This report is prepared by TERI for research and strategic-information purposes only. It is not investment, legal, tax or financial advice, and does not state the position of the Government of Tanzania, the Bank of Tanzania, CMSA, DSE, SSRA or TIRA. Recommendations are analytical proposals; estimates, scenarios and targets ("TERI calculation") are illustrative, not forecasts, and should be independently verified before use in decision-making. Public sources use different definitions, dates and GDP bases for several indicators in this report (market capitalisation/GDP, government securities outstanding, pension allocation shares); every material discrepancy encountered is flagged in Annex A.
This report draws together and extends three earlier TICGL/TERI reports: Tanzania's Capital Market: Growing Fast, Still Shallow (the symptom — DSE market cap passing TZS 40tn while remaining shallow), Government Securities Dominance: The Crowding-Out Problem (the mechanism — why government securities absorb nearly all domestic savings), and Pension-to-Investment Gap (the largest single pool caught in that imbalance). This report sets the whole picture against the number that matters most for Tanzania's development trajectory: the roughly TZS 65 trillion a year of private investment that FYDP IV and Vision 2050 assume will materialise — and asks, concretely, where it will come from.
01 — OverviewExecutive Summary
Tanzania's development plans assume that the private sector will carry most of the investment burden. Under Vision 2050 and FYDP IV, the private sector is expected to invest TZS 324.49 trillion of the TZS 477.75 trillion required over 2026/27–2030/31 — 67.9% of the envelope, the "70%" cited in policy discussion. That is about TZS 65 trillion a year, roughly 28% of 2025 GDP (TZS 234.1 trillion after rebasing). The practical question for every investor, banker and policymaker is therefore simple: where will the capital come from?
Commercial banks will remain essential but cannot be the only answer: bank loans are mostly short- to medium-term, collateral-heavy and priced near 15%, while factories, logistics, housing, hotels, energy and data centres need long-term, patient capital. A deeper capital market — equity, corporate bonds, infrastructure and project-finance instruments — is the logical complement.
Tanzania's capital market is growing fast but is not yet financing the private sector at the scale the plan assumes. DSE total market capitalisation reached TZS 40.6 trillion in September 2026, yet listed corporate, public-institution and sukuk bonds stand at only TZS 1.6 trillion against TZS 32.0 trillion of government bonds. The constraint is not the absence of institutions — DSE, CMSA, SSRA, a sovereign yield curve, sukuk, green and sub-national bond categories all exist. It is the structure of the market: sovereign dominance, a thin issuer pipeline, under-diversified institutional portfolios, weak liquidity and limited project preparation.
Key findings
- Scale mismatch. The five-year private investment requirement equals about 8.0x the entire DSE market capitalisation, 4.4x the total assets of the banking system (TZS 74.5tn, Dec 2025), and roughly 200x the stock of listed corporate bonds.
- The market is growing, but not toward private financing. In the year to June 2026, listed government bonds increased by TZS 4.84tn while corporate bonds increased by TZS 0.25tn — a ratio of about 20 to 1. Secondary-market trading of corporate bonds was about 0.14% of combined turnover in one reported 2025 period.
- The headline "10.85% of GDP" ratio is out of date. On rebased 2025 GDP, DSE total capitalisation is about 17.3% of GDP (domestic 12.1%). The real gap is not index level but flow and instrument mix.
- Capital markets mobilise roughly 1–2% of annual private investment needs. The TICGL/TERI target of 7–9% by 2030 implies TZS 4.5–5.8tn a year — about five to six times the current corporate listing run-rate of roughly TZS 0.95tn a year.
- Peers show what depth requires. Malaysia's corporate bonds and sukuk are about 42% of bonds outstanding; Tanzania's corporate share of listed bonds is about 4.8%.
- A window has opened in 2026. Treasury securities opened to non-resident investors (17 Jul 2026); BoT launched a sovereign yield curve (7 Aug 2026); a record five corporate bonds were listed in H1 2026.
- Outcomes depend on reform. Three scenarios put cumulative capital-market mobilisation over 2026/27–2030/31 at TZS 7.8tn (business as usual), TZS 18.0tn (reform) and TZS 26.3tn (stretch). The reform path adds about TZS 10 trillion of long-term private capital relative to the base case.
What needs to change: eight priority actions
Read this alongside TERI's Pension-to-Investment Gap report
Pension funds are Tanzania's single largest pool of long-term domestic savings — TZS 25.9 trillion, growing 21.4% a year. This report shows exactly how large a role that pool would need to play to help close the private-investment gap.
Read: Pension-to-Investment Gap →02 — The Core Question1. The Financing Question: Where Will the Capital Come From?
FYDP IV, themed "Transformation for Inclusive Economic Growth and Employment Creation", sets a total resource requirement of TZS 477.75 trillion for 2026/27–2030/31. The financing architecture is explicit: roughly 70% private, 30% public.
Table 1. FYDP IV financing envelope, 2026/27–2030/31
| Source of investment | TZS trillion | Share | Annual average |
|---|---|---|---|
| Private sector | 324.49 | 67.9% | 64.9 |
| Government (MDAs and LGAs) | 115.04 | 24.1% | 23.0 |
| Public corporations | 38.22 | 8.0% | 7.6 |
| Total FYDP IV | 477.75 | 100.0% | 95.5 |
Memo: 2026/27 plan year (total TZS 86.3tn) — Private TZS 60.1tn (69.6%), Public TZS 26.2tn. Source: Ministry of Finance and Planning presentations to Parliament, June 2026, as reported by The Citizen, Daily News and AllAfrica; TICGL/TERI calculations. Annual averages are simple five-year means.
Two features matter for financial-sector policy. First, the annual private requirement of about TZS 65 trillion equals roughly 28% of 2025 GDP — an investment-to-GDP profile few economies achieve without deep long-term finance. Second, the plan assumes faster growth: government projects 6.3% growth in 2026 (up from 5.9% in 2025), while analysts note that reaching a USD 1 trillion economy by 2050 needs growth nearer 10% a year. The plan also targets 1.7 million new jobs in 2026, against 981,000 in 2024 — jobs created when firms can finance plant, inventory and expansion over multi-year horizons.
Sources: FYDP IV (requirement, a five-year flow); Bank of Tanzania (banking system total assets, Q4 2025; pension investment assets, 2025); DSE (market capitalisation, 11 Sep 2026); DSE/TanzaniaInvest Q2 2026 (bonds, end-June 2026). Flows and stocks are not strictly comparable; the chart shows orders of magnitude, not a funding identity. Reproduced exactly as prepared in the source report.
