D). Source: TCRA (2025); TICGL scenario model.

Reading the scenarios

In scenario A the economy keeps adding payment volume but the DVCR drops to about 1.1%: the paradox deepens. Scenario B, which requires ICT's share to reach 2.5%, would add about TZS 3.0 trillion to annual GDP in 2030 and TZS 8.0 trillion cumulatively over five years relative to A. Scenario C, the official 3% target, is demanding: it needs ICT value added to grow about 25% a year in nominal terms (from TZS 3.75 trillion to TZS 11.31 trillion), whereas implied nominal ICT value added grew only about 4% between 2024 and 2025. It is achievable only with new activity (software, data, cloud, digital exports), not by growing the existing telecom base alone.

Build your own 2030 scenario

Same model as the report: GDP and payments compound annually from 2025; the ICT share moves in a straight line to your 2030 value. Defaults reproduce scenario B.

Payment growth, % a year

ICT share of GDP in 2030, %

Nominal GDP growth, % a year

Payments 2030

583.7

TZS trillion

ICT value added 2030

9.43

TZS trillion

DVCR 2030

1.61%

vs 1.47% in 2025

Required nominal ICT growth

20.3%

a year, 2025–2030

Cumulative ICT VA 2026–30

34.2

TZS trillion

Gain vs rails-only (1.7% share)

+8.0

TZS trillion cumulative

07 — Economic ImpactWhat Value Addition Would Mean for GDP, Jobs, MSMEs and Public Revenue

GDP

Under scenario B the additional ICT value added is worth 0.8 percentage points of 2030 GDP relative to inertia (2.5% versus 1.7%); under scenario C it is 1.3 points. These figures count only direct ICT value added. Broader effects (lower costs and higher productivity in trade, agriculture and transport) would be additional and require the satellite account to measure.

Extra ICT Value Added in 2030 vs Rails-Only

TZS trillion in 2030 relative to scenario A (6.41). B +3.02 (+0.8 pp of GDP), C +4.90 (+1.3 pp), D −0.75 (−0.2 pp). Source: TICGL scenario model.

2030 vs scenario A	B	C	D
ICT share of GDP	+0.8 pp	+1.3 pp	−0.2 pp
Extra ICT VA in 2030 (TZS tn)	+3.02	+4.90	−0.75
Cumulative 2026–30 (TZS tn)	+8.0	+13.0	−2.0

Jobs

No official ICT employment series exists, so jobs cannot be projected rigorously. The report therefore uses proxies and recommends a new KPI. Agent positions rose 19% in 2024 and 34.4% in 2025 to 1.98 million; if agent growth slows to 5–8% a year the network would reach 2.5–2.9 million by 2030. These are largely self-employed, low-income roles. The more important question is quality: how many positions in software, data, cybersecurity, digital marketing and platform operations are created per TZS trillion of payments. TICGL proposes "digital jobs per million transactions" as a core KPI, supported by a labour-force survey module.

Mobile-Money Agents: 2024, 2025 and the 2030 Range

Million agents. 1.48 (2024) and 1.98 (2025) are actuals; 2030 shows 5% (2.53) and 8% (2.91) annual growth. These are mostly self-employed, low-income roles. Source: BoT NPS; TICGL calc.

MSMEs

MSMEs convert payments into growth only if they can borrow, keep records, sell online and formalise. FYDP IV targets 60% e-commerce use among SMEs by 2031 (from 15% in 2023), 40% formal credit access by 2031 (from about 20%), 250,000 MSME registrations a year and a Credit Guarantee Corporation. Reaching 60% from 15% by 2031 implies roughly 5–6 percentage points of adoption gain every year. Each of these goals depends on the data-to-credit link and on digital bookkeeping tools. See TICGL's MSME capital-survival study for the underlying constraints.

FYDP IV MSME Targets: Baseline vs 2031

Percent of SMEs. E-commerce use 15% (2023) → 60%; formal credit access about 20% → 40%. Source: FYDP IV as summarised by TICGL; TICGL MSME research.

Required Annual Gain to Hit the E-commerce Target

MSME e-commerce use, percent, if adoption rises in a straight line from 15% (2023) to 60% (2031): +5.6 pp a year. Source: FYDP IV target; TICGL calc.

Public revenue

Digital rails create a potential tax and compliance dividend. When transactions are recorded electronically, presumptive tax, e-invoicing and merchant registration become cheaper to administer. Today only an estimated 5–7% of mobile-money data feeds credit scoring or tax systems (TICGL via uchumi360). Raising this share, with strong data-protection safeguards, is a lever for revenue and for MSME credit at the same time.

Mobile-money data used

5–7%

for credit scoring or tax

E-commerce target

60%

of SMEs by 2031 (15% in 2023)

Formal credit target

40%

of MSMEs by 2031 (≈20% now)

MSME registrations

250,000

a year (FYDP IV)

Why these four impact channels belong together

GDP gains require new ICT activity; jobs require skills and platforms; MSME gains require credit, records and online sales; revenue gains require data use. All four depend on the same missing layer: the conversion of payment data and payment habits into productive digital services.

08 — Policy & KPIsFrom Volume to Value: Eight Actions and a KPI Dashboard

The evidence points to a shift in emphasis from volume to value. Eight actions follow, mapped to the Digital Economy Strategic Framework 2024–2034, FYDP IV and Dira 2050.

#	Action	Lead institutions	Horizon	Success indicator
1	Link mobile-money data to credit scoring for MSMEs with data protection, consent and consumer-protection rules	BoT, PDPC, credit bureaus, banks, MNOs	2026–28	Digital MSME credit as % of payments; loan accounts per 100 active wallets
2	Digitise MSME bookkeeping, e-invoicing and tax tools at near-zero cost	TRA, MoFP, MCIT, SIDO	2026–28	% MSMEs using digital records; registrations (target 250,000 a year)
3	Back local software, fintech, cloud and cybersecurity firms through public procurement, shared test environments and risk capital	MCIT, ICT Commission, e-GA, TIC	2026–30	ICT investment (USD); number of registered software firms; local share of government ICT spend
4	Build the digital export pipeline (software, BPO/ITES, digital content) with an ICT-services export series	MCIT, BoT, NBS, TIC	2027–30	ICT service exports (USD m); jobs in export-oriented ICT firms
5	Close the device gap: device financing, tax and duty review on entry-level smartphones	MoFP, TCRA, MNOs	2026–29	Smartphone penetration (42% → 58%+)
6	Invest in data centres, cloud, reliable power and digital skills, not connectivity alone	MCIT, TANESCO, universities, private sector	2026–30	Local data-hosting capacity; ICT graduates employed in the sector
7	Promote merchant digitisation and platforms in agri-food, retail, transport, tourism and manufacturing	MoIT, SIDO, TCRA, platforms	2026–30	Merchant acceptance points (2.79m → 4m+); MSME e-commerce use (15% → 60% by 2031)
8	Create a Digital Economy Satellite Account and an annual digital jobs module in the labour-force survey	NBS, BoT, MCIT	2027–28	Published broad digital GVA; jobs series; DVCR published annually

Table 4. Policy actions. Source: TICGL/TERI research report, Section 10.

Policy Action Timeline, 2026–2030

Each bar spans the action's horizon from its start year to the end of its final year. Seven of eight actions start in 2026; the satellite account and export series are sequenced for 2027. Source: Table 4.

Proposed KPI dashboard

KPI	Baseline (2025)	2030 target range
Digital Value Conversion Ratio	1.47%	1.6–1.9% (scenarios B–C)
ICT share of GDP (narrow)	1.6%	2.5–3.0%
Broad digital economy share of GDP	≈ 7% (indicative, unofficial)	Official series published
Digital credit as % of mobile payments	2.2%	3.5–4.3%
Payments to businesses as % of mobile payments	14.7%	25%+
MSME e-commerce use	15% (2023)	45–60%
Smartphone penetration	41.8%	58–62%
Digital jobs per million transactions	Not measured	Baseline set 2027
ICT service exports	Not measured	Baseline set 2027

Table 5. Targets are TICGL proposals derived from the scenarios and FYDP IV; they are not official government commitments.

KPI Distance to Travel: 2025 Baseline vs Low End of the 2030 Target Range

Percent. Baselines: ICT share 1.6, DVCR 1.47, digital credit/payments 2.2, P2B share 14.7, MSME e-commerce 15 (2023), smartphones 41.8. Targets (low end): 2.5, 1.6, 3.5, 25, 45, 58. Source: Table 5.

How the eight actions group

Turn payment data into MSME finance: actions 1 and 2. Build the supply side: actions 3, 4 and 6 (firms, exports, infrastructure and skills). Widen demand: actions 5 and 7 (devices, merchants, platforms). Measure it: action 8, without which the 3% target and the DVCR cannot be tracked officially.

09 — Risks & Data GapsWhat Could Go Wrong, What Cannot Yet Be Measured, and What TICGL/TERI Will Do Next

Risks to the outlook

Five risks

Fee and tax shocks: increases in transaction levies or excise could reduce use and push activity back to cash; scenario D shows payments growing 12% instead of 18%.
Over-reliance on payments revenue: if the sector's growth is concentrated in the same few operators, the ICT share may not rise even if revenues grow.
Skills and power: limited talent supply and unreliable electricity constrain data-centre and software expansion.
Consumer protection and digital credit: fast growth in digital lending (32% in 2025) needs safeguards against over-indebtedness and predatory pricing.
Measurement risk: without a satellite account, policy may keep targeting the narrow 1.6% figure and miss broad gains.

How Much the Payment Growth Rate Matters in 2030

Mobile payments in 2030 as % of GDP (TZS 377tn), by annual payment growth from TZS 255.13tn in 2025: 12% → 449.6tn (119%), 18% → 583.7tn (155%), 20% → 634.9tn (168%), 22% → 689.5tn (183%). Source: TICGL scenario arithmetic.

The Downside Costs Value, Not Just Volume

2030 ICT value added (TZS trillion): scenario D (12% payment growth, 1.5% share) 5.66 vs A 6.41, B 9.43 and C 11.31. Source: TICGL scenario model.

Data gaps

Gap	Why it matters	Suggested owner
Official ICT / digital jobs series	Needed to test H1 and compute digital jobs per million transactions	NBS (labour-force survey), TCRA
ICT and digital service exports	Cannot assess H4 or export-led value addition	BoT (BoP services), NBS
Mobile-money industry revenue and fee take-rate	Needed to link transaction flows to revenue and value added	TCRA, BoT
Digital credit split by MSME vs personal	BoT cites alternative scoring for MSMEs but no breakdown	BoT
MSME digital tool adoption (e-commerce, inventory, bookkeeping)	Only 15% (2023) e-commerce figure; no national series	NBS, SIDO, TICGL
Registered software firms and startups (official register)	Counts vary from 75 to 170+ fintechs	BRELA, ICT Commission

Source: TICGL/TERI research report, Section 11.2.

Next research steps for TICGL/TERI

Replace approximations with accounts

Extract the full 2019-based annual national-accounts table for Information and Communication (current prices, 2019–2025) to replace the share-based approximation.
Publish the DVCR quarterly on the TICGL dashboard using BoT and NBS releases.

Fill the micro-data gap

Run a TICGL/TERI MSME digital adoption survey (payments, credit, e-commerce, bookkeeping).
Build a regional benchmark (Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, Ethiopia) of ICT share, services share and mobile-money intensity.

Talk to TICGL/TERI

Need a digital-economy briefing, an MSME digital-adoption study, a fintech or ICT market-entry assessment, or a feasibility study for a digital platform in Tanzania? Our economists can tailor this analysis to your sector.

What We Do →TICGL Markets →TERI Research →Invest in Tanzania →✉️ economist@ticgl.com

10 — Sources & Data NotesMethod, Definitions and Reconciliation Notes

Basis

Source report. TICGL/TERI research report "From Digital Payments to Digital Value Addition" by Amran Bhuzohera (November 2026), built on Bank of Tanzania, Ministry of Finance, NBS, TCRA, Vodacom Tanzania and TICGL research. Calculations. Growth rates, indices, implied ICT value added, the DVCR, ratios, rounding bands and all scenario figures are TICGL/TERI arithmetic on published figures. Scenario results are illustrative outcomes of stated assumptions, not forecasts. This page is a detailed companion to the full report and does not replace it.

Data reconciliation notes (Appendix B of the report)

Item	Issue	Treatment on this page
ICT value added 2025	Project notes show both ≈ TZS 4.2 trillion and ≈ TZS 3.74 trillion. 1.6% of TZS 234.1 trillion = TZS 3.75 trillion.	Uses 3.75 (matches the 1.6% share and the UNdata figure).
Mobile payments vs GDP	Earlier drafts say "~100%" or "95%". Actual ratio: 93.8% (2024) and 109.0% (2025).	Uses the computed ratios.
Transaction volume series	Volumes of 0.22–0.25 bn (2020–22) jump to 5.06 bn (2023): a change in definition, not a 20× rise. TCRA also reports 6.31 bn for 2025 vs BoT 7.96 bn.	Volume growth not computed across 2022/23; BoT value series used for trends.
Source attribution	The ICT share, growth, smartphone, 4G and 5G figures were attributed to the TICGL MSME page. That page does not contain them.	Attributed to Economic Survey 2025 and TCRA.
ICT growth 2023–2024	Pre-rebasing ministry budget statements cite 7.6% (2023) and 14.3% (2024); the 2019-base Economic Survey shows 10.7% and 11.2%.	Uses the rebased Economic Survey series.
Loan accounts (2.4m), outstanding credit (TZS 48.4tn), TanFiX 0.83	Taken from project notes citing The Citizen/BoT; not independently verified.	Used only as indicative context.
Informal sector survey 2025 (TZS 88.1tn; 36.3% of GDP; 24m workers)	From project notes; not independently verified.	Not used in calculations.
ICT policy targets	"3% by 2029 and 10% by 2036" could not be verified. A 3% ICT target (from 1.5%) is documented; the 10% figure is not.	Uses 3%; 10% omitted.
GDP denominator	TZS 234.1 trillion (June 2026). A later BoT release reports TZS 243.3 trillion combined GDP (headline only).	Uses 234.1; sensitivity shown in "Why the Gap Persists".
Rounding	ICT shares are published to one decimal, so implied ICT value added carries a band of roughly ±TZS 0.2 trillion.	Rounding band shown in the DVCR chart.

Bank of Tanzania (2026), National Payment Systems Annual Report 2025. Dar es Salaam.
Ministry of Finance, United Republic of Tanzania (2026), Economic Survey 2025. Dodoma.
National Bureau of Statistics and Office of the Chief Government Statistician (2026), Revised National Accounts Statistics, Base Year 2019: Sources and Methods, June 2026.
Ministry of Finance / Planning and Investment (2026), State of the Economy Report and National Development Plan 2026/27, presented to Parliament 11 June 2026.
Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (2025–2026), Communication Statistics, quarters ending December 2024 to March 2026.
Vodacom Tanzania PLC (2026), preliminary condensed consolidated financial results, year ended 31 March 2026.
TICGL (2026), Structural Barriers to MSME Capital Survival in Tanzania, May 2026; TICGL (2026), Tanzania Entrepreneurship Profile 2024–2025, February 2026; TICGL (2026), Tanzania Digital Economy Vision 2050 and Tanzania's Digital Transformation 2024–2034.
Government of Tanzania (2024), Digital Economy Strategic Framework 2024–2034; Government of Tanzania (2026), FYDP IV 2026/27–2030/31, as summarised in TICGL (2026).
Internet Governance Project (2026, June), Tanzania Is Getting Online. Its Digital Economy Isn't Following.
The Guardian (Tanzania) (2026, April), digital economy systems adoption (Tanzania Business Report 2024/25); TanzaniaInvest (2026), digital credit, savings and TCRA statistics; Daily News / allAfrica (2026, August), Mobile money reshapes economy; uchumi360 (2026), mobile-money and TIPS statistics.

11 — Quick AnswersFrequently Asked Questions

Why is Tanzania's ICT sector only 1.6% of GDP when mobile payments are TZS 255 trillion?

Transaction value is a gross flow in which the same shilling is counted each time it changes hands, while GDP counts only new value created. Mobile payments reached TZS 255.13 trillion in 2025 (109% of nominal GDP of TZS 234.1 trillion), but ICT value added is about TZS 3.75 trillion (1.6% of GDP). The gap is not a statistical error, yet it is a genuine development problem: payments grew 2.34 times between 2020 and 2025 while ICT real value added grew 1.54 times.

What is the Digital Value Conversion Ratio (DVCR)?

ICT value added divided by mobile payment value, times 100. It fell from 1.81% in 2024 to 1.47% in 2025, so each TZS 100 of mobile payments corresponds to about TZS 1.5 of ICT value added. It is a diagnostic, not a grade: cheaper transfers also lower it.

How large is Tanzania's mobile money economy?

TZS 255.13 trillion (about USD 96 billion) of mobile payments across 7.96 billion transactions in 2025, with 75.78 million active accounts, 1.98 million agents and 2.79 million merchant acceptance points. Payments to businesses were TZS 37.52 trillion (14.7% of value) and TIPS instant payments TZS 54.95 trillion (+84%).

Is the gap just a measurement problem?

Partly, but not mostly. The ICT definition is narrow, mobile-money fees may be recorded under financial services, GDP was rebased in 2026 and transaction value is gross. Even a broad digital-economy estimate of about 7% of GDP is far from 109%, so better measurement can narrow the gap but not close it.

How much could ICT value added be in 2030?

With payments growing 18% a year: TZS 6.4 trillion if only the rails grow (ICT at 1.7% of GDP), TZS 9.4 trillion in a value-addition push (2.5%) and TZS 11.3 trillion if the official 3% target is met. The gap between the first two is worth about TZS 8.0 trillion of cumulative GDP over 2026–2030. A downside with 12% payment growth gives TZS 5.7 trillion.

How much digital credit and savings are there?

Digital credit was TZS 5.58 trillion in 2025 (+32.3%), only 2.2% of payment value. Digital savings tripled (+263%) to TZS 3.18 trillion, 1.2% of payment value. There are 75.78 million active accounts against roughly 2.4 million loan accounts, an indicative gap of more than 30 to 1.

What is smartphone penetration in Tanzania?

41.82% in December 2025 (42.5% in March 2026), about 29.8 million smartphones, up from roughly 25% in 2022. 4G covers 94.2% of the population and 5G reached 32.83% in March 2026. The device ceiling limits data-heavy services such as e-commerce and cloud tools.

What does TICGL recommend?

Eight actions: link mobile-money data to MSME credit scoring with data protection; digitise MSME bookkeeping and e-invoicing; back local software, fintech, cloud and cybersecurity firms; build a digital export pipeline; close the device gap; invest in data centres, cloud, power and skills; promote merchant digitisation and platforms; and create a Digital Economy Satellite Account with an annual digital jobs module.

Muhtasari

Muhtasari kwa Kiswahili

Kutoka Malipo ya Kidijitali hadi Uongezaji wa Thamani ya Kidijitali: Mwaka 2025 malipo ya simu nchini Tanzania yalifikia TZS trilioni 255.13 (takriban USD bilioni 96), sawa na asilimia 109 ya Pato la Taifa la TZS trilioni 234.1. Hata hivyo sekta ya Habari na Mawasiliano (ICT) ilibaki asilimia 1.6 ya Pato la Taifa: ilikuwa asilimia 1.6 mwaka 2019 na asilimia 1.6 mwaka 2025.

