Data-driven: every figure is tied to a named source; derived figures are marked "TICGL calculation". Look-back and look-forward: five years of history (2020–2025, with early-2026 indicators) and five years of scenarios (2026–2030, aligned with FYDP IV, 2026/27–2030/31). Scenarios are not predictions: they show what the economy looks like under different value-capture assumptions, all stated explicitly. Prepared by TERI for research and strategic-information purposes; not investment, legal, tax or financial advice.
00 — Overview & VerdictExecutive Summary: The Rails Are Strong, the Value Layers Above Them Are Thin
Tanzania has built one of Africa's most intensively used digital payment systems, but it has not yet built the economy on top of it. In 2025 mobile payments reached TZS 255.13 trillion (about USD 96 billion) across 7.96 billion transactions, equal to 109% of nominal GDP (TZS 234.1 trillion). Over the same period the Information and Communication sector stayed at 1.6% of GDP: it was 1.6% in 2019, 1.6% in 2025, and never above 1.7% in between.
This is not a statistical error, but it is a genuine development problem. Transaction value is a gross flow; GDP counts only new value created. Even so, the volume of money moving through digital rails has grown far faster than the domestic value added, jobs, exports and MSME capital those rails could support. Payments rose 2.34 times between 2020 and 2025 while ICT real value added rose 1.54 times.
The conversion is getting weaker, not stronger. The Digital Value Conversion Ratio (DVCR) fell from 1.81% in 2024 to 1.47% in 2025: each TZS 100 of mobile payments now corresponds to about TZS 1.5 of ICT value added.
The next five years are a fork. With the same 18% payment growth, ICT value added in 2030 ranges from TZS 6.4 trillion (rails-only) to TZS 9.4 trillion (value-addition push) to TZS 11.3 trillion (the 3%-of-GDP target). The difference between the first two is worth about TZS 8.0 trillion of cumulative GDP over 2026–2030.
Mobile Payments vs ICT Share of GDP, 2020–2025
Flows Are Huge; the Value Layers on Them Are Small (2025)
Growth in 2025: Where the Digital Economy Grew Fastest
Seven headline findings
- 1. Flows outran value added. Mobile payment value rose 2.34× between 2020 and 2025 (18.5% a year; 22.0% a year since 2021). ICT real value added rose 1.54×. Even though ICT grew about 9% a year in real terms against GDP growth near 5–6%, its nominal share did not rise.
- 2. The DVCR fell. ICT value added per TZS of mobile payments dropped from 1.81% in 2024 to 1.47% in 2025 (TICGL calculation).
- 3. The rails are strong. 75.78 million active accounts, 1.98 million agents, 2.79 million merchant acceptance points, TIPS flows up 84% to TZS 54.95 trillion, 4G coverage at 94.2%.
- 4. The productive layers are thin. Digital credit is 2.2% of payment value, digital savings 1.2%, payments to businesses 14.7%. Smartphone penetration is 41.8%; there is no official series for ICT service exports.
- 5. Returns are concentrated. Vodacom Tanzania alone booked TZS 734.8 billion of M-Pesa revenue in FY2026 (+24.5%); the independent software, platform and data layer is small and unmeasured.
- 6. The next five years are a fork. Same payment growth, ICT value added of TZS 6.4 to 11.3 trillion in 2030; the push scenario is worth about TZS 8.0 trillion of cumulative GDP over 2026–2030.
- 7. Measurement itself is a policy gap. Official ICT value added (1.6%) captures telecoms and narrow IT services; a broad digital-economy estimate of about 7% is cited in the Tanzania Business Report 2024/25, but no official digital satellite account exists.
Headline indicators, 2024 and 2025
| Indicator | 2024 | 2025 | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mobile payment value (TZS trillion) | 198.86 | 255.13 | BoT NPS Annual Report 2025 |
| Mobile payments as % of nominal GDP | 93.8% | 109.0% | TICGL calculation |
| Nominal GDP (TZS trillion) | 211.98 | 234.1 | NBS / State of the Economy Report, Jun 2026 |
| ICT share of GDP | 1.7% | 1.6% | Economic Survey 2025 |
| ICT real growth | 11.2% | 8.8% | Economic Survey 2025 |
| Implied ICT value added (TZS trillion) | 3.60 | 3.75 | TICGL calculation |
| Digital Value Conversion Ratio | 1.81% | 1.47% | TICGL calculation |
| Active mobile-money accounts (million) | 63.21 | 75.78 | BoT NPS Annual Report 2025 |
| Mobile-money agents (million) | 1.48 | 1.98 | BoT NPS Annual Report 2025 |
| Payments to businesses (TZS trillion) | 26.6 | 37.52 | BoT NPS Annual Report 2025 |
| Digital credit (TZS trillion) | 4.22 | 5.58 | BoT NPS Annual Report 2025 |
| Smartphone penetration | 35.99% | 41.82% | TCRA, Dec 2024 and Dec 2025 |
Table 1. ICT shares are published rounded to one decimal, so implied value added carries a rounding band of roughly ±TZS 0.2 trillion.
The question is no longer whether Tanzanians will use digital rails; they already do, at a scale above GDP. The question is whether the domestic economy will capture the software, platform, data, credit and export layers that sit on those rails. On current trends the answer is no: the conversion ratio is falling. The evidence points to a shift in policy emphasis from volume to value.
01 — Question & FrameworkWhy Transaction Value Is Not Value Added, and How to Measure the Gap
Mobile money is Tanzania's most successful digital product. It has moved the country to the top of Africa's payment-intensity rankings and brought tens of millions of people into a formal payment system. Yet the national accounts record the Information and Communication sector at only about 1.6% of GDP, and the sector is not obviously becoming a bigger part of the economy. The central research question is therefore:
Why has rapid growth in digital transactions not translated into a larger digital value-added base: more ICT output, more skilled jobs, more MSME productivity and more digital exports?
Why it matters: four reasons
1. Policy assumptions
- FYDP IV (2026/27–2030/31) and the Digital Economy Strategic Framework 2024–2034 both assume digitalisation will drive growth, jobs and formalisation.