The comparison is deliberately stark and should be read carefully. Private investment is not all raised in financial markets — much comes from retained earnings, FDI, development-finance institutions, households and PPP sponsors. But capital markets are meant to supply precisely the part banks supply poorly: long-tenor, large-ticket and equity-like capital.
Table 2. Which private investment is naturally financed by which source
| Investment need | Natural financing source | Why banks alone fall short |
|---|---|---|
| Working capital, trade finance, short-cycle SME needs | Banks, microfinance, fintech | Banks are well suited; this is their core business |
| Long-term corporate capex (factories, agro-processing, hotels, logistics) | Corporate bonds, term loans, equity | Tenor mismatch with deposits; refinancing risk |
| Infrastructure and PPP assets | Project bonds, infrastructure funds, pension and insurance capital | Ticket sizes and tenors exceed single-bank limits |
| Housing and real estate | Mortgage finance, REITs, securitisation | Funding is short; collateral-heavy; high rates |
| Scale-ups, technology and service exporters | Venture, private equity, growth-market equity | Intangible assets are not accepted as collateral |
| Large-firm expansion and ownership broadening | IPOs, follow-on offers, rights issues | Debt capacity limits; Vision 2050 domestic-ownership goals |
03 — Diagnosis2. Why Bank Finance Alone Cannot Close the Gap
This is not an argument against banks. Private-sector credit grew 23.5% in the year to December 2025 (Bank of Tanzania), and banks remain the main channel for working capital and SME lending. The argument is that banks cannot, and were never designed to, carry a transformation programme alone. Four structural limits explain why.
Table 3. Structural limits of bank-led financing
| Limit | What it means in practice | Indicative evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Maturity mismatch | Deposits are short- and medium-term; factories, hotels, rail and housing need 7–25 year money. Rolling short loans over long assets creates refinancing risk. | Average lending rate ≈15.24% (Dec 2025); long-dated bank credit scarce relative to the plan's needs |
| Collateral dependence | Banks lend against titled land, buildings and guarantees. Firms whose assets are contracts, brands, software or future cash flows struggle to qualify. | Service exporters, technology firms, young businesses and women-owned firms disproportionately affected |
| Concentration and size limits | Single-obligor limits cap how much one bank can lend to a project or group; risk cannot be spread beyond the banking system. | Banking system assets TZS 74.5tn vs private investment requirement of TZS 324tn over five years |
| Cost and bargaining power | Where bank debt is the only option, borrowers have little negotiating power. A functioning bond and equity market creates price competition. | Private-sector credit around 15–17% of GDP — low for an economy seeking rapid industrialisation |
Sources: BoT Monthly Economic Review (Jan 2026); IMF (May 2025) and AfDB comparative measures as cited in TICGL/TERI working notes; BoT banking-system balance sheet. Credit-to-GDP measures differ by definition and GDP base (see Annex A).
There is a second, less obvious point. The same savings pool that banks and institutions invest is also being drawn on by the Treasury. The 2026/27 budget carries TZS 15.54tn of new borrowing, of which TZS 6.56tn is domestic, on top of TZS 7.84tn to repay maturing loans. Recent long-dated Treasury bonds carry coupons of roughly 15–16% (15.25% on the 20-year bond issued Feb 2025; 15.00% on the 25-year bond issued Aug 2025). A private corporate issuer must offer a premium over a risk-free benchmark that already matches the bank lending rate — making bank loans look cheaper even when shorter and more demanding. This is the pricing face of crowding out, explored further in Section 5.
The policy objective is not to replace banks but to complement them: banks originate, underwrite, guarantee and distribute; capital markets provide the long-term funding and risk-sharing that bank balance sheets cannot. The reforms in Section 7 are designed so banks participate as arrangers, trustees, guarantors and market makers — not as victims.
04 — Data3. Where Tanzania's Capital Market Stands
3.1 Data snapshot
Table 4. Tanzania capital-market indicators, 2025–2026
| Indicator | Value | Date / source | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|
| DSE total market capitalisation | TZS 40.61tn (≈USD 15.3bn) | 11 Sep 2026; DSE/TanzaniaInvest | First time above TZS 40tn; includes cross-listed stocks |
| DSE domestic market capitalisation | TZS 28.28tn | 11 Sep 2026 | +5.84% in one week; driven by a few large stocks |
| Value of 28 listed companies | TZS 35.18tn (+79.1% y/y) | End-Q2 2026 vs TZS 19.64tn, end-Q2 2025 | Strong valuation gains, not new capital raised |
| Total market cap / GDP | ≈17.3% (domestic ≈12.1%) | TZS 40.61/28.28tn over 2025 GDP of TZS 234.1tn | Not "shallow" by Kenya/Nigeria standards, but far from Mauritius/South Africa |
| Listed companies | 28 | Q2 2026 | Thin issuer base |
| Government bonds listed | TZS 32.01tn (+17.8% y/y) | End-Jun 2026 vs TZS 27.17tn | Government securities outstanding TZS 32.29tn (BoT, Aug 2026) |
| Corporate, public-institution bonds and sukuk | TZS 1.60tn (+18.2% y/y) | End-Jun 2026 vs TZS 1.35tn | Government paper ≈20x corporate; corporates 4.8% of listed bonds |
| Corporate bonds (BoT series) | TZS 0.76tn (2024) → TZS 1.9tn (2025) | Bank of Tanzania | Passed TZS 2tn after the EFTA bond (May 2026) |
| New debt securities listed in Q2 2026 | 5 securities, TZS 236.4bn | DSE Q2 2026 | Run-rate ≈TZS 0.95tn a year |
| Secondary turnover, 2025 period | Treasury bonds TZS 1.615tn vs corporate TZS 2.19bn | DSE (TICGL/TERI working notes) | Corporate ≈0.14% of combined; Treasury ≈740x corporate |
| Equity turnover, 1–10 Sep 2026 | ≈TZS 16bn a day (7 trading days) | DSE daily reports | ≈0.04% of market cap daily; ≈10% annualised |
| Pension investment assets | TZS 24.05tn (total TZS 27.04tn) | Bank of Tanzania, 2025 | Largest domestic pool of long-term capital |
| Domestic debt stock | TZS 37.9tn | BoT, Dec 2025 | Large, liquid sovereign alternative for every institution |
Sources: DSE market reports (Sep 2026); TanzaniaInvest DSE weekly and Q2 2026 reports; Bank of Tanzania; Ministry of Finance GDP rebasing (2019 base); The Citizen; TICGL/TERI calculations. USD conversion at about TZS 2,650/USD. Turnover figures include block trades and so overstate retail liquidity; see Annex A.
