BK

Dr. Bravious Kahyoza

CP3P · World Bank Certified PPP Expert

Dr. Bravious Kahyoza is a distinguished Tanzanian economist and a World Bank Certified Public-Private Partnership specialist (CP3P). He brings deep expertise in infrastructure financing, water sector governance, and development economics across East Africa. As a leading voice on Tanzania's economic architecture, his analysis bridges rigorous academic economics with actionable policy insight. He is a regular contributor to TICGL's economic intelligence platform.

Political Context & The Debate

Political commentator Idrisa Kwekweta, in his article "The Illusion of Public-Private Partnerships in Tanzania's Water Sector", published on the Sauti ya Ujamaa platform, described Tanzania's PPP model in the water sector as "privatisation in disguise." He argued that the model systematically weakens state capacity while allowing profit-driven companies to take control of infrastructure built using taxpayers' money.

The article emerged at a politically sensitive moment — shortly after the PPP Centre launched the PPPC CentreStage initiative linked to the implementation of the Fourth Five-Year Development Plan (FYDP IV 2026–2031). Its publication immediately triggered fierce debate across policy institutions, universities, and development circles over the future of Tanzania's water governance model.

RUWASA Clean and Safe Water Supply Scheme tank constructed September 2025 in Buhinbu Ngalula, Tanzania — a 100,000-litre capacity facility built under the Ministry of Water and Sanitation Agency
Photo: A RUWASA (Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Agency) 100,000-litre water storage tank constructed in September 2025 at Buhinbu Ngalula, Tanzania — part of the United Republic of Tanzania's Ministry of Water clean and safe water supply scheme. Solar-powered pumping facility visible on the left.

Kwekweta's critique carries undeniable political weight. His article correctly identifies real governance weaknesses inside the water sector, including institutional inefficiency, weak accountability systems, and declining public trust in state-managed service delivery. Its emotional appeal resonates because millions of Tanzanians continue facing daily water insecurity despite decades of public investment.

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The Central Question Critics Avoid: If PPPs are rejected completely, where will the enormous financing required to modernise Tanzania's water infrastructure come from? Criticising capital is politically attractive, but replacing it is economically far more difficult.

The Financing Crisis: Data Speaks

Data from Tanzania's national Water Sector Report for 2015–2020 directly expose the structural crisis. During that period, only 11 per cent of financing in the water sector came from government resources, while the remaining 89 per cent relied on development partners and external donors. The crisis in Tanzania's water sector is therefore fundamentally a crisis of capital and infrastructure financing, not merely an ideological invasion of private interests.

Tanzania Water Sector Financing · 2015–2020
89% of Water Sector Financing Came from External Donors
Source: Tanzania National Water Sector Report 2015–2020 | Compiled by TICGL Economic Intelligence
Structural Financing Gap · Trending Analysis
Government Contribution vs. External Funding — Historical Trend
Estimated annual distribution based on sector reports. The persistent gap illustrates why external capital (including private) remains structurally necessary.
Tanzania Water Sector Financing Breakdown (2015–2020 Period)
Financing SourceShare (%)Estimated Amount (TZS Billion)StatusSustainability
Development Partners / Donors71%~2,840ConditionalVolatile
External Loans / Multilaterals18%~720Debt-tiedModerate
Government Resources (GoT)11%~440DomesticStable
Total Sector Financing100%~4,000

PPP vs. Privatisation: A Critical Distinction

Under Tanzania's PPP framework, the state retains ownership of strategic assets and maintains regulatory authority over the sector. "PPP is not privatisation," policymakers repeatedly argue, because the framework operates within Tanzania's established legal and institutional structure, where government preserves powers over tariffs, service obligations, investment conditions, and contract enforcement.

✅ PPP Model (Tanzania's Framework)

  • State retains ownership of strategic assets
  • Government sets and controls tariffs
  • Regulatory authority remains with EWURA
  • Mandatory rural coverage obligations
  • Reinvestment requirements embedded in contracts
  • Time-bound agreements with public oversight
  • Cross-subsidy mechanisms for poor households
  • Lifeline tariff protections possible

❌ Full Privatisation (What Critics Fear)

  • Transfer of ownership to private entity
  • Profit maximisation as primary driver
  • Limited government regulatory oversight
  • No mandatory rural coverage requirements
  • Market-determined tariff structures
  • No time-bound contract accountability
  • Risk of exclusion of unprofitable communities
  • Bolivia/Argentina-type outcome risk

Critics of PPPs often commit what analysts describe as a dangerous policy error: demanding the complete abandonment of the PPP model whenever a contract or project experiences failure. Governance experts argue that failed contracts reflect weak public oversight and poor regulation, not proof that PPPs themselves are inherently defective.

