1. What Is M3, and Why Should Anyone Outside a Bank Care?
A 60-second primer before the data
Extended broad money supply (M3) is the broadest official measure of "money" circulating in Tanzania's economy. It is built up in layers:
M1 — Narrow money
Cash in people's hands plus money sitting in current/cheque accounts — the most liquid, immediately spendable money. TZS 31.2 trillion in April 2026.
M2 — Broad money
M1 plus savings and time deposits in Shillings — money that's still yours, just slightly less instantly spendable. TZS 50.1 trillion.
M3 — Extended broad money
M2 plus foreign currency deposits held in Tanzanian banks. The full picture of money in the system. TZS 65.1 trillion.
Economists watch M3 growth because, over time, money supply, prices, output and the speed at which money changes hands are mathematically linked:
In plain terms: if the amount of money in an economy grows much faster than the amount of goods and services actually being produced (real GDP), and the speed at which money changes hands doesn't fall enough to offset it, the extra money has to show up somewhere — usually in higher prices (inflation) or a weaker currency. This is precisely the tension Tanzania's numbers now show.
2. The Numbers: How Fast Is Money Supply Actually Growing?
M3 has grown every single month for over a year
TZS 53.3tn
M3 stock, April 2025
TZS 65.1tn
M3 stock, April 2026
+22.0% ▼ from 23.2%
M3 growth y/y, April 2026
+24.7%
Full-year 2025 M3 growth
Chart 1 — M3 Money Supply Stock & Growth Trend (April 2025 – April 2026)
Source: Bank of Tanzania and banks, BOT Monthly Economic Review, May 2026, Table A3.
M3 has risen in every one of the last 13 months without a single monthly decline — from TZS 53.3 trillion in April 2025 to TZS 65.1 trillion in April 2026, an increase of nearly TZS 12 trillion in a single year. Growth has moderated slightly from its 2025 peak (23.2% in March 2026) to 22.0% in April, but it remains far above Tanzania's long-run average.
Chart 2 — Long-Term M3 Growth vs. Real GDP Growth (2018 – 2025)
Source: Bank of Tanzania, Ministry of Finance and Planning, BOT Monthly Economic Review, May 2026, Table A1.
This chart is the single most important one in this article. From 2018 to 2024, M3 growth and GDP growth moved in a broadly reasonable relationship to each other — money supply grew faster than output, as is normal in a financially deepening economy, but not dramatically so. In 2025, that relationship broke: M3 growth more than doubled to 24.7 percent while real GDP growth edged up only modestly to around 6.0 percent.
3. What's Actually Driving the Growth
It's not foreign money flooding in — it's domestic credit creation
This is the most important, and most under-reported, detail in the entire money supply story. M3 growth can come from two very different sources, with very different implications:
- Net Foreign Assets (NFA) — money entering the system via foreign currency inflows (exports, remittances, FDI, reserves). NFA actually fell 0.7 percent year-on-year to TZS 14.6 trillion in April 2026.
- Net Domestic Assets (NDA) — money created domestically through bank lending to the private sector and government. NDA surged 30.7 percent year-on-year to TZS 50.5 trillion — the overwhelming driver of the entire M3 increase.
In other words: Tanzania's money supply boom is homegrown, generated almost entirely by the banking system extending credit faster than the economy is growing — not by dollars flowing in from abroad. That distinction matters because credit-driven money growth carries a more direct inflation and currency risk than reserve-backed money growth.
Chart 3 — Composition of M3 Growth: NFA vs. NDA
Source: Bank of Tanzania, Table 2.2.1.
Table 1 — M3 and Its Main Components (TZS billions)| Component | Apr 2025 | Apr 2026 | Growth y/y |
|---|
| Net foreign assets | 14,658.6 | 14,553.0 | -0.7% |
| Net domestic assets | 38,679.1 | 50,538.9 | +30.7% |
| — of which: claims on private sector | 38,755.8 | 47,919.3 | +23.6% |
| Extended broad money (M3) | 53,337.7 | 65,091.9 | +22.0% |
4. The Widening Money-vs-GDP Gap
Why a persistent gap of this size is the metric to watch
The gap in one line
In 2025, Tanzania's money supply grew roughly four times faster than its real economy (24.7% vs. ~6.0%). A one-off gap of this size can reflect healthy financial deepening — more people opening bank accounts, more businesses accessing formal credit for the first time. A persistent gap of this size, repeated for a second year running, is different: it means the banking system is creating purchasing power faster than the economy can produce goods and services to absorb it.
Tanzania has genuine grounds for the "financial deepening" explanation — private sector credit to GDP has climbed from just 14.3 percent in 2018 to 21.6 percent in 2025, still low by regional and global standards, meaning there is real room for credit to keep expanding as more of the economy is formally banked. But the rate of that expansion in the last 12–18 months has been unusually fast, and TICGL's view is that both explanations — genuine deepening and an overheating credit cycle — are probably true at the same time, in different parts of the economy.
Chart 4 — Private Sector Credit to GDP Ratio, Tanzania (2018–2025)
Source: Bank of Tanzania, BOT Monthly Economic Review, May 2026, Table A1.
5. The First Warning Sign: Core Inflation Starts to Accelerate
Core inflation jumped from 2.2% to 3.1% in a single month (April 2026)
Textbook monetary theory does not predict inflation to arrive instantly or mechanically — it typically shows up with a lag, and Tanzania's April 2026 inflation figures should not be read as pure proof of a money-supply-driven price spiral (much of the April jump was explicitly attributed by the Bank of Tanzania to fuel price pass-through from the Middle East conflict). But the direction is consistent with what a persistently high M3-vs-GDP gap would predict: both headline inflation (4.0%, up from 3.2%) and, more tellingly, core inflation (3.1%, up from 2.2%) — which strips out volatile food and energy prices — rose sharply in the same month.
Core inflation is the more important of the two for this story, because it is less exposed to one-off external shocks like oil prices and more reflective of underlying domestic demand pressure — exactly the channel through which excess money supply growth would be expected to show up first.
Chart 5 — M3 Growth vs. Core & Headline Inflation (Apr 2025 – Apr 2026)
Source: NBS & Bank of Tanzania computations, BOT Monthly Economic Review, May 2026.
TICGL read: One month of rising core inflation alongside high M3 growth is not proof of causation. But it is exactly the pattern that would justify the Monetary Policy Committee watching money supply and credit growth closely over the next two to three quarters, rather than treating April's inflation uptick as a one-off, purely fuel-driven event.
6. Impact on Credit & Financial Deepening: Not All Sectors Are Growing Equally
Trade, mining and transport are absorbing most of the new credit
The domestic credit expansion behind M3 growth is highly uneven across sectors. Private sector credit grew 23.6 percent year-on-year overall, but that average hides very different stories sector by sector:
Chart 6 — Annual Credit Growth by Economic Activity, April 2026
Source: Banks & Bank of Tanzania, Table 2.2.2.
Trade credit grew fastest at 44.2 percent — much of this is working-capital financing for import-heavy, fast-turnover businesses, which tends to translate quickly into consumer prices if it isn't matched by proportional output growth. Manufacturing credit, by contrast, grew just 4.2 percent — meaning the credit boom is disproportionately financing trade and consumption-adjacent activity rather than the kind of productive capacity expansion (factories, processing plants) that would grow real GDP fast enough to close the money-vs-output gap discussed in Section 4.
