01 — OverviewExecutive Summary
Two numbers about Tanzania's tax base are both accurate, and both keep making headlines for opposite reasons. The first: TRA's cumulative taxpayer register — everyone ever issued a Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN) — has grown from around 70,000 at TRA's founding in 1996 to over 8.1 million by mid-2026, a milestone TRA itself celebrated at its 30th anniversary. The second: the number of "active" registered taxpayers — those the Ministry of Finance counts as actually filing and paying in a given period — fell from 3.36 million in 2021/22 to 2.18 million in 2024/25, a decline of roughly a third, even as formalisation campaigns continued over the same period.
This report, building on TICGL/TERI's earlier tax-policy research, digs into what sits underneath both numbers: how a shrinking "active" base and a growing "registered" base can be simultaneously true, why TRA's revenue collections have kept setting records regardless, and what the gap means for Tanzania's Dira 2050 ambitions to widen its domestic revenue base.
- The register keeps growing because it almost never shrinks. A TIN, once issued, is rarely cancelled — so the cumulative count rises even when many holders stop filing.
- "Active" is a stricter, shrinking flow measure. Reported active-taxpayer snapshots show a consistent downward trend across three independent citations between 2021/22 and 2024/25.
- Revenue has grown anyway — TZS 32.26 trillion in 2024/25, TZS 37.95 trillion in 2025/26 — driven disproportionately by large taxpayers, customs, and digital administration, not by growth in the number of small active filers.
- Compliance infrastructure lags registration: 88 percent of business-TIN holders were not registered for Electronic Fiscal Devices as of July 2024, per the Controller and Auditor General.
02 — The Core TensionRegistered vs Active: Tanzania's Two Taxpayer Numbers
Ask "how many taxpayers does Tanzania have?" and the honest answer is: it depends which of two very different numbers you mean.
📇 Total Registered (TIN Holders)
- 8.1 million+ as of mid-2026 — up from 70,000 at TRA's 1996 founding
- A cumulative stock: once a TIN is issued, it is rarely cancelled, even if the holder stops trading or filing
- Grew from 4.46 million (2021/22) to 6.27 million (2023/24) to roughly 7.7 million (late 2025), per NBS Tax Statistics data and subsequent reporting
- Reflects registration drives, digital onboarding, and formalisation campaigns pulling more people and businesses into the system
VS
✅ "Active" Taxpayers (Filing & Paying)
- 2.18 million in 2024/25 — down from 3.36 million in 2021/22
- A flow measure: counts who is actually filing returns and making payments in a given period
- An intermediate snapshot of 2.82 million was cited by Tanzania's Vice President as of 2024, consistent with a continuing downward trend
- Ministry of Finance and senior officials have publicly linked the decline to overburdening of the existing taxpayer pool
Why both numbers can be true
Think of the register as a bathtub that almost never drains: TINs flow in continuously through new registrations, but very few flow out through cancellation, even for businesses that have closed or gone dormant. "Active" status measures something different — who is actually turning up to file and pay in a specific tax year. It's entirely possible, and is exactly what Tanzania's data shows, for the bathtub to keep filling while the share of taxpayers actively transacting with TRA in any one period shrinks.
03 — The DataThe Decline in Active Taxpayers: Three Data Points, One Direction
3.36M active, 2021/22
2.82M active, 2024
2.18M active, 2024/25
Three independent public citations, spaced roughly a year apart, all point the same way. In April 2025, Tanzania's Vice President expressed concern that registered active taxpayers had dropped from 3.36 million in 2021–2022 to 2.82 million in 2024, urging renewed efforts to expand the base. TICGL/TERI's own August 2026 tax-policy research, citing Ministry of Finance data, put the 2024/25 active count at 2.18 million — continuing the same downward trajectory into the most recent fiscal year on record.
