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Tanzania State-Owned Enterprises 
February 19, 2026  
Transforming Tanzania State-Owned Enterprises: Corporate Governance for Financial Sustainability | TICGL Research TICGL Research Discussion Paper  ·  ID: TICGL-JE-2025-092 Transforming State-Owned Enterprises by Adopting Corporate Governance Models for Enhanced Financial Sustainability A Case Study of Tanzania's Public Service Agencies — Updated to February 2026 Dr. Bravious Felix Kahyoza (PhD, FMVA, CP3P) & Amran Bhuzohera TICGL […]
Transforming Tanzania State-Owned Enterprises: Corporate Governance for Financial Sustainability | TICGL Research
TZS 1.028T
SOE Dividends 2024/25
▲ 68% vs prior year
40–60%
Annual Loss Reduction
▲ Since 2020 reforms
253
Total SOEs in Tanzania
35 commercial entities
6.1%
Tanzania GDP Growth 2025
5.9% projected 2026
🔄
Research Updated — February 2026: This report has been updated to incorporate 2025/26 developments including the Finance Act 2025, CAG March 2025 Performance Audit findings, IMF 2025 projections, Dira 2050 targets, and preliminary 2025/26 fiscal data. Government dividend target for 2025/26 is TZS 1.7 trillion (internal goal: TZS 2 trillion), representing a 65% increase over 2024/25.

Research Overview

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) remain at the core of Tanzania's economy, primarily delivering electricity, water, telecommunications and transport services. Yet most of these entities continue posting ongoing financial losses, are deeply dependent on government subsidies, and are operationally inefficient — making them a major driver of the government's fiscal deficit.

This research explores the feasibility of corporatisation — the application of private-sector corporate governance practices within public enterprises — as a pathway to financial sustainability. Using a mixed-methods design, the study examines secondary financial data from 2015 to 2026 for three selected SOEs: TANESCO, TTCL, and DAWASA/DAWASCO. Primary data was gathered through semi-structured interviews with 28 key informants and questionnaires administered to 50 managers.

Findings show that the main governance factors driving underperformance include political interference, lack of board independence, misaligned incentives, and soft budget constraints. Partial reforms implemented since 2020 — performance contracts and limited board restructuring — have reduced annual losses by 40–60% and contributed to a record sector-wide dividend of TZS 1.028 trillion in 2024/25, yet no utility SOE has achieved sustained profitability.

Grounded in Agency Theory, Public Choice Theory, and international benchmarks (Singapore's Temasek Holdings, China's gradual corporatisation, New Zealand's SOE Act), the research concludes that full corporatisation — rather than hybrid arrangements or privatisation — is the most politically and practically viable path to transforming Tanzania's SOEs into financially sustainable, efficient entities that contribute positively to national development goals. Eight prioritised policy recommendations are proposed.

State-Owned Enterprises Corporatisation Corporate Governance Financial Sustainability Public Sector Reform Tanzania New Public Management Dira 2050 ✦ New TISEZA ✦ New Finance Act 2025 ✦ New SOE Mergers ✦ New

Tanzania's Macroeconomic Landscape

6.1%
Real GDP Growth 2025
5.9%
Projected GDP Growth 2026
TZS 56.49T
National Budget 2025/26
3.0%
Budget Deficit / GDP (2025/26 target)
3–5%
Inflation Range 2025/26
4+ months
Foreign Reserve Cover (imports)

Tanzania's economy continues on a robust growth trajectory. The IMF projects real GDP growth of 6.1% in 2025 and 5.9% in 2026, supported by strong performances in tourism, agriculture, and natural resources. The 2025/26 national budget of TZS 56.49 trillion underscores ambitious public expenditure — with the proposed 2026/27 budget of TZS 61.9 trillion representing a 9.6% expansion, within which SOE efficiency improvements are expected to reduce subsidy burdens significantly.

Tanzania's 253 SOEs (35 commercial entities) contributed a record TZS 1.028 trillion in dividends and contributions to the government in FY2024/25 — a 68% increase from prior years — primarily driven by profit-generating entities in banking and ports. However, utility SOEs in energy, water and telecommunications continue to be net fiscal drains.

Tanzania Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
Historical trend and IMF projections — 2019 to 2026

Background of the Study

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are enterprises controlled by the State — sometimes branded as public enterprises or parastatals. In most third-world countries, they are principally charged with delivery of electricity, water, transportation, telecommunications, and healthcare. Globally, the OECD estimates that SOEs represent more than 20% of total investments and 5% of total employment in most jurisdictions.

The rise of New Public Management (NPM) in the 1980s and 1990s proposed that the public sector adopt private-sector management practices — performance-based incentives, customer orientation, and accountability for results. One key NPM-inspired measure is corporatisation: restructuring public enterprises to operate as independent commercial entities, with the state retaining ownership, while introducing hard budget constraints and profit-oriented management — without full privatisation.

Tanzania's SOEs have been central to national economic development since independence, a direct consequence of the 1967 Arusha Declaration's socialist policies. By the 1980s, structural reforms revealed deep-rooted inefficiencies, with many SOEs depending on government subsidies. In 2022/23, a cohort of Tanzania SOEs posted combined losses of nearly TZS 400 billion due to operational inefficiencies and governance weaknesses.

✦ 2025 Policy Update — TISEZA

Tanzania's 2025 Investment and Special Economic Zones Act established TISEZA as a one-stop investor centre, promoting private-sector management practices in SOEs and streamlining regulatory frameworks. This is a significant structural development aligned with NPM principles and the Dira 2050 long-term economic vision.