3.2 Reading the numbers: growth in value, not yet in financing
The DSE rally is real: total capitalisation more than doubled in USD terms in about fourteen months, from roughly USD 6.5bn (mid-2025) to about USD 15.3bn (Sep 2026). But a rise in market capitalisation measures what existing shares are worth, not how much new capital firms raised. The rise reflects share-price appreciation in a small number of large, mostly bank, stocks; foreign investors were net sellers for four consecutive weeks to mid-September 2026; and equity trading is dominated by block trades in a few counters.
Source: DSE Q2 2026 performance, via TanzaniaInvest; TICGL/TERI calculations. Government listed bonds grew by TZS 4.84tn in twelve months; corporate bonds by TZS 0.25tn. Reproduced exactly as prepared in the source report.
Figure 2 contains the report's central statistic. In percentage terms, corporate and government bonds grew at a similar pace (about 18% each) over the year to June 2026 — encouraging on its face. In absolute terms, however, the Treasury added roughly twenty times as much new paper as private issuers. The market is deepening in the way governments borrow far faster than in the way firms raise capital.
Earlier TICGL/TERI working notes quoted market capitalisation of about 10.85% of GDP — consistent with end-2025 market capitalisation of roughly TZS 25tn against rebased GDP of TZS 234.1tn. Since then capitalisation has risen to TZS 40.6tn (TZS 28.3tn domestic), which is about 17% of 2025 GDP (domestic about 12%). The correct message for policy is therefore not "the DSE is tiny relative to the economy" — it is that the market's rapid growth has not translated into proportionate private capital formation. This report uses the updated ratios throughout and flags the earlier figure only as a vintage effect.
3.3 Momentum in 2026: a window for reform
- Corporate bond listings accelerated. Five corporate bonds were listed in H1 2026, the highest number to date, including the EFTA leasing bond (TZS 33.6bn, listed 13 Apr 2026) and the iTrust Finance bond (listed 8 Jul 2026). Strong subscription rates indicate unmet investor demand for private paper.
- Foreign access has widened. The Foreign Exchange (Amendment) Regulations, 2026 (gazetted 17 Jul 2026) opened Treasury bills and bonds to non-resident investors of any nationality for the first time.
- A sovereign yield curve now exists. BoT launched a daily sovereign yield curve on 7 Aug 2026 covering maturities from under one month to 25 years, developed with the Ministry of Finance, CMSA, DSE and US Treasury technical support — the foundation for pricing corporate bonds.
- New product categories already exist. DSE reporting now tracks corporate, sustainable, sub-national, sukuk and infrastructure bond categories, and an ETF is listed. The architecture is in place; volume and diversity are not.
The risk is that these gains are absorbed mainly by government securities, as institutions respond first to the sovereign curve. Sections 7 and 8 are designed so the new foundations widen private access, not only cheapen sovereign borrowing.
05 — Comparators4. What Other Markets Show: Global, African and East African Comparisons
This section compares capacity and, more importantly, how markets operate to channel savings into private capital. Because published ratios differ by source, date and definition, Figure 3 shows ranges rather than single points (Annex A explains the differences).
South Africa (~313–321%) and Malaysia (~210%) are off the scale and not shown. Sources: World Bank WDI and CEIC; TICGL/TERI working notes drawing on exchange data; DSE and Ministry of Finance for Tanzania. Reproduced exactly as prepared in the source report.
Table 5. How selected markets support private-sector capital
| Market | Capacity indicators | How it supports private firms | Lesson for Tanzania |
|---|---|---|---|
| Global benchmark | World average market cap ≈86% of GDP | Deep markets convert household and institutional savings into long-term corporate capital at scale | Depth comes from institutional demand plus issuer supply, not exchange size alone |
| South Africa | Market cap ~313–321% of GDP; JSE cap R19.2tn (2024); R23bn green/social/sustainability bonds listed in 2025 | Large pension and asset-management sector; Regulation 28 sets prudential limits allowing substantial infrastructure and private allocations | An ecosystem, not a single reform. Investment rules must enable, not just permit, private assets |
| Malaysia | Capital market RM4.3tn (≈2.1x GDP); bonds/sukuk RM2.2–2.3tn; corporate bonds/sukuk ≈42% of bonds outstanding | Government curve used as pricing base; sukuk and corporate bonds give a wide issuer base; strong credit assessment | Government bonds are a foundation, not the destination. Tanzania's corporate share is ≈4.8% |
| Mauritius | Market cap ~40–60% of GDP; financial services ≈13% of GDP | Capital market supports domestic firms and cross-border finance; financial services treated as an export sector | Positioning the capital market as a regional service line can add scale |
| Egypt | 2025 issuances EGP 830.1bn (EGP 131.5bn non-equity); market cap ≈16.5% of GDP | Diverse issuer base and product range including securitisation and sukuk | Product diversity widens the funnel for private issuers |
| Nigeria | Listed federal bonds ₦3.79tn vs corporate ₦0.30tn (≈12.6:1); banks raised ₦2.25tn through recapitalisation listings | Larger equity and corporate-bond market than Tanzania; regulation-driven capital raising | Size alone does not guarantee private finance; inflation and FX risk can still weaken issuance |
| Kenya | NSE market cap ≈USD 21.5bn (mid-2025); bond market overwhelmingly government paper | Largest East African equity market; larger institutional base; mobile-linked retail channels | Even a deeper market suffers the same crowding-out pattern |
| Rwanda | Market cap ≈USD 3.2bn (2025); 16 Treasury bonds and 4 corporate bonds listed | Targeted reforms: investment clinics, green/sustainability-linked bonds, bank and insurer listings | Policy targeting can outperform scale in a small market |
| Uganda | Bond market larger than equity market relative to GDP | Government debt developed first; corporate segment still limited | Typical East African sequencing; the challenge is the next step |
Sources: World Bank WDI and CEIC; OECD Africa Capital Markets Report; JSE, EGX, NGX and Rwanda FRA disclosures; Malaysia Capital Market data, as compiled in TICGL/TERI working notes. Figures for different years are indicative, not strictly comparable.
4.1 The African pattern
Africa's capital markets are highly concentrated: South Africa, Egypt and Nigeria account for more than 80% of African equity-market capitalisation, and together with Mauritius hold about 60% of the continent's corporate debt outstanding. The binding problem is not a shortage of African savings — pension funds and insurers held an estimated USD 775 billion in assets in 2025, including about USD 455 billion in pension assets (Tanzania's social-security assets of TZS 27.0tn are roughly USD 10 billion of that). The OECD points to a consistent reason savings do not reach private firms: banks and institutions prefer sovereign debt because it carries lower risk, lower capital charges and more liquid secondary markets than private loans or bonds — precisely the Tanzanian pattern.