Active Registered Taxpayers: The Downward Trend, 2021/22–2024/25
Millions of active (filing/paying) taxpayers, as reported at each citation point
Note: these three figures come from separate public citations (Vice President's April 2025 remarks; TICGL/TERI's August 2026 report citing the Ministry of Finance) rather than a single continuous published series, so treat the connecting line as an illustrative trend rather than a precise quarterly series. All three, however, are consistent in direction and rough magnitude.
Whichever exact endpoint one uses — 2.82 million or 2.18 million — the direction and rough scale of the decline are corroborated by two independent sources roughly a year apart, which strengthens confidence that this is a genuine trend rather than a one-off data anomaly or reporting quirk.
04 — The DataThe Register Keeps Growing: 70,000 to 8.1 Million
Set against the active-taxpayer decline, the cumulative TIN register tells an almost opposite story. NBS's Tax Statistics Report series shows the total registered taxpayer count rising every year on record, and TRA's own 30th-anniversary figures put the milestone at over 8.1 million by mid-2026.
Total Registered Taxpayers, 2017/18–2023/24
Thousands of TIN holders, per NBS Tax Statistics Report data, with year-on-year growth
The Long Run: TRA's Register Since 1996
Selected milestones, thousands of registered taxpayers (log scale)
~1996TRA established
Roughly 70,000 taxpayers on record, annual collections around TZS 207 billion.
2017/18–2023/24NBS-tracked expansion
Register more than doubles, from 2.74 million to 6.27 million, driven by successive registration and formalisation drives.
2021/22–2024/25The active-count divergence begins
Even as the total register keeps climbing, active filing-and-paying taxpayers fall from 3.36 million to 2.18 million.
Mid-2026Register crosses 8.1 million
TRA marks its 30th anniversary; operational offices have grown from 95 to 323, and staff from 924 to 8,790, over the same broad period of expansion.
05 — TICGL AnalysisReconciling the Numbers: Stock, Flow, and What Gets Missed
The headline tension — "taxpayers are disappearing" versus "the register just hit a record 8.1 million" — dissolves once the two figures are read as what they actually measure, but that doesn't make the underlying compliance problem any less real.
1. TINs are sticky by design
A TIN functions as a permanent identity number, similar to a national ID, rather than a subscription that lapses. Businesses that close, individuals who die or emigrate, and duplicate or dormant registrations from earlier drives all remain in the cumulative count unless specifically cleaned up — something TRA's own systems, per the CAG's 2025 audit, do not yet do systematically.
2. "Active" is where the real story sits
The active-taxpayer figures — however imperfectly tracked across different citations — are the ones that actually matter for whether Dira 2050's formalisation and domestic-revenue goals are being met. A shrinking active base, even alongside a growing register, means TRA is working harder to extract the same or more revenue from a narrower, potentially more strained pool of genuinely compliant filers.
3. Both trends can share one cause
Complex procedures and compliance costs can simultaneously push existing filers toward inactivity or informality (shrinking the active count) while registration drives continue adding new TINs faster than genuine compliance grows behind them (expanding the register) — precisely the dynamic TICGL/TERI's Price of Formalisation report flags as a risk of formalisation drives "running in place."
Why this matters for policy
If policymakers cite only the growing 8.1 million register, the taxpayer-base story looks like unambiguous success. If they cite only the falling active count, it looks like unambiguous failure. Neither framing alone is accurate — and a formalisation strategy built on the register number risks overstating how much of Dira 2050's domestic-revenue gap it is actually closing, exactly the caution TICGL/TERI's tax-policy research raises about relying on MSME-focused instruments for material new revenue.
06 — The DataRevenue Keeps Rising — So Who Is Actually Paying?
Despite the active-taxpayer decline, TRA has posted record collections and beaten its target for 24 consecutive months through mid-2026. That is not a contradiction of the taxpayer-decline story — it is a clue to where Tanzania's tax revenue actually comes from.