2. Wrong scoreboard
- An economy that counts transaction value as success may overlook the thinness of the layers above the rails.
3. Youth jobs
- The youth employment agenda depends on digital livelihoods being productive, not only numerous.
4. MSMEs
- Over 5 million enterprises, 98% of them micro: this is where the conversion from payment use to enterprise growth must happen.
A flow is not value added
Three different measures are often compared as if they were the same.
| Measure | What it counts | Tanzania, 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| Transaction value | Gross money moving through the payment system. A single TZS 1,000 can be counted several times as it changes hands. | TZS 255.13 trillion (mobile payments) |
| GDP / value added | New value created by production: wages, profits and taxes net of intermediate inputs. | TZS 234.1 trillion (GDP) |
| ICT sector value added | Value added of firms whose main activity is telecoms, publishing, programming and information services. | ≈ TZS 3.75 trillion (1.6% of GDP) |
Table 2.1. Source: BoT NPS Annual Report 2025; NBS; Economic Survey 2025; TICGL calculation.
Mobile money moves money; it is not itself output. A useful illustration is velocity: trust-account balances at year end were TZS 2.83 trillion, so each shilling of float turned over about 90 times in 2025 (TICGL calculation). High turnover is a sign of usefulness, but it also means the headline flow is large relative to the money actually held.
The digital value-addition chain
Each arrow is a conversion. Tanzania scores very high on the first two links (adoption and transactions). The gap opens at the third and fourth links: how much of the flow becomes domestic revenue, wages, profit and capital formation, and how much of that stays in independent local firms rather than a few large operators or imported software and cloud services.
The Digital Value Conversion Ratio
A falling DVCR can reflect healthy cost reductions in payments (cheaper transfers) as well as weak capture of higher-value activities. The policy question is whether value added is rising in absolute terms and in non-payment layers, not whether the ratio alone goes up.
How Many Times Larger Is the Payment Flow Than Each Value Layer? (2025)
Try it: Digital Value Conversion Ratio calculator
Change the inputs (defaults are the 2025 figures) to see the DVCR and the payments-to-GDP ratio. Computed in your browser; no data is sent anywhere.
Data and method
The report combines five categories of evidence, then computes growth rates and indices from published series, derives implied ICT value added as ICT share × nominal GDP, computes the DVCR, and builds scenarios to 2030 by varying only the assumptions shown in the Outlook tab.
| Evidence | What was used |
|---|---|
| National accounts | ICT share of GDP and real growth for 2019–2025 from the Economic Survey 2025 (2019 base year, post-rebasing); nominal GDP of TZS 211.98 trillion (2024) and TZS 234.1 trillion (2025) from the State of the Economy Report presented to Parliament in June 2026. |
| Payment systems | Mobile payment value and volume, accounts, agents, merchants, digital credit and savings and TIPS flows from the Bank of Tanzania NPS Annual Report 2025, plus the 2020–2024 series from BoT and the Economic Survey. |
| Telecoms and devices | TCRA quarterly communication statistics (December 2024 to March 2026). |
| Firm evidence | Vodacom Tanzania FY2026 results (year to 31 March 2026). |
| MSME evidence | TICGL Structural Barriers to MSME Capital Survival in Tanzania (May 2026) and the TICGL Entrepreneurship Profile (February 2026). |
Three data limits shape the analysis (see Sources & Data Notes): ICT shares are rounded, there is no official ICT jobs or ICT export series, and the transaction-volume series changes definition in 2023.
02 — Look-back 2020–2025Payments Doubled and More; ICT Value Added Grew Fast in Volume but Not as a Share
Payments: a step-change after 2022
Mobile payment value was almost flat between 2020 and 2022 (TZS 109–115 trillion) and then accelerated: +35.3% in 2023, +28.5% in 2024 and +28.3% in 2025. Interoperability, merchant payment acceptance and the Tanzania Instant Payment System (TIPS) are the main drivers cited in BoT and Ministry reporting. Payments to businesses (P2B) grew faster than the total: TZS 26.6 trillion in 2024 to TZS 37.52 trillion in 2025 (+41%), lifting their share of mobile payment value from 13.4% to 14.7%.
Mobile Payment Value and Annual Growth, 2020–2025
Growth Indices, 2020 = 100
ICT value added: growing fast in real terms, flat as a share
ICT real growth averaged 9.1% a year over 2020–2025 (9.1, 9.3, 5.4, 10.7, 11.2 and 8.8%), well above real GDP growth of roughly 4.5–6% in the same years. On volume terms the sector therefore grew about 1.54× between 2020 and 2025. Yet its nominal share of GDP stayed at 1.6–1.7%. Two explanations are consistent with the data:
Price deflation inside ICT
- Falling effective prices for voice and data mean real output rises faster than nominal revenue, so the sector's nominal weight does not grow with its volume.
Value capture outside the narrow sector
- Much of the benefit of connectivity and payments is realised as lower costs and higher activity in trade, transport, agriculture and finance, and is recorded there.
The available data do not allow the two to be separated; it is a priority for the digital satellite account proposed in the Policy tab.
ICT Real Growth and ICT Share of GDP, 2019–2025
The conversion ratio
Multiplying the published ICT share by nominal GDP gives implied ICT value added of TZS 3.60 trillion in 2024 and TZS 3.75 trillion in 2025. Against mobile payment value the DVCR fell from 1.81% to 1.47%. Put differently, mobile payment value rose by TZS 56.3 trillion in one year while implied ICT value added rose by only about TZS 0.14 trillion.