Pengo si kosa la takwimu, lakini ni tatizo halisi la maendeleo: thamani ya miamala ni mtiririko wa jumla, wakati Pato la Taifa linahesabu thamani mpya pekee. Kati ya 2020 na 2025 malipo ya simu yaliongezeka mara 2.34 (asilimia 18.5 kwa mwaka), huku thamani halisi iliyoongezwa na ICT ikiongezeka mara 1.54 tu.

Kiwango cha Ubadilishaji wa Thamani ya Kidijitali (DVCR): thamani iliyoongezwa na ICT kwa kila shilingi ya malipo ya simu ilishuka kutoka asilimia 1.81 (2024) hadi asilimia 1.47 (2025). Kwa kila TZS 100 za malipo ya simu, takriban TZS 1.5 ndizo thamani iliyoongezwa na ICT.

Miundombinu ni imara: akaunti hai za pesa za simu milioni 75.78, mawakala milioni 1.98, sehemu za kupokea malipo kwa wafanyabiashara milioni 2.79, TIPS iliongezeka asilimia 84 hadi TZS trilioni 54.95, na mtandao wa 4G unafikia asilimia 94.2 ya wananchi.

Tabaka za uzalishaji ni nyembamba: mikopo ya kidijitali ni TZS trilioni 5.58 (asilimia 2.2 ya thamani ya malipo), akiba za kidijitali TZS trilioni 3.18 (asilimia 1.2), malipo kwa biashara asilimia 14.7. Simu janja ni asilimia 41.8 tu, na hakuna takwimu rasmi za mauzo ya nje ya huduma za ICT.

Mapato yamejikita: Vodacom Tanzania pekee ilipata TZS bilioni 734.8 kutoka M-Pesa mwaka wa fedha 2026 (asilimia 24.5 juu). Kampuni huru za programu, majukwaa na data ni ndogo na hazipimwi.

Sababu tano za pengo: (1) miundombinu ya malipo bila majukwaa, (2) mapato kujikita kwa waendeshaji wachache, (3) kikwazo cha simu janja na gharama, (4) upungufu wa ujuzi na mtaji kwa tabaka za uzalishaji, (5) kiungo dhaifu kati ya data na mikopo (ni asilimia 5–7 tu ya data ya pesa za simu inayotumika kwa alama za mikopo au kodi).

Je, ni tatizo la upimaji? Kwa sehemu, lakini si hasa. Hata makadirio mapana ya uchumi wa kidijitali (takriban asilimia 7 ya Pato la Taifa) yako mbali na asilimia 109. Upimaji bora unaweza kupunguza pengo lakini hauwezi kulifunga.

Mwelekeo wa 2026–2030 (hali nne): kwa ukuaji ule ule wa malipo (asilimia 18 kwa mwaka), thamani iliyoongezwa na ICT mwaka 2030 ni TZS trilioni 6.4 (miundombinu pekee), trilioni 9.4 (msukumo wa kuongeza thamani) au trilioni 11.3 (lengo la asilimia 3). Tofauti kati ya hali mbili za kwanza ni takriban TZS trilioni 8.0 za Pato la Taifa kwa miaka mitano. Hali ya chini (ukuaji wa malipo asilimia 12) inatoa trilioni 5.7. Hizi si utabiri bali matokeo ya dhana zilizotajwa.

Hitimisho na hatua: kipaumbele kihame kutoka wingi kwenda thamani. Hatua nane: unganisha data ya pesa za simu na alama za mikopo kwa MSMEs kwa ulinzi wa data; dijitisha uhasibu na ankara za kielektroniki; saidia kampuni za ndani za programu, fintech, wingu na usalama wa mtandao; jenga mauzo ya nje ya huduma za kidijitali; funga pengo la simu janja; wekeza kwenye vituo vya data, umeme na ujuzi; kuza majukwaa ya wafanyabiashara; na unda Akaunti ya Setilaiti ya Uchumi wa Kidijitali pamoja na takwimu za ajira za kidijitali.

Malipo ya simu 2025: TZS trilioni 255.13 · Pato la Taifa: asilimia 109 · ICT: asilimia 1.6
DVCR: asilimia 1.47 (kutoka 1.81) · Mikopo ya kidijitali: TZS trilioni 5.58 · Simu janja: asilimia 41.8
ICT 2030: TZS trilioni 5.7 / 6.4 / 9.4 / 11.3 · Faida ya msukumo dhidi ya hali ya kawaida: TZS trilioni 8.0

Chanzo: Benki Kuu ya Tanzania (NPS Annual Report 2025); Economic Survey 2025; NBS; TCRA; Vodacom Tanzania; utafiti wa TICGL/TERI (Amran Bhuzohera, Novemba 2026). Kwa maelezo zaidi: economist@ticgl.com.

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Scope

Prepared by TERI for research and strategic-information purposes; it is not investment, legal, tax or financial advice. All figures come from the Bank of Tanzania Monthly Economic Review, October 2026 and the agencies it cites (NBS, Ministry of Finance, Tanzania Revenue Authority, World Bank, Zanzibar Office of the Chief Government Statistician). Where two tables in the review differ, both are shown with their source.

00 — Overview & VerdictExecutive Summary: A Stable Headline With Pressure Building Underneath

The answer

Tanzania's headline numbers are calm; the composition is not. Inflation held at 4.3%, inside the 3–5% target, but the driver changed: food inflation fell from 7.0% to 3.9% while transport inflation rose from 2.1% to 14.0% and services inflation from 1.3% to 6.1%. Core inflation is 4.1%, up from 2.2% a year ago.

Policy tightened a little; credit did not slow. The Central Bank Rate rose 50 basis points to 6.25%, yet private sector credit grew 34.2% to TZS 56.4 trillion and extended broad money (M3) 25.9%. Private credit explains about 96% of the TZS 15.0 trillion rise in M3 over the year, while net foreign assets fell 17.3%.

Oil, not weak exports, widened the external gap. The 12-month current account deficit grew 27.6% to USD 2.40 billion. Petroleum imports rose USD 1.60 billion (+72.3%), more than the USD 1.29 billion extra earned from gold. Exports of goods and services still grew 19.9% and September alone showed a USD 421 million monthly surplus.

Fiscal strength is real; debt-service strain is rising. July revenue beat target by 9.5%, but interest costs ran 33.7% above estimate and development spending ran 7.4% below estimate. External debt arrears doubled in a year to USD 1.20 billion.

Headline inflation

4.3%

Sep-26, unchanged; target 3–5%

Core inflation

4.1%

vs 2.2% in Sep-25

Transport inflation

14.0%

vs 2.1% in Sep-25; weight 14.1%

Central Bank Rate

6.25%

from 5.75%; corridor 4.75–7.75%

Private credit growth

+34.2%

TZS 56,359B; M3 +25.9%

Current account deficit

USD 2,397.5M

12m to Sep-26, +27.6%

Reserves

USD 6,031.9M

4.3 months of imports (4.9 end-2025)

Exports of goods & services

USD 21,065M

+19.9%; gold USD 5.8B

July 2026 revenue

TZS 3,502B

+9.5% above target

External debt arrears

USD 1,197M

+105% in 12 months

Domestic debt

TZS 41.1T

+9.8% y/y; 89.6% securities

TZS per USD, Sep-26

2,654.91

+7.4% depreciation y/y

Where Growth Is Running: Key Year-on-Year Rates

Percent, year to September 2026 (stocks and 12-month flows). Amber bars are the fast-growing pressure points. Source: BoT MER October 2026; TICGL/TERI calc. for gold.

Annual Inflation by Main Group: One Year Ago vs Now

Percent. Food has cooled; transport, energy and services have heated. Source: BoT MER, Table 2.1.1.

Growth, Inflation and Credit, 2018–2025

Percent. Real GDP growth (bars), CPI inflation and growth of credit to the private sector (lines). 2025 provisional. Source: BoT MER Table A1.

The review in eight lines

Area	Evidence (September 2026 unless stated)	Reading
Prices	Headline 4.3%; core 4.1%; food 3.9%; energy, fuel and utilities 7.8%; transport 14.0%; services 6.1%	Anchored, but re-composed
Monetary policy	CBR 6.25% (from 5.75%); interbank rate 6.67%; reverse repo take-up TZS 2,624.5B (from 3,037.4B)	Gently tighter
Money & credit	M3 +25.9%; private credit +34.2%; transport & communication credit +78.3%; lending rate 15.54%	Boom, broad-based
Markets	T-bill yield 4.85%; 10-year bond 10.69%; shilling TZS 2,654.91/USD; foreign access to Government securities opened on 17 July 2026	Orderly, liquid
Fiscal (July)	Revenue TZS 3,502.2B (+9.5% vs target); spending TZS 3,572.5B; interest TZS 564.9B vs 422.5B estimate	Strong revenue, rising interest bill
Debt	National debt USD 52,344.2M; external USD 36,784.2M; arrears USD 1,197.4M (USD 584.1M a year ago)	Arrears flag
External	Deficit USD 2,397.5M (+27.6%); petroleum imports +72.3%; gold exports ≈USD 5.8B; reserves 4.3 months	Oil-driven widening
Zanzibar	Inflation 4.3% (5.6% in Aug); current account surplus USD 986.8M (+18.7%); cloves USD 38.0M vs 6.2M	Resilient, clove-aided

Table 0.1. Source: BoT MER October 2026. Readings are TICGL/TERI judgements.

Key findings

Stable headline, new drivers. Annual food inflation fell 3.1 points while transport inflation rose almost 12 points; on base-year weights transport now contributes about 2.0 points to the 4.3% headline, up from 0.3 a year ago.
Core inflation has doubled. From 2.2% to 4.1% in a year, and services inflation from 1.3% to 6.1%; the BoT says core is now the primary driver of headline (3.1 of 4.3 points).
Credit is the engine of money growth. Private credit added TZS 14.4 trillion to M3 over the year; net foreign assets subtracted TZS 2.7 trillion.
Credit is broad-based but fast. Eight sector series grew 17.7–78.3%; transport and communication, trade and agriculture lead; personal loans remain the largest share at 33.9%.
Oil is the swing factor abroad. Crude averaged USD 102.3/barrel in September (+21.2% m/m); Tanzania's petroleum import bill is up USD 1.6 billion a year.
Fiscal outturn is strong but lopsided. Import taxes and local VAT/excise beat estimates; income tax and grants missed; interest and other recurrent spending overshot while development spending undershot.
Arrears are the quiet risk. Principal arrears more than doubled to USD 867.5 million, with commercial creditors up from USD 184.5 million to USD 549.6 million.
Zanzibar is steadier but its goods exports are now 58% cloves, a cyclical crop.

Bottom line

Tanzania enters the last quarter of 2026 with anchored headline prices, a liquid financial system, a strong revenue start to the fiscal year and a growing export base. The pressures are second-round inflation from fuel, a credit expansion that is several times faster than nominal GDP, a larger oil bill against reserve cover of 4.3 months, and creditor arrears that have doubled. The task for the next six months is containment: keep core inflation from drifting above 5%, keep credit quality visible, and clear arrears before they become a market-access cost.

01 — Global & CommoditiesA Resilient World Economy, a Middle East Energy Shock

The BoT review opens with a global economy that is "resilient but uneven". The IMF's October 2026 World Economic Outlook lifted 2026 global growth to 3.1% from 3.0%, helped by resilient demand, private-sector adaptation and AI investment that is expected to offset the Middle East energy shock. Sub-Saharan Africa was revised up to 4.5% from 4.3% on better terms of trade for oil exporters, but oil importers such as Tanzania face elevated energy costs.

Forecast (2026 growth)	Latest	Previous	Source and note
World	3.1%	3.0%	IMF WEO October vs July 2026
Advanced economies	2.1%	n/a	Bolstered by US performance
Emerging market and developing economies	3.7%	n/a	India offsets weaker China
Sub-Saharan Africa	4.5%	4.3%	Oil exporters gain; oil importers face headwinds
OECD world	2.9%	2.8%	OECD September vs June 2026

Table 1.0. Source: BoT MER October 2026, Chapter 1.

2026 Growth Forecasts: Latest vs Previous

Percent. IMF October vs July (world, SSA); OECD September vs June. Advanced and emerging groups shown as latest only. Source: BoT MER.

Crude Oil: Average, Brent and Dubai, Aug-25 to Sep-26

USD per barrel. The March–May 2026 spike and the September rebound to USD 102.3 follow Middle East tensions. Source: World Bank Pink Sheet via BoT Table A8.

September 2026 commodity moves

Commodity	Unit	Aug-26	Sep-26	Change	Why it matters to Tanzania
Crude oil, average	USD/barrel	84.4	102.3	+21.2%	Pump prices, transport costs, import bill
Natural gas, Europe	USD/mmbtu	21.11	25.42	+20.4%	LNG market tightness; fertilizer inputs
Gold	USD/troy oz	4,411	4,319	−2.1%	Largest export; BoT gold purchase programme
Wheat, US HRW	USD/tonne	330	347.0	+5.2%	Bread, flour and milling costs
Sugar, world	USD/kg	0.38	0.41	+7.9%	Food inflation; industrial sugar imports
Palm oil	USD/tonne	1,117	1,180	+5.6%	Edible oil import prices
Coffee, Arabica	USD/kg	7.97	7.26	−8.9%	Export earnings from coffee
Coffee, Robusta	USD/kg	3.98	3.69	−7.3%	Export earnings from coffee
DAP fertilizer	USD/tonne	793.5	800.6	+0.9%	Input costs for the 2026/27 season
Urea fertilizer	USD/tonne	390.0	407.5	+4.5%	Input costs for the 2026/27 season

Table 1.1. Source: World Bank Commodity Price Data (Pink Sheet) via BoT MER Table 1.1 and Table A8. "Change" is September over August.

Monthly Change in Selected Commodity Prices

Percent, September over August 2026. Energy and grains up; coffee and gold down. Source: BoT MER Table 1.1.

Gold Price, Aug-25 to Sep-26

USD per troy ounce. Peaked at USD 5,020 in February 2026 and eased to USD 4,319 in September. Source: World Bank via BoT Table A8.

Fertilizer Prices: Urea and DAP

USD per tonne. Urea spiked to USD 857 in April 2026 and has settled near USD 400; DAP is still near its 14-month high of USD 801. Source: World Bank via BoT Table A8.

Coffee Prices: Arabica and Robusta

USD per kg. Both have retreated from late-2025 highs; Tanzania's coffee export earnings fell in the year to September. Source: World Bank via BoT Table A8.

Global inflation and what it means for Tanzania

Global inflation stayed elevated in September on energy costs. Advanced-economy inflation, especially in the United States and the euro area, rose and central banks signalled tighter policy if price pressures persist. Among emerging markets, inflation edged up in India (weather and oil) and China (energy, partly offset by lower food prices). Within the EAC and SADC, inflation was divergent but mostly inside regional convergence criteria (the EAC ceiling is 8%).

Channel	Direction	Evidence in the review
Import costs and inflation	Negative	Elevated energy and fertilizer prices raise import costs and domestic price pressure; BoT flags a possible tighter stance.
Export earnings	Positive	Firmer agricultural prices and stronger regional demand are expected to support export earnings.
Gold terms of trade	Mixed	Gold eased 2.1% in September but remains far above 2025 levels (USD 3,368 in Aug-25).
Downside risks	Elevated	Prolonged Middle East conflict, trade-route disruption, El Niño effects on farm output and food supply.

Reading

The global backdrop is better than feared on growth but worse on prices. For Tanzania the energy shock is the transmission line: it shows up first in transport inflation, next in the import bill and current account, and then in monetary policy.

02 — InflationOn Target, but the Engine Has Changed From Food to Transport and Services

Headline inflation was 4.3% in September 2026, unchanged from August and inside the 3–5% national target; it was 3.4% a year ago. The BoT attributes the stability to moderation in energy, fuel and utilities inflation, which partly offset a slight rise in food inflation. Inflation is projected to stay elevated in the coming months on Middle East tensions and El Niño-related Vuli rains, but within the target and regional benchmarks, helped by surplus food production from the 2025/26 harvest.

Main group	Weight	Sep-25	Aug-26	Sep-26	Change y/y (pts)	m/m Sep-26
Food and non-alcoholic beverages	28.2	7.0	3.7	3.9	−3.1	−0.5
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco	1.9	3.6	1.5	1.1	−2.5	0.2
Clothing and footwear	10.8	1.9	1.8	1.7	−0.2	0.1
Housing, water, electricity, gas and fuels	15.1	2.3	2.5	2.5	+0.2	0.3
Furnishings and household maintenance	7.9	2.8	2.6	2.6	−0.2	0.5
Health	2.5	1.2	1.5	1.4	+0.2	0.0
Transport	14.1	2.1	13.8	14.0	+11.9	1.1
Information and communication	5.4	0.2	1.5	1.5	+1.3	0.0
Recreation, sports and culture	1.6	0.8	0.7	0.5	−0.3	−0.3
Education services	2.0	2.9	3.2	3.2	+0.3	0.0
Restaurants and accommodation	6.6	1.0	3.0	2.9	+1.9	0.0
Insurance and financial services	2.1	0.4	0.2	0.2	−0.2	0.0
Personal care and miscellaneous	2.1	2.3	3.3	3.3	+1.0	0.0
All items (headline)	100.0	3.4	4.3	4.3	+0.9	0.1
Core	73.9	2.2	4.1	4.1	+1.9	0.4
Non-core	26.1	6.7	4.8	4.9	−1.8	−0.5
Energy, fuel and utilities	5.7	3.7	8.5	7.8	+4.1	0.2
Services	37.2	1.3	5.9	6.1	+4.8	0.6
Goods	62.8	4.7	3.5	3.4	−1.3	−0.2

Table 2.1. Annual inflation, percent, base 2020 = 100. Source: BoT MER Table 2.1.1 (NBS); "change y/y" is TICGL/TERI arithmetic.

Twelve-Month Inflation: Headline, Core, Food, Energy and Transport

Percent, Sep-25 to Sep-26. Transport steps up from April 2026; food steps down through June. Source: BoT MER Table A9(i), A9(ii).

Contribution to Headline Inflation: BoT Decomposition

Percentage points, Sep-25 vs Sep-26. Unprocessed food falls from 1.6 to 0.8; core rises from 1.6 to 3.1; energy is the balance (0.2 to 0.4, TICGL arithmetic). Source: BoT MER Chart 2.1.5.

Annual Inflation by Group, September 2026

Percent, sorted. Transport is the outlier; energy and services follow. Source: BoT MER Table 2.1.1.

Approximate Contribution by Group: Sep-25 vs Sep-26

Percentage points, weight × annual rate. Food 1.97 → 1.10; transport 0.30 → 1.97. TICGL/TERI estimate on base-year weights (the BoT chart uses a different decomposition).

Month-on-Month Inflation, 2026

Percent. Headline (bars) and transport (line). The April 2026 transport jump of 5.2% is the biggest single-month move in the series. Source: BoT MER Table A9(iii), A9(iv).

Services vs Goods Inflation

Percent. Services inflation rose from 1.3% to 6.1% while goods inflation fell from 4.7% to 3.4%: services overtook goods for good in May 2026. Source: BoT MER Table A9(ii).

Food: easing prices, falling reserves

Food inflation rose slightly to 3.9% from 3.7%, driven by sorghum, potatoes, finger millet and wheat, but it remains far below the 7.0% of a year ago. Wholesale staples such as rice, beans and maize were at or below year-earlier levels in the review's charts. The National Food Reserve Agency held 478,160.2 tonnes at end-September after buying 705.7 tonnes and releasing 6,877.1 tonnes of maize and paddy; stocks are the lowest for September since 2023 and 16% below September 2025.

NFRA Food Stocks, 2025 vs 2026 (End of Month)

Tonnes. Stocks have drawn down from 567,469 in January 2026 to 478,160 in September. Source: BoT MER Table 2.1.2.