TRA Annual Tax Collections vs Target
TZS trillions, selected fiscal years
Where December 2025 Revenue Came From
Share of TZS 4.13 trillion collected in December 2025, by source
In December 2025 alone, TRA collected TZS 4.13 trillion, of which large taxpayers contributed roughly TZS 1.9 trillion and customs roughly TZS 1.2 trillion — together well over 70 percent of that month's total — while small and medium traders contributed around TZS 838 billion. This composition is consistent with the study's broader finding: material revenue growth is concentrated among large taxpayers, customs, and administrative efficiency gains, not among the millions of small, actively-registered filers whose numbers have been shrinking.
FY2021/22 Collections
TZS 22.2T
Baseline year for active-taxpayer comparison
FY2023/24 Collections
TZS 26.73T
~85% of that year's domestic revenue
FY2024/25 Collections
TZS 32.26T
103% of target, +16.7% YoY
FY2025/26 Collections
TZS 37.95T
105% of target, 24th consecutive month above target
07 — Supporting DataTax-to-GDP in Context: Progress, But Still Below Regional Peers
Tanzania's tax-to-GDP ratio has been reported at different points between roughly 11.5 percent and 14.9 percent depending on the source, methodology, and fiscal year — reflecting genuine improvement over time as well as differences in how domestic revenue is measured. TICGL/TERI's own Price of Formalisation report puts the 2024 figure at approximately 12.9–13.1 percent. Across nearly every measure, however, Tanzania remains below the Sub-Saharan Africa average, most commonly cited in the 15–18 percent range.
Tanzania's Tax-to-GDP Ratio: The Range Across Sources
Percent of GDP, as reported by different sources and time periods (2023–2025)
Figures vary because different institutions use different fiscal-year definitions, revenue scopes (tax-only vs total domestic revenue), and GDP rebasing assumptions. TICGL reports the range transparently rather than resolving it to a single figure, consistent with the approach in the companion Price of Formalisation report.
09 — TICGL ViewWhat This Means for Tanzania's Domestic Revenue Strategy
For TRA and the Ministry of Finance
A public "active" taxpayer metric — tracked consistently over time, and reconciled with the total register — would let policymakers monitor the compliance trend directly, rather than relying on periodic public citations that vary in scope and vintage as this report's own sourcing had to work around.
For the formalisation agenda
New registration drives should be judged on whether they convert into sustained active filing, not just TIN issuance. Diagnosing why an existing pool of taxpayers is lapsing into inactivity may matter more for Dira 2050's revenue target than continuing to add new registrations to an already fast-growing stock.
For investors and the private sector
The concentration of revenue growth among large taxpayers and customs, documented above, suggests Tanzania's near-term domestic-revenue gains will keep depending disproportionately on a relatively small number of large, well-administered taxpayers rather than broad-based small-business compliance — a dynamic worth factoring into market-entry and partnership planning.
10 — TICGL RecommendationsClosing the Registered–Active Gap
- Publish a consistent, dated "active taxpayer" series alongside the total TIN register, so the two figures are never read as competing claims about the same thing.
- Audit and clean the TIN database to separate genuinely dormant, closed, or duplicate registrations from taxpayers who are simply non-compliant — the distinction the CAG's 2025 audit found TRA's own systems could not make.
- Diagnose the causes of inactivity among the roughly 1.2–1.4 million taxpayers who appear to have moved from active to inactive status since 2021/22, before launching further large-scale registration drives.
- Close the EFD compliance gap among the 88 percent of business-TIN holders not yet registered for EFDs, prioritising traders TRA's own data cannot currently classify as exempt or non-compliant.
- Evaluate formalisation campaigns on active-filing conversion, not registration counts alone, so success is measured by sustained compliance rather than by how many new TINs are issued.
11 — Quick AnswersFrequently Asked Questions
Is the number of taxpayers in Tanzania rising or falling?