Digital Value Conversion Ratio, 2024 and 2025
One Year's Increase: Payments vs ICT Value Added (2024→2025)
Annual data, 2020–2025
| Year | Mobile payments (TZS tn) | Growth | ICT share of GDP | ICT real growth | Payments index (2020=100) | ICT real index (2020=100) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | 109.21 | — | 1.7% | 9.1% | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| 2021 | 115.23 | 5.5% | 1.6% | 9.3% | 105.5 | 109.3 |
| 2022 | 114.32 | −0.8% | 1.6% | 5.4% | 104.7 | 115.2 |
| 2023 | 154.71 | 35.3% | 1.6% | 10.7% | 141.7 | 127.5 |
| 2024 | 198.86 | 28.5% | 1.7% | 11.2% | 182.1 | 141.8 |
| 2025 | 255.13 | 28.3% | 1.6% | 8.8% | 233.6 | 154.3 |
Table A1. Sources: BoT; Economic Survey 2025; TICGL calculation. 2019: ICT share 1.6%, growth 4.2%.
Payments compounded at 18.5% a year over 2020–2025 (22.0% a year since 2021). ICT real value added compounded at about 9.1%. The payment index (233.6) ended 79 points above the ICT real index (154.3), and the ICT share of GDP ended where it started.
03 — Connectivity & Digital FinanceWide at the Base, Shallow at the Top: Devices, Credit, Savings, Returns and Jobs
Connectivity and devices
Connectivity has expanded rapidly. Telecom subscriptions rose from 86.8 million (December 2024) to 106.9 million (December 2025) and 111.9 million (March 2026); internet subscriptions from 48.0 million to 58.1 million and 58.9 million; 5G population coverage reached 32.83% in March 2026. But the device ceiling remains: smartphone penetration was 41.82% in December 2025 (42.5% in March 2026), up from roughly 25% in 2022, while feature phones remain near 87%. Rich digital services (e-commerce apps, cloud tools, digital bookkeeping) depend on smartphones and data affordability.
Telecom and Internet Subscriptions, Dec 2024 – Mar 2026
Smartphone Penetration: The Device Ceiling
Digital finance: the productive layers are small relative to the payment base
The financial layers that turn payments into capital are small relative to the payment base. Digital credit reached TZS 5.58 trillion in 2025 (+32.3%), but this is just 2.2% of mobile payment value. Digital savings tripled (+263%) to TZS 3.18 trillion, still 1.2% of payment value. Project notes citing BoT and The Citizen also record 75.78 million active mobile-money accounts against about 2.4 million total loan accounts, a usage gap of more than 30 to 1 (indicative; not independently verified, see Sources & Data Notes).
Value Layers as a Share of Mobile Payment Value (2025)
Digital Credit, Savings and Payments to Businesses, 2024 vs 2025
Accounts and Agents: the Rails Keep Widening
Mobile Money Reaches MSMEs, but Not Credit or Commerce
The MSME figures above come from TICGL's Structural Barriers to MSME Capital Survival in Tanzania: about 20% of the 5 million-plus SMEs have formal finance, 72% operate informally, 98% are micro-enterprises with capital below USD 2,000 and 53% use mobile money. Mobile money has become the on-ramp to the financial system, but not yet the bridge to credit, growth capital and formalisation.
The supply side: concentration of returns
Vodacom Tanzania's FY2026 results (year to 31 March 2026) show service revenue of TZS 1,846.7 billion (+21.8%), of which M-Pesa contributed TZS 734.8 billion (+24.5%) and mobile data TZS 546.7 billion (+29.5%). M-Pesa alone is about 40% of service revenue (TICGL calculation). The company describes digital lending, savings and merchant payments as growing contributors to M-Pesa revenue. These are healthy, profitable businesses; they also illustrate that the visible value in the digital economy is concentrated in a handful of large network and mobile-money operators. An equivalent public series for independent software firms, fintechs, platforms and digital service exporters does not exist.
Vodacom Tanzania FY2026: Where Revenue Sits
Investment by Sector, 2025: ICT Lags Mining and Finance
Jobs: many livelihoods, few measured digital jobs
The digital economy's employment footprint is real but poorly measured. Observable positions include about 1.98 million mobile-money agents (+34.4% in 2025), 2.79 million merchant acceptance points and a startup ecosystem of 1,041 active ventures in 2024 (+24%). These are mostly micro-enterprises and self-employment, not high-productivity formal ICT employment. Tanzania has no official series for total ICT, software, fintech and digital-content employment, and none for ICT service exports: the single largest evidence gap for the value-addition argument.
Digital financial services and infrastructure, 2025
| Indicator | Value | Growth / note |
|---|---|---|
| Mobile payment volume | 7,959.4 million transactions | +24.1% |
| Active mobile-money accounts | 75.78 million | +19.9% (63.21m in 2024) |
| Mobile-money agents | 1.98 million | +34.4% |
| Trust-account balances | TZS 2.83 trillion | +35.7% |
| Merchant acceptance points | 2.79 million | More than doubled |
| Payments to businesses | TZS 37.52 trillion; 2.30 bn transactions | +41% value; +30.4% volume |
| TIPS (instant payments) | TZS 54.95 trillion | +84.3% value |
| Digital credit | TZS 5.58 trillion; 336.5m transactions | +32.3% value |
| Digital savings | TZS 3.18 trillion; 97.5m transactions | +263% value |
| Telecom subscriptions (Dec 2025 / Mar 2026) | 106.9 million / 111.9 million | Penetration 159.8% (Mar 2026) |
| Internet subscriptions (Dec 2025 / Mar 2026) | 58.1 million / 58.9 million | Penetration 84.2% (Mar 2026) |
| Smartphone penetration (Dec 2025 / Mar 2026) | 41.82% / 42.5% | Smartphones 29.8 million |
| 4G / 5G coverage (Dec 2025) | 94.2% / 30.1% | 5G 32.83% in Mar 2026 |
Table A2. Sources: BoT NPS Annual Report 2025 (via TanzaniaInvest, Daily News, uchumi360); TCRA Communication Statistics.
04 — Why the Gap PersistsFive Structural Drivers, and Why Measurement Explains Only Part of It
Five structural drivers
1. Rails without platforms
- Success has been concentrated in payments. Domestic e-commerce, logistics, agritech and marketplace platforms that would capture value locally remain small.
- MSME e-commerce use was only 15% in 2023, against a FYDP IV target of 60% by 2031.
2. Concentrated returns
- Most measured value sits with network operators through transaction fees and data revenue.