NFRA Stocks Each September, 2022–2026

Tonnes. The 2024 build-up to 651,403 tonnes has been worked down to 478,160. Source: BoT MER Table 2.1.2.

Energy and utilities

Energy, fuel and utilities inflation eased to 7.8% from 8.5% on lower petrol, diesel and kerosene price movements during the month, but it is more than double the 3.7% of September 2025. With crude at USD 102.3 in September (USD 84.4 in August), the easing is fragile. The BoT notes that core inflation, not energy, now accounts for most of the headline: 3.1 of 4.3 points, against 1.6 of 3.4 a year ago.

Headline inflation calculator

Weights from the CPI basket (food 28.2, transport 14.1, housing and utilities 15.1, all other 42.6). Defaults reproduce September 2026. "All other groups" default of 2.0% is the rate implied by the other ten groups. A weighted approximation, not an official CPI.

Food, annual %

Transport, annual %

Housing & utilities, annual %

All other groups, annual %

Implied headline, %

4.30

Room to 5% ceiling, pts

0.70

Transport contribution, pts

1.97

Food contribution, pts

1.10

Reading

The 4.3% headline hides a swap: cheaper food is financing dearer transport. If food inflation reverts toward 6.5% (El Niño, wheat and sugar prices), the headline would move to about 5.0% with transport unchanged. Use the calculator: food 6.5, transport 14.0 gives 5.0%, the ceiling of the target band.

03 — Money, Credit & Interest RatesPolicy Rate Up 50 Basis Points; Credit Still Growing at Three Times Nominal GDP

The Monetary Policy Committee's July 2026 decision raised the Central Bank Rate (CBR) to 6.25% for the quarter ending September 2026, from 5.75% in the quarter to June, to contain second-round inflation from elevated energy, fertilizer and transport costs. Operations kept the 7-day interbank rate inside a corridor of 4.75–7.75%. Liquidity was adequate; reverse-repo demand fell as banks held more liquidity (transactions TZS 2,624.5 billion vs TZS 3,037.4 billion in August).

Policy instrument	Jun-26	Jul-26	Aug-26	Sep-26
Central Bank Rate / Repo rate	5.75	6.25	6.25	6.25
Reverse repo rate	5.75	6.25	6.25	6.25
Lombard rate (top of corridor)	7.25	7.75	7.75	7.75
Discount rate	8.25	8.75	8.75	8.75
Overall interbank cash market rate	6.00	6.57	6.67	6.67
Overall Treasury bill rate	4.83	4.74	4.86	4.85
Overall lending rate	15.22	15.10	15.05	15.54
Overall time deposit rate	8.69	8.78	8.78	9.02

Table 3.1. Percent. Source: BoT MER Table A4 and Table 2.3.1.

Policy Rate, Lombard Rate and the Interbank Rate

Percent, Sep-25 to Sep-26. The interbank rate sits above the CBR; the overall T-bill rate sits far below it. Source: BoT MER Table A4.

Lending, Deposit and Spread: Jan–Sep 2026

Percent. Overall lending rose to 15.54% in September; deposits to 9.02%; the short-term spread narrowed to 5.78 points. Source: BoT MER Table 2.3.1.

Money supply: strong, credit-led

Item	Sep-25 (TZS B)	Aug-26 (TZS B)	Sep-26 (TZS B)	Growth y/y	Change y/y (TZS B)
Net foreign assets	15,896.7	13,575.4	13,152.3	−17.3%	−2,744.4
Bank of Tanzania	14,467.3	13,730.9	14,139.1	−2.3%	−328.2
Banks	1,429.3	−155.5	−986.7	turned negative	−2,416.0
Net domestic assets	41,957.4	58,553.3	59,675.6	+42.2%	+17,718.2
Domestic claims	54,854.2	68,093.2	69,436.3	+26.6%	+14,582.1
Securities held by banks	8,723.1	11,718.3	12,056.9	+38.2%	+3,333.8
Claims on the private sector	41,999.9	55,255.9	56,359.4	+34.2%	+14,359.5
Other items (net)	−12,896.9	−9,539.8	−9,760.7	−24.3%	+3,136.2
Narrow money (M1)	27,916.4	35,592.8	36,121.8	+29.4%	+8,205.4
Broad money (M2)	44,516.8	56,085.2	57,334.6	+28.8%	+12,817.8
Foreign currency deposits	13,337.2	16,043.5	15,493.3	+16.2%	+2,156.1
Currency in circulation	7,730.8	9,119.9	9,394.0	+21.5%	+1,663.2
Reserve money (M0)	13,717.6	17,245.9	17,127.7	+24.9%	+3,410.1
Extended broad money (M3)	57,854.0	72,128.7	72,827.9	+25.9%	+14,973.9

Table 3.2. Source: BoT MER Table 2.2.1 and Table A3; "change y/y" is TICGL/TERI arithmetic. Banks' net foreign assets turned negative (net foreign liabilities).

M3 and Credit to the Private Sector, Sep-25 to Sep-26

TZS billion (bars) and private credit as % of M3 (line, right axis). Credit's share of M3 rose from 72.6% to 77.4%. Source: BoT MER Table A3; TICGL/TERI calc.

What Moved M3 Over the Year: Counterparts

TZS billion, Sep-25 to Sep-26. Private credit +14,360; net foreign assets −2,744; total M3 +14,974. TICGL/TERI calc. from Table 2.2.1.

Credit by sector

Sector (annual growth, %)	Apr-26	May-26	Jun-26	Jul-26	Aug-26	Sep-26
Transport and communication	39.7	44.6	59.5	66.0	77.2	78.3
Trade	44.2	35.0	46.4	43.5	47.1	52.5
Agriculture	30.5	30.9	30.1	37.3	38.4	41.9
Mining and quarrying	39.7	19.8	39.9	65.2	75.9	35.2
Building and construction	20.6	25.4	34.4	38.9	41.8	34.3
Hotels and restaurants	6.0	−2.9	0.9	25.1	24.6	32.7
Personal	17.7	20.0	21.8	24.7	24.9	23.1
Manufacturing	4.2	3.3	8.3	5.1	12.9	17.7

Table 3.3. Source: BoT MER Table 2.2.2.

Credit Growth by Sector: April vs September 2026

Annual growth, %. Transport & communication and hotels accelerate; mining and construction slow in September after peaks in August. Source: BoT MER Table 2.2.2.

Share of Bank Credit by Activity, September 2026

% of outstanding private-sector credit. Personal loans 33.9%, trade 15.6%, agriculture 13.7%; all other activities 36.8% (residual). Source: BoT MER Chart 2.2.6.

Financial Depth: Private Credit to GDP and Credit Growth, 2018–2025

Percent. Credit to GDP rose from 13.8% to 19.1% in seven years; credit growth hit 23.6% in 2025. Source: BoT MER Table A1.

Reading

Credit growth of 34.2% compares with nominal GDP growth of 10.4% in 2025 and M3 growth of 25.9% against 4.3% inflation. Lending is deepening (credit to GDP 19.1% in 2025), which is positive, but it is concentrated in fast-growing transport and communication, trade and agriculture books, banks' net foreign position has turned negative, and the review publishes no non-performing-loan data. Credit quality, not credit volume, is the next number to watch.

04 — Financial MarketsLiquid Markets, Falling Short Yields and a Newly Open Door for Foreign Investors

Government securities markets stayed vibrant in September 2026. The Bank ran two Treasury bill auctions (tender TZS 678.3 billion) that drew bids of TZS 1,205 billion, of which TZS 654.6 billion were accepted, so the overall weighted yield stayed at 4.85%. Three Treasury bond auctions (5, 10 and 15-year; tender TZS 535.8 billion in total) attracted TZS 1,267.2 billion of bids and accepted TZS 489.7 billion.

T-bill bid cover

1.78x

bids TZS 1,205B ÷ tender 678.3B

T-bond bid cover

2.36x

bids TZS 1,267.2B ÷ tender 535.8B

10-year yield

10.69%

13.74% in Sep-25

Interbank turnover

TZS 4,791.7B

from 4,566.2B; 7-day = 62%

September 2026 Auctions: Tender, Bids and Accepted

TZS billion. Treasury bills and bonds were oversubscribed; 39% of bond bids and 54% of bill bids were accepted (TICGL calc.). Source: BoT MER section 2.4.

Treasury Bond Yield Curve: Sep-25 vs Sep-26

Weighted average yield, %. Yields fell by up to 3.8 points (2-year); the 10-year fell 3.05 points and the 7-year is unchanged. Source: BoT MER Table A4.

Treasury Bill Yields by Tenor: Sep-25 vs Sep-26

%. The bill curve has steepened: 35-day fell from 6.20% to 2.41% while 364-day rose from 5.99% to 6.38%. Source: BoT MER Table A4.

Bond Yields Over Time: 5, 10, 15 and 20-Year

%, Sep-25 to Sep-26. Long yields fell steadily until March–April 2026 and then edged back up. Source: BoT MER Table A4.

Yield (%)	Sep-25	Dec-25	Mar-26	Jun-26	Aug-26	Sep-26	Change y/y (pts)
35-day bill	6.20	5.38	4.20	2.82	2.11	2.41	−3.79
91-day bill	6.81	5.93	4.23	3.56	3.42	3.40	−3.41
182-day bill	6.56	5.91	5.69	4.98	5.12	5.11	−1.45
364-day bill	5.99	6.24	5.80	6.65	6.70	6.38	+0.39
Overall T-bill rate	6.03	5.87	5.21	4.83	4.86	4.85	−1.18
2-year bond	12.17	10.05	8.36	8.36	8.40	8.40	−3.77
5-year bond	12.48	10.54	10.54	9.54	9.54	9.53	−2.95
10-year bond	13.74	12.45	11.30	10.39	10.87	10.69	−3.05
15-year bond	13.91	12.08	10.78	10.39	10.55	10.79	−3.12
25-year bond	13.19	13.19	11.99	11.89	11.48	11.48	−1.71
Overall interbank rate	6.45	6.29	6.32	6.00	6.67	6.67	+0.22

Table 4.1. Percent. Source: BoT MER Table A4; "change y/y" is TICGL/TERI arithmetic.

Interbank Cash Market Rates by Tenor, September 2026

%. Short tenors cluster near the CBR of 6.25%; the 181-day-and-above bucket is stuck at 12.00%. Source: BoT MER Table A4.

Overnight and Overall Interbank Rate vs the CBR

%, Sep-25 to Sep-26. Overall interbank rate moved up with the July 2026 CBR increase. Source: BoT MER Table A4.

Foreign exchange

The interbank foreign exchange market was stable, helped by commodity-export and tourism inflows. Turnover reached USD 151.7 million and the Bank sold only USD 7.2 million to smooth volatility. The shilling averaged TZS 2,654.91 per USD (TZS 2,657.01 in August), an annual depreciation of 7.4% that the BoT attributes largely to a base effect from a sharp appreciation in September 2025.

Exchange Rate, 2018–2025 and September 2026

TZS per USD: annual average, end-period, and September 2026 average (2,654.91). Source: BoT MER Table A1 and section 2.4.

Foreign Exchange Market in September 2026

USD million. Turnover USD 151.7M against BoT net sales of just USD 7.2M, i.e. 4.7% of volume (TICGL calc.). Source: BoT MER section 2.4.

Policy spotlight: Tanzania opens Government securities to the world

On 17 July 2026, the Foreign Exchange (Amendment) Regulations, 2026 (Government Notice No. 206 of 2026) replaced Regulation 20 of the 2022 Regulations, removing geographical restrictions and the minimum holding period on Government securities. The reform follows competitive bond auctions (January 2025), an Electronic Matching System for the interbank FX market (May 2026) and the Tanzania Sovereign Yield Curve (August 2026).

The BoT expects more competition at auctions, lower borrowing costs, longer-dated issuance, deeper secondary liquidity, better price discovery, higher reserves and a shift of exchange-rate risk to investors. The risks it names are abrupt outflows, reserve losses and higher yields; benefits depend on low inflation, fiscal discipline, adequate reserves and transparent markets.

Stage of capital-account opening	Who gained access to Government securities	Conditions
2014	EAC residents	Ceiling of 40% of each issue; 12-month restriction on transfer to Tanzanian residents
2022 Regulations	SADC residents and the diaspora added	Holding period shortened to six months
17 July 2026 (GN 206)	Rest of the world	No geographical restriction; no minimum holding period

Table 4.2. Source: BoT MER, "Tanzania Opens Further to Global Capital".

Reading

Yields at 10–15 years are about 3 points lower than a year ago and the market is oversubscribed, so the opening comes at a favourable moment. The bill curve has flipped from inverted to upward sloping, and the 10-year yield is still 4.4 points above the CBR. The test of the reform is whether foreign money arrives into this curve without a sudden reversal when oil, or US yields, move.

05 — Fiscal OperationsA Strong Revenue Start to 2026/27, With Interest and Recurrent Costs Running Hot

Mainland government collections reached TZS 3,502.2 billion in July 2026, 9.5% above the TZS 3,198.4 billion estimate. Central government revenue was TZS 3,354.9 billion (95.8% of the total). Spending was TZS 3,572.5 billion: TZS 2,779.6 billion recurrent and TZS 792.9 billion development. The 2026/27 budget envisages TZS 46.2 trillion of revenue and TZS 54.5 trillion of spending, leaving a deficit of TZS 7.7 trillion after grants.

Total revenue, July

TZS 3,502.2B

+9.5% vs estimate

Tax revenue

TZS 2,877.0B

+11.8% vs TZS 2,574.5B estimate

Interest payments

TZS 564.9B

+33.7% vs estimate; 15.8% of spending

Development spending

TZS 792.9B

−7.4% vs estimate; 22.2% of spending

July 2026 (TZS billion)	Estimate	Actual	Gap	Gap %
Total revenue (incl. LGAs)	3,198.4	3,502.2	+303.8	+9.5%
Central government revenue	3,054.7	3,354.9	+300.2	+9.8%
Tax revenue	2,574.5	2,877.0	+302.5	+11.8%
Taxes on imports	1,020.5	1,163.4	+142.9	+14.0%
Taxes on local goods and services	453.7	638.2	+184.6	+40.7%
Income taxes	910.6	862.6	−48.0	−5.3%
Other taxes	189.8	212.8	+23.0	+12.1%
Non-tax revenue	480.2	477.9	−2.3	−0.5%
LGA own sources	143.7	147.3	+3.6	+2.5%
Total expenditure	3,376.9	3,572.5	+195.6	+5.8%
Recurrent expenditure	2,521.0	2,779.6	+258.6	+10.3%
Wages and salaries	1,254.9	1,164.4	−90.5	−7.2%
Interest payments	422.5	564.9	+142.4	+33.7%
Domestic interest	192.2	383.8	+191.6	+99.7%
Foreign interest	230.3	181.1	−49.2	−21.4%
Other goods, services and transfers	843.6	1,050.2	+206.7	+24.5%
Development and net lending	855.9	792.9	−63.0	−7.4%
Local	519.3	521.0	+1.7	+0.3%
Foreign	336.7	271.9	−64.7	−19.2%
Balance before grants	−178.6	−70.3	+108.3	—
Grants (project)	103.5	75.7	−27.8	−26.8%
Balance after grants (cheques issued)	−75.1	+5.4	+80.5	—
Overall balance (after cash adjustments of TZS 476.2B)	−75.1	+486.2	+561.3	—

Table 5.1. TZS billion, Tanzania Mainland, cheques issued basis. Source: BoT MER Table A2; gap columns are TICGL/TERI arithmetic. The review text cites 9.8% for "tax collections", which matches central-government revenue (see Data Notes).

July 2026 Revenue by Source: Estimate vs Actual

TZS billion. Local VAT and excise (+41%) and import taxes (+14%) carried the beat; income tax missed by 5%. Source: BoT MER Table A2.

July 2026 Spending: Estimate vs Actual

TZS billion. Wages were under estimate; interest and other recurrent spending overshot; development fell short. Source: BoT MER Table A2.

How July Was Financed

TZS billion. Foreign financing of +1,094.8 (including program loans of 1,164.1) funded a repayment of domestic debt (−1,581.0, of which banks −1,864.5). Source: BoT MER Table A2.

Composition of July Spending: Estimate vs Actual

% of total expenditure. Interest rises to 15.8% of spending against 12.5% planned; development is 22.2% against 25.3% planned. TICGL calc. from Table A2.

The 2026/27 budget in one table

Budget 2026/27 (TZS trillion)	Amount	Share
Taxes on imports	13.47	29.1%
Income taxes	14.48	31.3%
Taxes on local goods and services	6.83	14.8%
Other taxes	2.47	5.3%
Non-tax revenue	7.02	15.2%
LGA own sources	1.97	4.3%
Total revenue	46.23	100%

Budget 2026/27 (TZS trillion)	Amount	Share
Wages and salaries	14.09	25.9%
Interest payments	6.86	12.6%
Other goods, services, transfers	14.25	26.1%
Development and net lending	19.30	35.4%
Total expenditure	54.50	100%

Table 5.2. Source: BoT MER Table A2; shares are TICGL/TERI arithmetic. Financing: foreign net TZS 4.43 trillion, domestic net TZS 3.27 trillion (deficit after grants TZS 7.71 trillion). Grants TZS 0.56 trillion.

2026/27 Budget Revenue by Source

TZS trillion. Income tax and import taxes provide 60% of the TZS 46.2 trillion. Source: BoT MER Table A2.

2026/27 Budget Spending and Financing

TZS trillion. Development of 19.3 is financed 72% locally; interest of 6.9 is 12.6% of spending. Source: BoT MER Table A2.

Medium-term fiscal trend

Revenue, Current and Development Spending, % of GDP

Fiscal years 2018/19 to 2025/26 (provisional). Revenue has risen from 13.8% to 17.2% of GDP while current spending rose from 10.3% to 12.9%. Source: BoT MER Table A1.

Budget Deficit, % of GDP

Overall balance (after grants) and balance excluding grants. The overall deficit narrowed to 2.7% of GDP in 2025/26. Source: BoT MER Table A1.

Reading

Revenue is the good news: tax performance is up on the estimate and the revenue-to-GDP ratio has risen 3.4 points in seven years. The costs to watch are interest (domestic interest was almost double its estimate in July) and recurrent spending outside wages. July's overall surplus is not a trend: it reflects TZS 1.09 trillion of foreign financing, mostly program loans, and a TZS 476.2 billion cash adjustment.

06 — Debt & ArrearsNational Debt USD 52.3 Billion: Stable Stock, Doubling Arrears

The national debt stock was USD 52,344.2 million at end-September 2026 (USD 52,341.1 million in August). External debt was USD 36,784.2 million (70.3%), of which 83.4% is public. Domestic debt was TZS 41.1 trillion. In September, external disbursements were USD 234.3 million and debt service USD 171.9 million (principal USD 122.0 million, interest USD 49.9 million).

National debt

USD 52.3B

external 70.3%

External debt

USD 36.8B

+6.6% y/y; public 83.4%

Domestic debt

TZS 41.1T

+9.8% y/y

External arrears

USD 1.20B

+105% in 12 months

External debt

Creditor (USD million)	Sep-25	Share	Aug-26	Sep-26	Share	Change y/y
Multilateral	20,230.1	58.6%	21,899.2	21,892.2	59.5%	+8.2%
Commercial	12,042.8	34.9%	12,721.4	12,677.7	34.5%	+5.3%
Bilateral	1,559.3	4.5%	1,561.1	1,547.4	4.2%	−0.8%
Export credit	677.8	2.0%	666.4	666.9	1.8%	−1.6%
External debt stock	34,510.1	100%	36,848.2	36,784.2	100%	+6.6%

Table 6.1. Includes interest arrears. Source: BoT MER Table 2.6.2; "change y/y" is TICGL/TERI arithmetic.

