Section 5
Belt & Road Initiative (BRI): Key Infrastructure Projects
Tanzania signed onto the BRI in 2013. Over the following decade, Chinese state-owned enterprises and development banks financed and built infrastructure reshaping Tanzania's connectivity, energy capacity, and industrial base. The 2024 FOCAC Summit further expanded commitments with a focus on 'green BRI' principles — emphasising clean energy, digital connectivity, and supply chain localisation in Africa.
🌿
Environmental Note: The Julius Nyerere Hydropower project, located near the Selous Game Reserve (a UNESCO World Heritage site), has faced international scrutiny over ecological impacts on the Rufiji River ecosystem and downstream communities. Tanzania's Investment Act 2022 includes environmental governance provisions to address such risks, though enforcement remains uneven.
$3.6B
Julius Nyerere Hydropower (2.1 GW)
TANESCO / PBOC 2024
$2.2B
SGR Dar–Dodoma Section (460 km)
TRC / CCECC 2024
$10B
Bagamoyo Port (Rejected 2019–2020)
TZ Govt. / CCECC
$800M
Sino-Tan Kibaha Industrial SEZ (planned)
TIC / MOFCOM 2024
Major BRI Projects — Status & Geo-Economic Role
🔨 UNDER CONSTRUCTIONStandard Gauge Railway (SGR)
Dar es Salaam – Dodoma
USD 2.2 Billion
460 km section launched in 2024. Transforms freight movement and links Dar es Salaam to the landlocked hinterland. Gateway to Burundi, DRC, and Rwanda — one of BRI's most strategically important East African corridors.
🚂 Target: Operational by 2026–2027 | Contractor: CCECC
⚡ ADVANCED CONSTRUCTIONJulius Nyerere Hydropower Station
USD 3.6 Billion
2.1 GW added capacity — Tanzania's largest ever infrastructure project. An industrial energy security game-changer. Located on the Rufiji River near Selous Game Reserve. Environmental scrutiny ongoing.
🏭 Capacity: 2.1 GW | Full operation expected 2026–2027
📋 MOU SIGNED 2024TAZARA Railway Revitalisation
TBD — Exploratory Phase
The original 1,860 km China-built railway connecting Dar es Salaam to Zambia. MoU signed September 2024 (CCECC/MOFCOM). Revival would create 20,000+ jobs and activate the Southern Africa logistics corridor.
🛤️ Strategic: Links Tanzania to Zambia, DRC, Zimbabwe
🚫 REJECTED / STALLEDBagamoyo Port
USD 10 Billion (Proposed)
Would have been East Africa's largest port. Rejected by President Magufuli in 2019–2020 over a 99-year lease condition — described as "the terms they give to a conquered people." Tanzania's defining act of BRI sovereignty doctrine.
⚖️ Status: Precedent set. Alternative financing being explored.
✅ COMPLETEDDar es Salaam Port Upgrade
Multi-hundred million USD
Expanded container and bulk cargo capacity. Positions Dar es Salaam as East Africa's premier maritime trade hub, servicing six landlocked countries. Critical for regional trade and BRI corridor efficiency.
⚓ Handles ~95% of Tanzania's seaborne trade
✅ COMPLETEDKIKA Airport — Zanzibar
~USD 150 Million+
New international terminal completed, positioning Zanzibar as a premier Indian Ocean tourism hub. Increases aviation capacity significantly, supporting the blue economy and hospitality investment sector.
✈️ Zanzibar tourism arrivals target: 1M+/year
✅ COMPLETEDUbungo Interchange, Dar es Salaam
~USD 200 Million
Key multi-level urban junction constructed by CCECC. Significantly reduced Dar es Salaam traffic congestion at one of the city's most critical commercial nodes. A high-visibility Chinese civil engineering achievement in Tanzania.
🚦 Serves ~500,000 vehicles/day at peak
🏗️ UNDER DEVELOPMENTSino-Tan Kibaha Industrial SEZ
USD 800 Million (Planned)
Planned special economic zone targeting manufacturing diversification and export processing. Designed to attract Chinese manufacturing FDI for light industry, import substitution, and export to regional markets.