- This earns legitimate returns on heavy infrastructure investment but does not automatically seed independent software and service firms.
3. Device and affordability ceiling
- With 41.8% smartphone penetration, a large part of the market can use USSD payments but not data-heavy services.
4. Skills and capital for the productive layers
- Agent and merchant roles scale easily; software engineering, data, cybersecurity and product roles need training pipelines and risk capital.
- Fewer than 0.2% of SMEs have ever received angel or venture capital.
5. Weak data-to-credit link
- Mobile-money histories are a rich credit signal, yet only an estimated 5–7% of that data is used for credit scoring or tax purposes (TICGL, via uchumi360).
- Result: 75.78 million active accounts and very few productive loans.
What the drivers add up to
- A payments economy, not yet a production economy: adoption and transactions are world-class, while revenue capture, value added and exports are not.
The Internet Governance Project's June 2026 report adds a wider comparative point: Tanzania's services share of GDP fell from 49% in 2001 to 29% in 2024, against about 55% in Kenya, and Tanzania's broader digital economy is estimated at less than one-fifth of Kenya's. It attributes part of the gap to regulatory architecture that works against a more independent digital sector. TICGL cites this as an external view to be tested, not as an established fact.
Services Share of GDP: Tanzania vs Kenya (Internet Governance Project, June 2026)
Is it a measurement problem? Partly, but not mostly
Narrow definition
The national accounts' Information and Communication activity covers publishing, broadcasting, telecoms, programming and information services. Mobile-money fees may be classified under financial services, not ICT; the financial and insurance sector grew 15.7% in 2025.
Broad estimates
The Tanzania Business Report 2024/25 puts direct ICT at 1.5–2% and the broad digital economy at about 7% of GDP. Even the broad figure is far from 109%.
Rebasing
GDP was rebased to 2019 prices in 2026. A later BoT release reported a combined GDP figure of TZS 243.3 trillion after harmonisation (headline only; year basis not confirmed). If applied to 2025, mobile payments would equal about 105% rather than 109% of GDP, which does not alter the conclusion.
Gross versus net
Every transfer, cash-in and cash-out counts in transaction value, so flows overstate economic activity by construction.
Narrow, Broad and Gross: The Gap Survives Every Measure
Where the Value May Be Recorded Instead: 2025 Real Growth
Measurement refinements can narrow the gap but cannot close it. A broader, official digital-economy satellite account would still show a sector far smaller than the flows it carries.
05 — Hypotheses TestedFive Research Hypotheses Against the Evidence
The report tests five hypotheses. Two are supported on the available data, one is partly supported, one is plausible but lacks data, and one is scenario-based and to be confirmed by monitoring.
| Hypothesis | Evidence | Assessment |
|---|---|---|
| H1. Transaction value grew faster than ICT value added and formal digital jobs | Payments ×2.34 vs ICT real VA ×1.54 (2020–25); DVCR 1.81% → 1.47%; no formal digital jobs series | Supported for value added Jobs untested (no data) |
| H2. Mobile money is used mainly for P2P and payments rather than linking MSMEs to credit, e-commerce and formal markets | P2B only 14.7% of value (rising from 13.4%); digital credit 2.2% of payment value; 15% MSME e-commerce use | Partly supported P2P share not published, but about 85% of value is non-P2B |
| H3. Most mobile-money MSMEs lack formal credit, so payments do not convert into investment and jobs | 20% of SMEs with formal finance; 65% lack collateral; 75.78m accounts vs about 2.4m loan accounts | Supported |
| H4. Thin local software, data infrastructure, skills and export firms make Tanzania a payments economy rather than a production economy | Smartphone 41.8%; no ICT export series; ICT investment USD 152m vs mining USD 442m; concentrated operator revenue | Plausible insufficient data to confirm |
| H5. Value-addition policies raise ICT contribution more than volume growth alone | Scenarios: same payments growth gives ICT value added of TZS 6.4–11.3 trillion by 2030 | Scenario-based to be confirmed by monitoring |
Table 3.1. Source: TICGL/TERI research report, Section 7.
H1: Growth Multiples, 2020→2025
H2: P2B vs Everything Else
H3: Accounts vs Loan Accounts
H1 and H3 are supported by the data; H2 is partly supported; H4 is plausible but cannot be confirmed without ICT jobs and export series; H5 is tested through the scenarios in the next tab. The common thread is that the thinness is in the layers above the rails, and that the data to measure it do not yet exist.
06 — Outlook 2026–2030Four Scenarios: Same Rails, Very Different Value Captured
The scenarios isolate one variable: how much value the economy captures from the same digital rails. Scenarios A, B and C share identical payment growth (18% a year, close to the 2020–2025 average of 18.5%); they differ in the ICT share of GDP reached by 2030. Scenario D shows what a slowdown would do.
A. Rails-only (inertia)
- ICT share 1.6% → 1.7%
- Payments +18% a year
B. Value-addition push
- ICT share → 2.5%
- Payments +18% a year
C. Policy-target case
- ICT share → 3.0% (official target)
- Payments +18% a year
D. Downside
- ICT share → 1.5%
- Payments +12% a year
GDP: nominal GDP grows 10% a year from TZS 234.1 trillion (2025) to about TZS 377 trillion in 2030 (about 6% real growth plus about 4% inflation/price effects). ICT share: moves in a straight line from 1.6% (2025) to the 2030 value of each scenario. Payments: 18% a year in A–C (TZS 584 trillion in 2030), 12% in D (TZS 450 trillion); a 20% path would match the Daily News/BoT illustration of about TZS 630 trillion within five years, and 22% gives TZS 690 trillion. Digital credit grows at 20% (A), 30% (B), 35% (C) and 12% (D) a year from TZS 5.58 trillion. Smartphone penetration reaches 52%, 58%, 62% and 48% respectively by 2030. Target: the 3% target is the official ICT target set in the Ministry's strategic plan; a further 10%-by-2036 target appeared in earlier notes but could not be verified in a primary source and is not used.