External Debt by Creditor: Sep-25 vs Sep-26

USD million, including interest arrears. Multilateral lenders hold 59.5%; commercial 34.5%. Source: BoT MER Table 2.6.2.

Disbursed External Debt: Monthly Stock

USD million, Sep-25 to Sep-26, by borrower. Central government 84%; private sector 16%. Source: BoT MER Table A10.

Currency Composition of External Debt

USD million. The US dollar is 65.3% (23,788.8), the euro 18.1% (6,580.8), the yuan 6.7% (2,450.2), other 10.0% (3,634.5). Source: BoT MER Table A10.

Where External Debt Went: Use of Funds, Sep-26

USD million. Balance-of-payments and budget support 23.2%, transport and telecommunication 21.0%, social welfare and education 19.3%. Source: BoT MER Table A10.

External Debt: Disbursements vs Debt Service

USD million per month. Principal repayments (bars) and interest compared with disbursements (line). Net transfers were negative in October 2025, February and April 2026. Source: BoT MER Table A10.

Net Flows and Net Transfers on External Debt

USD million per month. Net flows (disbursements less principal) stayed positive except April 2026. Source: BoT MER Table A10.

External arrears: the quiet risk

Arrears (USD million)	Sep-25	Dec-25	Mar-26	Jun-26	Aug-26	Sep-26	Change y/y
Principal arrears	401.8	458.9	492.0	622.6	754.3	867.5	+115.9%
Commercial	184.5	211.8	240.4	317.9	441.1	549.6	+197.9%
Bilateral	175.0	184.0	188.0	197.3	198.8	198.8	+13.6%
Export credit	41.7	62.3	62.9	94.2	100.8	104.9	+151.6%
Multilateral	0.7	0.8	0.7	13.2	13.6	14.2	—
Interest arrears	182.3	209.9	224.1	274.6	311.4	329.9	+81.0%
Total arrears	584.1	668.8	716.1	897.2	1,065.6	1,197.4	+105.0%

Table 6.2. Source: BoT MER Table A10 item 10; "change y/y" is TICGL/TERI arithmetic. Interest arrears here equal the sum of creditor interest arrears (USD 329.9M) and tie to Table 2.6.2 (80.6 + 24.7 + 182.6 + 42.0).

External Debt Arrears: Principal and Interest

USD million, Sep-25 to Sep-26. Total arrears have risen every month; the pace quickened from May 2026. Source: BoT MER Table A10.

Principal Arrears by Creditor

USD million. Commercial arrears tripled from USD 184.5M to USD 549.6M; export-credit arrears more than doubled. Source: BoT MER Table A10.

Why arrears matter

Arrears are 3.3% of the external debt stock, a small share, but they have grown 8–14% a month since May against a debt stock growing 6.6% a year, and the largest increase is on commercial debt. They sit alongside a debt-service bill that, per the budget, includes TZS 6.9 trillion of interest. A rising arrears number signals payment-processing or liquidity frictions that can raise the cost of future borrowing before it raises default risk.

Domestic debt

TZS trillion	Sep-25	Share	Aug-26	Sep-26	Share	Change y/y
Treasury bonds	30.30	80.9%	34.79	34.80	84.6%	+14.8%
Treasury bills	2.06	5.5%	1.79	1.90	4.6%	−7.9%
Government stocks	0.14	0.4%	0.14	0.14	0.3%	−0.1%
Overdraft (BoT)	4.94	13.2%	4.18	4.29	10.4%	−13.3%
Domestic debt (excl. liquidity papers)	37.46	100%	40.90	41.11	100%	+9.8%

Table 6.3. Securities TZS 36.83 trillion (89.6%). Source: BoT MER Table 2.6.5; TICGL/TERI arithmetic. Components may not sum exactly to totals (rounding, other liabilities of TZS 0.02 trillion in Sep-25).

Domestic Debt by Holder: Sep-25 vs Sep-26

TZS trillion. Banks (28.5%) and pension funds (27.4%) hold more than half. Source: BoT MER Table 2.6.6.

Domestic Debt by Instrument: Sep-25 vs Sep-26

TZS trillion. Bonds are now 84.6% of the stock; the overdraft has shrunk to 10.4%. Source: BoT MER Table 2.6.5.

In September the Government raised TZS 356 billion from the domestic market (TZS 178 billion in Treasury bonds and TZS 178 billion in 364-day bills) and paid domestic debt service of TZS 556.4 billion: TZS 250.8 billion principal and TZS 305.6 billion interest.

Going deeper

A separate TICGL/TERI analysis, Tanzania National Debt Overview, expresses the whole stock in TZS trillion, combines domestic and external debt, and tests sustainability scenarios.

07 — External SectorExports +19.9%, Imports +24.0%: Oil Widens the Deficit, Gold and Tourism Cushion It

The current account deficit widened to USD 2,397.5 million in the year to September 2026 from USD 1,879.3 million (+27.6%) as imports outpaced exports. The September month itself showed a surplus of USD 421.2 million (a deficit of USD 252.5 million a year earlier), as goods exports reached USD 1,504.1 million and services receipts USD 1,017.5 million. Reserves were USD 6,031.9 million, 4.3 months of projected imports.

Current account (USD million)	12m to Sep-24	12m to Sep-25	12m to Sep-26p	Change y/y	Sep-25 month	Sep-26 month
Goods account	−5,928.7	−4,596.3	−6,241.2	+35.8%	−573.8	−318.5
Exports of goods	8,226.5	10,060.1	12,444.9	+23.7%	1,013.1	1,504.1
Imports of goods	14,155.2	14,656.4	18,686.1	+27.5%	1,586.9	1,822.6
Services account	4,062.9	4,315.9	5,172.2	+19.8%	433.0	729.3
Receipts	6,667.1	7,508.3	8,620.2	+14.8%	703.5	1,017.5
Payments	2,604.2	3,192.4	3,448.1	+8.0%	270.6	288.2
Goods and services balance	−1,865.8	−280.4	−1,069.0	3.8x	−140.8	+410.8
Exports of goods and services	14,893.6	17,568.5	21,065.1	+19.9%	1,716.6	2,521.6
Imports of goods and services	16,759.4	17,848.9	22,134.2	+24.0%	1,857.4	2,110.8
Primary income	−1,735.4	−2,073.6	−2,089.8	+0.8%	−137.6	−123.0
Secondary income	585.2	474.6	761.4	+60.4%	26.0	133.4
Current account balance	−3,016.0	−1,879.3	−2,397.5	+27.6%	−252.5	+421.2

Table 7.1. Source: BoT MER Table 2.7.1. The review writes the Sep-25 monthly goods and services exports as USD 1,716.6M; the 12-month totals use the table values. Exports include adjustments for informal cross-border trade.

Exports and Imports of Goods and Services, 12 Months to September

USD million and the current account balance (line). Exports grew USD 3.5B but imports grew USD 4.3B. Source: BoT MER Table 2.7.1.

What Widened the Deficit? Changes From the Year to Sep-25

USD million, year to Sep-26 vs year to Sep-25. Petroleum imports (+1,600.5) outweigh gold (+1,403.3) and tourism and transport receipts. Source: BoT MER; TICGL/TERI arithmetic.

Exports: gold and manufactures lead

Gold and Manufactured Goods Exports

USD million, 12 months to September. Gold rose 31.7% to USD 5,834.5M (47% of goods exports); manufactures 42.4% to USD 2,202.4M. Source: BoT MER Chart 2.7.2.

Services Receipts by Category

USD million, 12 months to September. Travel USD 4,565.8M (+4.1%); transport USD 3,478.7M (+30.3%) on transit trade; other USD 575.7M. Source: BoT MER Chart 2.7.3.

Traditional exports were led by tobacco, while coffee and cashew nuts fell despite remaining key cash crops. Monthly goods exports reached USD 1,504.1 million in September 2026 (USD 1,013.1 million in September 2025), mainly on gold.

Imports: industrial supplies and petroleum

Select imports (USD million, 12m to Sep)	2025	2026p	Change	Change %
Industrial supplies	5,279.5	5,843.9	+564.4	+10.7%
White petroleum products	2,213.1	3,813.6	+1,600.5	+72.3%
Freight	1,318.6	1,706.6	+388.0	+29.4%
Industrial transport equipment	1,240.8	1,615.8	+375.0	+30.2%
Machinery and mechanical appliances	1,123.6	1,572.1	+448.5	+39.9%
Parts and accessories	1,175.6	1,393.8	+218.2	+18.6%
Electrical machinery and equipment	483.1	712.3	+229.2	+47.4%

Table 7.2. Source: BoT MER Chart 2.7.4; "change" columns are TICGL/TERI arithmetic. Petroleum is about 20% of goods imports.

Select Imports: 12 Months to Sep-25 vs Sep-26

USD million. Machinery, transport equipment and electrical equipment reflect public and private investment. Source: BoT MER Chart 2.7.4.

Service Receipts vs Payments

USD million, 12 months to September. Receipts 6,667.1 → 7,508.3 → 8,620.2; payments 2,604.2 → 3,192.4 → 3,448.1 (+8.0% in 2026, driven by freight). Source: BoT MER Table 2.7.1.

Eight years of balance-of-payments history

Goods Exports, Goods Imports and the Current Account, 2018–2025

USD million. Goods exports have grown 2.4 times since 2018; the current account deficit peaked at USD 5.5B in 2022 and narrowed to USD 2.0B in 2025. Source: BoT MER Table A1.

Gross Reserves and Import Cover, 2018–2025

USD million (bars) and months of imports (line, right axis). End-September 2026: USD 6,031.9M and 4.3 months, against USD 6,329.0M and 4.9 months at end-2025. Source: BoT MER Table A1 and section 2.7.

Oil-shock calculator: what a different fuel bill does to the current account

Baseline: current account deficit USD 2,397.5M; white petroleum imports USD 3,813.6M; gold exports USD 5,834.5M; exports of goods and services USD 21,065.1M (12 months to Sep-26). Enter a price change and volume change for petroleum, and a change in gold export earnings. A first-round arithmetic illustration, not a forecast.

Petroleum price change, %

Petroleum volume change, %

Gold export earnings change, %

New petroleum bill, USD M

3,813.6

New deficit, USD M

2,397.5

Deficit, % of exports of G&S

11.4%

Change vs baseline, USD M

0.0

Reading

Every 10% rise in the petroleum import price adds about USD 381 million to the deficit, 16% of the baseline. A 10% change in gold earnings moves it USD 583 million the other way, so gold remains the swing factor. The BoT's 4.3 months of import cover is calculated on projected imports; on the 12-month import bill of USD 22.1 billion, USD 6.0 billion of reserves covers about 3.3 months (TICGL arithmetic), which is why the pace of the import bill matters.

08 — ZanzibarInflation Back to 4.3%, a Growing Current Account Surplus and a Clove-Driven Export Jump

Zanzibar's headline inflation moderated to 4.3% in September 2026 from 5.6% in August, on lower food prices (food is 41.9% of the Zanzibar basket), but it is above the 3.5% of September 2025. Food inflation was 6.9% (9.8% in August); non-food was 2.3%. The current account surplus widened 18.7% to USD 986.8 million.

Headline inflation

4.3%

5.6% in Aug-26; 3.5% in Sep-25

Food inflation

6.9%

9.8% in Aug-26; 4.1% in Sep-25

Current account surplus

USD 986.8M

+18.7%

Clove exports

USD 38.0M

from USD 6.2M; 6.5k tonnes

Zanzibar inflation (annual, %)	Weight	Sep-25	Aug-26	Sep-26	m/m Sep-26
Food and non-alcoholic beverages	41.9	4.7	9.6	6.8	−1.9
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco	0.2	2.7	4.2	4.2	0.0
Clothing and footwear	6.3	5.6	1.5	1.5	0.0
Housing, water, electricity, gas and fuels	25.8	1.1	1.0	1.3	−0.3
Furnishings and household maintenance	4.8	3.7	4.3	4.8	0.5
Health	1.3	1.6	0.9	0.9	0.0
Transport	9.1	2.2	5.2	4.7	0.0
Information and communication	4.2	2.7	0.3	0.3	0.0
Recreation, sport and culture	1.1	6.2	3.0	1.2	0.0
Education	1.6	3.8	1.1	1.1	0.0
Restaurants and accommodation	1.4	1.6	6.2	6.2	0.0
Insurance and financial services	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Personal care and miscellaneous	1.7	5.8	1.1	0.8	0.1
All items (headline)	100.0	3.5	5.6	4.3	−1.0
Food (selected group)	40.5	4.1	9.8	6.9	−2.0
Non-food	59.5	2.9	2.2	2.3	−0.1

Table 8.1. Base July 2022 = 100. Source: BoT MER Table 3.1.1 (Office of the Chief Government Statistician). The review text describes monthly headline inflation as "1 percent"; the table shows −1.0%, which is used here.

Zanzibar Inflation by Group: Sep-25, Aug-26, Sep-26

Annual %. Food is the driver of the August peak and the September decline; restaurants and transport stay elevated. Source: BoT MER Table 3.1.1.

Headline, Food and Non-Food: Sep-25 to Sep-26

Annual %. Headline 3.5% to 5.6% to 4.3%; food 4.1% to 9.8% to 6.9%; non-food steady at 2.2–2.9%. Source: BoT MER Table 3.1.1.

Zanzibar budget in September 2026

September 2026	TZS billion	Note
Resource envelope	210.4	92.8% of the monthly target
Domestic revenue	200.9	95.5% of the envelope; 92.9% of target
Tax revenue	173.7	86.4% of domestic revenue; 91.6% of target; VAT, local excise and income tax were strong
Non-tax revenue	27.3	2.4% above target
Grants	9.5	Balance of the envelope (TICGL arithmetic)
Total expenditure	494.5	Consistent with available resources
Development spending	355.9	72% of spending; 77.8% domestically financed

Table 8.2. Source: BoT MER section 3.2.

Zanzibar's external sector

USD million	12m to Sep-25	12m to Sep-26p	Change	Sep-26 month
Goods account (net)	−532.2	−768.5	+44.4%	−49.5
Exports of goods	35.2	65.0	+84.9%	1.9
Imports of goods (f.o.b)	567.4	833.5	+46.9%	51.4
Services account (net)	1,470.1	1,733.6	+17.9%	169.7
Receipts	1,573.8	1,799.4	+14.3%	174.7
Payments	103.7	65.9	−36.5%	5.0
Exports of goods and services	1,609.0	1,864.4	+15.9%	176.6
Imports of goods and services	671.1	899.4	+34.0%	56.4
Primary income (net)	9.4	17.1	+82.8%	3.0
Secondary income (net)	1.1	4.6	>100%	1.1
Current account balance	831.4	986.8	+18.7%	69.4

Table 8.3. Source: BoT MER Table 3.3.1.

Zanzibar Current Account Components

USD million, 12 months to September. A services surplus of USD 1.7B offsets a goods deficit of USD 0.8B. Source: BoT MER Table 3.3.1.

Zanzibar Goods Exports, 12 Months to Sep-26

USD million, total 65.0. Cloves are 58.4% (up from USD 6.2M), "other" 20.1%, manufactured goods 17.7% (−36.1%). Source: BoT MER Table 3.3.2.

Zanzibar Goods Imports by Type

USD million, 12 months to September. Capital goods rose from USD 81.2M to 228.3M (machinery 84.2, transport equipment 78.6, electrical 48.2). Source: BoT MER Table 3.3.3.

Clove Exports: Value, Volume and Price

12 months to September. Value USD 6.2M to 38.0M; volume 1.1 to 6.5 thousand tonnes; unit price steady near USD 4,000–4,050 a tonne. Source: BoT MER Table 3.3.2.

Reading

Zanzibar's surplus rests on services (tourism-led receipts of USD 1.8 billion) and, this year, a cyclical clove harvest. Capital-goods imports have almost tripled, which is a positive investment signal but adds to the import bill. The inflation story mirrors the mainland's: food relief is real, but transport at 4.7% and restaurants at 6.2% are above the 4.3% headline.

09 — Outlook & PolicyWhat to Watch Between Now and the Next Monetary Policy Committee Meeting

The BoT expects inflation to remain elevated in the coming months, with Middle East tensions and El Niño-related Vuli rains as pressures, but to stay within the national target and regional benchmarks, helped by food-crop surpluses from the 2025/26 harvest. The review states that the global energy shock is the main external risk and that tighter policy is possible if price pressures persist. The Central Bank Rate was raised to 6.25% for the quarter ending September 2026. This tab sets out TICGL/TERI's reading of what to track.

Headline inflation under alternative food and transport paths

Implied Headline Inflation: Food and Transport Scenarios

%. CPI-weighted approximation (food 28.2%, transport 14.1%, housing and utilities held at 2.5%, all other groups at 2.0%). Transport inflation 14.0% today; the dotted line is the 5% ceiling of the target band. TICGL/TERI illustration, not a BoT projection.

Watch-list: indicators, thresholds and why they matter

Indicator	Latest	Level that would change the reading	Why
Headline inflation	4.3%	Above 5% (target ceiling)	Triggers a second tightening debate; food 6.5% with transport at 14% gets there
Core inflation	4.1%	Rising for a fourth month	Core is 3.1 of the 4.3 points; services inflation is 6.1%
Crude oil (average)	USD 102.3	Sustained above USD 100	Each 10% on the petroleum bill is about USD 0.38B on the current account
Private credit growth	34.2%	Above 30% with falling reserves	Credit is 96% of M3 growth; banks' net foreign assets are negative
Reserves / import cover	USD 6.0B / 4.3 months	Below 4 months	Down from 4.9 months at end-2025 as the import bill rises
External arrears	USD 1.20B	Beyond USD 1.5B	Increasing about USD 100M a month; commercial arrears lead
Interest share of spending	15.8% (July)	Above the 12.6% budgeted	Domestic interest was double the July estimate
Gold prices	USD 4,319/oz	Below USD 4,000	Gold is USD 5.8B, 47% of goods exports
Foreign portfolio inflows	Not yet reported	First reports after GN 206	Open access could lower yields or raise outflow risk

Table 9.1. Thresholds are TICGL/TERI judgements, not official targets. Latest values: BoT MER October 2026.

Policy implications

Monetary and financial policy

Keep the CBR under review while core inflation is at 4.1% and credit grows at 34%.
Publish non-performing-loan and sector-concentration data alongside the credit tables.
Prepare liquidity tools for the first foreign-investor flows into Government securities.

Fiscal and debt management

Clear commercial and export-credit arrears early; they have tripled and doubled respectively.
Watch domestic interest: TZS 383.8 billion in July against TZS 192.2 billion planned.
Keep program-loan inflows from masking recurrent overshoots.

External and energy

Diversify fuel procurement and storage to dampen the transport-inflation channel.
Protect gold-purchase accumulation as a reserves buffer.
Support manufactured and service exports, which are growing faster than traditional crops.

Investors and businesses

Price in higher transport costs and a 15.5% lending rate; a falling bill yield does not reach borrowers.
Foreign investors can now buy Government securities with no holding period; model FX and exit risk.
Importers should hedge fuel-linked costs; exporters benefit from stable FX.

Talk to TICGL/TERI

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10 — Sources & Data NotesMethod, Definitions and Reconciliation Notes

Basis

Source report. Bank of Tanzania, Monthly Economic Review, October 2026 (data to September 2026), covering global developments, Tanzania Mainland inflation, monetary policy, financial markets, budget operations, debt and the external sector, Zanzibar, and the Statistical Tables (A1–A10). Calculations. Contributions, shares, gaps, ratios, changes over 12 months, scenario and calculator results are TICGL/TERI arithmetic on published figures. The page is a detailed companion to the review and does not replace it.