International Corporatisation Success Stories

Global examples provide compelling evidence for the efficacy of corporatisation. In China, SOEs underwent corporatisation in the 1990s–2000s, resulting in significantly raised profitability and productivity through governance reforms alone — without transferring ownership to the private sector. In Singapore and New Zealand, public utilities were transformed into efficient, financially sustainable entities through independent boards and performance agreements.

These examples show that the key success factors are: legal separation from government, professional management, independent boards, and performance-based accountability — not necessarily ownership transfer.

ROA Improvement After Corporatisation — International Benchmarks
Return on Assets (%) before and after key governance reforms, selected countries

1.2 Problem Statement

According to IMF (2025), SOEs in Tanzania and other developing countries have generally maintained a negative trend of financial results despite their vital economic role. This trend is characterised by repeated losses, high debt levels, and reliance on government rescues. The CAG (2025) highlights losses at entities such as Air Tanzania Company Limited (TZS 99.8 billion in subsidies) and TTCL (TZS 27.7 billion loss) as significant fiscal risks.

Traditional bureaucratic management in SOEs focuses on political objectives at the expense of efficiency, producing agency problems where managers face little incentive to improve profitability. Although partial reforms have been undertaken since 2020, service-providing SOEs remain in a deep crisis of inefficiency due to insufficient implementation of sound corporate governance practices. The budget deficit is targeted to narrow to 3.0% of GDP in 2025/26 from 3.4% in 2024/25 — but this requires material improvements in SOE financial performance.

🔍 Fiscal Risk Snapshot — Selected Loss-Making SOEs (2024/25)

Air Tanzania: TZS 99.8bn in government subsidies  |  TTCL: TZS 27.7bn net loss  |  TANESCO: Government subsidies of ~TZS 400bn despite reforms  |  DAWASCO: Chronic losses averaging TZS 100–140bn per year

TANESCO Net Profit / Loss Trend (TZS Billions)
Showing the impact of partial governance reforms from 2020 onward

1.3 Research Objectives

General Objective: To examine how the adoption of corporate governance models can transform state-owned enterprises in Tanzania towards greater financial sustainability.

1
Analyse the current governance challenges facing Tanzania SOEs and their impact on financial performance.
2
Evaluate successful international models of corporatisation and corporate governance in public enterprises.
3
Assess the applicability of private-sector corporate governance practices (board independence, performance contracting) to Tanzania SOEs.
4
Propose policy recommendations for implementing corporate governance reforms in Tanzania SOEs to enhance profitability and efficiency.

1.4 Research Hypotheses

✅ Hypothesis H1 (Supported)
Stronger corporate governance practices — including independent boards and performance incentives — are positively associated with improved financial sustainability in SOEs. (r = 0.71, p<0.01)
H0 (Null Hypothesis — Rejected)
There is no significant relationship between corporate governance reforms and financial performance in public enterprises.

1.5 Selected Case Studies

Three strategically important Tanzania SOEs were selected because they represent critical infrastructure services, have rich reform histories, and allow examination of different governance arrangements — fully public, partially privatised, and failed PPP — while remaining under ultimate government control.

TANESCO
Tanzania Electric Supply Company Limited
SectorEnergy
Net Loss (2023/24)(TZS 180bn)*
Subsidy (Govt)~TZS 400bn
Reform StatusBest Performer
Loss Reduction60% since 2020
TTCL
Tanzania Telecommunications Corporation Ltd
SectorTelecommunications
Net Loss (2023/24)(TZS 27.7bn)
Revenue Growth5% (stagnant)
Reform StatusMixed Outcomes
Key IssueBackbone cost surge
DAWASCO
Dar es Salaam Water and Sewerage Corp.
SectorWater / Sanitation
Net Loss (2023/24)(TZS 100bn)*
Collection Efficiency78% (↑ from 65%)
Reform StatusLeast Reformed
World Bank Project89% disbursed (Sep 2025)
Net Loss Comparison — TANESCO, TTCL & DAWASCO (2019/20–2023/24, TZS Billions)
All three SOEs show losses; TANESCO shows the strongest improvement trajectory following 2020 reforms
Total SOE Sector Dividend Contributions to Government (TZS Billions)
Sector-wide record driven by commercial SOEs (banks, ports) — utility SOEs still net drains

Financial Performance Summary — Selected SOEs (2019/20–2023/24)

SOEIndicator2019/202020/212021/222022/232023/24Trend
TANESCONet Profit/Loss (TZS bn)(450)(380)(320)(250)(180)*Improving ▲
Govt Subsidy (TZS bn)600550500450400Reducing ▲
Return on Assets (%)-4.2-3.8-3.1-2.5-1.8Improving ▲
TTCLNet Profit/Loss (TZS bn)(19)(15)(4.3)(0.9)(27.8)Deteriorating ▼
Revenue Growth (%)8%12%15%10%5%Stagnant ▼
DAWASCONet Profit/Loss (TZS bn)(120)(140)(130)(110)(100)*Gradual ▶
Collection Efficiency (%)65%68%72%75%78%Improving ▲

* Estimated based on partial data and trends; full 2024/25 reports pending. Sources: CAG Reports, Treasury Registrar, SOE Disclosures.

1.6 Significance & Scope

This research contributes evidence-based insights to the debate on public sector reform in the developing world, providing actionable recommendations for Tanzania's policymakers. If implemented successfully, corporatisation reforms could increase SOE revenue generation — moving from the current TZS 1 trillion dividend baseline toward the government's target of TZS 1.7–2 trillion annually by 2025/26, and a projected TZS 2 trillion+ by 2035.

The study is aligned with Tanzania's National Five-Year Development Plan (FYDP III, 2021/22–2025/26) and the longer-term Dira 2050 vision — which targets a US$1 trillion economy by 2050 and explicitly calls for SOEs to adopt transparent, merit-based governance frameworks as a prerequisite for economic transformation.