🏭 Targets: 10,000+ direct jobs; 20,000 indirect
✅ OPERATIONALMaweni Limestone / Huaxin Cement
USD 100 Million+
Major cement manufacturing investment reducing Tanzania's dependence on imported construction materials. Supports domestic construction sector and feeds demand from SGR and hydropower project builds.
🏗️ Capacity: 3M+ tonnes cement/year
BRI Project Investment Breakdown by Category (USD Billion)
Energy dominates by investment value; transport by strategic corridor significance.
Sources: TRC, TANESCO, TIC, CCECC project disclosures 2024. Bagamoyo excluded (rejected). SEZ figures are planned, not committed.
| Project | Cost (USD) | Status (2025) | Geo-Economic Role |
|---|
| SGR Dar–Dodoma (460 km) | 2.2B | Under Construction | Freight corridor; gateway to DRC, Burundi, Rwanda |
| Julius Nyerere Hydropower | 3.6B | Advanced Construction | 2.1 GW; energy security; industrialisation enabler |
| TAZARA Revitalisation | TBD | MoU signed Sept 2024 | Regional corridor to Zambia; 20,000+ jobs est. |
| Bagamoyo Port (proposed) | 10.0B | Rejected 2019–20 | Would be E. Africa's largest port; sovereignty precedent |
| Dar es Salaam Port Upgrade | ~500M+ | Completed | E. Africa maritime hub; expanded container capacity |
| Ubungo Interchange, Dar | ~200M | Completed | Reduced urban congestion; key commercial node |
| KIKA Airport, Zanzibar | ~150M+ | Completed | Tourism hub; increased aviation capacity |
| Sino-Tan Kibaha SEZ | 800M (planned) | Under Development | Manufacturing; export processing; import substitution |
| Maweni / Huaxin Cement | 100M+ | Operational | Domestic cement; reduces import dependency |
Section 6
Geopolitical & Geo-Economic Dynamics
6.1 The Foundation: Mutual Non-Interference & Strategic Alignment
The China–Tanzania political relationship is anchored in principles of non-interference, respect for sovereignty, and South-South solidarity — a framework Tanzania finds appealing as it avoids the governance conditionality attached to Western finance. Tanzania formally reaffirms the one-China principle, while Beijing backs Tanzania against external political interference. This political alignment provides the geopolitical glue that sustains economic ties even during friction.
China views Tanzania as a strategic gateway to East Africa on three axes: (1) the Indian Ocean maritime corridor (Dar es Salaam port); (2) the landlocked African interior via TAZARA and SGR; and (3) natural resource access — Tanzania holds significant reserves of nickel, copper, gold, natural gas, and emerging critical minerals including lithium potential.
🌐
Strategic Value: Dar es Salaam port is the most strategically critical node in Tanzania's China relationship — handling ~95% of seaborne trade and serving as the logistical hub for six landlocked countries: Zambia, DRC, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, and Malawi.
6.2 Great Power Competition: China vs. US vs. EU in Tanzania
Tanzania sits at the centre of an intensifying great power competition for influence in East Africa. China's deep investment base gives it structural advantages, while the US (via PGII) and EU (via Global Gateway) have announced competing infrastructure finance initiatives — though neither has matched China's scale or speed of deployment in Tanzania.