4.2 What the leading markets have in common
| Common feature | How it works in peers | Where Tanzania stands |
|---|---|---|
| Institutional mandates that enable private assets | South Africa (Regulation 28) and Malaysia use prudential, risk-based rules allowing rated corporate, infrastructure and alternative assets | Guidelines still favour or effectively steer toward government paper |
| Diverse issuers across sectors | Banks, telecoms, energy, property, manufacturers and funds all issue in South Africa, Egypt and Malaysia | Pipeline dominated by banks and financial-sector issuers; 28 listed companies |
| Standard programmes, low repeat-issuance cost | Shelf registration, medium-term-note programmes, standard documentation | Largely deal-by-deal |
| Ratings, market makers, research, trustees | Deep service ecosystems underpin investor confidence | Thin; credit-rating coverage limited |
| Credit enhancement and blended finance | Guarantees, first-loss tranches, development-bank participation | Limited, ad hoc |
| Targeted SME and growth-market routes | Rwanda's clinics; pooled SME instruments | Enterprise Growth Market (2013) under-used |
| Regional integration | Cross-listing, mutual recognition, regional bond issuance | EAC cross-listing exists but is narrow |
1. Tanzania is not an outlier in being government-dominated. Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda show the same pattern. What distinguishes deeper markets is the combination of enabling investment rules, diverse issuers and market infrastructure.
2. Market-capitalisation ratios are a poor guide to private financing capacity. Egypt and Nigeria have comparable or lower ratios than Tanzania, yet issuance patterns differ by product and regulation. Policy should track flows, issuer counts and instrument mix.
3. The relevant benchmark is the corporate share of the bond market. Malaysia's is around 42%; Tanzania's is under 5%. Lifting it requires reform on both sides of the market.
06 — Root Causes5. Why the Private Segment Stays Small: Structural Diagnosis
The evidence points to a market constrained on both sides: investors lack suitable private assets, and firms lack the readiness, incentives and low-cost routes to issue them. Seven constraints interact.
5.1 Sovereign dominance and the pricing of risk
Government securities are the safest, most liquid assets in the system, carrying low regulatory risk weights — banks, pension funds and insurers have rational reasons to hold them. Crowding out here does not mean private firms are legally barred; it means portfolio competition: every shilling placed in a 15–16% risk-free coupon must be matched by a corporate instrument offering a credible premium. In 2026/27 the budget plans TZS 6.56tn of new domestic borrowing — about seven times the annualised corporate listing run-rate (≈TZS 0.95tn). A government yield curve is essential for pricing private securities, so the objective is not to shrink the government market but to prevent it from absorbing nearly all institutional capital.
5.2 Institutional portfolios lack suitable private assets
Tanzania's social-security funds held TZS 27.04tn in assets in 2025, of which TZS 24.05tn were investment assets. World Bank-cited data put pension holdings of government securities at about TZS 7.7tn — roughly 32% of that investment-asset base (about 45% on the narrower base used in one dataset; estimates vary with definitions, reconciled further in the companion pension report). The key point is not that pension funds hold government bonds — they need safe, liquid assets. It is that the market offers few alternatives. Even a modest reallocation is large relative to the current private bond market: 5% of pension investment assets is about TZS 1.2tn and 10% is about TZS 2.4tn, compared with TZS 1.6tn of listed corporate bonds outstanding.
5.3 A thin and narrow issuer pipeline
Only 28 companies are listed, and recent debt issuance has come largely from banks and financial institutions. Many firms that could issue lack audited financial statements, formal governance, independent directors, credit ratings, reliable cash-flow projections, succession arrangements and continuous-disclosure systems. The Enterprise Growth Market, launched in 2013 with lower listing requirements, has not produced a stream of growth-company issuers because SMEs still face compliance cost, limited investor awareness and weak reporting.
5.4 High fixed costs and slow processes
Legal fees, audit and rating costs, prospectus preparation, listing fees and approvals are largely fixed costs. For a mid-sized firm raising TZS 10–30bn they weigh heavily relative to a bank loan, even if the loan is shorter and dearer. Importantly, no public data series currently reports the all-in cost or time to issue in Tanzania — creating that baseline is a first-year priority.
5.5 Limited liquidity and price discovery
Corporate bonds are treated as hold-to-maturity. In one reported 2025 period, Treasury-bond secondary turnover reached TZS 1.615tn while corporate-bond trading was about TZS 2.19bn. Investors who cannot exit demand a liquidity premium; issuers pay more; fewer firms issue; trading stays thin. Equity liquidity is also concentrated: sampled daily turnover in early September 2026 averaged about TZS 16bn (≈0.04% of market capitalisation a day), with large block trades in a few bank counters.
5.6 Weak project preparation
Savings cannot finance projects that are not investable. Before a pension fund or insurer can participate, a project needs feasibility studies, demand forecasts, legal and ownership structures, revenue models, environmental approvals, risk allocation, procurement plans, financial models, credible sponsors and independent appraisal. Tanzania has capital but too few bankable transactions, particularly in PPPs, municipal revenue assets and housing.
5.7 Product, ecosystem and integration gaps
Credit-rating coverage is thin, market-making is limited, and there is no deep repo or securities-lending market. Few infrastructure, green, social, municipal or securitised instruments exist. The financial system remains bank-led, with banks not yet fully acting as underwriters, guarantors, market makers and distributors for private securities.
Table 6. Constraint, evidence and reform response
| Constraint | Key evidence | Reform pillar (Section 7) |
|---|---|---|
| Sovereign dominance | Gov. bonds TZS 32.0tn vs corporate TZS 1.6tn; domestic borrowing TZS 6.56tn in 2026/27; coupons 15–16% | 7.1 Rebalance sovereign and private paper |
| Institutional portfolios | Pension investment assets TZS 24.05tn; ~TZS 7.7tn in government securities; each 5% reallocation ≈TZS 1.2tn | 7.2 Institutional capital |
| Issuer pipeline | 28 listed companies; financial-sector-led issuance; EGM under-used | 7.3 Issuer pipeline |
| Costs and time | No published cost or time-to-issue baseline | 7.3 Issuer pipeline; 7.8 Governance |
| Liquidity | Corporate bonds ≈0.14% of bond turnover; equity turnover ≈0.04% of cap a day | 7.5 Ecosystem and market structure |
| Project preparation | Few bankable PPP and municipal projects reach investors | 7.6 Project preparation |
| Products and credit risk | Limited infrastructure, green, municipal, securitised instruments; no systematic guarantees | 7.4 Products; 7.7 Credit enhancement |
07 — Outlook6. Five-Year Outlook: Three Scenarios to 2030/31
To show what is at stake, TERI models annual capital-market mobilisation (net new private equity and bond capital raised through the market) as a share of the annual private-investment requirement — TZS 60.1tn in 2026/27 and TZS 66.1tn a year thereafter. Shares are TICGL/TERI assumptions anchored on current mobilisation of about 1–2% and the 7–9% target for 2030.