The research focuses on secondary data from 2015 to 2026 covering energy, transport, and telecommunications SOEs. Key limitations include reliance on publicly available financial reports, potential data gaps in less transparent entities, and the inherent challenges of primary data collection in politically sensitive reform areas.

📌 Finance Act 2025 — Key SOE Implications

The Finance Act 2025 widens the tax base and introduces CNG equipment exemptions for clean energy SOEs. Some measures take effect from January 2026. Underperforming SOEs face potential merger or dissolution if they miss 2025/26 dividend targets. Digital compliance (e-fiscal devices) targets 95% tax compliance by 2026, yielding TZS 32.26 trillion in 2024/25 government revenue.

Literature Review & Methodology — Tanzania SOE Corporate Governance Research | TICGL
TICGL-JE-2025-092  ›  Batch 2 of 3  ›  Literature Review & Methodology

Theoretical Foundations & Research Methodology

Agency Theory, Public Choice Theory, global corporatisation benchmarks, and the mixed-methods design powering this landmark Tanzania SOE study.

2.1 Theoretical Framework

The governance and performance challenges of SOEs can be analysed through several established theories. Two primary frameworks — Agency Theory and Public Choice Theory — illuminate the inherent conflicts and inefficiencies in public sector management, while complementary theories such as NPM and Resource Dependence Theory provide supporting lenses for reform design.

Theory 1
Agency Theory
Jensen & Meckling (1976); Eisenhardt (1989)
In SOEs, multiple bureaucratic layers dilute ownership accountability. Managers face weak performance incentives, creating moral hazard. Corporatisation addresses this through independent boards, performance contracts, and incentive alignment — mimicking private-sector mechanisms to reduce agency costs.
📌 Tanzania relevance: Explains why TANESCO's losses fell 60% after 2020 board restructuring and performance contracts were introduced.
Theory 2
Public Choice Theory
Buchanan & Tullock (1962); Niskanen (1971)
Without competitive pressures or clear accountability, SOEs deliver lower performance. Politicians use enterprises for patronage and employment of political clientele. The DAWASA 2003–05 lease failure and TTCL's 2018 re-nationalisation are direct illustrations of rent-seeking overriding economic rationality.
📌 Tanzania relevance: 22 of 28 interviewees cited political interference as the primary performance barrier — directly confirming this theory.
Theory 3
New Public Management (NPM)
Hood (1991); OECD (2015)
NPM's core principle — "letting managers manage" — means granting autonomy while demanding accountability. When applied in Tanzania (performance contracts, delegated procurement, partial board independence), efficiency improved: TANESCO collection rates rose 15% and DAWASA billing efficiency gained 15–20 percentage points.
📌 Tanzania relevance: Partial NPM implementation since 2020 has produced measurable improvements without full privatisation.
Theory 4
Resource Dependence Theory
Pfeffer & Salancik (1978)
SOE boards are conceived as architectures to manage dependence on government for financial and political support. Independent boards with diverse expertise reduce this dependence by bringing in external resources, legitimacy, and networks — enabling SOEs to access alternative financing and market relationships.
📌 Tanzania relevance: Supports the recommendation for ≥60% independent board directors to reduce ministerial capture and expand SOE financing options.
✦ 2025/26 Theoretical Update

Agency Theory gains fresh validation through Finance Act 2025's governance mandates, which explicitly reduce political pre-approval requirements for SOE operational decisions. Public Choice Theory is reinforced by Dira 2050's accountability framework, which creates external pressure on politicians to reform SOE oversight by tying national development targets to SOE performance metrics.


2.2 Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework integrates corporate governance principles into SOE management to achieve financial sustainability. Per Cadbury (1992), corporate governance is "the system of rules, practices, and processes through which an organisation is guided and controlled." The framework positions private-sector governance standards as the independent variable that drives improved SOE financial performance (the dependent variable), mediated by contextual factors such as political will and the regulatory environment.

Key Conceptual Definitions

ConceptDefinitionMeasurement ProxySource
CorporatisationRestructuring public entities into commercial corporations under company law, retaining state ownership but imposing hard budget constraints and commercial objectivesLegal status; board composition; commercial mandate presenceShirley (1999)
Board IndependenceProportion of non-executive independent directors on SOE boards, recruited through merit-based processes free from political appointment% independent directors; recruitment process transparencyOECD (2015)
Performance ContractingBinding agreements linking executive compensation to measurable KPIs including profitability, customer satisfaction, and efficiency targetsVariable pay %; KPI fulfilment rate; performance contract coverageWorld Bank (2024)
Financial SustainabilityAbility to achieve positive returns, pay dividends to government, and reduce subsidy dependence on a sustained basisROA, ROE, operating margins, subsidy levels, dividend paymentsWorld Bank (2024)
Soft Budget ConstraintsImplicit expectation that the state will bail out loss-making SOEs, eliminating market discipline and efficiency incentivesFrequency of bailouts; subsidy trends; debt-to-equity conversionsBoardman & Vining (1989)

2.3 Global Experiences of Corporatisation

Worldwide studies consistently show that corporatised SOEs outperform traditionally managed ones — even without full privatisation — when rigorous corporate governance disciplines are applied. The evidence is clear: legal separation from government, professional boards, hard budget constraints, and performance accountability are the key success factors.