| Dimension | 🇨🇳 China / BRI | 🇺🇸 USA / PGII | 🇪🇺 EU / Global Gateway |
|---|
| Capital Model | State-backed SOE loans; moving toward PPPs | DFI blended finance; private sector-led | Grants + concessional loans; governance conditions |
| Key Conditionality | Minimal political; commercial terms | Human rights, democracy, anti-corruption | Rule of law, sustainability, transparency |
| Tanzania Rank | #1 trade partner; #1 FDI source | 11th largest US aid recipient in SSA | Limited bilateral presence vs China |
| Infrastructure Focus | Ports, SGR, hydropower, industrial parks | Digital, clean energy, health systems | Green energy, digital connectivity, EPA trade |
| Financing Scale (Tanzania) | USD 11.5B cumulative FDI + loans | Modest; USAID + DFC limited | Growing; limited vs China |
| Leverage Mechanisms | Debt dependency + project lock-in + port | AGOA trade access + aid conditionality | EPA preferential trade agreements |
| Narrative | South-South; no colonial legacy; 'mutual benefit' | Transparent, high-standard alternative | Rules-based sustainable financing |
| TZ Diplomatic Position | Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partner | Traditional ally; strategic partner lite | Development partner; EU-AU framework |
Comparative Influence Score — China vs. US vs. EU in Tanzania (Estimated)
Multi-dimensional assessment across trade, FDI, infrastructure, political alignment and soft power.
Scoring based on TICGL analysis of trade data, diplomatic engagement records, and financing volumes. 1 = low influence, 10 = dominant.
6.3 Tanzania's Strategic Non-Alignment Doctrine
President Samia Suluhu Hassan's administration has explicitly adopted a 'multi-vector' economic diplomacy approach — deepening Chinese ties while simultaneously engaging the IMF, World Bank, EU, and US. Tanzania's 2024 revised Foreign Policy explicitly elevates economic benefit and non-alignment as core principles, positioning Dar es Salaam as a 'swing state' that can extract value from competitive suitors on both sides of the US-China rivalry.
🏛️
The Bagamoyo Doctrine: By rejecting China's USD 10 billion Bagamoyo Port offer — citing the 99-year lease as "the terms they give to a conquered people" — Tanzania demonstrated it will not accept financial dependence at the cost of sovereignty. This simultaneously signalled to Western DFIs that it was open to alternative financing, creating competitive pressure that is Tanzania's most powerful negotiating tool.
6.4 Geo-Economic Risks & Tanzania's Responses
| Risk | Description | Tanzania's Response / Status |
|---|
| Trade deficit dependency | USD 7.5B deficit (2024); import dominance limits industrialisation | Zero-tariff push; export target USD 1B+ (partial at USD 710M) |
| Debt trap risk | New FOCAC 2024 loans may raise Chinese debt above 15% of external | TIC reform; ICSID adoption; PPP-first framework |
| Sovereignty via concessions | Long-term asset concessions could compromise control | Bagamoyo precedent; renegotiation doctrine established |
| Labour import gap | Chinese projects criticised for imported Chinese labour vs local hiring | TIC local content mandate; 50%+ local labour negotiation target |
| Environmental governance | BRI extractive projects risk ecologically sensitive zones (Selous) | Investment Act 2022 EIA provisions (enforcement uneven) |
| Technology transfer gap | FDI in low-tech assembly; limited R&D transfer | Green energy & digital economy annexes in FOCAC 2024 |
| Currency exposure | 66% of TZ external debt in USD; CNY appreciation adds cost | Limited hedging; calls for CNY/TZS-denominated structures |
| Over-reliance risk | Geopolitical disruption (US-China rivalry) could affect BRI flows | Non-alignment policy; diversified partner engagement |
Tanzania–China Geo-Economic Risk Assessment Matrix
Risk severity score (1–10) across eight dimensions. Higher = greater risk exposure.
Section 7
Forecast to 2030: Sustainability Assessment
We model three scenarios through 2030 drawing on IMF/AfDB GDP forecasts, FOCAC 2024 commitments, BRI investment cycle patterns, Tanzania's trade diversification agenda, and China's 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) priorities — which emphasise green economy, digital infrastructure, and supply chain localisation in Africa.
7.1 Scenario Assumptions
📊 BASE CASE
$14.5–15.5B
2030 trade projection. Tanzania GDP: 5.5–5.8% p.a. SGR operational 2027; Julius Nyerere online 2026–27. Modest export diversification; debt-to-GDP stabilises ~50%.
🚀 HIGH GROWTH
$18.0–19.0B
2030 trade projection. Tanzania GDP: 6.5–7.0% p.a. Green minerals surge; TAZARA revival 2027; early hydropower commissioning unlocks manufacturing. Chinese debt improves.