If every institutional failure justified abolishing an entire system, then failures in public institutions themselves would justify abolishing public service delivery altogether.

— Policy Analyst, Tanzania Water Sector Consultations

What Tanzanians Already Pay for Water

Women and children carrying water buckets across a dry, arid landscape in rural Tanzania, illustrating the daily burden of water collection affecting millions of households
Photo: Women and children in rural Tanzania carry water containers across a dry landscape — a daily reality for millions of households who spend hours and thousands of shillings securing water from unsafe or distant sources. The informal water economy imposes severe costs on the poor.

Critics say PPPs will raise prices for poor households, but analysts argue Tanzanians are already paying heavily through unreliable informal systems. The data reveals a troubling paradox: informal water costs often exceed what a well-regulated utility would charge.

Current Water Costs Faced by Tanzanian Households
Household TypeDaily Water Cost (TZS)Monthly Estimated (TZS)Supply QualityRisk Level
Urban Households (informal)~5,000~150,000InconsistentModerate–High
Rural Households (informal)~2,000~60,000Often unsafeHigh
Connected Urban (utility)~800–1,200~24,000–36,000RegularLow
Utility Tariff vs. Actual Cost46% below costTariffs currently ~46% below actual operational costs, driving chronic underinvestment
Household Water Cost Analysis
Informal Water Costs Far Exceed Regulated Utility Prices
Daily water expenditure in TZS. Poor households without piped connections pay the most for the worst quality water.
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Tariff Reality: Tanzania's current water tariffs remain nearly 46% below actual operational costs. This chronic underpricing fuels underinvestment, accelerates infrastructure ageing, and paradoxically makes the case for private capital — not against it.

Experts argue the debate should move beyond "market versus public service" and focus instead on building systems that combine investment with social protection, including subsidies, lifeline tariffs, and mandatory rural service obligations.

The Cost of Inaction: Leakage & Infrastructure Loss

The pressure for reform continues to grow as Tanzania loses about 43 per cent of treated water through leaks and illegal connections. Over the past seven years, water inefficiencies have cost nearly 2 trillion Tanzanian Shillings, while poor water access drains an estimated 2.4 billion US dollars annually — roughly 3.2 per cent of GDP.

System Performance Indicators — Tanzania Water Sector
Water Lost to Leaks & Illegal Connections (Non-Revenue Water) 43%
Financing from External/Donor Sources (2015–2020) 89%
Tariff vs. Actual Operational Cost Gap 46% below cost
Government Domestic Funding of Water Sector 11%
Economic Impact of Water Inefficiency
7-Year Accumulated Cost of Water Losses in Tanzania
Estimated annual losses from non-revenue water (leaks, illegal connections) compounding over time. TZS Billion.

🔍 Key Economic Insight

Poor water access costs Tanzania an estimated $2.4 billion USD annually — approximately 3.2% of GDP. This is not a future risk from PPP reform. It is the present, measurable cost of the status quo. Any credible policy analysis must weigh this against the theoretical risks of private participation.

Water, Agriculture & Food Security

Agriculture accounts for nearly 85 per cent of national water use, making water infrastructure central to food security, irrigation, industrialisation, and economic growth. Although Tanzania has 29.4 million hectares suitable for irrigation, only 727,280 hectares had been developed by 2022 — far below the government's target of 1.6 million hectares by 2028.

Agriculture & Irrigation Potential vs. Reality
Tanzania's Massive Irrigation Development Gap
Irrigable land (million hectares) — potential vs. developed vs. 2028 government target.
Tanzania Water-Agriculture Nexus: Key Indicators
IndicatorValueBenchmark / TargetGapAssessment
Agriculture share of national water use~85%Sub-Saharan avg: 80%Dominant sector
Total irrigable land29.4M haVast potential
Developed irrigated land (2022)727,280 ha1.6M ha by 2028872,720 ha behindBelow target
% of potential irrigated~2.5%~5.4% by 20282.9 pp gapCritical gap
Annual GDP loss (poor water access)$2.4B USDTarget: <1% GDP3.2% of GDPSevere

Governance & Institutional Capacity

Another criticism raised by Kwekweta is that Tanzania lacks the institutional capacity to effectively regulate sophisticated PPP arrangements. Analysts acknowledge the concern is legitimate, but argue that weak institutional capacity is not a reason to abandon partnerships altogether.