Both, depending on which figure you look at. The total register has grown from about 70,000 to over 8.1 million, but "active" taxpayers — those actually filing and paying — fell from 3.36 million (2021/22) to 2.18 million (2024/25).
How many people are registered with TRA in Tanzania?
Over 8.1 million taxpayers were on TRA's register as of mid-2026, up from about 6.27 million in 2023/24 and 4.46 million in 2021/22.
Why is the active-taxpayer count falling while total registrations rise?
Registration is a cumulative stock that rarely shrinks; "active" status is a flow measuring who is actually filing and paying in a given period. A taxpayer can hold a valid TIN for years while being inactive.
What is Tanzania's EFD compliance rate?
As of July 2024, about 88 percent of business TIN holders (1,813,385 of 2,056,723) were not registered for Electronic Fiscal Devices, per a Controller and Auditor General audit tabled in April 2025.
Is TRA still collecting more revenue despite fewer active taxpayers?
Yes — TZS 32.26 trillion in 2024/25 and TZS 37.95 trillion in 2025/26, driven disproportionately by large taxpayers, customs, and administrative efficiency gains rather than growth in the active small-taxpayer base.
12 — MethodologySources & Notes
- Ministry of Finance data on active registered taxpayers (3.3–3.36 million, 2021/22; 2.18 million, 2024/25), as cited in TICGL/TERI's "The Price of Formalisation" report, August 2026.
- Vice President's remarks on active taxpayers declining from 3.36 million (2021/22) to 2.82 million (2024), reported by TanzaniaInvest, April 2025.
- National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), Tax Statistics Report, 2023/24 — registered taxpayer counts by fiscal year, 2017/18–2023/24.
- Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) 30th-anniversary corporate communications, July 2026 — total register (8.1 million+), office and staffing expansion.
- TRA corporate announcements on 2024/25 (TZS 32.26 trillion, 103% of target) and 2025/26 (TZS 37.95 trillion, 105% of target) revenue performance.
- Controller and Auditor General (CAG) performance audit on Electronic Fiscal Devices, tabled in Parliament 16 April 2025 (EFD non-registration among business TIN holders, as of July 2024).
- Tanzania Private Sector Foundation (TPSF) remarks on formal vs informal business registration shares, reported April 2025.
- Tax-to-GDP ratio figures compiled from multiple sources (PwC Tanzania, World Bank/Trading Economics, TICGL prior research, and TanzaniaInvest), reflecting the range across methodologies and fiscal years discussed in Section 7.
- This page is an independent analytical summary prepared by TICGL/TERI and does not constitute financial, investment, tax, or legal advice.
MuhtasariMuhtasari kwa Kiswahili
Kitendawili cha Walipa Kodi Tanzania: Milioni 8.1 Wamesajiliwa, Lakini Ni Wangapi Wanaolipa Kweli? Orodha ya walipa kodi waliosajiliwa (wenye TIN) imeongezeka kutoka takribani 70,000 mwaka TRA ilipoanzishwa hadi zaidi ya milioni 8.1 kufikia katikati ya mwaka 2026. Wakati huo huo, idadi ya walipa kodi "active" — wanaolipa na kuwasilisha taarifa zao kwa ukawaida — imepungua kutoka milioni 3.36 (2021/22) hadi milioni 2.18 (2024/25), kulingana na takwimu za Wizara ya Fedha.
Takwimu hizi mbili zinaweza kuwa kweli kwa wakati mmoja kwa sababu zinapima vitu tofauti. Usajili (TIN) ni orodha inayoongezeka tu — mara chache TIN hufutwa hata kama biashara imefungwa au mtu hajalipa kodi kwa miaka. "Active" ni kipimo cha wale wanaofanya malipo na kuwasilisha taarifa kwa wakati fulani — na hapa ndipo tatizo halisi la kupungua kwa msingi wa kodi linapoonekana. Licha ya hali hii, TRA imeendelea kuvunja rekodi za makusanyo — Sh trilioni 32.26 (2024/25) na Sh trilioni 37.95 (2025/26) — kwa sababu ukuaji mkubwa wa mapato unatokana zaidi na walipa kodi wakubwa na forodha, si ongezeko la walipa kodi wadogo wanaofanya kazi kikamilifu.