7. Impact on the Exchange Rate
So far, the Shilling has absorbed the money growth without visible strain
A textbook concern with rapid domestic money creation is currency depreciation — more Shillings chasing the same pool of foreign currency should, all else equal, weaken the exchange rate. So far, that hasn't happened in a disorderly way: the Shilling actually appreciated 2.7 percent year-on-year against the US Dollar on the official interbank market in April 2026, helped by record gold export receipts and strong tourism inflows offsetting the domestic credit expansion (see TICGL's companion analysis, "Why TZS Still Ranks Among Africa's 'Weakest' Currencies in 2026", linked below).
This is an important nuance: fast M3 growth has not yet translated into currency weakness, precisely because export receipts (gold, tourism) have been strong enough to supply the foreign currency side of the equation even as domestic credit expanded rapidly. That balance is exactly what TICGL flags as the thing to watch — if gold prices or tourism receipts soften while domestic credit growth stays this high, the currency channel is where the pressure would most likely surface next.
8. The Fiscal Link: Government Domestic Borrowing
Overdraft utilisation is rising, a signal worth tracking
Part of domestic credit expansion also reflects government financing needs. Domestic debt reached TZS 39.3 trillion at the end of April 2026, up 2.3 percent from March — an increase the Bank of Tanzania attributed mainly to utilisation of the government's overdraft facility, which rose from 13.3 percent to 15.0 percent of the domestic debt stock in a single month. Government borrowing from the banking system is one of the channels through which net domestic assets — and therefore M3 — expand, alongside private sector lending.
TZS 39.3tn
Domestic debt stock, April 2026
15.0%
Share of domestic debt from overdraft, up from 13.3%
5.06%
Treasury bill weighted average yield, April 2026
5.75%
Central Bank Rate, held since Q1 2026
9. TICGL Risk Assessment
Rating the plausibility and severity of each transmission channel
10. TICGL Analytical Take
- The money-vs-GDP gap is the single number to track. A widening gap between M3 growth (22-25%) and real GDP growth (~6%) sustained into 2027 would be a far more reliable early warning of future inflation than any single month's headline CPI print.
- Financial deepening and overheating can — and probably do — coexist. Tanzania's private credit-to-GDP ratio (21.6%) is still low by international standards, meaning structural credit expansion is healthy and needed. But the pace of the last 18 months looks faster than the pace of genuine new-customer financial inclusion alone would explain.
- Export receipts are currently masking the pressure. Gold and tourism inflows have let Tanzania run rapid domestic credit growth without currency strain so far. This is a favourable but not guaranteed condition — it depends on global gold prices and travel demand remaining strong.
- Sectoral credit allocation matters as much as the aggregate number. Credit flowing disproportionately into trade rather than manufacturing or agro-processing raises the odds that new money shows up in consumer prices rather than in expanded productive capacity — a theme consistent with TICGL's broader research on Tanzania's industrialisation gap under FYDP IV.
11. Frequently Asked Questions
What is Tanzania's M3 money supply and how big is it?
M3 (extended broad money supply) is the broadest measure of money circulating in Tanzania's economy — currency plus all bank deposits, including foreign currency deposits. It reached TZS 65.1 trillion in April 2026, up 22.0 percent from a year earlier.
Why is Tanzania's M3 growing faster than GDP?
M3 grew 24.7 percent in 2025 versus real GDP growth of about 6.0 percent — a gap driven almost entirely by rapid domestic credit expansion (net domestic assets up 30.7 percent y/y) rather than foreign currency inflows (net foreign assets fell 0.7 percent).
Does fast M3 growth cause inflation in Tanzania?
It's a contributing risk factor rather than an automatic cause. Headline inflation rose to 4.0 percent in April 2026 (from 3.2 percent) and core inflation rose to 3.1 percent (from 2.2 percent) — both still within target bands, but the direction is consistent with what a persistent money-vs-GDP gap would predict.
What is driving Tanzania's rapid credit and money supply growth?
Private sector credit grew 23.6 percent year-on-year, led by trade (44.2%), mining and quarrying (39.7%), and transport and communication (39.7%). Private credit to GDP has risen from 14.3 percent in 2018 to 21.6 percent in 2025.
TERI
Tanzania Economic Research Institute (TERI) — a TICGL research initiative
Analysis prepared using data from the Bank of Tanzania Monthly Economic Review, May 2026, and Ministry of Finance and Planning.
Primary data source: Bank of Tanzania, Monthly Economic Review — May 2026 (ISSN 0856-6844), Tables 2.2.1, 2.2.2, A1 and A3. Figures are provisional (p) where noted in original BOT tables and subject to revision in subsequent BOT publications.
1. The Ranking: Africa's Weakest Currencies, June 2026
Where TZS sits, and who ranks weaker
Multiple currency trackers publishing "weakest African currencies" surveys in June 2026 — compiled using Forbes calculator data by Business Insider Africa and Tuko.co.ke — place the Tanzanian Shilling 7th weakest on the continent, requiring roughly 2,600–2,635 units per US Dollar. Six African currencies now require more than 2,000 units per dollar, led by São Tomé & Príncipe's dobra and Sierra Leone's leone.
Sources: Forbes currency calculator data compiled by Business Insider Africa and Tuko.co.ke (June 2026); Trading Economics; Wise.com; Exchange-Rates.org. Nominal per-USD figures vary slightly by source and by day; TICGL uses a representative mid-June 2026 range.
Chart 1 — Africa's Weakest Currencies vs. TZS: Units per US Dollar, June 2026
Note: São Tomé, Sierra Leone and Guinea are truncated on this chart for readability (values in the tens of thousands). See Table 1 for full figures.
Why this ranking gets attention: Headlines built on this list travel fast because "weakest currency" sounds alarming. But nominal exchange-rate level is a poor proxy for currency health — Japan's yen trades above 140/USD and South Korea's won above 1,300/USD, and neither is considered "weak" in the crisis sense. What actually matters is covered in Sections 2–6 below.
2. What Bank of Tanzania's Official Data Actually Shows
The IFEM rate: stable, and appreciating year-on-year
On the Interbank Foreign Exchange Market (IFEM) that the Bank of Tanzania tracks and publishes monthly, the Shilling averaged TZS 2,612.46 per US Dollar in April 2026, compared with TZS 2,684.41 per USD in April 2025 — an annual appreciation of 2.7 percent. That is an improvement on the 2.5 percent appreciation recorded in March 2026, and a sharp turnaround from the 3.9 percent depreciation recorded in the same month a year earlier (April 2025). This is the opposite direction of travel implied by a "weakest currencies" headline.
Chart 2 — Official TZS/USD Exchange Rate, End of Period (Apr 2025 – Apr 2026)
Source: Bank of Tanzania / Ministry of Finance, BOT Monthly Economic Review, May 2026, Table A10 (national debt end-of-period exchange rate).
Behind this stability: gold export receipts rose to USD 5,268.9 million (year ending April 2026) from USD 3,821.2 million a year earlier — a 38 percent jump that materially eased dollar demand pressure — while tourism receipts grew 9.5 percent to USD 4,385.3 million on a 21.7 percent rise in international arrivals. The Bank's own intervention was light: it sold just USD 15.3 million on the IFEM in April 2026 "to maintain orderly market conditions" — not the scale of intervention associated with a currency under real stress.