Definitions and reconciliation notes

Item	Treatment on this page
CPI basket and base year	Mainland inflation uses the NBS CPI with base 2020 = 100 (weights: food 28.2%, transport 14.1%). Zanzibar uses base July 2022 = 100 (food 41.9%). The two are not comparable by weight.
Inflation contributions	The BoT decomposition (unprocessed food, energy, core) is quoted for Sep-25 and Sep-26. Group contributions (weight × annual rate) are TICGL/TERI approximations and differ slightly from the official published decomposition.
Tax revenue gap	The review text says taxes beat target by 9.8%; Table A2 gives tax revenue of TZS 2,877.0B against TZS 2,574.5B (+11.8%). The 9.8% matches central-government revenue (TZS 3,354.9B vs 3,054.7B). Table A2 figures are used.
Exports of goods and services, Sep-25	The text gives USD 17,568.9M while Table 2.7.1 shows USD 17,568.5M; the table value is used. Growth is 19.9% either way.
Domestic debt growth	TZS 41.11 trillion vs TZS 37.46 trillion (excluding liquidity papers) is +9.8%.
National and external debt	External debt of USD 36,784.2M includes arrears of USD 329.9M interest; disbursed outstanding debt (USD 36,454.3M in Table A10) plus interest arrears equals the stock in Table 2.6.2. Principal arrears (USD 867.5M) are shown separately as arrears and are already part of disbursed debt.
Import cover	The BoT's 4.3 months uses projected imports of goods and services. The 3.3-month figure on this page uses trailing 12-month imports as a TICGL/TERI cross-check.
Interest rates	Overall deposit rate is 9.02% in the text and 9.03% in Table A4 (rounding).
Zanzibar m/m inflation	The text says monthly headline inflation was "1 percent"; Table 3.1.1 shows −1.0%. The table value is used. Zanzibar food weight is 41.9% in the main groups and 40.5% in the "food" selected group.
Exchange rate	A 7.4% annual depreciation of the shilling (average TZS 2,654.91 per USD) is largely a base effect from September 2025, as stated by the BoT.
Provisional data	2025 annual figures, 2026 fiscal and external data and September 2026 debt are provisional (p) and may be revised. Figures marked "r" are revised.
Not published in the review	Non-performing loans, GDP growth for 2026, and the 2026 Q3 national accounts are not in this issue, so are not estimated here.
Rounding	Totals may differ from component sums by rounding.

Bank of Tanzania (October 2026), Monthly Economic Review, including Tables A1–A10.
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), Consumer Price Index releases, base 2020 = 100; Office of the Chief Government Statistician, Zanzibar.
Ministry of Finance (Tanzania) and Ministry of Finance and Planning (Zanzibar), government operations and debt data.
World Bank, Commodity Price Data (Pink Sheet); IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2026; OECD Economic Outlook, September 2026.
TICGL/TERI calculations on the above.

11 — Quick AnswersFrequently Asked Questions

What was Tanzania's inflation rate in September 2026?

4.3%, unchanged from August and inside the 3–5% target, up from 3.4% a year earlier (Bank of Tanzania). Core inflation was 4.1%, food 3.9%, transport 14.0% and energy, fuel and utilities 7.8%.

Why did inflation stay within target even though fuel prices rose?

Food inflation fell from 7.0% to 3.9% over the year, offsetting transport inflation of 14.0%. On CPI weights, food contributes about 1.1 points to the 4.3% headline (about 2.0 points a year ago) and transport about 2.0 (about 0.3). Food-crop surpluses and moderating energy inflation (7.8% from 8.5%) helped, but core inflation of 4.1% is now the main driver.

What is Tanzania's Central Bank Rate in 2026?

6.25% for the quarter ending September 2026, raised from 5.75% by the Monetary Policy Committee in July 2026 to contain second-round inflation from higher energy, fertilizer and transport costs. The interbank rate is managed inside a 4.75–7.75% corridor.

How fast is private sector credit growing in Tanzania?

34.2% a year to September 2026, to TZS 56.4 trillion. It added TZS 14.4 trillion to money supply (M3, +25.9%) over 12 months. Transport and communication credit grew 78.3%, trade 52.5% and agriculture 41.9%; personal loans remain the largest share at 33.9%.

What happened to Tanzania's current account deficit?

It widened 27.6% to USD 2,397.5 million in the 12 months to September 2026. Imports of goods and services grew 24.0% (petroleum imports +72.3% to USD 3.8 billion) against exports growth of 19.9%, led by gold (USD 5.8 billion). In September alone the account recorded a USD 421.2 million surplus. Reserves were USD 6.0 billion, or 4.3 months of projected imports.

How large is Tanzania's national debt?

USD 52,344.2 million at end-September 2026: external debt of USD 36,784.2 million (70.3%) and domestic debt of TZS 41.1 trillion. External debt arrears doubled in a year to USD 1,197.4 million, led by commercial creditors.

What did the July 2026 Foreign Exchange Amendment Regulations change?

Government Notice No. 206 of 17 July 2026 removed geographical restrictions and the minimum holding period on Government securities, opening Tanzania's Treasury bill and bond market to investors worldwide. The Bank of Tanzania expects deeper liquidity, lower borrowing costs and better price discovery, with risks from abrupt outflows.

What is the Tanzanian shilling exchange rate against the US dollar?

The shilling averaged TZS 2,654.91 per USD in September 2026 (TZS 2,657.01 in August), a marginal appreciation on the month and a 7.4% depreciation on the year, largely a base effect from a sharp appreciation in September 2025.

What is the inflation rate in Zanzibar?

4.3% in September 2026, down from 5.6% in August, on lower food prices (food inflation 6.9% from 9.8%). It was 3.5% in September 2025.

Muhtasari

Muhtasari kwa Kiswahili

Taarifa ya Uchumi wa Tanzania, Oktoba 2026: Kwa mujibu wa Mapitio ya Kila Mwezi ya Uchumi ya Benki Kuu ya Tanzania (Oktoba 2026, takwimu hadi Septemba 2026), bei zimetulia lakini muundo wake umebadilika; mikopo inaongezeka kwa kasi; na hali ya nje imeshinikizwa na mafuta.

Mfumuko wa bei: asilimia 4.3 Septemba 2026, ndani ya lengo la asilimia 3–5 (Septemba 2025 ulikuwa asilimia 3.4). Mfumuko wa bei wa chakula ulishuka kutoka asilimia 7.0 hadi 3.9, lakini wa usafirishaji ulipanda kutoka asilimia 2.1 hadi 14.0, na wa huduma kutoka 1.3 hadi 6.1. Mfumuko wa msingi (core) ni asilimia 4.1, kutoka 2.2, na unachangia pointi 3.1 kati ya 4.3.

Sera ya fedha na mikopo: Kiwango cha Riba cha Benki Kuu (CBR) kiliongezwa hadi asilimia 6.25 kutoka 5.75. Hata hivyo, mikopo kwa sekta binafsi ilikua asilimia 34.2 hadi TZS trilioni 56.4, na ujazo wa fedha (M3) ulikua asilimia 25.9. Mikopo ya usafirishaji na mawasiliano ilikua asilimia 78.3. Mali halisi za kigeni zilishuka asilimia 17.3, na za benki za biashara zimekuwa hasi.

Masoko ya fedha: minada ya hati fungani na bili ilijaa zabuni nyingi (hati fungani za miaka 10 asilimia 10.69, kutoka 13.74). Kuanzia tarehe 17 Julai 2026 (GN Na. 206), hati za Serikali zimefunguliwa kwa wawekezaji wa dunia nzima bila kikomo cha muda wa kushikilia. Shilingi ilikuwa wastani wa TZS 2,654.91 kwa dola.

Bajeti na deni: makusanyo ya Julai 2026 yalikuwa TZS bilioni 3,502.2, asilimia 9.5 juu ya lengo, lakini malipo ya riba yalikuwa asilimia 33.7 juu ya makadirio. Deni la taifa ni USD milioni 52,344.2 (nje asilimia 70.3; ndani TZS trilioni 41.1). Malimbikizo ya madeni ya nje yamezidi mara mbili hadi USD bilioni 1.20, hasa madeni ya kibiashara.

Sekta ya nje: nakisi ya akaunti ya sasa iliongezeka asilimia 27.6 hadi USD milioni 2,397.5 kwa miezi 12. Uagizaji wa bidhaa za mafuta ulipanda asilimia 72.3 hadi USD bilioni 3.8, ukizidi ongezeko la dhahabu (USD bilioni 5.8, +asilimia 31.7). Mauzo ya bidhaa na huduma yaliongezeka asilimia 19.9 hadi USD bilioni 21.1. Akiba ya fedha za kigeni ni USD bilioni 6.0, sawa na miezi 4.3 ya uagizaji.

Zanzibar: mfumuko wa bei ulishuka hadi asilimia 4.3 (kutoka 5.6 Agosti); ziada ya akaunti ya sasa ilikua asilimia 18.7 hadi USD milioni 986.8; mauzo ya karafuu yaliruka hadi USD milioni 38 kutoka 6.2.

Hitimisho na hatua: tofauti na kichwa cha habari, shinikizo zinajengeka chini: mfumuko wa msingi, ukuaji wa mikopo, bili ya mafuta, na malimbikizo ya madeni. Vitu vya kufuatilia: mfumuko juu ya asilimia 5, bei ya mafuta juu ya USD 100, akiba chini ya miezi 4, na ubora wa mikopo.

Mfumuko: 4.3% · Msingi: 4.1% · Usafirishaji: 14.0% · CBR: 6.25%
Mikopo binafsi: +34.2% · M3: +25.9% · Akaunti ya sasa: −USD milioni 2,397.5
Deni la taifa: USD milioni 52,344.2 · Malimbikizo ya nje: USD milioni 1,197.4 (+105%)

Chanzo: Benki Kuu ya Tanzania, Monthly Economic Review, Oktoba 2026; NBS; Wizara ya Fedha; mahesabu ya TICGL/TERI. Kwa maelezo zaidi: economist@ticgl.com.

Scope and units

Prepared by TERI for research and strategic-information purposes; it is not investment, legal, tax or financial advice. Every amount on this page is in TZS trillion unless it is marked USD or TZS billion. The Bank of Tanzania publishes external debt in US dollars and domestic debt in shillings; external amounts are converted at one constant rate so that month-to-month and year-to-year changes show borrowing, repayment and valuation as the Bank reports them in dollars, not exchange-rate noise. A companion page, Tanzania Economic Update, October 2026, covers the rest of the review.

00 — Overview & VerdictExecutive Summary: A Large but Stable Stock, With Pressure in the Plumbing

The answer

Tanzania owes about TZS 138.3 trillion (USD 52.3 billion), and the total did not move in September. National debt was USD 52,344.2 million, against USD 52,341.1 million in August. External debt is TZS 97.19 trillion (70.3%) and domestic debt TZS 41.11 trillion (29.7%). At a constant exchange rate the total is 128.6 trillion a year earlier, so the stock is up about 7.5% in twelve months.

The creditor mix is lenient at the top and pricier at the margin. Multilateral lenders hold TZS 57.84 trillion (59.5% of external debt); commercial lenders TZS 33.50 trillion (34.5%). At home, Treasury bonds are TZS 34.80 trillion (84.6% of domestic debt), and banks and pension funds hold 55.9% of the stock.

Arrears are the warning light. External arrears doubled from USD 584.1 million to USD 1,197.4 million (TZS 1.54 trillion to TZS 3.16 trillion). Commercial principal arrears almost tripled, from TZS 0.49 trillion to TZS 1.45 trillion.

The cost is rising inside the budget. The 2026/27 budget carries TZS 6.86 trillion of interest (14.8% of revenue) and TZS 7.84 trillion of principal repayments. In July, interest ran 33.7% above the estimate and domestic interest almost doubled.

National debt

TZS 138.3T

USD 52,344.2M; flat vs Aug-26

External debt

TZS 97.2T

USD 36,784.2M; +6.6% y/y (USD)

Domestic debt

TZS 41.1T

+9.8% y/y; 89.6% securities

External arrears

TZS 3.2T

USD 1,197.4M; +105% y/y

External debt service, 12m

TZS 7.0T

USD 2,658.3M; 12.6% of exports of goods & services

External debt ÷ exports

175%

USD 36.8B ÷ USD 21.1B exports of goods & services

Budgeted interest 2026/27

TZS 6.86T

12.6% of spending; 14.8% of revenue

Undisbursed external debt

TZS 39.7T

USD 15,011.6M committed, not yet drawn

National Debt, TZS Trillion: External and Domestic

TZS trillion. External amounts converted at one constant rate (TZS 2,642.26/USD) to remove valuation noise. Domestic debt excludes liquidity papers. Source: BoT MER Tables 2.6.1, 2.6.5.

Who Holds Tanzania's Debt? Total TZS 138.3 Trillion

TZS trillion, by creditor or holder, domestic and external combined. Multilateral lenders (57.8) and commercial external lenders (33.5) hold two-thirds. Source: BoT MER Tables 2.6.2, 2.6.6; TICGL/TERI conversion.

External Debt in TZS Trillion at Each Year-End, 2018–2025

TZS trillion, USD stock converted at each year-end exchange rate (BoT Table A1), plus Sep-26 at TZS 2,642.26. The shilling value has risen about 1.9 times since 2018. Source: BoT MER Table A1; TICGL/TERI arithmetic.

Debt Structure Indicators

Percent. Shares of the external and domestic stocks as reported at end-September 2026. Source: BoT MER Tables 2.6.1–2.6.6.

The debt in one table

TZS trillion	Sep-25*	Aug-26	Sep-26	Share Sep-26	Change y/y
External debt (incl. interest arrears)	91.18	97.36	97.19	70.3%	+6.6%
Central government	77.39	81.33	81.11	58.6%	+4.8%
Private sector	13.79	16.04	16.09	11.6%	+16.7%
Domestic debt (excl. liquidity papers)	37.46	40.90	41.11	29.7%	+9.8%
National debt	128.64	138.26	138.30	100%	+7.5%

Table 0.1. *External amounts converted at the constant Sep-26 implied rate (TZS 2,642.26 per USD), so changes are changes in the debt as reported in dollars. Source: BoT MER Tables 2.6.1, 2.6.5; TICGL/TERI arithmetic. In dollars the Bank reports national debt at USD 52,341.1M (Aug-26) and USD 52,344.2M (Sep-26).

Key findings

Stable stock. The total moved by under 0.1% in September: external disbursements of USD 234.3 million (TZS 0.62 trillion) were offset by principal repayments of USD 122.0 million and valuation.
External is the larger and the more concessional half. Multilateral lenders are 59.5% of external debt; 83.4% is owed by central government.
Domestic debt is a bond market. Bonds are 84.6% and bills 4.6% (TZS 1.90 trillion); the central bank overdraft is down 13.3% to TZS 4.29 trillion.
The shilling is a valuation channel. With 65.3% of external debt in US dollars and 18.1% in euros, a 10% depreciation raises the shilling value of external debt by about TZS 9.7 trillion.
Arrears are growing faster than the stock. They are 3.3% of external debt, up from 1.7% a year ago.
The pipeline is large. USD 15.0 billion (TZS 39.7 trillion) of committed loans is still undisbursed, down from USD 19.4 billion a year earlier.

Reading

The stock is large and steady, but the pressure sits in service, not size: dollar-denominated interest, rising commercial arrears and a budget that must roll over TZS 3.3 trillion of domestic principal and repay TZS 4.6 trillion of external principal in 2026/27. The review does not publish debt-to-GDP, so sustainability ratios on this page use exports and budget revenue.

01 — External DebtTZS 97.2 Trillion Owed Abroad: Mostly Multilateral, Mostly Government, Mostly Dollars

External debt held by the public and private sectors was USD 36,784.2 million at end-September 2026, TZS 97.19 trillion at the implied rate. The public sector owes 83.4%. During September the stock was stable: disbursements of USD 234.3 million (largely to the central government) and debt service of USD 171.9 million, of which USD 122.0 million was principal.

Creditor (TZS trillion)	Sep-25	Share	Aug-26	Sep-26	Share	Change y/y
Multilateral	53.45	58.6%	57.86	57.84	59.5%	+8.2%
Commercial	31.82	34.9%	33.61	33.50	34.5%	+5.3%
Bilateral	4.12	4.5%	4.12	4.09	4.2%	-0.8%
Export credit	1.79	2.0%	1.76	1.76	1.8%	-1.6%
External debt stock	91.18	100%	97.36	97.19	100%	+6.6%

Table 1.1. Includes interest arrears. USD amounts × TZS 2,642.26 per USD (constant). Source: BoT MER Table 2.6.2; TICGL/TERI arithmetic.

External Debt by Creditor: Sep-25 vs Sep-26

TZS trillion at a constant rate. Multilateral +4.4, commercial +1.7; bilateral and export credit slightly lower. Source: BoT MER Table 2.6.2.

Disbursed External Debt by Borrower, Monthly

TZS trillion at a constant rate, Sep-25 to Sep-26. Central government TZS 80.9 trillion; private sector TZS 15.4 trillion. Source: BoT MER Table A10.

Currency and purpose

Currency (disbursed debt)	USD M	TZS trillion	Share
US dollar	23,788.8	62.86	65.3%
Euro	6,580.8	17.39	18.1%
Chinese yuan	2,450.2	6.47	6.7%
Other currencies	3,634.5	9.60	10.0%
Disbursed outstanding debt (excl. interest arrears)	36,454.3	96.32	100%

Table 1.2. Source: BoT MER Tables 2.6.4, A10. Shares as reported by the Bank; interest arrears of USD 329.9M are added to reach the USD 36,784.2M stock.

External Debt by Currency, September 2026

TZS trillion, disbursed outstanding debt. A move in the dollar matters 3.6 times as much as a move in the euro. Source: BoT MER Table A10.

What the Money Was Used For, September 2026

TZS trillion, disbursed external debt by use of funds. Budget support is the largest (23.2%), then transport and telecommunications (21.0%) and social services (19.3%). Source: BoT MER Table A10.

Flows: borrowing, repayment and the pipeline

Monthly Disbursements and Debt Service

TZS trillion, Sep-25 to Sep-26 at a constant rate. Disbursements (line) against principal and interest. Total disbursements over Oct-25 to Sep-26: TZS 11.02 trillion; service TZS 7.02 trillion. Source: BoT MER Table A10.

Committed, Disbursed and Undisbursed Loans

TZS trillion, constant rate. Undisbursed commitments fell from 51.4 to 39.7 trillion; the step down in June 2026 (USD 19.6B to 15.5B) coincides with a lower total commitment in the Bank's table. Source: BoT MER Table A10.

Reading

The external debt profile is conventional for a lower-middle-income country: long-dated multilateral money, a one-third commercial layer, and the dollar as the main currency. The trade-off is the commercial layer, which is growing faster than the multilateral layer in arrears terms, and the 65.3% US dollar share that makes the shilling value of debt sensitive to the exchange rate.

02 — Domestic DebtTZS 41.1 Trillion Borrowed at Home: A Bond Market Held by Banks and Pension Funds

The domestic debt stock reached TZS 41.11 trillion at end-September 2026 (TZS 40.90 trillion in August; TZS 37.46 trillion in September 2025, excluding liquidity papers). Commercial banks and pension funds together hold more than half. In September the Government raised TZS 0.356 trillion (TZS 0.178 trillion of bonds and TZS 0.178 trillion of 364-day bills) and paid domestic debt service of TZS 0.556 trillion: TZS 0.251 trillion of principal and TZS 0.306 trillion of interest.