Table 7. Scenario assumptions and results (TZS trillion)
| Scenario | Share of annual requirement, 2026/27 → 2030/31 | 2026/27 | 2030/31 | Cumulative 5 years | Share of 5-year need |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Business as usual | 2.0% → 2.8% | 1.2 | 1.9 | 7.8 | 2.4% |
| Reform | 2.5% → 8.5% | 1.5 | 5.6 | 18.0 | 5.6% |
| Stretch | 3.0% → 13.0% | 1.8 | 8.6 | 26.3 | 8.1% |
Source: TICGL/TERI calculations. Requirement base: TZS 60.1tn (2026/27) and TZS 66.1tn a year for 2027/28–2030/31. Figures are illustrative targets, not forecasts.
Source: TICGL/TERI calculations. Reproduced exactly as prepared in the source report.
Current rules, deal-by-deal issuance
Continued sovereign dominance and episodic financial-sector bond issues. Mobilisation rises slowly with the economy and the market stays marginal.
Section 7 measures delivered on schedule
Pension/insurance rules modernised by 2027/28, shelf registration and standard documentation in place, a project-preparation facility feeding bonds, market-making and ratings operating. Mobilisation reaches TZS 5.6tn in 2030/31 (8.5%, inside the 7–9% target band). Cumulative additional capital vs business as usual: ≈TZS 10.2tn.
Regional and foreign capital added
A funded guarantee facility, large privatisation or state-company IPOs, and a materially wider SME channel. Requires strong macro-stability and high execution quality.
A one-off reallocation of 10% of 2025 pension investment assets would supply about TZS 2.4tn. The remainder of the Reform path would have to come from continuing net inflows to pension and insurance funds, collective schemes and banks' term investments, together with foreign portfolio capital newly able to enter the fixed-income market. The sources used here do not publish annual net inflows by investor class. Demand-side verification is therefore a first deliverable of the public dashboard (Section 8). Until then the Reform path should be read as a target requiring evidence, not as a forecast.
Jobs follow finance. The plan's ambition to create 1.7 million jobs in 2026 depends on firms having the long-term capital to build plant and expand payrolls. TERI does not attach a jobs multiplier to the scenarios because credible, Tanzania-specific estimates were not available, but the dashboard proposed in Section 8 includes a metric on firms financed and jobs supported by capital-market issuance.
Cumulative Five-Year Mobilisation by Scenario
08 — Agenda7. Policy and Structural Reform Agenda
The agenda is organised around eight pillars plus cross-cutting enablers. It is designed to be risk-based and fiduciary, not quota-driven: the objective is to create assets that institutions want to hold and issuers that investors want to fund, rather than to compel allocation.
Table 8. Reform pillars at a glance
| Pillar | Problem addressed | Lead institutions | Horizon | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7.1 Rebalance sovereign and private paper | Crowding out; pricing | MoF, BoT | 2026/27 → | High |
| 7.2 Institutional capital | Pension and insurer portfolios | SSRA, TIRA, MoF, BoT | 2026/27–2027/28 | Very high |
| 7.3 Issuer pipeline | Few ready issuers; cost and time | CMSA, DSE, BRELA, TRA | 2026/27–2028/29 | High |
| 7.4 Investable products | Narrow instrument range | CMSA, MoF, LGAs, BoT | 2027/28 → | High |
| 7.5 Ecosystem and market structure | Liquidity; price discovery | CMSA, DSE, BoT | 2026/27–2028/29 | High |
| 7.6 Project preparation | Too few bankable projects | PPPC, MoF, PO-PIP, TIB DBank | 2026/27 → | High |
| 7.7 Credit enhancement and FX | Credit and currency risk | MoF, BoT, development banks | 2027/28 → | Medium–high |
| 7.8 Governance and targets | Coordination; accountability | PO-PIP, MoF, CMSA | 2026/27 | Enabler |
Abbreviations: MoF Ministry of Finance; BoT Bank of Tanzania; SSRA Social Security Regulatory Authority; TIRA Tanzania Insurance Regulatory Authority; CMSA Capital Markets and Securities Authority; DSE Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange; BRELA Business Registrations and Licensing Agency; TRA Tanzania Revenue Authority; LGAs local government authorities; PPPC PPP Centre; PO-PIP President's Office, Planning and Investment.
7.1 Rebalance sovereign and private paper
Government borrowing should anchor the market, not exhaust it.
- Publish a rolling annual issuance calendar with indicative quarterly auction sizes and tenors, and stick to it.
- Distinguish refinancing from new development borrowing in public reporting; keep using concessional external finance (TZS 6.55tn in the 2026/27 plan) to ease pressure on the domestic market.
- Concentrate issuance in benchmark maturities to build liquidity and a reliable yield curve; avoid long-end issuance spikes that reprice the whole curve.
- Use the new sovereign yield curve as the official reference for corporate pricing, and publish daily corporate spreads over it.
- Pair the July 2026 opening to non-resident investors with FX-hedging access (Pillar 7.7) and clear settlement rules.
7.2 Mobilise institutional capital through prudent-person rules
This is the highest-impact lever. Pension, insurance and collective-scheme capital is the natural buyer of long-dated private paper.
- Move pension and insurance investment rules from asset-class ceilings and implicit preference for government paper to risk-based, prudent-person frameworks with explicit, rated buckets for corporate bonds, infrastructure and PPP instruments, REITs, private equity and venture funds, and SME pools.
- Set a voluntary, fiduciary glide path: at least 10% of pension investment assets in rated non-government instruments by 2030/31 (≈TZS 2.4tn on the 2025 base), reviewed annually by the regulators.
- Require independent valuation, custody, minimum credit ratings and conflict-of-interest controls so private-asset exposure does not repeat earlier governance weaknesses.
- Align solvency and capital rules for insurers and banks so rated corporate and infrastructure paper is not penalised relative to government paper beyond what risk justifies.
- Give pension funds co-investment rights in guaranteed or credit-enhanced structures, so early deals are safer.
7.3 Build the issuer pipeline
- Launch a National Issuer-Readiness Programme covering IFRS reporting, audit, governance, tax compliance, ratings, investor relations and board development, with time-limited, capped co-funding for first-time issuers.
- Reform the Enterprise Growth Market: lighter disclosure tied to a nominated-adviser or sponsor model, lower fees, a clear graduation path to the main market.
- Introduce shelf registration and medium-term-note programmes, standard trust deeds, term sheets and documentation to cut repeat-issuance cost.