- Walipa kodi waliosajiliwa (TIN): zaidi ya milioni 8.1 (2026), kutoka 70,000 (1996)
- Walipa kodi "active": milioni 2.18 (2024/25), kutoka milioni 3.36 (2021/22) — punguzo la takribani asilimia 35
- Asilimia 88 ya wafanyabiashara wenye TIN hawajasajiliwa kutumia EFD (Julai 2024, Ripoti ya CAG)
- Ni asilimia 30 tu ya biashara binafsi zilizosajiliwa rasmi TRA, licha ya asilimia 70 kuwa za watu binafsi
Vyanzo: Wizara ya Fedha, Ripoti ya Takwimu za Kodi ya NBS, TRA, na Mdhibiti na Mkaguzi Mkuu wa Hesabu za Serikali (CAG). Uchambuzi umeandaliwa na Idara ya Utafiti ya TICGL / Tanzania Economic Research Institute (TERI).
Executive Summary
This study examined the tax-policy instruments through which Tanzania's Dira 2050 and its Long-Term Perspective Plan (LTPP) 2026/27–2050/51 intend to fund the country's USD 1 trillion economic ambition while simultaneously formalising an informal sector that contributes an estimated 55 percent of GDP. It asks a narrow but consequential question: are the tax measures aimed at Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) — the same measures meant to move citizens from survival to ownership — capable of generating the domestic revenue Dira 2050 needs, or are they being asked to do a fiscal job they cannot realistically perform while imposing a real compliance cost on the citizens formalisation is meant to benefit?
The study finds that Tanzania's tax-to-GDP ratio, at approximately 12.9–13.1 percent, remains well below the Sub-Saharan Africa average of 15–18 percent, and that two official processes currently set different 2050 targets for closing that gap: the LTPP targets 25 percent, while the Presidential Commission on Tax Reforms, which submitted 284 recommendations to the President in March 2026, targets 22 percent. Compounding this, Tanzania's own active taxpayer registry contracted from 3.3 million in 2021/22 to 2.18 million in 2024/25 even as formalisation campaigns continued, and comparative evidence from Kenya and Uganda shows that presumptive and turnover-tax regimes aimed at the smallest enterprises typically raise negligible direct revenue relative to the compliance burden they impose.
Applying a four-dimensional tax-policy framework — revenue yield, compliance burden, formalisation incentive, and equity — to six tax channels under Dira 2050, the study finds that no channel currently rates strongly on both revenue yield and compliance burden simultaneously: the instruments capable of raising material new revenue (exemption rationalisation, large-taxpayer administration) are largely separate from the instruments aimed at MSMEs and formalisation. Tanzania's own 2021 mobile money transaction levy, which cut peer-to-peer transaction volumes by roughly 38 percent within three months before being repeatedly reduced and then largely scrapped, stands as a directly relevant domestic precedent for the risks of miscalibrated digital taxation that Dira 2050's own digital-tax provisions do not reference.
The report concludes with six recommendations centred on reconciling the two conflicting tax-to-GDP targets, decoupling the MSME formalisation agenda from the domestic-revenue agenda, and applying the lessons of Tanzania's own mobile money levy episode to future digital-tax design.
Related TICGL AnalysisWhat's Next for Tanzania's Economy? The Policy Gaps Keeping $1 Trillion Out of Reach by 2050
This tax-policy study is one part of a wider structural picture. Read TICGL's flagship analysis of the policy gaps standing between Tanzania and its Dira 2050 ambition — including the financing, institutional, and investment-climate gaps that sit alongside the tax questions raised here.