By instrument (TZS trillion)	Sep-25	Share	Aug-26	Sep-26	Share	Change y/y
Treasury bonds	30.30	80.9%	34.79	34.80	84.6%	+14.8%
Treasury bills	2.06	5.5%	1.79	1.90	4.6%	−7.9%
Government stocks	0.14	0.4%	0.14	0.14	0.3%	−0.1%
Government securities (subtotal)	32.50	86.8%	36.72	36.83	89.6%	+13.3%
Overdraft (Bank of Tanzania)	4.94	13.2%	4.18	4.29	10.4%	−13.3%
Domestic debt (excl. liquidity papers)	37.46	100%	40.90	41.11	100%	+9.8%

Table 2.1. Source: BoT MER Table 2.6.5; TICGL/TERI arithmetic. Sep-25 also had TZS 0.02 trillion of other liabilities.

By holder (TZS trillion)	Sep-25	Share	Aug-26	Sep-26	Share	Change y/y
Commercial banks	10.75	28.7%	11.60	11.70	28.5%	+8.8%
Pension funds	10.28	27.4%	11.29	11.26	27.4%	+9.5%
Others (public institutions, companies, individuals, non-residents)	7.07	18.9%	8.03	8.10	19.7%	+14.5%
Bank of Tanzania	6.75	18.0%	7.05	7.16	17.4%	+6.1%
Insurance companies	1.83	4.9%	2.05	2.03	4.9%	+11.2%
BoT special funds	0.78	2.1%	0.87	0.87	2.1%	+10.8%
Domestic debt (excl. liquidity papers)	37.46	100%	40.90	41.11	100%	+9.8%

Table 2.2. Source: BoT MER Table 2.6.6; TICGL/TERI arithmetic.

Domestic Debt by Instrument: Sep-25 vs Sep-26

TZS trillion. Bonds grew TZS 4.5 trillion; the overdraft shrank TZS 0.7 trillion; bills fell TZS 0.2 trillion. Source: BoT MER Table 2.6.5.

Domestic Debt by Holder: Sep-25 vs Sep-26

TZS trillion. Banks and pension funds each hold about TZS 11 trillion; "others" (including non-residents) grew fastest, +14.5%. Source: BoT MER Table 2.6.6.

Share of Domestic Debt by Holder, September 2026

Percent of TZS 41.11 trillion. Banks 28.5%, pension funds 27.4%, others 19.7%, Bank of Tanzania 17.4%, insurers 4.9%, special funds 2.1%. Source: BoT MER Table 2.6.6.

September 2026 Domestic Market Activity

TZS trillion. Raised TZS 0.356; principal repaid 0.251; interest paid 0.306. Net new money after principal TZS 0.105. Source: BoT MER section 2.6.

What domestic borrowing costs

Treasury Bond Yield Curve: Sep-25 vs Sep-26

Yield, %. The curve has dropped up to 3.8 points and the 10-year is 10.69%. Lower yields mean lower interest on new issues, but the stock is mostly older bonds. Source: BoT MER Table A4.

Monthly Interest Bill: Budget Average, July Estimate and July Actual

TZS trillion per month. The 2026/27 budget (domestic 4.03, foreign 2.83, total 6.86 a year) averages 0.572 a month; in July, domestic interest was 0.384 against a 0.192 estimate while foreign interest was 0.181 against 0.230. Source: BoT MER Table A2.

Reading

Domestic debt is growing slower than the economy's nominal money supply (M3 +25.9%), the market is oversubscribed (bond bid cover of 2.4 times in September) and yields are lower, so the domestic side is the most manageable part of the debt. Two things to watch: concentration, as banks and pension funds hold 55.9% of the stock and so cannot easily lend elsewhere, and the opening of Government securities to foreign investors from 17 July 2026, which could change both the holder mix and the exchange-rate exposure.

03 — Debt Service & ArrearsTZS 7.0 Trillion of External Service a Year, and Arrears That Have Doubled

In the twelve months from October 2025 to September 2026, external debt service was USD 2,658.3 million (TZS 7.02 trillion): USD 1,914.8 million of principal and USD 743.5 million of interest. New disbursements were USD 4,171.7 million (TZS 11.02 trillion), so net flows were positive. External arrears, however, rose every month.

External service, 12m

TZS 7.02T

principal 5.06T + interest 1.96T

Disbursements, 12m

TZS 11.02T

1.57 times service

Service ÷ exports

12.6%

of USD 21,065M exports of goods & services

Arrears ÷ external debt

3.3%

1.7% a year ago (USD 584M ÷ 34.5B)

Monthly External Debt Service: Principal and Interest

TZS trillion at a constant rate. Spikes in October and December 2025 (principal) and April and June 2026. Source: BoT MER Table A10.

Net Flows and Net Transfers on External Debt

TZS trillion per month. Net flows = disbursements less principal; net transfers = net flows less interest. Negative only in April 2026 (flows) and October, February and April (transfers). Source: BoT MER Table A10.

Arrears in TZS trillion

Arrears (TZS trillion)	Sep-25	Dec-25	Mar-26	Jun-26	Aug-26	Sep-26	Change y/y
Principal arrears	1.06	1.21	1.30	1.65	1.99	2.29	+115.9%
Commercial	0.49	0.56	0.64	0.84	1.17	1.45	+197.9%
Bilateral	0.46	0.49	0.50	0.52	0.53	0.53	+13.6%
Export credit	0.11	0.16	0.17	0.25	0.27	0.28	+151.6%
Multilateral	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.04	0.04	—
Interest arrears	0.48	0.55	0.59	0.73	0.82	0.87	+81.0%
Total arrears	1.54	1.77	1.89	2.37	2.82	3.16	+105.0%

Table 3.1. USD × TZS 2,642.26 per USD (constant). Source: BoT MER Table A10 item 10; TICGL/TERI arithmetic.

External Arrears: Principal and Interest

TZS trillion, Sep-25 to Sep-26. Total arrears rose from 1.54 to 3.16 trillion; the monthly rise has been 0.2–0.35 trillion since May. Source: BoT MER Table A10.

Principal Arrears by Creditor: Sep-25 vs Sep-26

TZS trillion. Commercial arrears +TZS 0.96 trillion; export credit +0.17; bilateral +0.06; multilateral +0.04. Source: BoT MER Table A10.

Debt-service burden indicators (TICGL/TERI arithmetic)

Indicator	Value	Basis
External debt service ÷ exports of goods and services	12.6%	USD 2,658.3M ÷ USD 21,065.1M, 12 months to Sep-26
External debt ÷ exports of goods and services	174.6%	USD 36,784.2M ÷ USD 21,065.1M
External debt service ÷ gross reserves	44.1%	USD 2,658.3M ÷ USD 6,031.9M
Interest ÷ principal, external service	38.8%	USD 743.5M ÷ USD 1,914.8M
Arrears ÷ external debt stock	3.3%	USD 1,197.4M ÷ USD 36,784.2M (1.7% in Sep-25)
Commercial debt ÷ external debt	34.5%	USD 12,677.7M ÷ USD 36,784.2M

Table 3.2. No sustainability thresholds are asserted; the review does not publish a debt-sustainability analysis.

Why the arrears matter

The arrears stock is small against the TZS 97 trillion of external debt, but its direction is clear: up every month, led by commercial creditors, with principal arrears more than doubling. A build-up of arrears usually reflects processing or foreign-currency liquidity frictions rather than inability to pay, but if it persists it raises the premium commercial lenders ask on new loans and can delay disbursements from the TZS 39.7 trillion pipeline that is still undrawn.

04 — Budget & CalculatorHow the 2026/27 Budget Pays for the Debt, and What a Weaker Shilling Would Add

The 2026/27 budget estimates revenue of TZS 46.23 trillion and spending of TZS 54.50 trillion, a deficit after grants of TZS 7.71 trillion. Debt takes a large slice: TZS 6.86 trillion of interest (TZS 4.03 trillion domestic, TZS 2.83 trillion foreign), plus principal repayments of TZS 4.55 trillion on external loans and TZS 3.29 trillion on domestic debt, which is rolled over.

Debt in the 2026/27 budget (TZS trillion)	Amount	% of revenue	% of spending
Interest payments	6.86	14.8%	12.6%
Domestic interest	4.03	8.7%	7.4%
Foreign interest	2.83	6.1%	5.2%
External principal (amortization)	4.55	9.8%	8.3%
Domestic principal (rolled over)	3.29	7.1%	6.0%
Interest plus principal	14.70	31.8%	27.0%

Table 4.1. Source: BoT MER Table A2; shares are TICGL/TERI arithmetic.

Financing the 2026/27 budget (TZS trillion)	Annual budget	July estimate	July actual
Overall deficit financed (after grants)	7.71	0.08	−0.49 (surplus)
Foreign loans (gross)	8.99	0.23	1.36
Program loans	1.79	0.00	1.16
Development project loans	7.14	0.23	0.20
of which non-concessional	2.43	0.00	0.00
Foreign amortization	−4.55	−0.08	−0.27
Foreign financing (net)	4.43	0.15	1.09
Domestic financing (net)	3.27	−0.08	−1.58
Bank borrowing	2.06	−0.06	−1.86
Non-bank (net of amortization)	1.22	−0.01	0.28
Domestic roll-over borrowing	3.29	0.21	0.08

Table 4.2. Source: BoT MER Table A2. July actual: foreign program loans of TZS 1.16 trillion were 65% of the full-year program-loan budget, and the Government repaid TZS 1.86 trillion to the banking system.

Debt Service in the 2026/27 Budget

TZS trillion. Interest 6.86 plus principal 7.84 = 14.70, or 31.8% of budgeted revenue. Source: BoT MER Table A2.

Where the 2026/27 Borrowing Comes From

TZS trillion. Project loans 7.14 (of which non-concessional 2.43) dominate; domestic bank and non-bank net borrowing 3.27 plus 3.29 rolled over. Source: BoT MER Table A2.

July 2026: Financing, Estimate vs Actual

TZS trillion. Foreign net financing came in at 1.09 against 0.15 estimated; domestic financing was −1.58 against −0.08. Source: BoT MER Table A2.

What a Weaker Shilling Does to the Debt Stock

TZS trillion, September 2026 stock revalued at a shilling 0–20% weaker. Domestic debt (41.1) does not change; external debt rises by about 9.7 trillion per 10%. TICGL/TERI arithmetic.

National debt calculator (TZS trillion)

Starts from the September 2026 stock (external USD 36.78 billion; domestic TZS 41.11 trillion; implied rate TZS 2,642.26 per USD). Enter an exchange-rate move and new net borrowing. Defaults add a year of the budgeted net financing (USD 1.68 billion external, TZS 3.27 trillion domestic) with no exchange-rate change. An arithmetic illustration, not a forecast.

Shilling depreciation, %

New net external borrowing, USD billion

New net domestic borrowing, TZS trillion

External debt, TZS T

101.63

Domestic debt, TZS T

44.38

National debt, TZS T

146.02

Change vs Sep-26, TZS T

+7.71

Reading

A third of budgeted revenue goes to interest and principal, and July's outturn shows how the mix can shift: foreign program loans of TZS 1.16 trillion arrived early and were used to repay TZS 1.86 trillion to the banking system. That is a positive liquidity event for banks, and it front-loads foreign borrowing: 65% of the year's program-loan budget arrived in the first month. The calculator shows the other side: a 10% weaker shilling adds more to the debt stock (TZS 9.7 trillion) than a full year of planned net domestic borrowing (TZS 3.3 trillion).

05 — Outlook & PolicyFive Debt Indicators to Watch Over the Next Two Quarters

The review shows a debt stock that is stable and a financing environment that is supportive: domestic auctions are oversubscribed, yields are lower, foreign investors are being admitted, and multilateral lenders continue to disburse. The pressure points are arrears, commercial debt and interest costs. TICGL/TERI would track the following.

Indicator	Latest	Level that would change the reading	Why
External arrears	TZS 3.16T (USD 1.20B)	Above USD 1.5B, or commercial arrears above USD 700M	Rising 8–14% a month since May; signals liquidity or processing friction
Commercial share of external debt	34.5%	Rising above 35% while multilateral share falls	Commercial debt carries higher cost and shorter tenor
Domestic interest bill	TZS 0.38T in July	Run-rate above TZS 0.34T a month (4.03T ÷ 12)	July was double the estimate; falling yields should help new issues
Foreign holdings of Government securities	Not yet reported	First data after GN 206 of 17 July 2026	Could lower yields; adds FX and reversal risk
Shilling vs US dollar	TZS 2,654.91	Depreciation beyond 5% in a quarter	Each 10% adds about TZS 9.7T to external debt
Undisbursed pipeline	TZS 39.7T (USD 15.0B)	Disbursements below service for two months	Net flows were negative in April 2026

Table 5.1. Thresholds are TICGL/TERI judgements, not official limits. Latest values: BoT MER October 2026.

Illustrative debt path: one more year of budgeted financing

National Debt in TZS Trillion After a Year of Budgeted Net Financing, at Different Exchange Rates

TZS trillion. September 2026 stock plus budgeted net foreign financing (USD 1.68B) and net domestic financing (TZS 3.27T), with the shilling 0%, 5% and 10% weaker. TICGL/TERI illustration, not a forecast.

Policy implications

Debt management

Clear commercial and export-credit arrears first; they have tripled and more than doubled.
Publish a quarterly arrears-by-creditor table with the debt bulletin.
Lengthen domestic maturities while yields are lower.

Fiscal policy

Hold interest at the budgeted 12.6% of spending by phasing non-concessional borrowing (TZS 2.43T planned).
Use the July program-loan inflow to rebuild deposits rather than front-load spending.
Publish debt-to-GDP in the monthly review.

Exchange-rate exposure

Match foreign-currency debt service to export and tourism receipts.
Consider shilling-denominated issuance for foreign investors under the new rules.
Track the 65.3% US dollar share and 18.1% euro share.

Investors and lenders

Treat arrears as a leading indicator of payment friction.
Foreign buyers of Treasury bonds should price FX and exit risk.
Local banks and pension funds: diversification beyond a 55.9% holding.

Talk to TICGL/TERI

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06 — Sources & Data NotesMethod, Definitions and Reconciliation Notes

Basis

Source report. Bank of Tanzania, Monthly Economic Review, October 2026 (data to September 2026): Tables 2.6.1–2.6.6 (debt developments), Table A1 (selected indicators), Table A2 (central government operations), Table A4 (interest rates) and Table A10 (national debt developments). Calculations. Conversions to TZS trillion, shares, changes, ratios, scenarios and calculator results are TICGL/TERI arithmetic on published figures.

Definitions and reconciliation notes

Item	Treatment on this page
Exchange rate used for conversion	The Bank reports external debt in US dollars and domestic debt in shillings. Its national-debt total of USD 52,344.2M implies domestic debt of USD 15,560.0M, i.e. TZS 2,642.26 per USD (TZS 41,113.5B ÷ USD 15,560.0M). That rate converts all external amounts. The September 2026 interbank average was TZS 2,654.91, which would raise external debt by 0.5%.
Constant-rate comparisons	Sep-25, Aug-26 and monthly series use the same rate, so changes show borrowing and repayment as reported in dollars. Converting at each month's actual rate would add the shilling's depreciation (7.4% y/y on average) to the shilling value of the external debt.
Year-end history	The 2018–2025 chart converts the dollar stock at each year-end exchange rate from Table A1, so it includes valuation effects.
External debt definitions	"External debt stock" (USD 36,784.2M) = disbursed outstanding debt (USD 36,454.3M) + interest arrears (USD 329.9M). Principal arrears (USD 867.5M) are inside disbursed debt and are shown separately as arrears.
Domestic debt basis	Excludes liquidity papers, as in Table 2.6.5. The Sep-25 total of TZS 37,459.0B includes TZS 18.4B of other liabilities.
Debt service	12-month external debt service is the sum of principal and interest for October 2025 to September 2026 in Table A10. The September domestic figures are from the text of section 2.6.
Budget figures	2026/27 amounts are the budget estimates in Table A2 for Tanzania Mainland; July amounts are cheques-issued outturns and are provisional.
Not in the review	Debt-to-GDP, public-sector-only debt service ratios and a debt-sustainability rating are not published in this issue, so none is estimated here.
Rounding	Totals may differ from component sums by rounding.

Bank of Tanzania (October 2026), Monthly Economic Review, section 2.6 and Tables A1, A2, A4, A10.
Ministry of Finance (Tanzania), debt and budget data as cited by the Bank of Tanzania.
TICGL/TERI calculations on the above.

07 — Quick AnswersFrequently Asked Questions

How large is Tanzania's national debt in TZS trillion?

National debt was USD 52,344.2 million at end-September 2026, about TZS 138.3 trillion at the exchange rate implied by the Bank of Tanzania's totals (TZS 2,642 per USD). External debt is about TZS 97.2 trillion (70.3%) and domestic debt TZS 41.1 trillion (29.7%).

How much of Tanzania's debt is external?

70.3% of the national debt (USD 36,784.2 million) is external. Multilateral lenders hold 59.5% of it, commercial lenders 34.5%, bilateral lenders 4.2% and export-credit agencies 1.8%. The central government owes 83.4% of the external stock; the private sector 16.6%.

What is Tanzania's domestic debt?

TZS 41.1 trillion at end-September 2026, up 9.8% in a year. Government securities are 89.6% (Treasury bonds TZS 34.8 trillion, Treasury bills TZS 1.9 trillion); the Bank of Tanzania overdraft is TZS 4.3 trillion. Commercial banks hold 28.5% and pension funds 27.4%.

What are Tanzania's external debt arrears?

External debt arrears rose from USD 584.1 million in September 2025 to USD 1,197.4 million in September 2026 (about TZS 3.2 trillion), a 105% increase. Principal arrears are USD 867.5 million and interest arrears USD 329.9 million; commercial creditors account for USD 549.6 million of the principal.

How much does Tanzania pay each year in debt service?

In the 12 months to September 2026 external debt service was about USD 2.66 billion (about TZS 7.0 trillion), or 12.6% of exports of goods and services. The 2026/27 budget provides TZS 6.86 trillion for interest, 14.8% of budgeted revenue of TZS 46.23 trillion, plus TZS 7.84 trillion of principal repayments.

Which currencies is Tanzania's external debt in?

The US dollar is 65.3% of external debt, the euro 18.1%, the Chinese yuan 6.7% and other currencies 10.0%. A 10% depreciation of the shilling adds roughly TZS 9.7 trillion to the shilling value of external debt.

Is Tanzania's debt sustainable?

The Bank of Tanzania review does not publish debt-to-GDP or a sustainability rating. The indicators it supports are mixed: the debt stock is stable month to month, most external debt is concessional-style multilateral lending, and exports are growing 19.9%, but arrears have doubled, commercial debt is 34.5% of external debt, and interest is 14.8% of budgeted revenue.

Muhtasari

Muhtasari kwa Kiswahili

Deni la Taifa la Tanzania, Oktoba 2026 (TZS trilioni): Kwa mujibu wa Mapitio ya Kila Mwezi ya Uchumi ya Benki Kuu ya Tanzania, deni la taifa mwishoni mwa Septemba 2026 lilikuwa USD milioni 52,344.2, sawa na takriban TZS trilioni 138.3. Kiasi hicho hakikubadilika kwa mwezi, lakini malimbikizo ya madeni ya nje yameongezeka mara mbili.