- Create a single digital approval window across CMSA, DSE, BRELA and TRA with statutory timelines, and publish the all-in cost and time to issue as a headline KPI.
- Build a deliberate pipeline of real-sector issuers (manufacturing, logistics, energy, hospitality, property, agro-processing) alongside banks, including selective listings of large state-owned and family firms.
7.4 Create investable products
- Infrastructure and project bonds linked to revenue-generating PPP assets.
- Municipal and sub-national bonds secured on market, terminal, water and energy revenues, building on the sub-national bond category already tracked at the DSE.
- Green, social and sustainability-linked bonds (South Africa and Rwanda precedents) and sukuk.
- REITs, mortgage-backed securities and housing-finance instruments tied to the national housing deficit.
- Securitisation of leases and receivables, pooled SME bonds with first-loss support, and low-cost ETFs and index funds for retail investors.
7.5 Strengthen the ecosystem and market structure
- Require ratings for public bond issues above a size threshold, and incentivise a competitive rating industry.
- License market makers with incentives (fee rebates, access to repo), and introduce a quote-driven corporate-bond trading platform with price transparency.
- Develop repo and securities-lending markets so bonds can be financed and held more easily.
- Encourage sponsored research, trustee and custody competition, and retail digital access with investor protection.
7.6 Prepare projects for markets
- Establish a revolving project-preparation facility that funds feasibility studies, financial models, legal structures, environmental approvals and independent appraisal, recovering costs at financial close.
- Standardise PPP-to-bond structures so projects passing the PFSR and full feasibility-study stages arrive at investors with consistent documentation.
- Create a public pipeline of bond-ready municipal and PPP assets with their revenue models, so pension and insurance funds can plan allocations.
7.7 Add credit enhancement and risk-sharing
- Set up a transparent, priced partial credit guarantee and first-loss facility, subject to independent risk assessment, portfolio caps and public contingent-liability reporting.
- Use viability-gap funding and anchor investments sparingly, only for projects with clear economic returns.
- Offer a local-currency hedging window (or BoT-supported swap line) for foreign investors; consider anchoring the facility with a ring-fenced share of resource windfalls (see TERI's companion gold-dependence reports) and development-partner capital.
7.8 Govern by targets
- Create a Capital Market Development Council at senior level to coordinate MoF, BoT, CMSA, SSRA, TIRA, TRA, BRELA and PPPC.
- Embed capital-market indicators in FYDP IV monitoring (Section 8) and publish a quarterly capital-market financing dashboard.
- Commission annual independent reviews that test whether pension and insurance flows, cost and time to issue, and corporate-bond liquidity are moving in the right direction.
Cross-cutting enablers: tax, law and regional integration
- Tax: predictable, neutral treatment of dividends, interest, capital gains, collective schemes, REIT distributions and pension investments; review withholding-tax and stamp-duty rules so corporate bonds are not disadvantaged relative to government paper; clarify green and social bond treatment.
- Legal and investor protection: faster insolvency procedures, stronger collateral enforcement, minority-shareholder protection, related-party and insider-trading enforcement, beneficial-ownership transparency.
- Regional: EAC cross-listing and mutual recognition of funds, regional bond issuance, common disclosure standards, cross-border settlement, diaspora bonds, integration with other East African exchanges.
09 — Implementation8. Implementation Roadmap, Targets and KPIs
Table 9. Five-year roadmap
Build the base
- Establish the Capital Market Development Council
- Publish baseline cost and time to issue
- Adopt the issuance calendar
- Launch the issuer-readiness facility
- Single approval window; standard bond documentation
- Pension/insurance guideline consultation
- Start the project-preparation facility
Outputs: Dashboard live; baseline data; guidelines drafted; first 10–15 firms in readiness programme
Open the pipeline
- New pension and insurance rules in force
- Shelf registration live; EGM reform
- Market-maker licensing and ratings requirements
- Pooled SME bond; first municipal and infrastructure bonds
- Credit-guarantee facility operational
- Hedging window for foreign investors
Outputs: Reform-scenario run-rate of TZS 3.6tn in 2028/29; at least 10 new issuers a year
Scale and integrate
- Regional cross-listings
- REITs and mortgage-backed securities at scale
- Repo market
- Wider retail participation
- Periodic review of reforms
Outputs: TZS 4.6–5.6tn a year mobilised; corporate share of listed bonds 12–15%
Table 10. Proposed KPI framework (baselines and 2030/31 targets)
| Indicator | Baseline | Proposed 2030/31 target |
|---|---|---|
| Capital-market mobilisation as % of annual private investment requirement | ≈1–2% (2025–26) | 7–9% |
| Annual capital-market mobilisation | ≈TZS 0.95tn (Q2 2026 run-rate, annualised) | TZS 4.5–5.8tn |
| Listed corporate, public-institution bonds and sukuk outstanding | TZS 1.60tn (Jun 2026) | TZS 8–10tn |
| Corporate share of listed bonds | ≈4.8% | 12–15% |
| Listed companies | 28 | 40–45 |
| Corporate-bond share of bond secondary turnover | ≈0.14% (2025 period) | At least 2% |
| Rated non-government instruments in pension investment assets | Not published | At least 10% (≈TZS 2.4tn on 2025 base) |
| Domestic market capitalisation / GDP | ≈12.1% | 15–20% |
| All-in cost and time to issue | Not published (baseline to be set in 2026/27) | At least 30% below baseline |
| Domestic participation in market capitalisation (FYDP IV target) | To be measured | At least 50% by June 2031 |
| New issuers per year (equity and debt) | 5 corporate bonds in H1 2026 | At least 10–12 a year by 2028/29 |
Source: TICGL/TERI proposals; baselines from DSE, BoT and Ministry of Finance data cited in this report.