📉 DOWNSIDE
$9.0–10.0B
2030 trade projection. Tanzania GDP: 3.5–4.0% p.a. SGR delays; TAZARA stalled; commodity export stagnation; debt-to-GDP exceeds 55%, triggering IMF monitoring.
| Variable | Base Case | High Growth | Downside |
|---|
| Tanzania GDP growth | 5.5–5.8% p.a. | 6.5–7.0% p.a. | 3.5–4.0% p.a. |
| China GDP growth | 4.5–5.0% | 5.0–5.5% | 3.0–4.0% |
| BRI investment pace | Moderate; PPP-led; green focus | Accelerated post-FOCAC 2024 | Slowdown; Chinese fiscal pressure |
| TZ export diversification | Modest; minerals + processed agri | Green minerals + manufactured surge | Import dependency deepens |
| SGR & TAZARA delivery | SGR 2027; TAZARA partial | Full TAZARA 2027; SGR 2026 | SGR delays; TAZARA stalled |
| Julius Nyerere Hydropower | Operational 2026; full 2027 | Early commission 2025/26 | Delays extend to 2028+ |
| Geopolitical environment | US-China managed competition | China-Africa deepens | TZ pivots West under conditionality |
| Debt management | Debt-to-GDP stabilises ~50% | Improves if exports rise | Exceeds 55%; IMF warning |
7.2 Bilateral Trade Projections (2024–2030)
Base case uses ~7% CAGR; High Growth uses ~11% CAGR; Downside uses ~1.5% CAGR from the 2024 baseline of USD 8.88 billion. High-growth projections are achievable if Tanzania captures green mineral value chains and processed export opportunities unlocked by zero-tariff access.
Tanzania–China Bilateral Trade Projections: Three Scenarios 2024–2030 (USD Billion)
The divergence between high growth and downside scenarios widens to ~$9B by 2030 — underscoring the decisive role of Tanzania's export diversification policy choices.
Source: TICGL modelling based on IMF/AfDB GDP forecasts, FOCAC 2024 commitments, and BRI investment cycle patterns. Scenarios are not predictions; they model plausible trajectories.
| Year | Base Case (USD B) | High Growth (USD B) | Downside (USD B) | Key Assumption |
|---|
| 2024 (actual/est.) | 8.88 | 8.88 | 8.88 | Baseline locked |
| 2025 (proj.) | 9.3–9.8 | 10.5–11.0 | 8.0–8.5 | SGR impact; FOCAC stimulus |
| 2026 (proj.) | 10.5–11.0 | 12.0–13.0 | 7.5–8.0 | Hydropower online; green minerals |
| 2027 (proj.) | 11.5–12.0 | 13.5–14.5 | 7.8–8.2 | TAZARA progress; SGR freight |
| 2028 (proj.) | 12.5–13.0 | 15.0–16.0 | 8.0–8.5 | Regional integration boost |
| 2029 (proj.) | 13.5–14.0 | 16.5–17.5 | 8.5–9.0 | Digital economy; e-commerce |
| 2030 (proj.) | 14.5–15.5 | 18.0–19.0 | 9.0–10.0 | Full BRI cycle maturation |
| TZ Export Target 2030 | USD 1.4B+ | USD 2.0–2.5B | USD 800M–1B | Diversification critical |
| Trade Deficit 2030 | ~USD 12–13B | ~USD 15–16B | ~USD 7–8B | Deficit narrows only in High scenario |
7.3 FDI, Debt & Key Indicator Projections
Key Indicator Projections: FDI, Debt, Jobs & Exports (2024–2030)
Cumulative Chinese FDI growth vs debt exposure trajectory — the critical balance Tanzania must manage.