Read the Full Policy Gap Analysis → 1. Background and Context
Dira 2050 requires financing on a scale far beyond anything Tanzania has previously mobilised: the LTPP estimates investment needs rising from USD 183 billion under the fourth Five-Year Development Plan to USD 1.58 trillion under the eighth, with total investment averaging more than 35 percent of GDP annually. Of this, the LTPP projects that domestic revenue, including tax collection, will cover only around 22 percent of financing needs, with foreign direct investment expected to mobilise roughly 57 percent and the domestic private sector the remaining 21 percent.
How Dira 2050's USD 1.58 Trillion Investment Need Is Expected to Be Financed
Source: LTPP 2026/27–2050/51 financing projections, as reported in the study.
The LTPP is candid that this gap has been long-standing and structural. Tanzania's tax-to-GDP ratio averaged approximately 12 percent between 2018 and 2024, against a Sub-Saharan Africa average of 16.3 percent, and stood at 12.9 percent in 2024. The Plan attributes this partly to administrative inefficiencies, tax exemptions with limited demonstrated impact on growth, and limited taxation of the informal sector and parts of agriculture — the same informal sector that the companion analysis of Dira 2050's citizen-ownership channels found contributes up to 55 percent of GDP while remaining largely outside the formal tax net.
This creates the specific tension this study investigates. The LTPP's own formalisation agenda proposes to bring millions of informal MSMEs into the tax system through a dedicated TRA support wing, a graduated tax system, and simplified compliance. This report asks the fiscal question directly: even if formalisation succeeds on its own terms, can taxing millions of newly formalised micro-enterprises realistically close a tax-to-GDP gap of 12 to 13 percentage points, or does relying on MSME taxation for that purpose risk imposing a real compliance cost on ordinary citizens for a fiscal return that comparative evidence suggests will be marginal?
1.1 Current Situation: Baseline Snapshot
Before assessing Dira 2050's forward-looking targets, this study establishes the current tax-policy baseline, drawing on the LTPP's own data, the Presidential Commission on Tax Reforms' March 2026 report, and Bank of Tanzania and Ministry of Finance data.
Table 1: Tax-policy baseline across six channels| Channel | Current Situation (Baseline) |
|---|
| MSME & informal-sector taxation | The informal sector contributes an estimated 55 percent of GDP and absorbs roughly 72 percent of the workforce (2023–24), largely outside the tax net. Over four million businesses reportedly remain informal, citing complex tax procedures as a primary barrier. |
| Fiscal sustainability / tax-to-GDP ratio | Tanzania's tax-to-GDP ratio stood at 12.9 percent in 2024 (13.1 percent by some FY2024/25 measures), against a Sub-Saharan Africa average of 15–18 percent and an EAC average of 12.7 percent. The fiscal deficit has averaged around 3.4–3.5 percent of GDP over the past five years. |
| Taxpayer base | The number of active registered taxpayers fell from 3.3 million in 2021/22 to 2.18 million in 2024/25, even as formalisation campaigns continued over the same period. |
| Tax exemptions & incentives | Tax exemptions are estimated to cost Tanzania approximately 2–3 percent of GDP in foregone revenue, with limited demonstrated impact on economic growth, and disparities flagged in how incentives are allocated relative to the 2022 Investment Act's guidelines. |
| Digital & mobile-money taxation | A mobile money transaction levy introduced in July 2021 cut monthly peer-to-peer transaction volumes by roughly 38 percent within three months; reduced by 30 percent in September 2021, a further 43 percent in July 2022, and largely scrapped for most transfers from October 2022. |
| Institutional reform | The Presidential Commission on Tax Reforms, established October 2024 and chaired by Ambassador Ombeni Sefue, submitted a report to President Samia Suluhu Hassan on 18 March 2026 with 284 reform proposals, including renaming TRA to the Tanzania Revenue Service and a one-year tax grace period for startups. |
2. Diagnostic Findings: The Policy Problem
A close reading of the LTPP alongside the Presidential Commission on Tax Reforms' 2026 report and Tanzania's own recent fiscal history surfaces four structural tensions that this study identifies as the central tax-policy problem for Dira 2050's implementation:
- Two unreconciled tax-to-GDP targets. The LTPP sets a target of raising Tanzania's tax-to-GDP ratio from 12.9 percent to at least 25 percent by 2050. The Presidential Commission on Tax Reforms separately sets a target of 22 percent for the same year — two different official benchmarks for the same indicator over the same horizon, with no public reconciliation between the two processes.