3. Reconciling Two Different Stories
Why official and market-tracker numbers diverge
Cross-checking independent trackers as at late June 2026: Trading Economics quoted USD/TZS around 2,625 on 3 June 2026 (Shilling down 1.16% over the prior month, but still up 1.87% over the trailing 12 months — consistent with BOT's appreciation story); Wise.com recorded a June 2026 weekly range of TZS 2,596–2,634 per USD with a six-month average of TZS 2,571; and Exchange-Rates.org noted the Shilling had eased about 6.1 percent year-to-date against the Dollar by 20 June 2026 on the specific rate series it tracks.
The gap between these figures is real and worth understanding rather than dismissing. Tanzania runs a managed, not fully liberalised, exchange rate. That means:
- BOT's figure is a monthly average of the interbank rate, smoothing out day-to-day spikes that trackers like Wise or Trading Economics quote in real time.
- Different reference dates. BOT's most recent published figure is for April 2026; independent trackers quote rates through late June 2026 — two months of additional currency movement not yet captured in BOT's own release cycle.
- Retail/parallel spread. Rates used by international remittance and travel platforms often reflect a small retail markup over the pure interbank mid-rate BOT publishes.
Table 2 — TZS/USD: Comparing Sources, 2026| Source | Period | Rate (TZS/USD) |
|---|
| Bank of Tanzania (IFEM avg.) | April 2026 | 2,612.46 |
| Bank of Tanzania (end of period) | April 2026 | 2,602.00 |
| Trading Economics | 3 Jun 2026 | 2,625.00 |
| Wise.com (weekly high) | 23 Jun 2026 | 2,634.05 |
| Wise.com (weekly low) | 25 Jun 2026 | 2,596.00 |
| Wise.com (6-month avg.) | Jan–Jun 2026 | 2,571.25 |
| Exchange-Rates.org | 20 Jun 2026 | 2,630.99 |
| Forbes Advisor / Xe | 25 Jun 2026 | 2,617.80 |
TICGL read: None of these figures point to a currency in freefall. The spread across sources (roughly TZS 2,570–2,635) is a normal band for a managed float, not evidence of a parallel-market crisis of the kind seen in some of the currencies ranked weaker than TZS on Table 1.
4. Five Reasons TZS Ranks "Weak" in Nominal Terms
None of these, on their own, signal instability
01
No currency redenomination
Unlike Ghana (2007) or Zimbabwe, Tanzania has never redenominated the Shilling by dropping zeros. Decades of cumulative — even if moderate — inflation since the 1970s compound into a nominally large units-per-dollar figure today, independent of current-year stability.
02
Larger economy, larger money stock
Extended broad money (M3) reached TZS 65.1 trillion in April 2026, up 22 percent year-on-year. A bigger, faster-growing economy naturally circulates more local-currency units, which mechanically raises the units-per-dollar figure over time even without depreciation.
03
Nominal ranking ignores the growth rate
"Weakest currency" lists rank the level of the exchange rate, not its trend. Uganda, Burundi and several currencies ranked "less weak" than TZS by level have depreciated far faster in percentage terms over the past year than the Shilling has.
04
Import-dependent economy
Refined petroleum products make up about 14.4 percent of goods imports. As a net commodity importer, Tanzania's dollar demand is structurally higher than gold- and tourism-export receipts alone would otherwise imply — a genuine, if moderate, source of currency pressure.
05
Regional company, not global outlier
TZS sits in a cluster of East/Central African currencies (Uganda, Burundi, DR Congo, Rwanda, Malawi) that all require 1,000+ units per dollar for similar structural reasons. This is a regional pattern, not a Tanzania-specific weakness signal.
✓
What would actually be alarming
A widening gap between the official and black-market rate, rapidly falling reserves, or double-digit annual depreciation — none of which currently apply to TZS based on the data in this review.
5. TZS vs. Regional Peer Currencies
A closer look at East & Central African currencies
Chart 3 — TZS vs. Selected East & Central African Currencies: Units per USD, June 2026
Source: Business Insider Africa / Tuko.co.ke (Forbes calculator), June 2026.
Within its immediate regional cluster, TZS sits between Rwanda/Malawi/DR Congo (nominally "stronger" by level) and Uganda/Burundi/Madagascar (nominally "weaker"). What distinguishes Tanzania is the combination of a diversified export base (gold, tourism, agriculture, manufactured goods) and a managed float backed by adequate reserves — a combination several of its lower-ranked regional peers lack.
6. The Real Risk to Watch: The Current Account & Global Oil Prices
Not the ranking — the trajectory
Tanzania's current account deficit widened to USD 2,651.8 million in the year ending April 2026, from USD 2,107.1 million a year earlier — a 25.6 percent deterioration — as import growth (15.5%) outpaced export growth (13.5%). This is financed comfortably today by gold and tourism inflows, but it is the genuine leading indicator for currency pressure, not the nominal exchange-rate ranking.
The transmission channel is direct: global crude oil prices jumped from USD 95.58/barrel in March 2026 to a monthly average of USD 103.91/barrel in April 2026 (intraday high USD 117.80), driven by Middle East tensions. Since refined petroleum makes up roughly 14.4 percent of Tanzania's goods imports, a sustained oil-price shock raises dollar demand mechanically — the more credible path to future TZS depreciation than the current nominal ranking implies.
The offsetting cushion
Gross official reserves stood at USD 5,722.5 million in April 2026 (up from USD 5,307.7 million a year earlier), covering 4.4 months of projected imports — within national and EAC benchmarks. Combined with record gold exports, this gives Bank of Tanzania meaningful room to defend orderly market conditions even if oil prices stay elevated through the rest of 2026.
Chart 4 — Current Account Balance & Foreign Exchange Reserves (Year Ending April, 2021–2026)
Source: Bank of Tanzania, Tables A5 & A10, BOT Monthly Economic Review, May 2026.
7. Supporting Context: Inflation, Policy Rate & Credit Growth
The macro backdrop shaping currency conditions
Currency stability doesn't happen in isolation — it reflects the wider monetary and price environment. Three data points from the May 2026 BOT review matter most for the TZS story:
4.0% ▲
Headline inflation, April 2026 (from 3.2% in March)
5.75%
Central Bank Rate, held since Q1 2026
23.6%
Private sector credit growth, y/y
22.0%
Broad money (M3) growth, y/y
Chart 5 — Twelve-Month Inflation Trend: Headline, Core, Food & Energy (Apr 2025 – Apr 2026)
Source: National Bureau of Statistics & Bank of Tanzania computations, BOT Monthly Economic Review, May 2026.
Why this matters for the Shilling
At its April 2026 meeting, the Monetary Policy Committee held the CBR at 5.75 percent and narrowed the policy corridor from 200 to 150 basis points to sharpen transmission — a stance consistent with defending currency stability without over-tightening credit. Inflation at 4.0 percent remains inside EAC/SADC convergence bands, meaning Tanzania is not fighting the kind of runaway domestic inflation that typically forces rapid currency depreciation elsewhere on the "weakest currencies" list (e.g., Sierra Leone, Guinea). Meanwhile, credit growth of 23.6 percent — led by trade (44.2%), mining (39.7%) and transport (39.7%) — signals an economy still expanding fast enough to keep attracting the dollar inflows that support the currency.