| Metric | 2024 (Baseline) | 2027 (Projected) | 2030 (Projected) | Sustainability Flag |
|---|
| Chinese FDI cumulative (USD B) | ~11.5B / 1,360 projects | ~15–16B / 1,700 projects | ~20B / 2,100+ projects | Green — if PPP-structured |
| Chinese debt / external debt (%) | ~11.6% | ~12–13% | ~13–15% | Yellow — keep below 15% |
| Total external debt-to-GDP (%) | 47.2% | ~49–50% | ~50–53% | Yellow — IMF threshold 55% |
| TZ exports to China (USD B) | 0.71 | 1.0–1.2 | 1.4–2.5 (scenario) | Yellow — structural bottleneck |
| Jobs from Chinese investment | 155,000+ | ~190,000 | ~250,000+ | Green — if local content enforced |
| Hydropower (Julius Nyerere GW) | Under construction | 2.1 GW operational | Full grid integration | Green — industrial enabler |
| SGR freight utilisation | Partial (Dar–Morogoro) | Dar–Dodoma full ops | Regional corridor active | Green — transformative if funded |
| Green BRI share of new projects | ~10–15% | ~25–30% (FOCAC target) | ~40–50% (15th 5YP) | Green — aligned with SDGs |
7.4 Sustainability Scorecard (2030 Outlook)
2030 Sustainability Scorecard — Tanzania–China Economic Relationship
Eight dimensions scored out of 10. Overall composite: 7/10 — Moderately Sustainable.
| Dimension | Score /10 | 2030 Outlook | Critical Action |
|---|
| Infrastructure Delivery | 8/10 | SGR + Hydropower transformative if on schedule | Fast-track Julius Nyerere commissioning |
| Debt Sustainability | 7/10 | Manageable if borrowing stays below 15% Chinese share | Cap sovereign BRI loans; prioritise PPP |
| FDI Quality & Jobs | 7/10 | Improving if local content mandates enforced | 50%+ local labour; tech transfer clauses |
| Geopolitical Resilience | 7/10 | Non-alignment posture is credible and sustainable | Maintain leverage via competing-suitor strategy |
| Trade Sustainability | 6/10 | Deficit narrows only if exports rise to USD 1.4B+ | Invest in processed agri & green mineral exports |
| Environmental Governance | 5/10 | Selous & Rufiji risks require active mitigation | Full enforcement of Investment Act 2022 EIA clauses |
| Export Diversification | 5/10 | Weakest dimension; commodity dependency persists | Critical minerals framework + agri-processing SEZs |
| OVERALL | 7/10 | Moderately Sustainable — resilient but fragile in key dimensions | Structural diversification is the decisive variable |
Section 8
Conclusions & Strategic Recommendations
The Defining Bilateral Relationship
The Tanzania–China economic partnership is the defining bilateral economic relationship in Tanzania's external sector. It delivers genuine development dividends — infrastructure, industrial investment, jobs, energy capacity, and market access — while carrying structural risks that require active, sophisticated policy management.
Tanzania's overall posture is stronger than most African BRI partners, but the window to lock in sustainable terms is narrowing as debt accumulates and dependency deepens. The decisive variable in every scenario is not how much China invests — it is whether Tanzania can convert that investment into structural economic transformation.
Overall Sustainability Score: 7 / 10 — Moderately Sustainable
8.1 What the Data Tells Us
Three data points define the relationship's fundamental tension. First, the trade deficit: China exports 11.5x more to Tanzania than Tanzania exports to China (2024). This asymmetry will persist unless Tanzania urgently develops value-added export capacity. Second, debt trajectory: at 47.2% of GDP and rising, Tanzania's debt profile is not yet critical, but the trajectory — combined with new FOCAC 2024 commitments — demands a hard debt ceiling. Third, investment quality: 155,000 jobs across 1,360 projects is genuinely positive, but the concentration in low-tech manufacturing and extractives means the technology and skills transfer that Tanzania needs for long-term competitiveness is not yet happening at the required scale.