Pre vs Post-Reform SOE Performance — International Corporatisation Models
Return on Assets (%) and profitability trajectory following key governance reforms
Country / EntityKey ReformsPre-ReformPost-Reform ROATimelineRelevance to Tanzania
🇳🇿 New Zealand
1980s SOEs Act
Commercial mandates; independent boards; hard budgets; legal separationLoss-making utilities>8% within 5 years1986–1991High ★★★★
🇸🇬 Singapore
Temasek Holdings
Professional boards; market incentives; zero ministerial interference; no state guarantees on debtSubsidised entitiesAvg ROE >10%; TSR ~9% compounded since 19741974–presentVery High ★★★★★
🇨🇳 China
1990s–2000s SOEs
Company Law application; performance contracts; SASAC oversight; mandatory independent directorsAverage ROA <2%ROA 4–6%; productivity +30%1993–2005High ★★★★
🇲🇾 Malaysia
Telekom / Tenaga Nasional
Partial stock exchange listing; independent directors; private-sector governance codesLosses in telecom/energyProfitable; market cap >RM 100bn1990–2000Moderate ★★★
🇰🇪 Kenya
Safaricom / Kenya Power
Strategic investors; governance codes; partial IPO (Safaricom)Chronic lossesMixed — Safaricom profitable; Kenya Power still challenged2008–2014High ★★★★
PPP lessons for DAWASA
📊 Respondent Survey Finding

92% of respondents viewed the Singapore and China models as most transferable to Tanzania, emphasising board independence and performance incentives over privatisation. 15 of 28 interviewees specifically called for "similar legal separation" to New Zealand's SOE Act approach.

Temasek Holdings Portfolio Value Growth (SGD Billions) — 1974 to 2024
From 36 subsidised companies to a SGD 389 billion global investment portfolio — the benchmark for SOE corporatisation

2.4 Tanzania Context and Previous Reforms

Tanzania's SOE sector is a product of socialist policies introduced through the 1967 Arusha Declaration. By the 1980s, the country had over 400 parastatals that dominated the economy while incurring debts due to inefficiencies. The Presidential Parastatal Sector Reform Commission (PSRC, established 1992) privatised or liquidated more than 300 non-strategic SOEs by the early 2000s. Strategic utilities, transport, and energy SOEs were retained under state ownership — often with only partial reforms.

The most recent reform wave under FYDP III and Treasury Registrar oversight has centred on performance contracts and board restructuring. These have yielded notable improvements — most visibly the record TZS 1.028 trillion in dividends in 2024/25. Yet persistent challenges remain: political board appointments, operational losses in transport and aviation, and fiscal risks from ongoing bailouts.

Tanzania SOE Reform Timeline — Key Milestones
Number of active SOEs and key policy/reform inflection points from 1967 to 2026
✦ 2025/26 Reform Additions

The Finance Act 2025 mandates tighter SOE governance and widens the tax base. The CAG March 2025 Performance Audit covers SOE flood and ferry management, recommending cost-effective ICT systems. TISEZA (2025 Investment and Special Economic Zones Act) promotes private-sector management practices as a one-stop investor centre. Underperforming SOEs now face credible threats of merger or dissolution if 2025/26 dividend targets are missed — a historic shift toward harder budget constraints.


2.5 Knowledge Gap

The Research Gap This Study Bridges

While a large body of global research exists on privatisation and SOE performance, there is very little empirical research on corporatisation as a distinct reform pathway in Africa — especially Tanzania. Most studies confuse corporatisation with privatisation, or focus on Asia/Oceania cases (New Zealand, Singapore). Tanzania-focused reform analyses have heavily relied on divestment outcomes, insufficiently scrutinising the governance structures of retained SOEs. This research bridges that gap by investigating corporate governance standards as a tool for financial viability in Tanzanian service-delivery enterprises.


3.1 Research Design

This research adopts a mixed-methods sequential explanatory design (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018). The quantitative phase leads — providing secondary financial data analysis — which then informs the qualitative phase. This design is appropriate because while financial performance can be objectively measured through ratios and trends, governance-related issues and political dynamics require deep contextual interpretation and stakeholder perspectives.

The study is primarily exploratory and descriptive, with explanatory elements, carried out within a pragmatic paradigm that prioritises practical solutions over strict philosophical adherence.

1
Phase 1 — Quantitative
Secondary Financial Data Analysis
Analysis of audited financial statements and performance reports from CAG Reports (2015–2025), Treasury Registrar annual summaries, SOE websites, and the Consolidated Holding Corporation (CHC) database. Key variables: ROA, ROE, operating profit margins, subsidy dependence, board composition, and performance contract fulfilment rates.
2
Phase 2 — Qualitative
Semi-Structured Interviews
28 key informants interviewed via face-to-face or Zoom sessions (45–60 minutes each). Audio-recorded with consent, verbatim transcription. Aimed to understand governance issues, reform experiences, and perceptions of corporate governance applicability.
3
Phase 3 — Supplementary Quantitative
Structured Questionnaires
Likert-scale questionnaires (adapted from OECD SOE governance indicators) electronically distributed to 50 middle managers in selected SOEs. Quantifies perceptions of board independence, managerial autonomy, and performance orientation.
4
Phase 4 — Integration
Mixed-Methods Synthesis
Sequential integration at the interpretation stage: qualitative insights explain quantitative patterns. Example: why TANESCO's improved board independence post-2020 has not yet translated into sustained profitability — the qualitative phase reveals persisting ministerial approval bottlenecks as the explanatory mechanism.

3.2 Population, Sampling & Data Sources

The target population includes all ~250 commercial public authorities and SOEs in mainland Tanzania under the oversight of the Treasury Registrar. The accessible population is limited to service-delivery SOEs in five strategic sectors: energy, water, telecommunications, transport, and ports — those partially reformed but still largely state-owned.