Chart 6 — 7-Day IBCM Rate vs. the CBR Corridor (May 2024 – April 2026)
Source: Bank of Tanzania, BOT Monthly Economic Review, May 2026, Chart 2.2.1.
8. Budget, Debt & External Reserves Snapshot
The fiscal and external-debt picture underpinning currency confidence
Central government revenue continues to outperform target — TZS 3,836.8 billion collected in March 2026, 8.5 percent above target — while the national debt stock reached USD 51,067.2 million at end-April 2026, of which 70.4 percent was external debt, still dominated by concessional multilateral creditors (58.3 percent of the external stock). A well-managed debt profile and a revenue base that consistently beats target both support investor and creditor confidence in the currency's medium-term stability.
Chart 7 — External Debt Stock by Creditor Category, April 2026
Source: Ministry of Finance & Bank of Tanzania, Table 2.6.2.
Chart 8 — Foreign Exchange Reserves vs. Months of Import Cover
Source: Bank of Tanzania, Chart 2.7.1.
Table 3 — Key External Sector Indicators, Year Ending April 2026| Indicator | 2025 | 2026 (provisional) | Change |
|---|
| Total exports (goods & services) | USD 16,625.0m | USD 18,876.7m | +13.5% |
| Total imports (goods & services) | USD 17,270.5m | USD 19,944.6m | +15.5% |
| Current account balance | -USD 2,107.1m | -USD 2,651.8m | Widened 25.6% |
| Gross official reserves | USD 5,307.7m | USD 5,722.5m | +7.8% |
| Gold exports | USD 3,821.2m | USD 5,268.9m | +37.9% |
| External debt stock | USD 33,764.5m | USD 35,949.6m | +6.5% |
9. TICGL Analytical Take
Reading the "weakest currency" narrative correctly
- Separate the level from the trend. Investors, importers and policymakers should track the direction of the IFEM rate and reserve cover month to month — not headline rankings built purely on nominal exchange-rate level, which say little about near-term risk.
- Watch the current account, not the currency table. A 25.6 percent widening of the current account deficit in a single year is the metric most likely to translate into real TZS pressure if it persists — particularly if global oil prices stay elevated on Middle East tensions.
- Gold and tourism are doing the heavy lifting. Both sectors are cyclical and exposed to global demand and price swings. A structurally sound export base still needs diversification beyond these two pillars to keep underwriting currency stability through future shocks — a theme consistent with TICGL's broader research on Tanzania's industrialisation gap.
- Reserve adequacy remains the key buffer. At 4.4 months of import cover, Tanzania has room to absorb short-term shocks without disorderly currency moves, but this buffer would erode if the current account deficit trend continues unaddressed.
10. Frequently Asked Questions
Why does the Tanzanian Shilling rank among Africa's weakest currencies?
As of June 2026, TZS trades at roughly TZS 2,600–2,635 per US Dollar, ranking 7th weakest in Africa on a nominal units-per-dollar basis, behind São Tomé, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Madagascar, Uganda and Burundi. This reflects currency history (no redenomination) and the size of Tanzania's money stock — not an indicator of acute currency crisis.
Is the Tanzanian Shilling actually losing value?
Not on Bank of Tanzania's own official interbank (IFEM) data: TZS averaged 2,612.46 per USD in April 2026, up 2.7 percent year-on-year. Independent trackers quote day-specific rates in the 2,600–2,635 range through June 2026 and describe modest year-to-date softening — a gap explained by averaging methods, reference dates and retail spreads, not a currency collapse.
What is the difference between a "weak" currency and a "depreciating" currency?
A currency's nominal exchange rate level reflects history and structure; a depreciating currency is one losing value over time. TZS requires many units per dollar (nominal characteristic) but has been broadly stable to appreciating year-on-year on official data — unlike several African currencies experiencing double-digit annual depreciation.
What could cause the Tanzanian Shilling to weaken further?
The most plausible risk is Tanzania's widening current account deficit (USD 2,651.8 million, year ending April 2026), driven by import growth outpacing exports. A sustained rise in global oil prices linked to Middle East tensions would raise the fuel import bill and could pressure the Shilling, even as gold and tourism receipts currently offset this.
How does Tanzania defend the Shilling's exchange rate?
Through light IFEM interventions (USD 15.3 million sold in April 2026) backed by gross official reserves of USD 5,722.5 million, covering about 4.4 months of projected imports — in line with national and EAC benchmarks.
TERI
Tanzania Economic Research Institute (TERI) — a TICGL research initiative
Analysis prepared using data from the Bank of Tanzania Monthly Economic Review, May 2026; Ministry of Finance and Planning; National Bureau of Statistics; Tanzania Revenue Authority; and independent currency-market trackers (Trading Economics, Wise.com, Exchange-Rates.org, Forbes Advisor, Business Insider Africa / Tuko.co.ke).
Primary data source: Bank of Tanzania, Monthly Economic Review — May 2026 (ISSN 0856-6844). Supplementary sources: Business Insider Africa / Tuko.co.ke, "Top 10 African Countries With Weakest Currencies as of June 2026"; Trading Economics, Tanzania Shilling currency data; Wise.com and Exchange-Rates.org historical USD/TZS rates; Forbes Advisor currency converter. Figures are provisional (p) where noted in original BOT tables and subject to revision in subsequent BOT publications.
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania's commercial capital and fastest-growing city in East Africa, faces a deepening urban mobility crisis. Severe traffic congestion on its primary road corridors imposes significant time losses on the city's workers, traders, and business operators, translating into measurable productivity deficits and economic costs. Workers in Dar es Salaam lose an average of 2.48 to 5.0 hours per day to congestion-related travel delays, with a city-wide productivity cost estimated at approximately TZS 4 billion per day — equivalent to roughly 6 percent of the city's annual GDP. The paper identifies major congestion corridors, disaggregates the impact by worker category, and proposes evidence-based policy responses aligned with Tanzania's Fourth Five-Year Development Plan (FYDP IV) and Development Vision 2050.
Section 1
Introduction: A City Under Structural Pressure
Dar es Salaam is one of the fastest-growing cities in sub-Saharan Africa, expanding at an annual rate of approximately 6.5 percent, with a metropolitan population approaching 8 million people as of 2025. It functions as Tanzania's commercial, financial, and industrial hub, contributing an estimated 17 to 20 percent of national GDP, with a per-capita GDP of TZS 5.8 million — more than double the national average.
Yet alongside this growth comes a deepening urban mobility crisis. The city's road infrastructure has not kept pace with rapid urbanisation, motorisation, and population growth. Approximately 70 percent of all registered vehicles in Tanzania operate within Dar es Salaam, placing an enormous burden on a road network designed for a fraction of current demand.
The economic significance of this congestion is rarely captured in formal economic accounts. Lost working hours, delayed business openings, missed client appointments, reduced delivery frequency, and excessive fuel expenditure are real costs borne by individuals and firms — but they are largely invisible in aggregate productivity statistics. This research makes those costs visible, measurable, and actionable for policymakers and urban planners.
"For a salaried worker, congestion means arriving late, leaving early, or working fewer effective hours. For a market trader, it means a delayed opening, fewer customers served, and reduced daily turnover. For a transport-dependent business, it means missed deliveries, higher fuel costs, and lower operational efficiency."