- A contracting taxpayer base alongside expanding formalisation ambitions. Active registered taxpayers fell from 3.3 million in 2021/22 to 2.18 million in 2024/25 — a decline of roughly a third — during the same period formalisation campaigns and digital tax systems were being expanded.
- A revenue-yield-versus-compliance-cost mismatch confirmed by regional evidence. Kenya's turnover tax generated only an estimated 0.002 percent of GDP in 2023 despite the compliance obligations it placed on hundreds of thousands of small traders. Uganda's presumptive tax regime imposes compliance costs averaging around USD 510 per year even on firms filing nil returns, and 68 percent of eligible SMEs remain outside the tax net regardless.
- An unreferenced domestic precedent on digital taxation. Tanzania's own 2021 mobile money transaction levy cut monthly peer-to-peer transaction volumes by roughly 38 percent within three months. Despite this direct national experience, the LTPP's digital-tax provisions (targeting e-commerce and digital-trade taxation by 2040) do not reference this precedent.
Left unresolved, these four tensions risk a scenario in which Tanzania succeeds at registering enterprises and improving inclusion — without closing the actual tax-to-GDP gap Dira 2050's financing model depends on.
3. Analytical Framework Applied in This Study
To assess Dira 2050's tax-policy instruments consistently, this study applied a four-dimensional working framework, structuring both the channel-level findings and the synthesis matrix below.
3.1Revenue Yield
The extent to which an instrument is capable of generating material, measurable domestic revenue relative to Tanzania's financing needs — as distinct from the number of taxpayers registered.
3.2Compliance Burden
The time, cost, and administrative complexity an instrument imposes on taxpayers, particularly MSMEs — frequently a stronger determinant of formalisation behaviour than the statutory tax rate itself.
3.3Formalisation Incentive
Whether an instrument's net effect, once compliance burden and support are weighed together, makes voluntary formalisation more or less attractive to an informal operator.
3.4Equity
Whether the burden of an instrument falls proportionately, or disproportionately, on smaller taxpayers, women-led enterprises, and lower-income citizens.
This framework separates two objectives that Dira 2050's own language sometimes treats as one: formalising the informal sector (a structural, inclusion-oriented goal) and closing the tax-to-GDP gap (a fiscal, revenue-oriented goal).
4. Study Objectives and Scope
Overall objective: to analyse the tax-policy instruments Dira 2050 and the LTPP rely on to formalise Tanzania's informal sector and fund the country's fiscal ambitions, and establish whether these instruments can deliver both objectives simultaneously, or should be sequenced separately.
- Mapped and analysed the principal tax-policy instruments: the MSME/TRA graduated tax wing, the tax-to-GDP fiscal target, exemption management, digital tax systems, LGA revenue autonomy, and mining/extractive royalty transparency.
- Assessed each instrument against the four-dimensional tax-policy framework.
- Benchmarked Tanzania against Kenya's turnover tax, Uganda's presumptive tax regime, and Rwanda's digital tax administration, and against Tanzania's own 2021–2022 mobile money levy episode.
- Identified the inconsistency between the LTPP's 25 percent and the Commission's 22 percent tax-to-GDP targets, alongside the taxpayer-base contraction running alongside both.
- Developed sequenced tax-policy recommendations separating the formalisation objective from the domestic-revenue objective.