Quantitative Sample (n≈25 SOEs)
Method Purposive sampling of annual reports & audited financial statements 2015–2025
~25 Service-delivery SOEs across 5 strategic sectors
Focus Deep case analysis: TANESCO, TTCL, DAWASA/DAWASCO
Qualitative Sample (n=28 Key Informants)
10–12 Senior executives & board members of selected SOEs
8–10 Officials from Treasury Registrar, Ministry of Finance, President's Office
5–8 Academics, think tanks (ESRF), World Bank & IMF experts
50 Middle managers (questionnaire)

Primary & Secondary Data Sources

📋
CAG Reports 2015–2025
Controller & Auditor General — National Audit Office of Tanzania
🏦
Treasury Registrar
Annual SOE performance summaries and dividend data
🌍
IMF (2023, 2025)
Tanzania fiscal risk assessments, GDP projections, RSF reforms
🌐
World Bank (2024, 2025)
Tanzania economic updates; DAWASA/DAWASCO project data
🏢
CHC Database
Consolidated Holding Corporation — public enterprise annual reports
🎙️
Primary Interviews
28 semi-structured interviews with SOE executives, officials & experts
Qualitative Sample Composition — Key Informant Breakdown (n=28)
Distribution of interview respondents by stakeholder category

3.5 Data Analysis Techniques

📊 Quantitative Analysis — SPSS / Stata
  • Trend analysis of key financial ratios (2015–2025): ROA, ROE, operating margins, subsidy levels
  • Pearson correlation between governance indicators and financial performance (r = 0.68–0.72)
  • Simple regression analysis: governance score vs loss reduction (R² = 0.52)
  • Pre- and post-reform comparisons (2018–2020 vs 2020–2025)
  • Descriptive statistics on Likert-scale questionnaire responses (n=50 managers)
🔍 Qualitative Analysis — NVivo Software
  • Thematic analysis following Braun & Clarke (2006) six-phase approach
  • Phase 1: Familiarisation with data and verbatim transcripts
  • Phase 2: Initial coding of interview content
  • Phase 3: Theme generation (deductive + inductive)
  • Phase 4–6: Theme review, definition, and reporting
  • Themes: agency problems, political interference, reform implementation (deductive) + emergent themes from data
Regression Analysis — Governance Score vs Loss Reduction (R² = 0.52)
A 1-unit increase in governance score (OECD indicators) is associated with TZS 4.63bn reduction in operational losses (β = −4.63, p < 0.001)
VariableCoefficient (β)Standard Errort-Valuep-ValueInterpretation
Constant12.473.213.880.001Baseline losses when governance score = 0
Governance Score (OECD)−4.631.15−4.020.0001-unit increase in governance score → TZS 4.63bn loss reduction
R: 0.72 R²: 0.52 Adjusted R²: 0.50 F-Statistic: 16.16 p-Value (Model): 0.000 N (Observations): 50

3.6 Ethical Considerations

The study adheres to ethical standards outlined by the Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH) and the Economic and Social Research Council (2015) international guidelines. Given the political sensitivity of SOE performance data, special care was taken to ensure findings are presented objectively without attributing blame to individuals.

Ethical Clearance
Obtained
📝
Informed Consent
(Written/Verbal)
🔒
Anonymity &
Confidentiality
🚪
Voluntary
Participation
💾
Secure Data
Storage
⚖️
Objective
Presentation
🔐 Anonymisation Protocol

All individual respondents are anonymised using codes (e.g., Executive_TAN01, Official_MOF03). Audio recordings are destroyed after transcription. No individual is identifiable in the published findings. Sensitive organisational details are anonymised or aggregated where disclosure could create institutional risk.

Findings, Recommendations & Temasek Case Study — Tanzania SOE Governance Research | TICGL
TICGL-JE-2025-092  ›  Batch 3 of 3  ›  Findings, Discussion, Recommendations & Case Study

Findings, Recommendations & the Temasek Benchmark

What the data shows, what theory explains, what policymakers should do — and the world's most instructive model for Tanzania's path forward.

🔬 Key Verdict: Hypothesis H1 Supported — Stronger corporate governance is positively & significantly associated with improved financial performance  (r = 0.71, p < 0.01)

4.1 Overall Financial Performance of Selected SOEs

Analysis of secondary financial data (2015–2026) drawn from CAG reports, Treasury Registrar summaries, and SOE disclosures — supplemented by qualitative insights from 28 interviews and 50 questionnaires — reveals a consistent pattern: partial governance reforms produce measurable improvement, but are insufficient for sustained profitability. The total SOE sector delivered a record TZS 1.028 trillion in dividends in 2024/25, driven primarily by profitable commercial entities such as banks and ports. Service-delivery SOEs in energy, water, and telecommunications continue to be net fiscal drains.

60%
Reduction in TANESCO annual losses since 2020 governance reforms
78%
DAWASCO revenue collection efficiency (up from 65% in 2019/20)
0
Utility SOEs achieving sustained profitability despite reforms
r=0.71
Pearson correlation between governance reforms and loss reduction (p < 0.01)
52%
Variance in loss reduction explained by governance score improvements (R²=0.52)
22/28
Key informants citing political interference as the primary performance barrier
SOE Performance Scorecard — Key Metrics Comparison (2019/20 vs 2023/24)
Radar chart showing improvement across governance and financial performance dimensions for each case study SOE

4.2 Traditional vs Corporate Governance Practices

Findings highlight stark contrasts between traditional public-sector practices dominant before 2020 and the emerging corporate governance elements introduced through partial reforms. The shift is measurable — and partial adoption already accounts for significant improvements — yet key elements remain incomplete.