Proposed Pathway: Key KPIs, Now → 2030/31
10 — Safeguards9. Risks and Safeguards
| Risk | Why it matters | Safeguard |
|---|---|---|
| Macroeconomic instability (inflation, FX) | Nigeria shows large markets still fail to finance firms when inflation, FX risk and high rates weaken issuance | Maintain monetary credibility; hedging window; steady sovereign curve |
| Persistent fiscal crowding out | TZS 6.56tn of 2026/27 domestic borrowing competes with private issuers | Issuance calendar; concessional external finance; benchmark discipline |
| Valuation and concentration | Market value rose 79% in a year in a few large stocks; foreign investors have been net sellers | Widen free float and listings; monitor valuation; investor-protection enforcement |
| Politically imposed allocation quotas | Forced pension allocation risks poor assets and member losses | Prudent-person rules, independent valuation, no hard quotas |
| Issuer governance and retail mis-selling | Defaults would damage trust for a decade | Mandatory ratings, suitability rules, disclosure enforcement, trustee oversight |
| Guarantee contingent liabilities | Mispriced guarantees shift risk to the budget | Pricing, caps, independent risk assessment, public reporting |
| Coordination failure across agencies | Reforms span at least eight institutions | Development Council, KPI dashboard, annual independent review |
| Financial-sector issuer concentration | Pipeline may remain bank-led without real-sector deals | Real-sector issuer targets; project-preparation facility |
| Data gaps | No published cost or time-to-issue; unclear institutional inflows | Make data publication a first-year deliverable |
"Tanzania's capital market is not missing institutions. The DSE, CMSA, a sovereign yield curve, a pension sector, collective schemes, sukuk, green and sub-national categories and an Enterprise Growth Market all exist. What is missing is depth and a private-sector orientation. About TZS 65 trillion a year of private investment — roughly 28% of GDP — cannot be financed by a banking system whose total assets are TZS 74.5 trillion and whose loans are short, collateral-heavy and priced near 15%. A capital market that works for private firms is a central economic-policy instrument, not a secondary financial-sector issue."
— TICGL / Tanzania Economic Research Institute (TERI)
11 — Conclusion10. Conclusion
Tanzania's capital market is not missing institutions. What is missing is depth and a private-sector orientation. Government securities absorb the bulk of long-term domestic savings; corporate bonds are about one-twentieth of the listed bond market; listed corporate paper barely trades; and only a handful of firms have the readiness, incentives and low-cost routes to issue.
That matters because the Vision 2050 and FYDP IV arithmetic leaves no alternative. About TZS 65 trillion a year of private investment, roughly 28% of GDP, cannot be financed by a banking system whose total assets are TZS 74.5 trillion and whose loans are short, collateral-heavy and priced near 15%. A capital market that works for private firms is therefore a central economic-policy instrument, not a secondary financial-sector issue.
The strategic task is not "grow the DSE". It is to restructure the market so private companies can raise long-term capital at scale, as deeper markets in South Africa, Mauritius and Malaysia do. The 2026 opening of Treasury markets to foreign investors, the new sovereign yield curve and record corporate-bond listings create a window. The reforms in this report — rebalance sovereign and private paper, enable institutional capital, build the issuer pipeline, create products, strengthen the ecosystem, prepare projects, share credit risk and govern by targets — could lift capital-market mobilisation from about 1–2% to 7–9% of annual private investment needs and add roughly TZS 10 trillion of long-term private capital over the plan period.
Tanzania does not only need more money in the economy; it needs institutions capable of converting long-term savings into long-term private productive capital, which in turn creates production, jobs, exports and sustainable growth.
12 — Data QualityAnnex A: Data Notes and Reconciliation
Public sources use different definitions, dates and GDP bases. The table lists the main discrepancies encountered and how this report treats them.
| Item | Figures encountered | Treatment in this report |
|---|---|---|
| GDP base | TZS 234.1tn (2025) after rebasing to 2019 prices; TZS 212tn (2024); older series (e.g. BoT annual report) lower | Use TZS 234.1tn (USD 91.8bn) for all 2025 ratios |
| Market cap / GDP | 10.85% in earlier notes; 17.3% total and 12.1% domestic on current data | Use updated ratios; 10.85% treated as an end-2025 vintage |
| DSE market capitalisation | TZS 33tn (mid-2026 note); TZS 35.2tn (end-Q2); TZS 40.6tn (11 Sep 2026); domestic TZS 28.3tn | Use dated figures; total includes cross-listed shares |
| Corporate bonds | TZS 0.76tn (2024) and 1.9tn (2025) BoT; TZS 1.60tn (DSE listed, Jun 2026); >TZS 2tn after EFTA (May 2026); TZS 316bn for one segment | Use DSE listed value for the gov-corporate comparison; BoT series for time trend |
| Government securities | TZS 31–33.6tn (notes); TZS 32.0tn listed (Jun 2026); TZS 32.29tn outstanding (BoT, Aug 2026); domestic debt TZS 37.9tn (Dec 2025) | Use TZS 32.0tn listed; domestic debt includes other instruments |
| Pension government-securities share | ≈32% (TZS 7.7tn/24.05tn); ≈45% (cited dataset); other estimates higher under broader definitions | Quote the range; refer to the companion pension report |
| Private-credit growth | 23.5% (BoT, Dec 2025); 17.6% (other series); 15–17% of GDP | Use 23.5% as BoT headline; GDP ratios flagged as definition-dependent |
| Capital-market contribution | "Below 1%" (notes); ≈1.8% if 2025 net increase in corporate bonds (TZS 1.14tn) is divided by TZS 64.9tn | State as roughly 1–2% of annual private requirement |
| Peer ratios | Kenya 9.5–17%; Nigeria 9.5–30%; Egypt 8–17%; Mauritius 40–60% | Show ranges (Figure 3) |
| Equity turnover sample | Seven trading days, 1–10 Sep 2026, include block trades | Indicative only; not an annual average |
13 — SourcesAnnex B: Principal Sources
- Bank of Tanzania: Monthly Economic Review (January 2026); Annual Report 2024/25; sovereign yield curve launch (7 August 2026).
- Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange: daily market reports (July–September 2026).
- TanzaniaInvest: DSE Q2 2026 performance; DSE Week 37 of 2026 report; sovereign yield curve; Bank of Tanzania economic reviews; Tanzania economy key figures 2024–2025.
- Ministry of Finance and Planning / PO-PIP: Fourth Five-Year Development Plan 2026/27–2030/31; National Development Plan 2026/27; State of the Economy 2025 (as reported by The Citizen, Daily News and AllAfrica, June 2026).
- The Citizen: "Tanzania corporate bond market crosses TZS 2 trillion" (EFTA bond), May 2026.
- World Bank World Development Indicators; CEIC; OECD Africa Capital Markets Report; IMF; AfDB; JSE, EGX, NGX, Rwanda Financial Reporting and Capital Markets data (as compiled in TICGL/TERI working notes).
- TICGL/TERI working notes on Tanzania capital markets (2026), and companion reports: Tanzania's Capital Market: Growing Fast, Still Shallow; Government Securities Dominance: The Crowding-Out Problem; Pension-to-Investment Gap.
Request the Full Report or a Briefing
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✉️ Request via economist@ticgl.com →14 — Quick AnswersFrequently Asked Questions
How much private investment does Tanzania's Vision 2050 plan assume?
Under FYDP IV (2026/27–2030/31), the private sector is expected to invest TZS 324.49 trillion of the TZS 477.75 trillion required — 67.9% of the envelope. That is about TZS 65 trillion a year, or roughly 28% of 2025 GDP (TZS 234.1 trillion after rebasing).