Scenario outcomes in 2030
| Indicator, 2030 | A. Rails-only | B. Value-addition push | C. Policy-target case | D. Downside |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nominal GDP (TZS tn) | 377.0 | 377.0 | 377.0 | 377.0 |
| Mobile payments (TZS tn) | 583.7 | 583.7 | 583.7 | 449.6 |
| Payments as % of GDP | 155% | 155% | 155% | 119% |
| ICT share of GDP | 1.7% | 2.5% | 3.0% | 1.5% |
| ICT value added (TZS tn) | 6.41 | 9.43 | 11.31 | 5.66 |
| DVCR | 1.10% | 1.61% | 1.94% | 1.26% |
| Digital credit (TZS tn) | 13.9 | 20.7 | 25.0 | 9.8 |
| Digital credit as % of payments | 2.4% | 3.5% | 4.3% | 2.2% |
| Smartphone penetration | 52% | 58% | 62% | 48% |
| Cumulative ICT value added 2026–30 (TZS tn) | 26.2 | 34.2 | 39.2 | 24.2 |
| Cumulative gain vs A (TZS tn) | — | +8.0 | +13.0 | −2.0 |
Table 3. Source: TICGL scenario model. Values are illustrative outcomes of stated assumptions, not forecasts.
ICT Value Added to 2030 Under Four Scenarios
Mobile Payment Value Outlook to 2030
ICT Share of GDP: the Straight-Line Paths
DVCR Path: the Paradox Deepens Under Rails-Only
Cumulative ICT Value Added, 2026–2030
Annual Extra ICT Value Added vs Rails-Only
Digital Credit: 2025 vs 2030 by Scenario
Smartphone Penetration: 2025 vs 2030 by Scenario
In scenario A the economy keeps adding payment volume but the DVCR drops to about 1.1%: the paradox deepens. Scenario B, which requires ICT's share to reach 2.5%, would add about TZS 3.0 trillion to annual GDP in 2030 and TZS 8.0 trillion cumulatively over five years relative to A. Scenario C, the official 3% target, is demanding: it needs ICT value added to grow about 25% a year in nominal terms (from TZS 3.75 trillion to TZS 11.31 trillion), whereas implied nominal ICT value added grew only about 4% between 2024 and 2025. It is achievable only with new activity (software, data, cloud, digital exports), not by growing the existing telecom base alone.
Build your own 2030 scenario
Same model as the report: GDP and payments compound annually from 2025; the ICT share moves in a straight line to your 2030 value. Defaults reproduce scenario B.
07 — Economic ImpactWhat Value Addition Would Mean for GDP, Jobs, MSMEs and Public Revenue
GDP
Under scenario B the additional ICT value added is worth 0.8 percentage points of 2030 GDP relative to inertia (2.5% versus 1.7%); under scenario C it is 1.3 points. These figures count only direct ICT value added. Broader effects (lower costs and higher productivity in trade, agriculture and transport) would be additional and require the satellite account to measure.
Extra ICT Value Added in 2030 vs Rails-Only
| 2030 vs scenario A | B | C | D |
|---|---|---|---|
| ICT share of GDP | +0.8 pp | +1.3 pp | −0.2 pp |
| Extra ICT VA in 2030 (TZS tn) | +3.02 | +4.90 | −0.75 |
| Cumulative 2026–30 (TZS tn) | +8.0 | +13.0 | −2.0 |
Jobs
No official ICT employment series exists, so jobs cannot be projected rigorously. The report therefore uses proxies and recommends a new KPI. Agent positions rose 19% in 2024 and 34.4% in 2025 to 1.98 million; if agent growth slows to 5–8% a year the network would reach 2.5–2.9 million by 2030. These are largely self-employed, low-income roles. The more important question is quality: how many positions in software, data, cybersecurity, digital marketing and platform operations are created per TZS trillion of payments. TICGL proposes "digital jobs per million transactions" as a core KPI, supported by a labour-force survey module.
Mobile-Money Agents: 2024, 2025 and the 2030 Range
MSMEs
MSMEs convert payments into growth only if they can borrow, keep records, sell online and formalise. FYDP IV targets 60% e-commerce use among SMEs by 2031 (from 15% in 2023), 40% formal credit access by 2031 (from about 20%), 250,000 MSME registrations a year and a Credit Guarantee Corporation. Reaching 60% from 15% by 2031 implies roughly 5–6 percentage points of adoption gain every year. Each of these goals depends on the data-to-credit link and on digital bookkeeping tools. See TICGL's MSME capital-survival study for the underlying constraints.
FYDP IV MSME Targets: Baseline vs 2031
Required Annual Gain to Hit the E-commerce Target
Public revenue
Digital rails create a potential tax and compliance dividend. When transactions are recorded electronically, presumptive tax, e-invoicing and merchant registration become cheaper to administer. Today only an estimated 5–7% of mobile-money data feeds credit scoring or tax systems (TICGL via uchumi360). Raising this share, with strong data-protection safeguards, is a lever for revenue and for MSME credit at the same time.
GDP gains require new ICT activity; jobs require skills and platforms; MSME gains require credit, records and online sales; revenue gains require data use. All four depend on the same missing layer: the conversion of payment data and payment habits into productive digital services.