AspectTraditional (Pre-2020)Post-Reform (2020–2025)Performance ImpactStatus
Board CompositionPolitical appointees (80–100%); minimal independence30–50% independent directors (TANESCO/TTCL post-2020)Faster decisions — 18/25 interviewees confirmed reduced interferencePartial ▶
Managerial AutonomyHigh ministerial oversight; procurement delaysPerformance contracts; delegated authority in TTCLTANESCO collection rates up 15% since 2021Partial ▶
Performance IncentivesCivil service salaries; zero profit-linked bonusesKPI-linked pay in reformed entitiesQuestionnaire motivation scores averaged 4.1/5Partial ▶
Transparency & ReportingDelayed/incomplete CAG disclosures; no IFRSAnnual audited reports; partial IFRS adoptionSector dividends up 68% in 2024/25; improved investor confidenceImproving ▲
Budget ConstraintsSoft — routine bailouts common and expectedHarder post-debt conversions (2022 TANESCO TZS 5trn conversion)TANESCO subsidies down 33% since 2022Improving ▲
Customer OrientationService as political obligation; no SLAsDigital billing; metering reforms (DAWASCO)DAWASCO collection efficiency: 65% → 78%Early Stage ▶
Governance Practice Adoption (Mean Score, 1–5)
Current adoption vs perceived applicability (n=50 managers)
Key Governance Challenges — Prevalence
Mentions by key informants (n=28 interviews)

4.3 Financial Performance Before and After Partial Reforms

Partial reforms — performance contracts (2018–2020), board restructuring (2020–2023), and the landmark 2022 TZS 5 trillion debt-to-equity conversion — show meaningful but incomplete results. Before reforms, chronic losses averaged TZS 400–600 billion annually across the three case studies, driven by overstaffing, tariff controls, and governance failures. After reforms, losses fell dramatically in TANESCO while DAWASCO showed gradual improvement. TTCL, however, deteriorated following the national backbone network takeover, illustrating how governance gains can be offset by structural decisions made outside commercial logic.

Before vs After Reform — Loss Trajectory Across All Three SOEs (TZS Billions)
Dashed line marks the 2020 reform inflection point — performance contracts & board restructuring introduced
TANESCO Return on Assets (%) — 2019/20 to 2023/24
Negative but consistently improving ROA trend following 2020 governance reforms

4.4 Case-Specific Analysis

60%
Loss Reduction Since 2020
-1.8%
ROA 2023/24 (up from -4.2%)
20%
Efficiency Gains (Independent Board)
TZS 5T
Debt-to-Equity Conversion (2022)

TANESCO is the best performer among the three case studies. The 2022 debt-to-equity conversion (TZS 5 trillion) dramatically improved solvency, and IPP (Independent Power Producer) contract renegotiations reduced generation costs. The adoption of independent board members (now 40–50% of total) is credited with 20% efficiency gains. TANESCO serves as proof-of-concept: governance reforms, even partial ones, produce measurable financial improvement. However, ministerial pre-approval requirements on major investments continue to cause costly delays — estimated to have added ~TZS 150 billion in costs (CAG, 2024). Full corporatisation, with legal separation, would eliminate this bottleneck entirely.

🔆 2025/26 Update — TANESCO

150 MWp solar PV project in Shinyanga (2025) is expected to reduce thermal generation costs further. IMF projects continued profit growth trajectory supported by 6.3% GDP growth. Ongoing arrears reduction programme is reducing government contingent liability.

(27.8bn)
Net Loss 2023/24 (TZS)
5%
Revenue Growth (Stagnant)
2021
Last Year of Near-Profitability
↑Cost
Backbone Takeover Impact

TTCL's story is one of mixed outcomes and structural reversals. Corporatised in the 1990s, partially privatised (49% sold), then re-nationalised in 2018 — each shift reflecting political logic rather than commercial strategy. TTCL came closest to profitability in 2021/22 (loss of only TZS 4.3bn) before the government's decision to take over the national backbone network added significant operational costs, pushing losses back to TZS 27.7bn in 2023/24. This illustrates how external, politically-driven structural decisions can undo genuine governance improvements. The 2018 re-nationalisation is a textbook case of Public Choice Theory rent-seeking.

📡 2025/26 Update — TTCL

Focus under FYDP III is digital transformation. CAG 2025 highlights persistent losses. Risk of merger or restructuring if 2025/26 targets are missed under Finance Act 2025 provisions. Digital compliance tools could provide cost reduction pathway.

78%
Collection Efficiency (up from 65%)
(100bn)
Net Loss 2023/24 (TZS, estimated)
89%
World Bank Project Disbursement (Sep 2025)
Least
Reformed of the Three Cases

DAWASCO/DAWASA is the least reformed of the three cases, its trajectory shaped by the failed 2003–2005 private lease and ongoing public-sector inertia. The failed PPP serves as a cautionary tale — private involvement without adequate institutional framework and governance safeguards does not succeed. Yet gradual improvements are evident: revenue collection efficiency climbed from 65% to 78% through metering reforms, and the World Bank-funded water sector project (89% disbursed by September 2025) is delivering incremental infrastructure improvements. Persistent water shortages in December 2025 underscore the urgency of deeper reform.

💧 2025/26 Update — DAWASCO

WSDP III (2022–2026) targets 94% water quality compliance. Budget 2025/26 allocates TZS 1.23 billion for sanitation improvements. December 2025 water shortages in Dar es Salaam have intensified political pressure for accelerated reform, potentially creating a reform window.