Dar es Salaam Population Growth Trend
Millions of residents, 2010–2030 (projected)
DSM Share of Tanzania's Registered Vehicles
Concentration of national vehicle fleet in Dar es Salaam
The Vehicle Fleet and Infrastructure Gap
An estimated 70 percent of all registered vehicles in Tanzania are located in Dar es Salaam. The total vehicle volume has been estimated at over 400,000, including more than 6,000 commuter buses (daladala). Yet the city's trunk road network was designed for a fraction of that load.
The average vehicular speed on major Dar es Salaam roads during peak hours has been measured at as low as 10 to 15 km/h — well below the free-flow benchmark of approximately 30 to 35 km/h on urban arterials. This means congestion effectively reduces average speeds by more than 50 percent during morning and evening peaks.
Average Road Speed: Free-Flow vs. Peak Hours (km/h)
Dar es Salaam major arterials — speed comparison by condition
BRT Status and the Infrastructure Gap
The Dar es Salaam Bus Rapid Transit (DART) system was introduced to provide high-capacity public transit on the Morogoro Road corridor. Phase 1, covering Kimara to Kivukoni, has been operational since 2016. However, only a single corridor is currently fully operational with dedicated busway infrastructure. The remaining major corridors — Kilwa Road, Nyerere Road, Mandela Road, and the northern approach routes — continue without BRT, leaving the overwhelming majority of workers dependent on daladala and private vehicles competing on the same road space.
🚌
BRT Coverage Gap: Of Dar es Salaam's five major arterial corridors, only the Morogoro Road Phase 1 corridor has dedicated BRT infrastructure. The remaining four corridors — serving the majority of commuters — have no segregated transit lanes, with all vehicles competing for the same road space.
Section 2
Residential Origins and Economic Destination Corridors
Dar es Salaam's urban form is predominantly monocentric — employment and commercial activity are heavily concentrated in a central corridor stretching from the CBD (Posta, Kisutu, Kariakoo) northward through Masaki, Msasani, and Mikocheni. Residential growth pushes workers and traders into peripheral areas, which are poorly connected to employment centres by road.
| Zone | Key Residential Areas | Economic Destinations | Primary Corridor |
|---|
| Northern | Tegeta, Wazo, Bunju, Mbezi Beach, Kawe, Goba, Mwenge, Kinondoni | CBD, Masaki, Msasani, Mikocheni | Sam Nujoma / Ali Hassan Mwinyi Road |
| Western | Kimara, Ubungo, Sinza, Kijitonyama, Mbezi Luis | CBD, Kariakoo, Posta, Ubungo | Morogoro Road |
| South-Western | Tabata, Segerea, Ukonga, Gongo la Mboto, Pugu, Buguruni, Vingunguti | CBD, Kariakoo, Industrial areas | Nyerere Road / Mandela Road |
| Southern | Mbagala, Chamazi, Tandika, Temeke, Mtoni | CBD, Kariakoo, Port/Kurasini | Kilwa Road / Bandari Road |
| Kigamboni | Kigamboni, Mjimwema | CBD, Kurasini, Port | Ferry / Bridge link |
| Port-Industrial | Kurasini, Bandari | CBD, Kariakoo, Industrial zones | Kilwa Road / Nyerere Road link |
Table 1: Study area breakdown — major residential origin zones mapped against primary economic destination clusters. Source: TICGL, JICA Dar Transport Master Plan.
Section 3
Travel Time Evidence: Peak-Hour Burden by Corridor
The most comprehensive primary research on travel time loss in Dar es Salaam was conducted along the Morogoro Road and Nelson Mandela Road corridors. The measured Travel Time Index (TTI) was 2.19, which means a journey during peak hours takes on average 2.19 times longer than the same journey during off-peak conditions — a congestion surcharge of 119 percent on every peak-hour commute.
The same study found an asymmetric effect: workers spent approximately double the off-peak time travelling to work in the morning, but approximately triple the off-peak time returning home in the evening. This means the evening peak is significantly more severe than the morning peak, compounding fatigue and reducing available time for rest, family activity, and secondary economic engagement.
Travel Time Index: DSM vs. African Peer Cities
Congestion multiplier (1.0 = free flow; higher = worse)
Morning vs. Evening Peak Severity
Ratio of peak travel time to free-flow baseline
Corridor-Level Travel Time Matrix
The following matrix provides estimated travel times across major commuter corridors, comparing morning peak and off-peak conditions, based on the TTI of 2.19 applied to corridor-specific baseline distances.
| Origin | Destination | Distance (km) | Off-Peak (min) | Peak (min) | Excess Time (min) |
|---|
| Tegeta | Kariakoo / CBD | 24–27 | 45–50 | 120–135 | 75–85 |
| Tegeta | Masaki / Msasani | 20–22 | 40–45 | 95–115 | 55–70 |
| Kimara | Posta / CBD | 20–22 | 35–45 | 75–100 | 40–55 |
| Mbagala | Kariakoo / CBD | 18–20 | 35–45 | 80–105 | 45–60 |
| Ukonga | Kariakoo / CBD | 15–18 | 30–40 | 70–95 | 40–55 |
| Goba / Mbezi Luis | Mwenge | 12–15 | 25–35 | 60–80 | 35–45 |
| Kigamboni | Posta / CBD | 22–25 | 40–50 | 90–120 | 50–70 |
| Temeke | Kilwa Rd / CBD | 14–17 | 30–40 | 70–90 | 40–50 |
| Segerea / Tabata | Nyerere Rd / CBD | 12–15 | 25–35 | 60–80 | 35–45 |
Table 2: Author estimates based on measured TTI of 2.19 (Mpogole et al., 2016); corridor distances from JICA Dar Transport Master Plan. All figures approximate.
Spotlight: Worst-Affected Corridors
Tegeta → CBD Corridor
Via Sam Nujoma / Ali Hassan Mwinyi Road
5 hrs
Max daily round trip
Kimara → CBD Corridor
Via Morogoro Road (BRT Phase 1)
3.3 hrs
Max daily round trip
Mbagala → CBD Corridor
Via Kilwa Road
3.5 hrs
Max daily round trip
Kigamboni → CBD Corridor
Via Ferry / Kigamboni Bridge
4 hrs
Max daily round trip
Peak vs. Off-Peak Journey Times by Corridor
Minutes — midpoint estimates per origin-destination pair
The Tegeta Corridor: A Representative Case Study
A worker living in Tegeta and employed in the CBD — approximately 25 kilometres via Sam Nujoma or Ali Hassan Mwinyi Road — may complete the journey in 45 to 50 minutes during off-peak conditions. During morning peak hours (approximately 06:30 to 09:00), the same journey routinely requires 120 to 135 minutes, and during evening peak (approximately 16:30 to 20:00), delays can extend to 150 minutes or beyond.
⏱️
The Tegeta Time Calculation: On a round trip, a Tegeta-based worker may spend between 3.5 and 5.0 hours per day in transit. Against a nominal 8-hour working day, this means up to 62 percent of a worker's waking productive window is consumed by mobility alone — before any time is allocated to eating, household responsibilities, rest, or skill development.
Section 4
Productive Hours Lost: Estimation by Worker Category
Dar es Salaam's labour force includes formal private sector employees, civil servants, self-employed traders, artisans, service providers, transport operators, and a large informal sector. The NBS Integrated Labour Force Survey estimates that the informal sector employs approximately 76 percent of Tanzania's workforce. Workers are grouped into four categories to capture the different ways congestion affects productive time.