Why can't banks alone finance Tanzania's private investment needs?
Four structural limits: a maturity mismatch (deposits are short- to medium-term against 7–25 year project needs), collateral dependence (firms whose assets are contracts, software or future cash flows struggle to qualify), concentration and single-obligor limits (banking system assets of TZS 74.5 trillion are 4.4x smaller than the five-year private investment requirement), and limited bargaining power for borrowers where bank debt is the only option.
How much of Tanzania's private investment need does the capital market currently supply?
Roughly 1–2% of the annual private investment requirement. The TICGL/TERI target of 7–9% by 2030 implies TZS 4.5–5.8 trillion a year, about five to six times the current corporate listing run-rate of roughly TZS 0.95 trillion a year.
Is Tanzania's capital market small compared to its economy?
Less than the old headline figure suggested. On rebased 2025 GDP, DSE total market capitalisation is about 17.3% of GDP (domestic about 12.1%), not the 10.85% cited in earlier notes. Tanzania is not unusually shallow by Kenya or Nigeria standards, but is far from Mauritius or South Africa. The real gap is not index level — it is flow and instrument mix: government bonds (TZS 32.0tn) outweigh corporate, public-institution and sukuk bonds (TZS 1.6tn) by about 20 to 1.
What would it take to close Tanzania's capital-market financing gap?
TERI's eight-pillar reform agenda: rebalance sovereign and private paper through a predictable issuance calendar; move institutional (especially pension) capital toward prudent-person, risk-based rules with rated private-asset buckets; build the issuer pipeline; create investable products; strengthen the ecosystem; prepare bankable projects; add credit enhancement; and govern by published targets. Under TERI's reform scenario, this could add roughly TZS 10 trillion in new private capital over the plan period.
Muhtasari kwa Kiswahili
Masoko ya Mitaji ya Tanzania kama Injini Inayokosekana ya Ufadhili wa Sekta Binafsi — Mipango ya maendeleo ya Tanzania inategemea sekta binafsi kubeba sehemu kubwa ya uwekezaji. Chini ya FYDP IV, sekta binafsi inatarajiwa kuwekeza TZS trilioni 324.49 kati ya trilioni 477.75 zinazohitajika (2026/27–2030/31) — sawa na TZS trilioni 65 kwa mwaka, karibu 28% ya GDP. Swali la msingi ni: fedha hizi zitatoka wapi?
Benki pekee haziwezi kutosha: Mikopo ya benki ni ya muda mfupi hadi wa kati, inahitaji dhamana, na riba ni karibu 15%. Miradi mikubwa (viwanda, hoteli, nishati, makazi) inahitaji mtaji wa muda mrefu zaidi. Mali zote za mfumo wa benki (TZS trilioni 74.5) ni ndogo mara 4.4 kuliko mahitaji ya uwekezaji wa miaka mitano.
Soko la mitaji linakua, lakini si kuelekea ufadhili wa sekta binafsi: Hati fungani za serikali ziliongezeka kwa TZS trilioni 4.84 ndani ya mwaka mmoja, wakati za makampuni ziliongezeka kwa TZS trilioni 0.25 tu — uwiano wa 20 kwa 1. Hati fungani za serikali zilizoorodheshwa ni TZS trilioni 32.0 dhidi ya TZS trilioni 1.6 za makampuni.
Soko la mitaji linachangia takribani 1–2% tu ya mahitaji ya mwaka ya uwekezaji wa sekta binafsi. Lengo la TICGL/TERI la 7–9% ifikapo 2030 linamaanisha TZS trilioni 4.5–5.8 kwa mwaka — mara tano hadi sita zaidi ya kiwango cha sasa.
Dirisha la mageuzi limefunguka mwaka 2026: Hati fungani za serikali zimefunguliwa kwa wawekezaji wa kigeni (Julai 2026), BoT imezindua curve ya riba ya kitaifa (Agosti 2026), na hati fungani tano za makampuni ziliorodheshwa katika nusu ya kwanza ya 2026 — rekodi mpya.
Matukio matatu ya miaka mitano ijayo: Hali ikiendelea kama ilivyo, mtaji wa jumla utakuwa TZS trilioni 7.8 tu. Kwa mageuzi, TZS trilioni 18.0. Kwa mageuzi makubwa zaidi, TZS trilioni 26.3. Mageuzi yanaweza kuongeza takribani TZS trilioni 10 za mtaji mpya wa sekta binafsi ikilinganishwa na hali ya sasa.
Hatua nane za mageuzi: (i) kusawazisha hati fungani za serikali na binafsi; (ii) kuhamisha mtaji wa taasisi (hasa pensheni) kwenye mali binafsi zenye ukadiriaji; (iii) kujenga mfumo wa makampuni yanayotoa hati fungani; (iv) kuunda bidhaa za uwekezaji (miundombinu, REITs, dira ya kijani); (v) kuimarisha mfumo mzima (ukadiriaji, market makers); (vi) kuandaa miradi inayoweza kukopesheka; (vii) kuongeza uimarishaji wa mikopo na udhamini; (viii) kusimamia kwa malengo yaliyochapishwa.
Hitimisho: Soko la mitaji la Tanzania halikosi taasisi — DSE, CMSA, curve ya riba ya kitaifa, sekta ya pensheni, sukuk, hati za kijani, vyote vipo. Kinachokosekana ni undani na mwelekeo wa kuhudumia sekta binafsi. Kazi ya kimkakati si "kukuza DSE" — ni kuunda upya soko ili makampuni binafsi yaweze kupata mtaji wa muda mrefu kwa kiwango kinachohitajika. Tanzania haihitaji fedha zaidi tu — inahitaji taasisi zenye uwezo wa kubadilisha akiba za muda mrefu kuwa mtaji wa uzalishaji wa muda mrefu, ambao kwa upande wake unazalisha uzalishaji, ajira, mauzo ya nje, na ukuaji endelevu.
- Uwekezaji wa sekta binafsi unaohitajika: TZS trilioni 324.5 (2026/27–2030/31), ≈TZS trilioni 65/mwaka
- Mchango wa sasa wa soko la mitaji: ≈1–2%; lengo la 2030/31: 7–9%
- Hati fungani za serikali dhidi ya makampuni: uwiano wa ≈20 kwa 1
- Mtaji mpya unaowezekana kwa mageuzi: +TZS trilioni 10 (miaka mitano)
Chanzo: TICGL/TERI, ripoti ya Masoko ya Mitaji ya Tanzania kama Injini Inayokosekana, Oktoba 2026. Kwa maelezo zaidi wasiliana na: economist@ticgl.com.