5. Interpreting the Findings Through Theory

Agency Theory confirmed: The continuous political interference, weak board independence, and lack of performance-linked incentives in Tanzania SOEs are precisely the agency problems predicted by Jensen and Meckling (1976). The separation of ownership (citizens/state) from control (politicians and managers) creates severe information asymmetry and goal misalignment. The 60% loss reduction in TANESCO following 2020 board restructuring aligns with Aivazian et al.'s (2005) China findings, where corporatisation without privatisation reduced agency losses by 30–50% through better internal governance.

Public Choice Theory validated: 22 of 28 interviewees confirmed political interference as the dominant barrier — the clearest possible validation of Buchanan and Tullock's (1962) framework. The aborted 2003–2005 DAWASA lease and the 2018 TTCL re-nationalisation are textbook examples of rent-seeking behaviour overriding economic rationality.

Tanzania vs global benchmarks: Unlike Singapore (no direct ministerial interference) or China (mandatory independent directors, SASAC oversight), Tanzania's boards still average less than 50% independent membership and remain subject to ministerial veto on major decisions. This is why the sector's TZS 1.028 trillion record in 2024/25 came primarily from already-profitable commercial entities, while utility SOEs remain in subsidy absorption mode. Tanzania is positioned at Shirley's (1999) "halfway point" between bureaucratic control and full corporatisation — partial reforms deliver partial results.

Tanzania vs Global Benchmarks — Board Independence & Financial Performance
Board independence (%) plotted against average ROA (%) — Tanzania's reform gap is visible
⚡ The Critical Missing Element

Respondents consistently identified the "no credible threat of exit" as the single most important missing element. In Singapore, failure results in bankruptcy or management replacement. In Tanzania, SOEs anticipate bailouts — and receive them. This "no credible threat" dynamic keeps inefficiency alive despite genuine governance improvements. Finance Act 2025's threat of merger/dissolution for underperforming SOEs represents the first credible attempt to change this dynamic.


6.2 Eight Prioritised Policy & Managerial Recommendations

The following eight recommendations are designed for progressive implementation over 3–7 years under the leadership of the Office of the Treasury Registrar (OTR), Ministry of Finance, and sector ministries. They are sequenced by feasibility and urgency, drawing on findings from all three case studies, international benchmarks, and 2025/26 policy developments.

#RecommendationLead InstitutionTimelineExpected OutcomeCostFeasibility
1
Legal Reclassification under Companies Act 2002
Amend the Public Corporations Act to grant full commercial autonomy and remove ministerial pre-approval on operational decisions
Parliament / MoF2026–2027Hard budget constraints; elimination of routine bailoutsLow
★★★★
3.8/5
2
Mandate ≥60% Independent Non-Executive Directors
Recruit through open, competitive, merit-based processes managed by an independent nomination committee. Zero political appointees.
OTR / President's OfficeImmediate–2027Reduced political interference; faster decision-makingMedium
★★★★
4.2/5
3
Binding Performance Contracts with 20–40% Variable Pay
KPI-linked pay tied to profitability, customer satisfaction, and efficiency metrics for CEOs and senior executives across all major SOEs
OTR with sector ministries2026 onwardStronger managerial incentives; alignment with profitability goalsMedium
★★★★★
4.5/5
4
Establish Professional SOE Holding Company (Temasek Model)
Centralise ownership, board appointments, and commercial discipline under a professionally managed holding entity (modelled on Temasek or Malaysia's Khazanah)
MoF / OTR2027–2029Unified oversight; professional management culture; reduced agency costsHigh
★★★★★
4.7/5
5
Full IFRS Adoption & Quarterly Public Disclosure
Independent audits published online within 90 days. All major SOEs to report under International Financial Reporting Standards immediately
OTR / NBAAImmediateEnhanced transparency; improved investor and lender confidenceLow
★★★★★
4.8/5
6
Phase Out Subsidies — Replace with Viability Gap Funding
Systematic 5-year subsidy phase-out for commercially viable operations; retain performance-based viability gap funding only for genuine public service obligations
MoF / PO-FP2026–2030Fiscal savings >TZS 500bn annually by 2030; harder budget constraintsRevenue Neutral
★★★★
4.2/5
7
Customer-Oriented Digital Reforms
Digital billing, 24/7 call centres, and service guarantees with automatic rebates for outages/delays. Implement e-fiscal compliance tools targeting 95% tax compliance by 2026
TANESCO, DAWASA, TTCL2026–2028Revenue collection >90%; higher customer satisfaction; reduced revenue leakageMedium–High
★★★★
4.4/5
8
Governance Capacity-Building Programme
Board member and senior manager training on corporate governance in partnership with IFC, OECD, or Singapore Cooperation Programme
OTR / IoD TanzaniaOngoingStronger governance culture; professional management standards across SOE sectorMedium
★★★★
4.1/5
📈 Projected Impact of Full Implementation (5–7 Years)
TZS 2T+
Annual dividends to government by 2035 (up from TZS 1.028T in 2024/25)
>TZS 500bn
Annual fiscal savings from subsidy phase-out by 2030
ROA 4–6%
Target return on assets for reformed utility SOEs (China benchmark)
20–30%
Projected profitability improvement from full board independence (China model)
>90%
Revenue collection efficiency target across utility SOEs
Dira 2050
SOEs as engines of Tanzania's US$1 trillion economy vision by 2050
Recommendation Feasibility vs Expected Impact Matrix
Bubble size = estimated fiscal impact; X-axis = feasibility score (1–5); Y-axis = timeline urgency

Singapore's Temasek Holdings: The Gold Standard for SOE Corporatisation

🇸🇬 International Benchmark — Established 1974
Temasek Holdings Pte Ltd
From 36 loss-making subsidised entities to a SGD 389 billion global investment portfolio — without full privatisation. The world's most instructive model for Tanzania's SOE reform path.
SGD 389bn
Portfolio Value (2024)
~9% p.a.
Compounded TSR since 1974
SGD 10–20bn
Annual Dividends to Government
>10% avg
Portfolio ROE

When Singapore separated from Malaysia in 1965, the government established numerous statutory boards and SOEs to drive industrialisation and employment. By 1974, the Ministry of Finance directly owned 36 companies spanning manufacturing, shipping, and airlines. Recognising the problems of direct ministerial oversight — political interference, soft budgets, bureaucratic delays — the government established Temasek Holdings Pte Ltd as a private exempt company under the Companies Act. The rest is one of the world's most remarkable governance success stories.