A
Formal Salaried Employees
2.0–3.0 hrs/day lost
Office employees, civil servants, private sector professionals. Direct impact: late arrival, reduced effective working day. Some leave home as early as 03:00–04:00 to avoid peak hours, sacrificing sleep rather than working hours.
B
Self-Employed Traders & Market Operators
1.5–2.5 hrs/day lost
Market traders, informal sector operators, small-scale vendors. Time is directly monetised — a trader who opens one hour late loses one hour of trading time. Doubly exposed when making multiple supply trips.
C
SME Owners, Service Providers & Professionals
1.5–3.0 hrs/day lost
SME operators, legal, accounting, consulting, medical professionals. Impact extends beyond personal commute — staff lateness, missed client meetings, and delivery delays all compound the business-level time loss.
D
Transport-Dependent Businesses & Logistics
2.0–4.0 hrs/day lost
Freight haulers, delivery services, daladala operators. Under free-flow conditions, a vehicle might complete 6 delivery cycles per day; peak congestion reduces this to 3–4. Revenue falls, fuel costs rise.
Daily Hours Lost by Worker Category
Low and high estimate range per category
Annual Productive Hours Lost per Worker
Mid-point estimate over 312 working days
Aggregate Productive Hours Lost — Summary Table
| Worker Category | Daily Hrs Lost | Monthly Hrs Lost (26 days) | Annual Hrs Lost (312 days) | % of Annual Working Hrs |
|---|
| Formal Salaried Employees | 2.0 – 3.0 | 52 – 78 | 624 – 936 | 31 – 47% |
| Self-Employed Traders | 1.5 – 2.5 | 39 – 65 | 468 – 780 | 23 – 39% |
| SME Owners / Professionals | 1.5 – 3.0 | 39 – 78 | 468 – 936 | 23 – 47% |
| Transport / Logistics Operators | 2.0 – 4.0 | 52 – 104 | 624 – 1,248 | 31 – 62% |
| Average across categories | 2.48 – 3.0 | 64 – 78 | 774 – 936 | 39 – 47% |
Table 3: Assumes 2,000 standard working hours per year (8 hrs/day × 250 working days). Hours lost are productive-equivalent hours, not total commute hours. Source: Mpogole et al. (2016); Elisonguo (2013); TICGL analysis.
What Does 47% Lost Working Time Mean?
A worker losing 47 percent of their annual working hours to congestion is effectively working for only 53 percent of their nominal working year — equivalent to just over six months of productive output from a twelve-month salary or business investment. For the city's aggregate economy, this is not a marginal inefficiency; it is a structural shortfall in human capital deployment at scale.
Transport / Logistics (max)
62%
Formal Employees (max)
47%
Figure: Percentage of annual working hours lost to congestion, by worker category (maximum estimates). Source: TICGL analysis.
Section 5
The Economic Cost of Congestion-Related Time Loss
The most widely used methodology for valuing lost time in transport economics is the wage-based approach, which treats the opportunity cost of time as equivalent to the marginal value of an hour of labour. As of 2025, the mean urban wage in Tanzania was estimated at TZS 494,812 per month (approximately USD 189), implying a mean hourly wage of approximately TZS 2,378 per hour (assuming 208 working hours per month).
Individual-Level Cost Estimation
| Parameter | Low Estimate | Mid Estimate | High Estimate | Basis |
|---|
| Daily excess time lost (hrs) | 2.0 | 2.5 | 5.0 | Measured range from Dar studies |
| Mean hourly wage (TZS) | 1,800 | 2,378 | 4,200 | NBS / World Bank 2025 data |
| Daily monetary loss (TZS) | 3,600 | 5,945 | 21,000 | Hours lost × hourly wage |
| Monthly loss (TZS, 26 days) | 93,600 | 154,570 | 546,000 | Daily × 26 |
| Annual loss (TZS, 312 days) | 1,123,200 | 1,854,840 | 6,552,000 | Daily × 312 |
| Annual loss (USD equivalent) | $430 | $710 | $2,510 | At TZS 2,610 / USD (2025) |
Table 4: Individual-level congestion cost estimation. Source: NBS Tanzania Integrated Labour Force Survey; TICGL analysis.
Annual Individual Cost of Congestion (TZS)
Low, mid, and high scenario by estimate
City-Wide Daily Productivity Loss (TZS Billions)
Conservative, mid and World Bank reference scenarios
City-Wide Daily Economic Cost Estimate
Conservative Scenario
TZS 5.4 Bn/day
1.5M commuters × TZS 3,600/day avg loss
Mid Scenario
TZS 7.2 Bn/day
2.0M commuters × TZS 3,600/day avg loss
World Bank / DMDP Reference
TZS 4 Bn/day
≈ USD 1.8 million per day
At mid scenario, the annualised city-wide productivity loss exceeds TZS 2.0 trillion per year (approximately USD 780 million) — equivalent to roughly 6% of Dar es Salaam's estimated annual GDP.
The Broader Economic Multiplier
The direct wage-equivalent time loss is only one component of the true economic cost. Several additional channels amplify the aggregate impact:
Cost Channels: Congestion's Broader Economic Footprint
Relative estimated contribution to total economic impact (illustrative)
Wage/productivity loss
~55%
Vehicle wear/maintenance
~10%
Supply chain inefficiency
~10%
Health & fatigue costs
~7%
Figure: Illustrative breakdown of congestion's total economic impact. Direct wage-equivalent loss is quantified; other channels are estimated. Source: TICGL analysis based on literature review.
Section 6
Business-Level Impacts: Traders, SMEs, and Transport Operators
For Dar es Salaam's market traders and small retailers, the day begins with the journey to market — either to pick up wholesale stock from Kariakoo, Tandika, or Mwenge markets, or to open a fixed location on time. Traffic congestion imposes an opening-time penalty on both activities.
Transport-dependent businesses face compounded exposure. A single delivery vehicle that might complete six delivery cycles per day under free-flow conditions may complete only three to four cycles under peak congestion — halving the operational output of that vehicle and its driver.
Sector-Specific Impact Analysis
| Sector | Primary Congestion Impact | Key Productivity Loss Channel | Severity |
|---|
| Retail / Trading | Late opening; delayed stock pickup from wholesale markets | Fewer customer transactions per day; reduced daily turnover | High |
| Construction / Engineering | Delayed material delivery; worker lateness affecting site start time | Reduced site working hours; project schedule overruns; cost escalation | High |
| Hospitality / Food Service | Delayed food supply delivery; staff late arrival; reduced breakfast/lunch service | Lost covers; food waste; reduced revenue per seat per day | Medium–High |
| Healthcare | Patient late arrival; staff commute delays; ambulance response time degraded | Reduced patient throughput; emergency response risk | High |
| Financial / Professional Services | Client appointments missed or shortened; staff unreliable attendance | Fewer billable hours; lower client satisfaction; reduced deal flow | Medium |
| Logistics / Transport | Fewer delivery cycles per vehicle per day; higher fuel burn | Revenue loss per vehicle; higher operating cost; supply chain disruption | Very High |
| Manufacturing / Industrial | Raw material delivery delay; shift start disruption | Reduced output per shift; energy and idle cost increase | Medium–High |
Table 5: Sector-specific congestion impact analysis. Source: TICGL research synthesis.