Weak institutions are a reason to deepen reform, not retreat from cooperation.

— Regulator, Tanzania Water Sector Policy Consultations

Tanzania has already accumulated significant regulatory experience in highly technical, capital-intensive sectors — including mining, telecommunications, energy, banking, and natural gas. Institutions such as EWURA and the Bank of Tanzania have expanded their oversight capacity through reforms, digital monitoring systems, and specialised technical training.

Tanzania's Regulatory Capacity Across Sectors — Comparative Assessment
SectorRegulatorPPP/Private PresenceRegulatory MaturityLessons for Water
TelecommunicationsTCRAHighAdvancedStrong model
EnergyEWURASignificantAdvancedDirectly transferable
MiningTMAA / MEMDominantModerate–HighWith reform
Banking / FinanceBank of TanzaniaHighAdvancedOversight model
Natural GasEWURA / PURAGrowingDevelopingRelevant
WaterEWURA / RUWASALimited (emerging)BuildingReform needed

Global Lessons & Tanzania's Path Forward

For years, critics have accused Tanzania of unthinkingly importing neoliberal water reforms associated with the 1990s. They argue that private-sector efficiency inevitably leads to tariff increases, cost-cutting, and exclusion of poor households. Kwekweta also cites cases such as the "Water Wars" in Bolivia and unrest in Argentina as evidence that PPP models are structurally doomed to fail.

Policy experts argue that Tanzania's current PPP reforms are designed specifically to avoid the failures seen in countries like Bolivia and Argentina, where weak regulation, flawed contracts, and political instability — not private participation alone — triggered crises. They point out that regulated PPP systems across Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America have expanded access, reduced water loss, and improved service reliability.

Global PPP Water Outcomes — Selected Countries
Regulated PPPs Improved Water Access Across Developing Nations
Approximate urban water access rates before and after PPP reforms in selected countries. Source: World Bank / WHO/UNICEF JMP estimates.
Case Studies: PPP Water Outcomes by Country
CountryPPP ModelOutcomeKey FactorLesson for Tanzania
🇵🇭 Philippines (Manila)Concession (1997)Access 67% → 96%Strong regulatory frameworkPositive model
🇨🇴 Colombia (Cartagena)Mixed public-privateAccess 72% → 99%Community-focused contractsPositive model
🇧🇴 Bolivia (Cochabamba)Weak-regulation concessionTariffs +200%, revolt (2000)Flawed contracts, weak oversightCautionary tale
🇦🇷 Argentina (Buenos Aires)Concession (1993–2005)Mixed: access ↑, then instabilityPolitical crisis, FX instabilityRegulation matters
🇸🇳 Senegal (SDE)Affermage (lease contract)Access 60% → 95%Strong state oversight retainedClosest African model
🇰🇪 Kenya (Nairobi)Utility reform + PSPService reliability improvedGradual institutional reformEast Africa peer
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The Senegal Model: Senegal's SDE affermage (lease) model is widely cited as Africa's most successful water PPP. Under this framework, the state retained full asset ownership while a private operator managed service delivery under strict performance contracts. Urban water access rose from 60% to 95% over two decades. Tanzania's PPP Centre has studied this model closely.

Conclusion: PPP Is Not a Free Lunch — But It Is Indispensable

Economists argue that private capital already plays a major role across Tanzania's economy through banks, telecommunications, mining, energy, and industrial investment. The real question, as one analyst noted, is whether Tanzania can build strong institutions capable of ensuring that capital serves national development rather than narrow private interests.

At a recent policy forum, David Kafulila bluntly captured the debate: "PPP is not a free lunch." Policymakers say the challenge now is to build a transparent and accountable system capable of turning investment into long-term public value instead of prolonged national stagnation.

Policy Decision Framework
Critical Drivers for Tanzania's Water Sector Reform
Urgency scores (0–10) across key reform dimensions. Higher = more urgent need for action.

📊 TICGL Economic Assessment

The economics are clear: Tanzania cannot finance its water infrastructure gap through domestic government resources alone — not when only 11% of sector funding is currently domestic. Rejecting PPPs without an alternative capital source means accepting the continued loss of $2.4 billion annually, the stagnation of 29 million hectares of irrigable land, and the perpetuation of a system where the poorest Tanzanians pay the most for the worst water. The path forward lies not in the rejection of private capital, but in the rigorous design of institutions, contracts, and regulatory systems that align investment with Tanzania's national development goals under FYDP IV.