Temasek's founding charter mandated commercial management, professional boards, and absolutely no government guarantees on debt. The Singapore Constitution was amended to protect Temasek's reserves — past reserves require Presidential approval for drawdowns, insulating the portfolio from short-term political spending. This constitutional protection is the ultimate expression of hard budget constraints.

Key Corporate Governance Reforms & Their Outcomes

Governance ElementTemasek Model ImplementationOutcome / ImpactTanzania Lesson
Ownership Structure100% MoF owned but operates independently as a private company. Zero ministerial interference in operations.Clear separation from day-to-day government controlEstablish SOE Holding Company under Companies Act — remove ministerial pre-approvals
Board IndependenceMajority independent directors; often global business leaders. No serving politicians on any board.Professional oversight; high-quality strategic decisionsMandate ≥60% independent directors through open, merit-based recruitment
Performance IncentivesMarket-competitive executive packages with long-term incentives tied to portfolio returns.Attracts top global talent; aligns management with shareholder valueImplement 20–40% variable pay linked to profitability and efficiency KPIs
Transparency & ReportingAnnual Temasek Review published publicly; full IFRS; voluntary Santiago Principles adherence.Investor confidence; publicly tracked net portfolio valueMandate IFRS adoption and quarterly public disclosure within 90 days
Portfolio ManagementActive divestment of underperformers; reinvestment in high-growth sectors. From 36 companies (1974) to ~11 core + international portfolio.Diversified risk; sustained high returns; no bailout cultureMerge or dissolve chronically underperforming SOEs; concentrate capital in viable entities
Hard Budget ConstraintsNo bailouts. Companies must borrow on own merit. Constitutional protection of reserves.Forces efficiency; failing entities face liquidation or saleFinance Act 2025 merger/dissolution threat is first step — strengthen with constitutional provisions
Temasek: Before vs After Corporatisation
Key performance metrics comparison
Projected Tanzania Dividend Trajectory
If Temasek-model reforms are adopted (TZS Billions)
🎯 The Core Lesson for Tanzania

Temasek demonstrates that full corporatisation — legal autonomy, professional boards, commercial mandates — achieves financial sustainability within under 10 years, even in strategically important sectors. The proposed Tanzania SOE Holding Company (Recommendation 4) could manage TANESCO, TTCL, DAWASA, and other entities under a single Temasek-style framework. Modelling TICGL's projections: this could add TZS 500–1,000 billion in additional annual dividends by 2035, while simultaneously delivering better public services. The contrast with partial reforms is decisive — Temasek's "hands-off but accountable" model directly addresses the political interference and agency problems identified throughout this research.


6.1 Summary & Conclusion

✅ Research Conclusion
Transforming state-owned enterprises through robust corporate governance is not only feasible but essential for Tanzania's journey toward middle-income status and the Dira 2050 vision of a US$1 trillion economy. The evidence is clear: partial reforms since 2020 have already generated measurable improvements — a record TZS 1.028 trillion in sector dividends, a 60% reduction in TANESCO losses, and improved collection efficiency at DAWASCO. The challenge is not one of possibility but of political will to move from partial to full corporatisation. With systematic implementation of the eight recommendations, Tanzania's SOEs can evolve from fiscal burdens into engines of national development — generating over TZS 2 trillion in annual dividends by 2035 while delivering demonstrably better public services to citizens.

The research partially supports Hypothesis H1 as proven: elements of corporate governance are associated with better financial performance (r = 0.71, p < 0.01). Governance score improvements explain 52% of variance in loss reduction (R² = 0.52). Full financial sustainability, however, requires deeper reforms than Tanzania has yet implemented — legal autonomy, hard budget constraints, professional boards, and performance-linked executive pay operating within a coherent institutional framework.

Tanzania has laid a promising foundation. The Finance Act 2025, Dira 2050 vision, TISEZA establishment, and the CAG's increasingly stringent performance audits all signal a policy environment increasingly receptive to deeper governance reform. The window is open. The evidence is available. The models are proven. What remains is the political commitment to cross from partial to full corporatisation.


6.3 Suggestions for Further Research

Research Gap 1
Longitudinal impact evaluation of the proposed SOE Holding Company model once established — measuring changes in profitability, service quality, and fiscal burden over a 10-year period.
Research Gap 2
Comparative study of corporatisation versus public-private partnerships (PPPs) in African utility sectors, using Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda as cases to draw practical lessons.
Research Gap 3
Political economy analysis of resistance to SOE governance reforms in Tanzania — exploring incentives of politicians, unions, and managers through in-depth qualitative methods.
Research Gap 4
Assessment of ESG (Environmental, Social, Governance) integration in Tanzania SOEs post-corporatisation and its effect on access to international climate finance and green bonds.
Research Gap 5
Gender and inclusivity dimensions of SOE board reforms — how increasing women and youth representation on boards affects decision-making quality and financial performance.
Research Gap 6
Assessment of digital transformation (e-fiscal compliance, AI-driven billing, smart metering) as a driver of SOE efficiency improvements aligned with the Finance Act 2025 mandates.

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