Estimated Daily Revenue Loss by Business Type (TZS '000 per operator)
Illustrative mid-scenario estimates based on sector turnover and congestion delay assumptions
"Commuter bus owners bear a double burden: fewer trips per day and significantly higher fuel consumption due to idle time in congestion — compressing margins, reducing public transport reliability, and creating a self-reinforcing negative cycle for the workers who depend on it."
Section 7
Policy Recommendations: From Evidence to Action
At an estimated TZS 4 to 7 billion per day in productivity value foregone — equivalent to approximately 6 percent of the city's GDP — Dar es Salaam's congestion-related productivity loss represents one of the largest unaddressed efficiency deficits in Tanzania's urban economy. Addressing it is a core economic development imperative directly relevant to the targets of FYDP IV and Development Vision 2050.
1
Infrastructure
Accelerate BRT Network Expansion Beyond Phase 1
The single most transformative intervention is the rapid expansion of the DART BRT network onto Kilwa Road (Southern Corridor), Nyerere Road (South-West), and the northern approach routes (Sam Nujoma / Ali Hassan Mwinyi). World Bank DMDP financing should be leveraged to accelerate corridor delivery, with PPP structures considered for station development and service operation.
2
Urban Policy
Establish Decentralised Economic Nodes
The monocentric structure of Dar es Salaam is a root cause of the congestion burden. Deliberate investment in secondary economic hubs — commercial and light industrial zones in Tegeta/Mbezi, Kigamboni, Ukonga/Gongo la Mboto, and Mbagala — would distribute the employment geography and reduce cross-city peak commutes. Consistent with FYDP IV's satellite city and secondary urban centre concepts.
3
Regulatory
Introduce Staggered Work Hours for Public Sector
A zero-capital, immediately implementable intervention: shift a portion of the government workforce to earlier (07:00) or later (09:30) start times, spreading peak demand across a wider time window and reducing the height of the morning peak. As the largest single employer in Dar es Salaam, the government can implement this unilaterally.
4
Regulatory
Promote Freight and Logistics Scheduling Outside Peak Hours
Require heavy and commercial vehicles to operate in designated time windows (before 06:00 and after 21:00 for centre-city deliveries), modelled on practices in Nairobi, Kampala, and Kigali. TANROADS and the municipal authorities have the regulatory mandate to implement such restrictions.
5
Technology / HR
Remote and Flexible Work Policy for the Private Sector
With mobile broadband penetration estimated at 80–85 percent nationally, a meaningful share of the formal sector workforce could perform some portion of their work remotely. Employer-led flexibility policies (work from home one or two days per week) would reduce the daily commuter volume without requiring infrastructure investment.
6
Engineering
Junction Upgrades and Traffic Signal Optimisation
Several of the worst congestion hotspots are attributable to poorly performing intersections. Targeted engineering interventions at key nodes — including grade-separated interchanges at Ubungo and Tazara — and modern adaptive traffic signal systems could significantly reduce localised bottlenecks at modest cost compared to new road construction.
7
Data & Research
Annual Congestion Cost Reporting and Data Collection
Tanzania's policymakers currently lack consistent, annually updated data on congestion levels, travel times, and productivity costs for Dar es Salaam. Establishing a formal annual congestion monitoring programme — drawing on GPS floating car data, DART operational data, and periodic commuter surveys — would enable evidence-based investment prioritisation. TICGL/TERI is positioned to contribute to this monitoring function.
Policy Intervention Matrix: Estimated Cost vs. Impact Potential
Indicative positioning of seven recommended interventions
Conclusion
Conclusion: Urban Mobility is an Economic Growth Strategy
Traffic congestion in Dar es Salaam is among the most costly and least-measured economic drains on Tanzania's fastest-growing city. The central findings of this research are unambiguous. Workers lose an average of 2.48 to 5.0 hours per day to congestion-related travel delays. Across a working month of 26 days, this implies a loss of 64 to 78 productive hours per worker — equivalent to nearly two full working weeks consumed annually by congestion alone.
The city-wide monetary cost is estimated conservatively at TZS 4 billion per day, equivalent to approximately TZS 1.2 to 2.0 trillion per year, or roughly 6 percent of Dar es Salaam's annual GDP.
The impact falls most heavily on peripheral corridor residents — particularly those living in Tegeta, Kimara, Mbagala, Ukonga, and Kigamboni — who face the longest commutes to the employment-dense CBD and northern business corridors. For market traders and informal sector operators, the impact is compounded through lost trading time, delayed market openings, reduced delivery cycles, and lower daily turnover.
"Tanzania's FYDP IV and Development Vision 2050 both identify urbanisation as a transformative driver of growth. That potential will not be realised if Dar es Salaam's workers continue to lose a third to half of their productive working time to roads. Urban mobility is not a secondary concern of development planning — it is a primary determinant of how productively a city's human capital can be deployed."
Projected Cumulative Productivity Loss Without Intervention (TZS Trillion)
Modelled annual accumulation 2025–2035, assuming population growth of 6.5% p.a. and no major infrastructure improvement
About the Authors
About the Authors
AB
Amran Bhuzohera
Managing Director & Chief Economist, TICGL. Leads TICGL's economic research and investment advisory practice, with a focus on Tanzania's macroeconomic policy, urban economics, and development finance.
BK
Dr. Bravious Kahyoza
Senior Economic Advisor & PPP Specialist, TICGL. Advises on public-private partnership structuring and policy analysis, contributing technical expertise to TICGL/TERI's applied economic research.
References
References and Data Sources
- Basondole, A. (n.d.). Traffic congestion estimates for Dar es Salaam. Unpublished report.
- Elisonguo, A. D. (2013). The Social-Economic Impact of Road Traffic Congestion in Dar es Salaam Region. Mzumbe University, Morogoro.
- IMF (2025). World Economic Outlook. International Monetary Fund, Washington DC.
- JICA (2008). Dar es Salaam Transport Policy and System Development Master Plan. Technical Report. Japan International Cooperation Agency / Pacific Consultants International, Tokyo.
- Kiunsi, R. B. (2013). A Review of Traffic Congestion in Dar es Salaam City from the Physical Planning Perspective. Ardhi University, Dar es Salaam.
- Mpogole, H., Mwamfupe, D., & Mwakatobe, A. (2016). Traffic Congestion in Dar es Salaam: Implications for Workers' Productivity. Journal of Sustainable Development, Canadian Center of Science and Education.
- Msigwa, R. (2013). Challenges facing urban transportation in Dar es Salaam. Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, 2(3), 145–155.
- NBS (2023). Tanzania Integrated Labour Force Survey 2022/23. National Bureau of Statistics, Dar es Salaam.
- TICGL (2025). Economics of Cities in Tanzania. Tanzania Investment and Consultant Group Ltd / Tanzania Economic Research Institute. www.ticgl.com.
- TomTom (2025). TomTom Traffic Index 2025: Annual Report on Global Urban Congestion. TomTom International BV, Amsterdam.
- World Bank (2019). Untying Dar es Salaam's Traffic Knots, One Feeder Road at a Time. World Bank Feature Story, 1 April 2019.
- World Bank (2024). Tanzania Country Overview. World Bank, Washington DC.