08 — Policy & KPIsFrom Volume to Value: Eight Actions and a KPI Dashboard
The evidence points to a shift in emphasis from volume to value. Eight actions follow, mapped to the Digital Economy Strategic Framework 2024–2034, FYDP IV and Dira 2050.
| # | Action | Lead institutions | Horizon | Success indicator |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Link mobile-money data to credit scoring for MSMEs with data protection, consent and consumer-protection rules | BoT, PDPC, credit bureaus, banks, MNOs | 2026–28 | Digital MSME credit as % of payments; loan accounts per 100 active wallets |
| 2 | Digitise MSME bookkeeping, e-invoicing and tax tools at near-zero cost | TRA, MoFP, MCIT, SIDO | 2026–28 | % MSMEs using digital records; registrations (target 250,000 a year) |
| 3 | Back local software, fintech, cloud and cybersecurity firms through public procurement, shared test environments and risk capital | MCIT, ICT Commission, e-GA, TIC | 2026–30 | ICT investment (USD); number of registered software firms; local share of government ICT spend |
| 4 | Build the digital export pipeline (software, BPO/ITES, digital content) with an ICT-services export series | MCIT, BoT, NBS, TIC | 2027–30 | ICT service exports (USD m); jobs in export-oriented ICT firms |
| 5 | Close the device gap: device financing, tax and duty review on entry-level smartphones | MoFP, TCRA, MNOs | 2026–29 | Smartphone penetration (42% → 58%+) |
| 6 | Invest in data centres, cloud, reliable power and digital skills, not connectivity alone | MCIT, TANESCO, universities, private sector | 2026–30 | Local data-hosting capacity; ICT graduates employed in the sector |
| 7 | Promote merchant digitisation and platforms in agri-food, retail, transport, tourism and manufacturing | MoIT, SIDO, TCRA, platforms | 2026–30 | Merchant acceptance points (2.79m → 4m+); MSME e-commerce use (15% → 60% by 2031) |
| 8 | Create a Digital Economy Satellite Account and an annual digital jobs module in the labour-force survey | NBS, BoT, MCIT | 2027–28 | Published broad digital GVA; jobs series; DVCR published annually |
Table 4. Policy actions. Source: TICGL/TERI research report, Section 10.
Policy Action Timeline, 2026–2030
Proposed KPI dashboard
| KPI | Baseline (2025) | 2030 target range |
|---|---|---|
| Digital Value Conversion Ratio | 1.47% | 1.6–1.9% (scenarios B–C) |
| ICT share of GDP (narrow) | 1.6% | 2.5–3.0% |
| Broad digital economy share of GDP | ≈ 7% (indicative, unofficial) | Official series published |
| Digital credit as % of mobile payments | 2.2% | 3.5–4.3% |
| Payments to businesses as % of mobile payments | 14.7% | 25%+ |
| MSME e-commerce use | 15% (2023) | 45–60% |
| Smartphone penetration | 41.8% | 58–62% |
| Digital jobs per million transactions | Not measured | Baseline set 2027 |
| ICT service exports | Not measured | Baseline set 2027 |
Table 5. Targets are TICGL proposals derived from the scenarios and FYDP IV; they are not official government commitments.
KPI Distance to Travel: 2025 Baseline vs Low End of the 2030 Target Range
Turn payment data into MSME finance: actions 1 and 2. Build the supply side: actions 3, 4 and 6 (firms, exports, infrastructure and skills). Widen demand: actions 5 and 7 (devices, merchants, platforms). Measure it: action 8, without which the 3% target and the DVCR cannot be tracked officially.
09 — Risks & Data GapsWhat Could Go Wrong, What Cannot Yet Be Measured, and What TICGL/TERI Will Do Next
Risks to the outlook
- Fee and tax shocks: increases in transaction levies or excise could reduce use and push activity back to cash; scenario D shows payments growing 12% instead of 18%.
- Over-reliance on payments revenue: if the sector's growth is concentrated in the same few operators, the ICT share may not rise even if revenues grow.
- Skills and power: limited talent supply and unreliable electricity constrain data-centre and software expansion.
- Consumer protection and digital credit: fast growth in digital lending (32% in 2025) needs safeguards against over-indebtedness and predatory pricing.
- Measurement risk: without a satellite account, policy may keep targeting the narrow 1.6% figure and miss broad gains.
How Much the Payment Growth Rate Matters in 2030
The Downside Costs Value, Not Just Volume
Data gaps
| Gap | Why it matters | Suggested owner |
|---|---|---|
| Official ICT / digital jobs series | Needed to test H1 and compute digital jobs per million transactions | NBS (labour-force survey), TCRA |
| ICT and digital service exports | Cannot assess H4 or export-led value addition | BoT (BoP services), NBS |
| Mobile-money industry revenue and fee take-rate | Needed to link transaction flows to revenue and value added | TCRA, BoT |
| Digital credit split by MSME vs personal | BoT cites alternative scoring for MSMEs but no breakdown | BoT |
| MSME digital tool adoption (e-commerce, inventory, bookkeeping) | Only 15% (2023) e-commerce figure; no national series | NBS, SIDO, TICGL |
| Registered software firms and startups (official register) | Counts vary from 75 to 170+ fintechs | BRELA, ICT Commission |
Source: TICGL/TERI research report, Section 11.2.
Next research steps for TICGL/TERI
Replace approximations with accounts
- Extract the full 2019-based annual national-accounts table for Information and Communication (current prices, 2019–2025) to replace the share-based approximation.
- Publish the DVCR quarterly on the TICGL dashboard using BoT and NBS releases.
Fill the micro-data gap
- Run a TICGL/TERI MSME digital adoption survey (payments, credit, e-commerce, bookkeeping).
- Build a regional benchmark (Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, Ethiopia) of ICT share, services share and mobile-money intensity.
Talk to TICGL/TERI
Need a digital-economy briefing, an MSME digital-adoption study, a fintech or ICT market-entry assessment, or a feasibility study for a digital platform in Tanzania? Our economists can tailor this analysis to your sector.
What We Do →TICGL Markets →TERI Research →Invest in Tanzania →✉️ economist@ticgl.com10 — Sources & Data NotesMethod, Definitions and Reconciliation Notes
Source report. TICGL/TERI research report "From Digital Payments to Digital Value Addition" by Amran Bhuzohera (November 2026), built on Bank of Tanzania, Ministry of Finance, NBS, TCRA, Vodacom Tanzania and TICGL research. Calculations. Growth rates, indices, implied ICT value added, the DVCR, ratios, rounding bands and all scenario figures are TICGL/TERI arithmetic on published figures. Scenario results are illustrative outcomes of stated assumptions, not forecasts. This page is a detailed companion to the full report and does not replace it.