11.5:1
Import-to-Export Ratio (2024)
Structural asymmetry — must be addressed
47.2%
Debt-to-GDP (2024) — rising
IMF warning threshold: 55%
155K+
Jobs created — genuine positive
But tech transfer gap persists
8.2 Seven Strategic Recommendations
1
Establish a Critical Minerals Export Framework
Process nickel, copper, and gold domestically before export. Use BRI investment to build processing capacity, not just extraction. Commodity exports currently at USD 428M — could reach USD 2B+ with downstream processing. This is Tanzania's single largest opportunity to reduce the trade deficit structurally.
📅 Target: 2026–2028
💰 Value: USD 1.5B+ revenue gain potential
🏭 Priority: Critical
2
Legislate a Hard Chinese Debt Cap at 15%
Legislate a ceiling of 15% of total external debt for Chinese sovereign borrowing. Require Parliamentary approval for all new BRI loans above USD 500 million. Chinese debt now at 11.6% and rising — the Bagamoyo rejection must become codified policy, not just a historical precedent vulnerable to future reversal.
📅 Target: Immediate
⚖️ Mechanism: Parliamentary legislation
🔴 Priority: Urgent
3
Enforce 50%+ Local Labour in All BRI Projects
Negotiate and enforce minimum local employment content in all new Chinese-funded construction and manufacturing contracts. The 155,000 jobs figure is positive, but Chinese contractor labour importation undercuts the local economic multiplier and erodes public support for the partnership. Enforcement must be binding, not aspirational.
📅 Target: 2025–2026
👷 Mechanism: TIC contract clauses
🟡 Priority: High
4
Leverage SGR & Julius Nyerere for Industrial Clusters
Designate processing zones at key SGR freight nodes and use cheap hydropower to attract Chinese and other manufacturing FDI to Tanzania. Energy + logistics parity creates a genuine competitive advantage for light manufacturing relocation. The 2.1 GW Julius Nyerere plant is the most powerful industrial enabler Tanzania has ever built.
📅 Target: 2026–2030
🏭 Potential: 50,000+ new manufacturing jobs
🟡 Priority: High
5
Accelerate Export Diversification to USD 1.4B by 2027
Focus on processed cashews, avocado oil, sesame products, marine products, and specialty coffee — all with zero-tariff access to China. Current trajectory (USD 710M in 2024) is too slow to narrow the structural deficit. TIC and MITI need a dedicated China Export Acceleration programme with sector-specific targets and export credit support.
📅 Target: 2025–2027
📈 Current: USD 710M → Target: USD 1.4B
🔴 Priority: Urgent
6
Enforce Environmental Governance in All BRI Projects
Require third-party Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) audits for all Chinese-funded projects in or near protected areas, with binding remediation clauses. The Julius Nyerere / Selous risk is Tanzania's most visible sustainability vulnerability internationally — and reputational damage from ecological failure would harm Tanzania's green credentials precisely when the global premium for sustainable investment is at its highest.
📅 Target: 2025–2026
🌿 Mechanism: Investment Act 2022 EIA enforcement
🟡 Priority: High
7
Maintain Non-Alignment as a Negotiating Asset
Actively engage US PGII, EU Global Gateway, and Gulf Sovereign Wealth Funds alongside China to ensure competitive bidding on all major infrastructure. Tanzania's leverage is strongest when multiple suitors compete — non-alignment must remain doctrine, not rhetoric. The Bagamoyo Port episode proved that walking away from a bad deal attracts better offers.
📅 Target: Ongoing
🌍 Partners: US, EU, Gulf SWFs, Japan
🟢 Priority: Strategic
Recommendations Priority Matrix — Impact vs. Timeline
Positioning each recommendation by expected impact (1–10) and implementation urgency.
📚 Data Sources & Methodology
UN COMTRADE | China MOFCOM / General Administration of Customs | World Bank WITS | IMF Article IV 2024 | Bank of Tanzania Debt Management Dept (Sept 2025) | TIC Investment Climate 2025 | AfDB | SAIS-CARI | FOCAC Secretariat | Tanzania Investment Act 2022 | TRC / CCECC project disclosures | TANESCO annual reports
Updated Edition — February 2026. All projections represent modelled scenarios, not predictions. Figures in USD unless otherwise stated.