Muundo wa deni: deni la nje ni takriban TZS trilioni 97.2 (asilimia 70.3), na deni la ndani ni TZS trilioni 41.1 (asilimia 29.7). Asilimia 83.4 ya deni la nje linadaiwa na serikali kuu; taasisi za kimataifa (multilateral) zinashikilia asilimia 59.5 na wakopeshaji wa kibiashara asilimia 34.5. Dola ya Marekani ni asilimia 65.3 ya deni la nje na euro asilimia 18.1.

Deni la ndani: TZS trilioni 41.1, ongezeko la asilimia 9.8 kwa mwaka. Hati fungani ni TZS trilioni 34.8 (asilimia 84.6), hati za muda mfupi (bili) TZS trilioni 1.9, na overdraft ya Benki Kuu TZS trilioni 4.3. Benki za biashara (asilimia 28.5) na mifuko ya pensheni (asilimia 27.4) zinashikilia zaidi ya nusu ya deni.

Malimbikizo: malimbikizo ya madeni ya nje yalipanda kutoka USD milioni 584.1 hadi 1,197.4 (takriban TZS trilioni 3.2), ongezeko la asilimia 105. Malimbikizo ya kibiashara yalikaribia mara tatu, kutoka TZS trilioni 0.49 hadi 1.45.

Gharama ya deni: katika miezi 12 hadi Septemba 2026, huduma ya deni la nje ilikuwa takriban TZS trilioni 7.0 (USD bilioni 2.66), sawa na asilimia 12.6 ya mauzo ya nje ya bidhaa na huduma. Bajeti ya 2026/27 inatenga TZS trilioni 6.86 kwa riba (asilimia 14.8 ya mapato) na TZS trilioni 7.84 kwa marejesho ya mtaji.

Hatari ya kubadilika kwa shilingi: shilingi ikidhoofika kwa asilimia 10, deni la nje linaongezeka kwa takriban TZS trilioni 9.7 kwa thamani ya shilingi, zaidi ya mikopo mipya ya ndani yote iliyopangwa kwa mwaka (TZS trilioni 3.3).

Hitimisho na hatua: hali ya jumla ni tulivu, lakini shinikizo liko kwenye malimbikizo, mikopo ya kibiashara na riba. Ya kufuatilia: malimbikizo juu ya USD bilioni 1.5, mkopo wa kibiashara juu ya asilimia 35 ya deni la nje, bili ya riba ya ndani, na mwenendo wa shilingi dhidi ya dola.

Deni la taifa: TZS trilioni 138.3 · Nje: 97.2 · Ndani: 41.1
Malimbikizo ya nje: TZS trilioni 3.2 (+asilimia 105) · Huduma ya deni la nje (miezi 12): TZS trilioni 7.0
Riba ya bajeti 2026/27: TZS trilioni 6.86 · Marejesho ya mtaji: TZS trilioni 7.84

Chanzo: Benki Kuu ya Tanzania, Monthly Economic Review, Oktoba 2026; Wizara ya Fedha; mahesabu ya TICGL/TERI. Kwa maelezo zaidi: economist@ticgl.com.

Scope

Prepared by TERI for research and strategic-information purposes; not investment, legal, tax or financial advice. The creditor table excludes liquidity papers. Year-on-year changes use Table 2.6.6 (Sep-25: TZS 37,459.0bn); the long-run series (Chart 2.6.1) shows TZS 37,819.1bn for Sep-25, a small definitional difference. Sep-26 data are provisional.

00 — Overview & VerdictA Domestic Debt Market Anchored by Banks and Pensions, With the Margin Moving to "Others"

Concentration: commercial banks (TZS 11,703.1bn) and pension funds (TZS 11,256.1bn) hold 55.8% of the stock. Adding the Bank of Tanzania (17.4%) and its special funds (2.1%), 75.3% sits with the financial and monetary system.

Growth: debt rose TZS 3,654.5bn (+9.8%) in a year. "Others" contributed 28.1% of the increase, pension funds 26.7% and commercial banks 26.0%; the BoT's holdings grew slowest (+6.1%).

Structure: 89.6% is government securities, of which bonds are 84.6%; the remaining 10.4% is the BoT overdraft. Domestic debt service in September was TZS 556.4bn (interest TZS 305.6bn).

Commercial banks

11,703.1

TZS bn; 28.5%; +8.8% y/y

Pension funds

11,256.1

TZS bn; 27.4%; +9.5% y/y

Bank of Tanzania

7,163.8

TZS bn; 17.4%; +6.1% y/y

Others

8,095.4

TZS bn; 19.7%; +14.5% y/y

Government Domestic Debt Stock

TZS billion, end-September (Aug-26: 40,899.5). Source: Ministry of Finance, BoT Chart 2.6.1

Domestic Debt by Creditor, Sep-26

TZS billion. Total 41,113.5. Source: BoT, Table 2.6.6

01 — By CreditorHoldings, Shares and Who Drove the Increase

Holdings by Creditor: Sep-25 vs Sep-26

TZS billion. Source: BoT, Table 2.6.6

Growth by Creditor, y/y

%, Sep-25 to Sep-26. Total +9.8%. Source: BoT, Table 2.6.6; TICGL/TERI calc.

Creditor Shares of the Stock

%. Sep-25, Aug-26, Sep-26. Source: BoT, Table 2.6.6

TZS billion	Sep-25	Aug-26	Sep-26	Share	Change y/y	% of increase
Commercial banks	10,752.0	11,599.3	11,703.1	28.5%	+951.1	26.0%
Pension funds	10,282.0	11,292.5	11,256.1	27.4%	+974.1	26.7%
Bank of Tanzania	6,750.9	7,054.9	7,163.8	17.4%	+412.9	11.3%
Insurance	1,825.1	2,050.4	2,030.1	4.9%	+205.0	5.6%
BoT special funds	780.5	867.6	865.1	2.1%	+84.6	2.3%
Others	7,068.6	8,034.7	8,095.4	19.7%	+1,026.8	28.1%
Domestic debt stock	37,459.0	40,899.5	41,113.5	100%	+3,654.5	100%

Table 1.1. Source: BoT, Table 2.6.6 (excluding liquidity papers); change, growth and contributions TICGL calc. "Others" include public institutions, private companies, individuals and non-residents.

Reading

Shares have barely moved (banks 28.7% to 28.5%, BoT 18.0% to 17.4%), but "others" gained 0.8pp to 19.7%. Foreign investors gained access to Government securities on 17 July 2026; BoT does not split non-residents out, so their role in this rise cannot be confirmed from these data.

02 — Instruments & CostLong Bonds Dominate; Yields Have Fallen Along the Curve

Domestic Debt by Instrument

TZS billion. Sep-25 vs Sep-26. Source: BoT, Table 2.6.5

Treasury Bond Yield Curve

%. Sep-25 vs Sep-26. Source: BoT, Table A4

Government Securities Issued for Financing

TZS billion per month: Treasury bills and bonds. Source: BoT, Chart 2.6.2

TZS billion	Sep-25	Aug-26	Sep-26	Share
Government securities	32,498.5	36,722.5	36,827.7	89.6%
Government bonds	30,304.0	34,793.4	34,795.6	84.6%
Treasury bills	2,058.7	1,793.4	1,896.4	4.6%
Government stocks	135.8	135.7	135.7	0.3%
Non-securitized debt (overdraft)	4,960.5	4,176.9	4,285.8	10.4%
Domestic debt stock	37,459.0	40,899.5	41,113.5	100%

Table 2.1. Source: BoT, Table 2.6.5 (tax certificates TZS 0.1bn and other liabilities not shown separately).

September financing: TZS 356bn raised (TZS 178bn bonds, TZS 178bn 364-day bills); domestic debt service TZS 556.4bn (principal TZS 250.8bn, interest TZS 305.6bn).
Yields, Sep-26: 5-year 9.53%, 10-year 10.69%, 15-year 10.79%, 25-year 11.48%; overall T-bill 4.85%.
Implied cost: FY2026/27 budgeted domestic interest of TZS 4,030.3bn is about 9.8% of the stock (TICGL calc.); July domestic interest was TZS 383.8bn, nearly double its estimate.
Overdraft: the BoT overdraft fell from TZS 4,942.1bn to 4,285.8bn (−13.3%) in a year.

Reading

With bonds at 84.6% and yields of 9–11.5% for most maturities against 4.85% on bills, the bulk of the stock locks in high coupons. Lower yields at the 2- and 5-year points (8.40%, 9.53%, down from 12.17%, 12.48%) reduce rollover cost, but the 15-year yield rose to 10.79%.

03 — Trend & Crowding-OutDebt Growth Slows While Private Credit Accelerates

Annual Growth of Domestic Debt

%, year to September. 2022 spike +49.4%. Source: Ministry of Finance; TICGL/TERI calc.

Government Debt vs Private Credit Growth

% y/y, Sep-26. Private credit +34.2% vs banks' government debt +8.8%. Source: BoT, Tables 2.2.1, 2.6.6

Indicator	Sep-25	Sep-26	Reading
Domestic debt (TZS bn)	37,459.0	41,113.5	+9.8%
Domestic debt (USD M)	15,407.9	15,560.0	+1.0% in dollars: shilling depreciation absorbs the growth
Private sector credit (TZS bn)	41,999.9	56,359.4	+34.2%
Banks' government debt ÷ private credit	25.6%	20.8%	Falling (TICGL calc.)
Securities held by banks (TZS bn)	8,723.1	12,056.9	+38.2% (broader BoT definition)

Table 3.1. Source: BoT, Tables 2.2.1, 2.6.6 and A10; ratios TICGL calc. Securities held by banks is a different series from the creditor-table claim.

Reading

Over the long run, domestic debt grew 2.7 times since September 2020 (about 17.9% a year). The latest year is the slowest since 2021, and banks' holdings per unit of private credit fell to 20.8%, so private lending, not government paper, absorbed most of bank balance sheet growth. The BoT's broader securities series, however, grew 38.2%, so the picture depends on definition.

05 — Sources & Data NotesMethod and Definitions

Source. Bank of Tanzania, Monthly Economic Review, October 2026 (Tables 2.2.1, 2.6.5, 2.6.6, A2, A4, A10; Charts 2.6.1, 2.6.2) with Ministry of Finance data. Calculations. Growth, contributions, ratios, the implied cost (budgeted domestic interest ÷ stock, a rough proxy) and the calculator are TICGL/TERI arithmetic. The creditor table covers debt excluding liquidity papers; "others" includes public institutions, private companies, individuals and non-residents. Domestic debt in USD uses BoT's A10 series. Provisional data may be revised.

06 — Quick AnswersFrequently Asked Questions

How large is Tanzania's domestic debt?

TZS 41,113.5 billion at end-September 2026, up from TZS 40,899.5 billion in August and TZS 37,459.0 billion in September 2025 (+9.8%), on the creditor-table basis.

Who holds Tanzania's domestic debt?

Commercial banks hold 28.5% (TZS 11,703.1 billion), pension funds 27.4%, the Bank of Tanzania 17.4%, insurers 4.9%, BoT special funds 2.1% and others 19.7%.

Which creditor category grew fastest?

Others, which include public institutions, private companies, individuals and non-residents, grew 14.5% to TZS 8,095.4 billion, followed by insurers at 11.2% and BoT special funds at 10.8%.

What instruments make up domestic debt?

Government bonds are 84.6% of the stock, overdraft 10.4%, Treasury bills 4.6% and government stocks 0.3%.

Muhtasari kwa Kiswahili

Deni la ndani la Serikali kwa makundi ya wakopeshaji, Septemba 2026: deni la ndani ni TZS bilioni 41,113.5 (ongezeko la asilimia 9.8 kwa mwaka).

Wakopeshaji: benki za biashara asilimia 28.5 (TZS bilioni 11,703.1), mifuko ya pensheni asilimia 27.4 (bilioni 11,256.1), Benki Kuu asilimia 17.4 (bilioni 7,163.8), bima asilimia 4.9, mifuko maalum ya BoT asilimia 2.1 na wengine asilimia 19.7. Benki na mifuko ya pensheni kwa pamoja zinashikilia zaidi ya nusu (asilimia 55.8).

Ukuaji: kundi la "wengine" (taasisi za umma, kampuni, watu binafsi na wasio wakazi) lilikua kwa kasi zaidi (asilimia 14.5) na lilichangia asilimia 28.1 ya ongezeko; hisa za Benki Kuu zilikua polepole zaidi (asilimia 6.1).

Hati: hati fungani ni asilimia 84.6 ya deni, overdraft asilimia 10.4, hati za Hazina asilimia 4.6. Mapato ya hati fungani za miaka 5 na 10 yameshuka hadi asilimia 9.53 na 10.69. Mikopo ya sekta binafsi imekua asilimia 34.2, haraka kuliko deni la Serikali lililoshikiliwa na benki.

Mapendekezo: kupanua wigo wa wawekezaji kwa tahadhari, kurefusha ukomavu wa deni wakati mapato ya hati fungani yanashuka, na kuzuia ukopaji wa Serikali usibane mikopo ya sekta binafsi.

Chanzo: BoT Monthly Economic Review, Oktoba 2026; mahesabu ya TICGL/TERI. Wasiliana: economist@ticgl.com.

Scope

Prepared by TERI for research and strategic-information purposes; not investment, legal, tax or financial advice. "Debt stock" is disbursed outstanding debt (DOD) plus interest arrears (USD 36,784.2M = 36,454.3 + 329.9). Use-of-funds and currency splits are of DOD (USD 36,454.3M). Sep-26 data are provisional.

00 — Overview & VerdictA Government-Led, Dollar-Based Debt Funding Budgets and Infrastructure, With a Growing Private Share

Borrower: the central government owes USD 30,695.7M (83.4%), but its share is falling as private-sector debt rose from USD 5,218.5M to USD 6,088.5M (+16.7%). Private borrowers also hold 75% of interest arrears (USD 249.3M of 329.9M).

Use of funds: 23.2% supports the balance of payments and budget; 38.6% finances infrastructure (transport and telecommunications 21.0%, energy and mining 12.8%, real estate and construction 4.8%); social welfare and education take 19.3%. The fastest growth was in energy and mining (+USD 622M), BoP support (+USD 469M) and finance (+USD 342M).

Currency: every dollar of the debt is foreign-currency, 65.3% in USD. Euro debt grew fastest among the majors in USD terms (+8.2%), so a weaker shilling and a stronger euro both raise the shilling burden.

Central govt DOD

30,615.1

USD M; +4.8% y/y

Private DOD

5,839.2

USD M; +14.2% y/y

BoP & budget support

8,441.6

USD M; 23.2% of DOD

Euro + yuan debt

9,031.0

USD M; 24.8% of DOD

Disbursed Debt by Borrower

USD million, end of month. Source: BoT, Table A10

Use of Funds, Sep-26

% of disbursed outstanding debt. Source: BoT, Table 2.6.3

External debt	Sep-25	Aug-26	Sep-26	y/y
Stock (USD M)	34,510.1	36,848.2	36,784.2	+6.6%
Disbursed outstanding debt (USD M)	34,327.8	36,536.8	36,454.3	+6.2%
Central government share (%)	84.9	83.5	83.4	−1.5pp
Private sector share (%)	15.1	16.5	16.6	+1.5pp
US dollar share (%)	65.9	65.0	65.3	−0.6pp

Table 0.1. Source: BoT, Tables 2.6.1, 2.6.4, A10; growth TICGL calc.

01 — By BorrowerGovernment Still Dominates, but the Private Sector Is Borrowing Faster

Monthly Disbursements by Borrower

USD million. Central government disbursements peaked in Jun–Jul 2026. Source: BoT, Table A10

Interest Arrears by Borrower

USD million. Private arrears rose 141% in a year. Source: BoT, Table 2.6.1

USD million	Sep-25	Share	Aug-26	Sep-26	Share
Central government	29,290.9	84.9%	30,779.4	30,695.7	83.4%
o/w disbursed outstanding debt	29,212.2	84.6%	30,698.7	30,615.1	83.2%
o/w interest arrears	78.7	0.2%	80.7	80.6	0.2%
Private sector	5,218.5	15.1%	6,068.8	6,088.5	16.6%
o/w disbursed outstanding debt	5,115.0	14.8%	5,838.1	5,839.2	15.9%
o/w interest arrears	103.6	0.3%	230.6	249.3	0.7%
Public corporations	0.6	0.0%	0.0	0.0	0.0%
External debt stock	34,510.1	100%	36,848.2	36,784.2	100%

Table 1.1. Source: BoT, Table 2.6.1. TANESCO, ATCL, TRC, TPA, TFC and DAWASA have no outstanding external debt.

Twelve-month disbursements: about USD 4,172M, of which central government USD 3,001.7M (71.9%) and private sector USD 1,170.3M (28.1%), above the private share of the stock (16.6%).
Flows vs stock: net flows after principal repayment were about USD 2,257M against a DOD increase of USD 2,126.5M; the difference (−USD 130M) reflects valuation and other adjustments (TICGL calc.).
September: disbursements USD 234.3M (central USD 226.1M, private USD 8.2M); debt service USD 171.9M.

Reading

Public corporations carry no direct external debt, so state-enterprise projects are funded through the central government balance sheet. Private borrowing is slowing (USD 8.2M in September) while its arrears are rising, a credit-quality signal worth tracking.

02 — By Use of FundsBudget Support and Infrastructure Take Over 60% of the Stock

Share of Disbursed Debt by Use of Funds

%, Sep-25 vs Sep-26. Source: BoT, Table 2.6.3

Change in Debt by Use of Funds

USD million, Sep-25 to Sep-26. Source: BoT, Table A10; TICGL/TERI calc.

Largest Uses of Funds, Monthly

USD million, disbursed outstanding debt. Source: BoT, Table A10

Use of funds	Sep-25 %	Aug-26 %	Sep-26 %	Sep-26 USD M	Change USD M
BoP and budget support	23.2	23.5	23.2	8,441.6	+469.4
Transport and telecommunications	21.7	20.8	21.0	7,644.3	+211.9
Social welfare and education	19.7	19.3	19.3	7,036.4	+273.2
Energy and mining	11.8	12.7	12.8	4,673.3	+622.4
Agriculture	5.0	5.5	5.5	2,001.5	+279.9
Real estate and construction	5.4	4.8	4.8	1,737.2	−106.0
Finance and insurance	3.5	4.2	4.2	1,542.5	+342.0
Industries	2.9	3.4	3.5	1,259.4	+266.1
Tourism	1.8	1.6	1.6	594.5	−20.7
Other	5.1	4.2	4.2	1,523.6	−211.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	36,454.3	+2,126.5

Table 2.1. Source: BoT, Table 2.6.3 (shares) and Table A10 (amounts); changes TICGL calc.

Reading

The mix is shifting from budget and transport support towards productive sectors: energy and mining, agriculture, industries and finance grew faster than the stock (+6.2%), while tourism, construction and "other" shrank. BoP and budget support remains the single largest claim and carries no direct revenue stream.

03 — By CurrencyA Dollar Core, a Growing Euro and Yuan Share

Debt by Currency

USD million equivalents, end of month. Source: BoT, Table A10

Currency Shares of Disbursed Debt

%. Sep-25, Aug-26, Sep-26. Source: BoT, Table 2.6.4

Growth by Currency, Sep-25 to Sep-26

% change in USD-equivalent value. Total +6.2%. Source: BoT, Table A10; TICGL/TERI calc.