Data reconciliation notes (Appendix B of the report)
| Item | Issue | Treatment on this page |
|---|---|---|
| ICT value added 2025 | Project notes show both ≈ TZS 4.2 trillion and ≈ TZS 3.74 trillion. 1.6% of TZS 234.1 trillion = TZS 3.75 trillion. | Uses 3.75 (matches the 1.6% share and the UNdata figure). |
| Mobile payments vs GDP | Earlier drafts say "~100%" or "95%". Actual ratio: 93.8% (2024) and 109.0% (2025). | Uses the computed ratios. |
| Transaction volume series | Volumes of 0.22–0.25 bn (2020–22) jump to 5.06 bn (2023): a change in definition, not a 20× rise. TCRA also reports 6.31 bn for 2025 vs BoT 7.96 bn. | Volume growth not computed across 2022/23; BoT value series used for trends. |
| Source attribution | The ICT share, growth, smartphone, 4G and 5G figures were attributed to the TICGL MSME page. That page does not contain them. | Attributed to Economic Survey 2025 and TCRA. |
| ICT growth 2023–2024 | Pre-rebasing ministry budget statements cite 7.6% (2023) and 14.3% (2024); the 2019-base Economic Survey shows 10.7% and 11.2%. | Uses the rebased Economic Survey series. |
| Loan accounts (2.4m), outstanding credit (TZS 48.4tn), TanFiX 0.83 | Taken from project notes citing The Citizen/BoT; not independently verified. | Used only as indicative context. |
| Informal sector survey 2025 (TZS 88.1tn; 36.3% of GDP; 24m workers) | From project notes; not independently verified. | Not used in calculations. |
| ICT policy targets | "3% by 2029 and 10% by 2036" could not be verified. A 3% ICT target (from 1.5%) is documented; the 10% figure is not. | Uses 3%; 10% omitted. |
| GDP denominator | TZS 234.1 trillion (June 2026). A later BoT release reports TZS 243.3 trillion combined GDP (headline only). | Uses 234.1; sensitivity shown in "Why the Gap Persists". |
| Rounding | ICT shares are published to one decimal, so implied ICT value added carries a band of roughly ±TZS 0.2 trillion. | Rounding band shown in the DVCR chart. |
- Bank of Tanzania (2026), National Payment Systems Annual Report 2025. Dar es Salaam.
- Ministry of Finance, United Republic of Tanzania (2026), Economic Survey 2025. Dodoma.
- National Bureau of Statistics and Office of the Chief Government Statistician (2026), Revised National Accounts Statistics, Base Year 2019: Sources and Methods, June 2026.
- Ministry of Finance / Planning and Investment (2026), State of the Economy Report and National Development Plan 2026/27, presented to Parliament 11 June 2026.
- Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (2025–2026), Communication Statistics, quarters ending December 2024 to March 2026.
- Vodacom Tanzania PLC (2026), preliminary condensed consolidated financial results, year ended 31 March 2026.
- TICGL (2026), Structural Barriers to MSME Capital Survival in Tanzania, May 2026; TICGL (2026), Tanzania Entrepreneurship Profile 2024–2025, February 2026; TICGL (2026), Tanzania Digital Economy Vision 2050 and Tanzania's Digital Transformation 2024–2034.
- Government of Tanzania (2024), Digital Economy Strategic Framework 2024–2034; Government of Tanzania (2026), FYDP IV 2026/27–2030/31, as summarised in TICGL (2026).
- Internet Governance Project (2026, June), Tanzania Is Getting Online. Its Digital Economy Isn't Following.
- The Guardian (Tanzania) (2026, April), digital economy systems adoption (Tanzania Business Report 2024/25); TanzaniaInvest (2026), digital credit, savings and TCRA statistics; Daily News / allAfrica (2026, August), Mobile money reshapes economy; uchumi360 (2026), mobile-money and TIPS statistics.
11 — Quick AnswersFrequently Asked Questions
Why is Tanzania's ICT sector only 1.6% of GDP when mobile payments are TZS 255 trillion?
Transaction value is a gross flow in which the same shilling is counted each time it changes hands, while GDP counts only new value created. Mobile payments reached TZS 255.13 trillion in 2025 (109% of nominal GDP of TZS 234.1 trillion), but ICT value added is about TZS 3.75 trillion (1.6% of GDP). The gap is not a statistical error, yet it is a genuine development problem: payments grew 2.34 times between 2020 and 2025 while ICT real value added grew 1.54 times.
What is the Digital Value Conversion Ratio (DVCR)?
ICT value added divided by mobile payment value, times 100. It fell from 1.81% in 2024 to 1.47% in 2025, so each TZS 100 of mobile payments corresponds to about TZS 1.5 of ICT value added. It is a diagnostic, not a grade: cheaper transfers also lower it.
How large is Tanzania's mobile money economy?
TZS 255.13 trillion (about USD 96 billion) of mobile payments across 7.96 billion transactions in 2025, with 75.78 million active accounts, 1.98 million agents and 2.79 million merchant acceptance points. Payments to businesses were TZS 37.52 trillion (14.7% of value) and TIPS instant payments TZS 54.95 trillion (+84%).
Is the gap just a measurement problem?
Partly, but not mostly. The ICT definition is narrow, mobile-money fees may be recorded under financial services, GDP was rebased in 2026 and transaction value is gross. Even a broad digital-economy estimate of about 7% of GDP is far from 109%, so better measurement can narrow the gap but not close it.
How much could ICT value added be in 2030?
With payments growing 18% a year: TZS 6.4 trillion if only the rails grow (ICT at 1.7% of GDP), TZS 9.4 trillion in a value-addition push (2.5%) and TZS 11.3 trillion if the official 3% target is met. The gap between the first two is worth about TZS 8.0 trillion of cumulative GDP over 2026–2030. A downside with 12% payment growth gives TZS 5.7 trillion.
How much digital credit and savings are there?
Digital credit was TZS 5.58 trillion in 2025 (+32.3%), only 2.2% of payment value. Digital savings tripled (+263%) to TZS 3.18 trillion, 1.2% of payment value. There are 75.78 million active accounts against roughly 2.4 million loan accounts, an indicative gap of more than 30 to 1.