Makala · Kiswahili
Msongamano wa Dar es Salaam: Wafanyakazi Zaidi ya Milioni 8 Wanapoteza Hadi Saa 5 kwa Siku — Na Jiji Linapoteza TZS Bilioni 4 Kila Siku
Na Amran Bhuzohera, Mchumi, na Dr. Bravious Kahyoza, Mshauri Mwandamizi wa Uchumi | TICGL / Tanzania Economic Research Institute (TERI) | Simu: +255 768 699 002
Dar es Salaam ni mojawapo ya miji inayokua haraka zaidi Afrika ya Kusini mwa Jangwa la Sahara — ikua kwa kasi ya asilimia 6.5 kwa mwaka, na idadi ya watu inayokaribia milioni 8 kufikia mwaka 2025. Mji huu ndiyo injini ya uchumi wa Tanzania, ukichangia asilimia 17 hadi 20 ya Pato la Taifa (GDP). Lakini pamoja na ukuaji huu mkubwa, kuna tatizo moja kubwa ambalo linaendelea kupuuzwa katika takwimu rasmi za uchumi:
Msongamano wa barabara unaibia Tanzania nguvu kazi ya thamani ya TZS bilioni 4 kila siku moja.
Hilo ndilo jibu la utafiti wa kina uliofanywa na TICGL na Tanzania Economic Research Institute (TERI), unaotoa tathmini ya kina ya muda unaopotea kwa msongamano, hasara ya uzalishaji na athari za kiuchumi kwa wafanyakazi na biashara jijini Dar es Salaam.
Je, Hali Halisi ni Nini? — Mambo 5 Makubwa ya Kuelewa
1
Kila mfanyakazi anapoteza saa 2.48 hadi 5.0 kwa siku — bila malipo
Utafiti unaonyesha kwamba wafanyakazi wanaotumia usafiri wa umma kwenye barabara za Morogoro Road na Nelson Mandela Road wanapoteza wastani wa saa 2.48 hadi 5.0 kwa siku. Kwa mwezi wa siku 26 za kazi, hii inamaanisha saa 64 hadi 78 zilizopotea — sawa na wiki karibu mbili kamili za kazi zinazomezwa na barabara kila mwezi. Travel Time Index (TTI) iliyopimwa Dar es Salaam ni 2.19 — ongezeko la asilimia 119 kwa kila safari ya muda wa kilele.
2
Gharama kwa jiji ni TZS bilioni 4 kila siku — sawa na asilimia 6 ya GDP ya Dar es Salaam
Ukipima hasara ya uzalishaji kwa wafanyakazi milioni 1.5 hadi 2.0 wanaosafiri kila siku, na kuzidisha kwa mshahara wa wastani wa saa (TZS 2,378), matokeo ni: hali ya wastani TZS bilioni 7.2 kwa siku; kumbukumbu ya Benki ya Dunia / DMDP: TZS bilioni 4 kwa siku; na kwa mwaka mzima zaidi ya TZS trilioni 1.2 hadi 2.0 — takriban asilimia 6 ya GDP ya Dar es Salaam.
3
Ukanda wa Tegeta ni mfano mzuri wa tatizo hili
Mfanyakazi anayeishi Tegeta na kufanya kazi CBD — kilomita 25 — anaweza kukamilisha safari hiyo kwa dakika 45 hadi 50 wakati wa usiku. Lakini wakati wa kilele cha asubuhi, safari hiyo hiyo inachukua dakika 120 hadi 135. Kwa safari ya kwenda na kurudi, mfanyakazi wa Tegeta anaweza kutumia saa 3.5 hadi 5.0 kwa siku barabarani tu — hadi asilimia 62 ya muda wake wa uzalishaji.
4
Biashara ndogo, madereva na wafanyabiashara wa masoko ndio wanaohisi zaidi
Dereva wa daladala anafanya safari 3 hadi 4 tu kwa siku badala ya 6 — nusu ya mapato yanayowezekana. Wafanyabiashara wa masoko ya Kariakoo, Tandika na Mwenge wanafungua maduka yao baadaye — wateja wachache, mapato madogo. Biashara za ujenzi, hospitali na usafirishaji zinabeba mzigo mara mbili: safari chache na mafuta mengi zaidi.
5
Mji wa monocentric ndiyo chanzo kikuu cha tatizo
Dar es Salaam ina muundo wa monocentric — ajira zimejikusanyika eneo moja tu: CBD hadi Masaki, Msasani na Mikocheni. Wakati huo huo, nyumba zinaendelea kujengwa mbali — Tegeta, Kimara, Mbagala, Ukonga, Kigamboni. Zaidi ya hayo, asilimia 70 ya magari yote yaliyosajiliwa Tanzania yako Dar es Salaam — mzigo mkubwa mno kwa barabara zilizoundwa kwa kiwango kidogo.
⚠️
TICGL Warning: Je, Dar es Salaam inaweza kuendelea kuwa injini ya uchumi wa Tanzania huku ikipoteza TZS trilioni 2 kwa mwaka kwa msongamano tu? Kama msongamano huu utaendelea bila jibu madhubuti, na idadi ya watu ikifikia milioni 10 ifikapo 2030, basi hasara ya uzalishaji itaendelea kukua kwa kasi zaidi kuliko uchumi wenyewe.
Hitimisho la TICGL
Msongamano wa Dar es Salaam si tatizo la usafiri tu — ni tatizo la kiuchumi la msingi ambalo linaathiri uwezo wa jiji kutumia kikamilifu nguvu kazi yake, biashara zake na uwekezaji wake. Hasara ya TZS bilioni 4 kwa siku haionekani kwenye akaunti yoyote ya Serikali — lakini inahisiwa kila siku na kila mfanyakazi anayetumia masaa yake kwenye barabara badala ya ofisini, dukani au shambani.
"Mjadala kuhusu uchumi wa Dar es Salaam haupaswi kuishia kwenye swali la 'GDP imekua kiasi gani?' bali uendelee kwenye swali muhimu zaidi: Je, mfanyakazi wa Dar es Salaam anaweza kufanya kazi kwa ufanisi kamili wakati saa 3 hadi 5 za siku yake zinateketezwa na barabara? Hapo ndipo kipimo halisi cha uwezo wa uchumi wa Dar es Salaam kitakapoanzia."
TICGL / Tanzania Economic Research Institute (TERI) | www.ticgl.com | Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Makala hii imetayarishwa kwa madhumuni ya utafiti na ushiriki wa kisera. Matumizi yake yanakubaliwa kwa idhini.
📄
TICGL / TERI Research Paper · 2025
Unataka Kupata Nakala Kamili ya Utafiti Huu?
Utafiti kamili wa "Time Lost in Traffic and Its Impact on Productive Economic Activity in Dar es Salaam" unajumuisha data kamili ya corridor-level, mfumo wote wa kihesabu (TTI, ACET, PHLm, MVTL), uchambuzi wa kina wa sekta zote na mapendekezo yaliyokamilika ya kisera — yaliyoundwa na TICGL / Tanzania Economic Research Institute (TERI).
✓ Data kamili ya travel time kwa corridor 9
✓ Hesabu kamili za PHLm, MVTL na BOHL
✓ Uchambuzi wa uchumi — kwa sekta 7
✓ Mapendekezo 7 ya kisera yaliyokamilika
✓ Marejeo yote ya kisayansi na vyanzo vya data
✓ Inafaa kwa watafiti, wawekezaji na watunga sera
Bonyeza kitufe hapo juu ili ufungue barua pepe yako tayari imejazwa. Tuma ombi lako na tutawasiliana nawe haraka iwezekanavyo. · amran@ticgl.com
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