Currency	Sep-25 %	Aug-26 %	Sep-26 %	Sep-25 USD M	Sep-26 USD M	Growth
United States dollar	65.9	65.0	65.3	22,619.2	23,788.8	+5.2%
Euro	17.7	18.3	18.1	6,080.3	6,580.8	+8.2%
Chinese yuan	6.5	6.7	6.7	2,224.1	2,450.2	+10.2%
Other	9.9	9.9	10.0	3,404.3	3,634.5	+6.8%
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	34,327.8	36,454.3	+6.2%

Table 3.1. Source: BoT, Tables 2.6.4 and A10; growth TICGL calc. Non-USD balances are reported in USD equivalents, so exchange-rate moves between currencies are embedded in them.

Reading

USD-denominated debt matches the currency of most export earnings (gold, tourism) but euro and yuan debt (24.8%) adds cross-currency risk. The USD share slipped 0.6pp in a year as euro and yuan balances grew faster.

05 — Sources & Data NotesMethod and Definitions

Source. Bank of Tanzania, Monthly Economic Review, October 2026 (Tables 2.6.1, 2.6.3, 2.6.4, A10) with Ministry of Finance data. Calculations. Growth, USD-equivalent shares, 12-month disbursement sums, net flows and sensitivities are TICGL/TERI arithmetic. Table 2.6.1 shows the stock including interest arrears; Tables 2.6.3–2.6.4 and A10 use DOD. Aug-26 is revised (r) and Sep-26 provisional (p). The "other" use-of-funds category and "other" currencies are BoT residuals.

06 — Quick AnswersFrequently Asked Questions

How large is Tanzania's external debt?

USD 36,784.2 million at end-September 2026: disbursed outstanding debt of USD 36,454.3 million plus USD 329.9 million of interest arrears.

Who owes Tanzania's external debt?

The central government owes USD 30,695.7 million (83.4%) and the private sector USD 6,088.5 million (16.6%). Public corporations have no external debt.

What is the currency composition of Tanzania's external debt?

US dollar 65.3%, euro 18.1%, Chinese yuan 6.7% and other currencies 10.0% of disbursed outstanding debt.

What was external debt used for?

Balance of payments and budget support 23.2%, transport and telecommunications 21.0%, social welfare and education 19.3%, energy and mining 12.8%, and other sectors the remaining 23.7%.

Muhtasari kwa Kiswahili

Deni la nje la Tanzania, Septemba 2026: deni la nje ni USD milioni 36,784.2 (ongezeko la asilimia 6.6 kwa mwaka); deni lililotolewa na linalosubiri kulipwa (DOD) ni USD milioni 36,454.3.

Kwa mkopaji: Serikali Kuu inadaiwa USD milioni 30,695.7 (asilimia 83.4, ilikuwa 84.9); sekta binafsi USD milioni 6,088.5 (asilimia 16.6), ikiongezeka asilimia 16.7 kwa mwaka. Mashirika ya umma hayana deni la nje moja kwa moja. Malimbikizo ya riba ya sekta binafsi yamepanda hadi USD milioni 249.3.

Kwa matumizi ya fedha: msaada wa urari wa malipo na bajeti asilimia 23.2; usafirishaji na mawasiliano 21.0; ustawi wa jamii na elimu 19.3; nishati na madini 12.8; kilimo 5.5. Nishati na madini iliongezeka zaidi (USD milioni 622).

Kwa sarafu: dola ya Marekani asilimia 65.3, euro 18.1, yuan ya China 6.7 na nyingine 10.0. Deni lote ni la fedha za kigeni, kwa hiyo kushuka kwa thamani ya shilingi kunaongeza mzigo wake; kushuka kwa asilimia 1 kunaongeza takriban TZS trilioni 0.96.

Mapendekezo: kuendelea kukopa kwa masharti nafuu na kwa miradi mahususi, kufuatilia malimbikizo ya sekta binafsi, na kulinganisha sarafu za madeni na mapato ya mauzo ya nje.

Chanzo: BoT Monthly Economic Review, Oktoba 2026; mahesabu ya TICGL/TERI. Wasiliana: economist@ticgl.com.

Scope

Prepared by TERI for research and strategic-information purposes; not investment, legal, tax or financial advice. "Estimate" is the July 2026 monthly estimate in BoT Table A2; "budget" is the FY2026/27 annual budget. One month is a small and seasonal sample, so run-rates are illustrative. Actual 2026 figures are provisional.

00 — Overview & VerdictStrong Collections, Weaker Spending Quality

Revenue beat the estimate by TZS 304.8 billion (9.5%). Central government revenue was TZS 3,354.9 billion (95.8% of the total). Taxes on imports (+14.0% vs estimate) and on local goods and services (+40.7%) more than offset income tax, which fell 5.3% short.

Spending grew but its quality weakened. Recurrent spending was 10.3% above estimate, driven by interest (+33.7%; domestic interest nearly doubled) and other goods and services (+24.5%). Wages (−7.2%) and development (−7.4%) came in below plan; development was less than half of July 2025.

The surplus is mostly financing and timing. The balance after grants was only TZS 5.4 billion; the overall surplus of TZS 486.2 billion reflects cash adjustments of TZS 476.2 billion, and program loans of TZS 1,164.1 billion allowed repayment of TZS 1,864.5 billion of bank debt.

Central govt revenue

3,354.9

TZS bn; est. 3,054.7

Interest ÷ revenue

16.1%

565 of 3,502 (TICGL calc.)

Grants

75.7

TZS bn; −26.8% vs est., −58.3% y/y

Overall balance

+486.2

TZS bn; est. −75.1

July 2026: Estimate vs Actual

TZS billion. Source: BoT, Table A2

Fiscal Ratios, FY2018/19–2025/26

% of GDP. Source: BoT, Table A1

Fiscal summary, July 2026

TZS billion	Budget 2026/27	Estimate	Actual	vs estimate
Total revenue (incl. LGAs)	46,228.2	3,198.4	3,502.2	+9.5%
Central government revenue	44,262.0	3,054.7	3,354.9	+9.8%
Total expenditure	54,498.6	3,376.9	3,572.5	+5.8%
Recurrent	35,195.4	2,521.0	2,779.6	+10.3%
Development and net lending	19,303.2	855.9	792.9	−7.4%
Balance before grants	−8,270.4	−178.6	−70.3	+108.3bn
Overall balance	−7,707.3	−75.1	486.2	+561.3bn

Table 0.1. Source: BoT, Table A2 (Ministry of Finance); variances TICGL calc.

01 — RevenueWhere the Extra TZS 300 Billion Came From

Revenue by Source, July

TZS billion: July 2025 actual, 2026 estimate, 2026 actual. Source: BoT, Chart 2.5.1

Variance vs Estimate, by Source

% difference between actual and July estimate. Source: BoT, Table A2; TICGL/TERI calc.

July Collections as % of FY2026/27 Budget

%. An even pace would be 8.3% a month. Source: BoT, Table A2; TICGL/TERI calc.

TZS billion	Jul-25	Estimate	Jul-26	vs est.	y/y	Annual budget
Taxes on imports	958.8	1,020.5	1,163.4	+14.0%	+21.3%	13,473.7
Income taxes	795.2	910.6	862.6	−5.3%	+8.5%	14,475.7
Taxes on local goods and services	446.1	453.7	638.2	+40.7%	+43.1%	6,826.9
Other taxes	145.7	189.8	212.8	+12.1%	+46.1%	2,470.1
Tax revenue	2,345.8	2,574.5	2,877.0	+11.7%	+22.6%	37,246.4
Non-tax revenue	431.8	480.2	477.9	−0.5%	+10.7%	7,015.6
LGA own sources	n/a	143.7	147.3	+2.5%	n/a	1,966.2
Grants	181.6	103.5	75.7	−26.8%	−58.3%	563.1

Table 1.1. Source: BoT, Table A2 and Chart 2.5.1; July 2025 tax revenue is the sum of its four components (TICGL calc.). The BoT text states tax revenue exceeded target by 9.8%; Table A2 implies +11.7% (9.8% matches central government revenue).

Reading

Growth leans on trade and consumption taxes: imports plus local goods and services supplied 62.6% of tax revenue (1,801.6 of 2,877.0). Income tax, the most stable base, grew 8.5% y/y but undershot its estimate. Grants have shrunk to 2% of revenue plus grants, reducing external cushions.

02 — ExpenditureInterest Rises, Development Slips

Expenditure by Category, July

TZS billion: 2025 actual, 2026 estimate, 2026 actual. Source: BoT, Chart 2.5.2

Variance vs Estimate, by Category

% difference, actual vs July estimate. Source: BoT, Table A2; TICGL/TERI calc.

Interest Payments: Domestic vs Foreign

TZS billion. Domestic interest nearly doubled vs estimate. Source: BoT, Table A2

July Spending as % of FY2026/27 Budget

%. An even pace would be 8.3%. Source: BoT, Table A2; TICGL/TERI calc.

TZS billion	Jul-25	Estimate	Jul-26	vs est.	Share of spending
Wages and salaries	1,066.3	1,254.9	1,164.4	−7.2%	32.6%
Interest payments	378.4	422.5	564.9	+33.7%	15.8%
o/w domestic	n/a	192.2	383.8	+99.7%	10.7%
o/w foreign	n/a	230.3	181.1	−21.4%	5.1%
Other goods, services, transfers	927.0	843.6	1,050.2	+24.5%	29.4%
Development and net lending	1,634.4	855.9	792.9	−7.4%	22.2%
o/w local	n/a	519.3	521.0	+0.3%	14.6%
o/w foreign	n/a	336.7	271.9	−19.2%	7.6%
Total expenditure	n/a	3,376.9	3,572.5	+5.8%	100%

Table 2.1. Source: BoT, Table A2 and Chart 2.5.2 (July 2025 sub-items not published); shares and variances TICGL calc. July 2025 total is not shown because the chart omits some items.

Reading

Domestic interest took 9.5% of its annual budget (TZS 4,030.3bn) in one month, a sign of heavy domestic debt service (domestic debt TZS 41.1tn). Development spending fell 51.5% y/y and foreign-financed projects ran 19.2% below plan, while locally funded projects stayed on plan.

03 — Balance & FinancingA Cash Surplus Built on Program Loans and Adjustments

Fiscal Balances, July

TZS billion: before grants, after grants, overall. Source: BoT, Table A2

Financing Mix, July

TZS billion. Net foreign financing vs net domestic financing. Source: BoT, Table A2

Government Securities Issued for Financing

TZS billion per month: Treasury bills and bonds, Sep-25 to Sep-26. Source: BoT, Chart 2.6.2

TZS billion	Budget	Estimate	Actual
Balance after grants	−7,707.3	−75.1	5.4
Adjustments to cash and other items	0.0	0.0	476.2
Overall balance	−7,707.3	−75.1	486.2
Foreign loans (gross)	8,985.2	233.2	1,360.3
o/w program loans	1,787.7	0.0	1,164.1
o/w project loans	7,141.0	233.2	196.2
Foreign amortization	−4,550.2	−81.8	−265.5
Domestic financing (net)	3,272.3	−76.3	−1,581.0
o/w bank borrowing	2,056.4	−63.7	−1,864.5
o/w non-bank (net)	1,216.0	−12.6	283.5

Table 3.1. Source: BoT, Table A2. Negative financing means repayment or build-up of deposits.

Reading

Program loans (TZS 1,164.1bn, 65% of the annual program-loan budget) arrived in July and were used to repay bank debt (TZS 1,864.5bn), easing domestic liquidity but front-loading external borrowing. The FY2026/27 budget deficit after grants is TZS 7.7tn, financed 58% by foreign sources (TZS 4.4tn net).

04 — Outlook & CalculatorWhat the First Month Signals for FY2026/27

Revenue: the budget requires total revenue of TZS 46.2tn (17.2% of GDP in 2025/26 vs 13.8% in 2018/19). A month at 3.5tn annualises to about 42.0tn, below budget, so seasonal strength must persist.
Interest: domestic interest and rising domestic debt (TZS 41.1tn) are the main spending risk; policy rates at 6.25% add to bill costs.
Development: 4.1% of the annual development budget was spent in July; foreign-financed projects need project-loan disbursements (only 2.7% of the annual budget so far).
Offsets: robust import taxes, gold exports, and foreign access to bonds (July 2026 reform) may widen the financing base.

Zanzibar, September 2026

TZS billion	Actual	Note
Resource envelope	210.4	92.8% of monthly target
Domestic revenue	200.9	92.9% of target; tax 173.7 (91.6%)
Non-tax revenue	27.3	2.4% above target
Expenditure	494.5	Development 355.9 (72%), 77.8% domestically financed

Table 4.1. Source: BoT, Section 3.2 (Ministry of Finance and Planning, Zanzibar).

Budget run-rate calculator

Defaults: central government revenue, July 2026 (one month), against the FY2026/27 budget. Illustrative only, because monthly flows are seasonal.

Annual budget, TZS bn

Actual to date, TZS bn

Months elapsed

Share of budget

7.6%

Pace needed

8.3%

Annualised, TZS bn

40,259

Gap to budget, TZS bn

−4,003

Bottom line

Collections are strong but trade-tax dependent, and spending is shifting toward debt service. Priorities: broaden income and local taxes, contain domestic interest through longer-tenor, lower-cost financing, and protect foreign-financed development disbursements.

How TICGL and TERI can help

TICGL/TERI supports PPP structuring, fiscal-risk and value-for-money analysis, and revenue and budget modelling. Contact economist@ticgl.com.

What We Do →TERI Research →Invest in Tanzania →

05 — Sources & Data NotesMethod and Definitions

Source. Bank of Tanzania, Monthly Economic Review, October 2026 (Table A2 Central Government Operations, cheques issued, Tanzania Mainland; Table A1; Charts 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.6.2; Section 3.2 for Zanzibar). Calculations. Variances, shares of budget, run-rates and ratios are TICGL/TERI arithmetic. Table A2 covers July 2026 only; "Estimate" is the monthly estimate. Annualising one month (×12) ignores seasonality and is for illustration. Chart 2.5.2's July 2025 actuals are used where Table A2 has no prior-year column. Actual 2026 data are provisional. Total expenditure excludes amortization and expenditure float.

06 — Quick AnswersFrequently Asked Questions

How much revenue did Tanzania collect in July 2026?

Total revenue including local government was TZS 3,502.2 billion, 9.5% above the TZS 3,198.4 billion estimate. Central government revenue was TZS 3,354.9 billion, 95.8% of the total.

How much did the government spend in July 2026?

Total expenditure was TZS 3,572.5 billion: recurrent TZS 2,779.6 billion and development TZS 792.9 billion.

Why is interest spending a concern?

Interest payments were TZS 564.9 billion, 33.7% above plan and 49% above July 2025. Domestic interest alone, TZS 383.8 billion, was nearly double its estimate.

Did Tanzania run a deficit in July 2026?

No. Before grants the balance was a deficit of TZS 70.3 billion, after grants a surplus of TZS 5.4 billion, and the overall balance a surplus of TZS 486.2 billion after cash adjustments of TZS 476.2 billion.

Muhtasari kwa Kiswahili

Mapato na matumizi ya Serikali Kuu, Julai 2026 (mwezi wa kwanza wa mwaka wa fedha 2026/27): mapato yamevuka lengo, lakini matumizi yanaelekea zaidi kwenye riba.

Mapato: jumla ya mapato TZS bilioni 3,502.2, juu ya lengo kwa asilimia 9.5. Mapato ya Serikali Kuu ni TZS bilioni 3,354.9 (asilimia 95.8). Kodi za bidhaa za nje (+14.0%) na bidhaa na huduma za ndani (+40.7%) zilichangia zaidi; kodi ya mapato ilikuwa chini ya lengo kwa asilimia 5.3. Misaada ilishuka hadi TZS bilioni 75.7.

Matumizi: jumla TZS bilioni 3,572.5; matumizi ya kawaida bilioni 2,779.6 na ya maendeleo bilioni 792.9 (chini ya lengo kwa asilimia 7.4 na chini ya Julai 2025 kwa asilimia 51.5). Malipo ya riba yalikuwa bilioni 564.9, juu ya mpango kwa asilimia 33.7; riba ya ndani karibu maradufu.

Urari: upungufu kabla ya misaada bilioni 70.3; ziada ya jumla bilioni 486.2 inatokana zaidi na marekebisho ya fedha taslimu (bilioni 476.2) na mikopo ya programu (bilioni 1,164.1), iliyotumika kulipa madeni ya benki (bilioni 1,864.5).

Mapendekezo: kupanua wigo wa kodi ya mapato na ya ndani, kudhibiti gharama za riba kwa kukopa kwa muda mrefu na kwa gharama nafuu, na kulinda utoaji wa fedha za miradi ya maendeleo.

Chanzo: BoT Monthly Economic Review, Oktoba 2026; mahesabu ya TICGL/TERI. Wasiliana: economist@ticgl.com.

Lot	Research area	Illustrative topics
1	Macroeconomic Analysis and Modelling	Economic growth and productivity; inflation, monetary policy and exchange rate dynamics; macro-econometric, CGE and SAM-based modelling; forecasting and scenario analysis; national savings and investment trends
2	Public Finance and Fiscal Policy	Domestic revenue mobilisation; tax policy and revenue administration; public expenditure and public financial management; public debt sustainability and fiscal space; intergovernmental fiscal transfers
3	Trade, Industrial Policy and Sectoral Economics	Industrialisation and value addition; export competitiveness and regional integration; import substitution; sector studies in agriculture and agribusiness, mining and mineral value chains, energy, tourism, transport and logistics, blue economy and fisheries, and the digital economy
4	Investment Climate, PPP and Private Sector Policy	Domestic and foreign direct investment; investment climate and competitiveness; regulatory and business environment reform; PPP frameworks and project economics; state-owned enterprise reform; MSME development and formalisation
5	Financial Sector Development and Inclusion	Banking sector development; financial inclusion and access to credit; capital markets and investment financing; digital financial services; SME financing; financial stability and resilience
6	Labour, Skills and Inclusive Growth	Employment and labour market dynamics; youth and women’s economic participation; informal economy; skills and labour productivity; poverty and inequality
7	Social Sector Financing and Social Protection	Financing of education, health and water; social protection design and costing; cost-effectiveness and value-for-money analysis
8	Local Government Economics and Spatial Development	Local government own-source revenue; markets and urban economics; decentralisation and local economic development; economic appraisal of local infrastructure
9	Evaluation, Impact Assessment and Field Research	Programme and impact evaluation; assessment of national development strategies; survey design and sampling; data collection and management; qualitative research; data science and analytics

No.	Deliverable
1	Inception report and research methodology
2	Literature review and analytical framework
3	Data collection instruments and fieldwork report
4	Preliminary research findings
5	Draft economic research report
6	Final economic research report
7	Policy brief and executive summary
8	Research presentation and stakeholder validation
9	Supporting datasets, statistical outputs and analytical models, where applicable

Criterion	What is assessed	Points
Relevant experience in the selected lot(s)	Track record of comparable research, by the individual or institution	25
Qualifications and team	Individuals: education and professional experience. Firms: institutional capacity and qualifications of the core team	20
Quality of work samples	Rigour, clarity and policy relevance of past outputs	20
Contribution note, methodology and technical capacity	Approach to the lot, analytical methods, data, models and tools	20
Experience in Tanzania and East Africa	Knowledge of the economic and institutional context	5
Technical total		90
Financial proposal	Reasonableness and competitiveness of indicative rates, compared with other qualified applicants in the same lot	10
Total		100

Activity	Date
RFP published	16 December 2026
Deadline for clarification questions	16 January 2027
TICGL responses to clarification questions	By 21 January 2027
Deadline for submission of proposals	31 January 2027, 17:00 EAT
Evaluation and verification	1 to 13 February 2027
Notification of results	By 20 February 2027
Partner Agreements signed; first TORs issued	February to March 2027
Programme workstreams with new partners begin under their TOR	March 2027