What is smartphone penetration in Tanzania?
41.82% in December 2025 (42.5% in March 2026), about 29.8 million smartphones, up from roughly 25% in 2022. 4G covers 94.2% of the population and 5G reached 32.83% in March 2026. The device ceiling limits data-heavy services such as e-commerce and cloud tools.
What does TICGL recommend?
Eight actions: link mobile-money data to MSME credit scoring with data protection; digitise MSME bookkeeping and e-invoicing; back local software, fintech, cloud and cybersecurity firms; build a digital export pipeline; close the device gap; invest in data centres, cloud, power and skills; promote merchant digitisation and platforms; and create a Digital Economy Satellite Account with an annual digital jobs module.
Muhtasari kwa Kiswahili
Kutoka Malipo ya Kidijitali hadi Uongezaji wa Thamani ya Kidijitali: Mwaka 2025 malipo ya simu nchini Tanzania yalifikia TZS trilioni 255.13 (takriban USD bilioni 96), sawa na asilimia 109 ya Pato la Taifa la TZS trilioni 234.1. Hata hivyo sekta ya Habari na Mawasiliano (ICT) ilibaki asilimia 1.6 ya Pato la Taifa: ilikuwa asilimia 1.6 mwaka 2019 na asilimia 1.6 mwaka 2025.
Pengo si kosa la takwimu, lakini ni tatizo halisi la maendeleo: thamani ya miamala ni mtiririko wa jumla, wakati Pato la Taifa linahesabu thamani mpya pekee. Kati ya 2020 na 2025 malipo ya simu yaliongezeka mara 2.34 (asilimia 18.5 kwa mwaka), huku thamani halisi iliyoongezwa na ICT ikiongezeka mara 1.54 tu.
Kiwango cha Ubadilishaji wa Thamani ya Kidijitali (DVCR): thamani iliyoongezwa na ICT kwa kila shilingi ya malipo ya simu ilishuka kutoka asilimia 1.81 (2024) hadi asilimia 1.47 (2025). Kwa kila TZS 100 za malipo ya simu, takriban TZS 1.5 ndizo thamani iliyoongezwa na ICT.
Miundombinu ni imara: akaunti hai za pesa za simu milioni 75.78, mawakala milioni 1.98, sehemu za kupokea malipo kwa wafanyabiashara milioni 2.79, TIPS iliongezeka asilimia 84 hadi TZS trilioni 54.95, na mtandao wa 4G unafikia asilimia 94.2 ya wananchi.
Tabaka za uzalishaji ni nyembamba: mikopo ya kidijitali ni TZS trilioni 5.58 (asilimia 2.2 ya thamani ya malipo), akiba za kidijitali TZS trilioni 3.18 (asilimia 1.2), malipo kwa biashara asilimia 14.7. Simu janja ni asilimia 41.8 tu, na hakuna takwimu rasmi za mauzo ya nje ya huduma za ICT.
Mapato yamejikita: Vodacom Tanzania pekee ilipata TZS bilioni 734.8 kutoka M-Pesa mwaka wa fedha 2026 (asilimia 24.5 juu). Kampuni huru za programu, majukwaa na data ni ndogo na hazipimwi.
Sababu tano za pengo: (1) miundombinu ya malipo bila majukwaa, (2) mapato kujikita kwa waendeshaji wachache, (3) kikwazo cha simu janja na gharama, (4) upungufu wa ujuzi na mtaji kwa tabaka za uzalishaji, (5) kiungo dhaifu kati ya data na mikopo (ni asilimia 5–7 tu ya data ya pesa za simu inayotumika kwa alama za mikopo au kodi).
Je, ni tatizo la upimaji? Kwa sehemu, lakini si hasa. Hata makadirio mapana ya uchumi wa kidijitali (takriban asilimia 7 ya Pato la Taifa) yako mbali na asilimia 109. Upimaji bora unaweza kupunguza pengo lakini hauwezi kulifunga.
Mwelekeo wa 2026–2030 (hali nne): kwa ukuaji ule ule wa malipo (asilimia 18 kwa mwaka), thamani iliyoongezwa na ICT mwaka 2030 ni TZS trilioni 6.4 (miundombinu pekee), trilioni 9.4 (msukumo wa kuongeza thamani) au trilioni 11.3 (lengo la asilimia 3). Tofauti kati ya hali mbili za kwanza ni takriban TZS trilioni 8.0 za Pato la Taifa kwa miaka mitano. Hali ya chini (ukuaji wa malipo asilimia 12) inatoa trilioni 5.7. Hizi si utabiri bali matokeo ya dhana zilizotajwa.
Hitimisho na hatua: kipaumbele kihame kutoka wingi kwenda thamani. Hatua nane: unganisha data ya pesa za simu na alama za mikopo kwa MSMEs kwa ulinzi wa data; dijitisha uhasibu na ankara za kielektroniki; saidia kampuni za ndani za programu, fintech, wingu na usalama wa mtandao; jenga mauzo ya nje ya huduma za kidijitali; funga pengo la simu janja; wekeza kwenye vituo vya data, umeme na ujuzi; kuza majukwaa ya wafanyabiashara; na unda Akaunti ya Setilaiti ya Uchumi wa Kidijitali pamoja na takwimu za ajira za kidijitali.
- Malipo ya simu 2025: TZS trilioni 255.13 · Pato la Taifa: asilimia 109 · ICT: asilimia 1.6
- DVCR: asilimia 1.47 (kutoka 1.81) · Mikopo ya kidijitali: TZS trilioni 5.58 · Simu janja: asilimia 41.8
- ICT 2030: TZS trilioni 5.7 / 6.4 / 9.4 / 11.3 · Faida ya msukumo dhidi ya hali ya kawaida: TZS trilioni 8.0
Chanzo: Benki Kuu ya Tanzania (NPS Annual Report 2025); Economic Survey 2025; NBS; TCRA; Vodacom Tanzania; utafiti wa TICGL/TERI (Amran Bhuzohera, Novemba 2026). Kwa maelezo zaidi: economist@ticgl.com.