6. Comparative Findings: Lessons from Other Economies
Tanzania is not alone in trying to tax its informal and small-business sector into the formal system while also raising material new domestic revenue. A review of comparable regional and cross-country experience offers concrete, quantified lessons for how Dira 2050's tax instruments are designed.
Table 2: Comparative regional tax-policy experience| Country / Region | Relevant Experience | Key Lesson for Dira 2050 |
|---|
| Kenya | Turnover tax on small businesses, introduced 2008 at 3 percent on annual turnover between roughly USD 5,000–50,000, generated an estimated 0.002 percent of GDP in 2023. | Presumptive taxes targeted at the smallest enterprises are unlikely to be a meaningful direct revenue source; evaluate on formalisation outcomes, not revenue. |
| Uganda | Presumptive tax regime (since 1997) imposes average compliance costs of ~USD 510/year even on nil returns; 68 percent of eligible SMEs remain outside the tax net. | Compliance cost and administrative burden, not the statutory rate, are usually the binding constraint on formalisation. |
| Rwanda | The Rwanda Revenue Authority's e-Tax online filing, paired with SME-targeted training, is associated with improved compliance and revenue collection. | Digitalisation of tax administration works when paired with active taxpayer education; introduced alone, it risks excluding the least digitally literate operators. |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | An estimated 65 percent of regional tax authorities operate a simplified or presumptive small-business regime; cross-country reviews find these raise little revenue relative to administrative cost. | Design and evaluate Tanzania's MSME tax wing primarily as an inclusion instrument, with a separate revenue plan. |
Tanzania's Tax-to-GDP Ratio vs. Regional Benchmarks and 2050 Targets
Figures in percent of GDP. SSA range shown as reported low–high band; Tanzania 2024 figure and both 2050 targets from the LTPP and the Presidential Commission on Tax Reforms.
Tanzania's Active Taxpayer Registry, 2021/22 vs 2024/25
Source: Ministry of Finance data, as cited in the study. Decline of roughly one-third over three years.
7. Findings: Six Tax-Policy Channels under Dira 2050
Applying the framework in Section 3, this study analysed six tax-policy channels through which Dira 2050 and the LTPP intend to formalise the informal sector and mobilise domestic revenue.
7.1 MSME Tax Wing and the Graduated Tax System
The LTPP proposes a dedicated MSME wing within the TRA offering simplified, digitised tax filing, reduced initial tax burden on newly formalised businesses, and tax credits of up to 30 percent for firms creating 500+ jobs, alongside a national digital MSME database by 2030.
Strength identifiedDirectly targets the compliance-cost barrier that comparative evidence (Uganda) identifies as the single biggest deterrent to formalisation.
Structural gap / riskComparable regimes elsewhere (Kenya's 0.002 percent of GDP) generate negligible direct revenue. If Tanzania's 25 percent target implicitly assumes material MSME revenue, that assumption is not supported by comparative evidence.
7.2 Fiscal Sustainability and the Tax-to-GDP Target
The LTPP targets raising the tax-to-GDP ratio from 12.9 percent to at least 25 percent by 2050, alongside reducing public debt to 40 percent of GDP and containing the fiscal deficit to 1–3 percent of GDP.
Strength identifiedDirectionally consistent with the Tax Reform Commission's own recommendations; both processes agree administrative inefficiency and informality, not statutory rates, are the primary drags on revenue.
Structural gap / riskThe LTPP's 25 percent and the Commission's 22 percent targets for 2050 are not reconciled in any public document reviewed, risking inconsistent Five-Year Development Plan monitoring.
7.3 Tax Base Erosion: The Shrinking Taxpayer Registry
Active registered taxpayers fell from 3.3 million (2021/22) to 2.18 million (2024/25), even as formalisation campaigns and digital tax systems expanded over the same period.
Strength identifiedThe trend has been acknowledged publicly by senior finance officials, and the Commission's recommendations (simplified registration, a one-year startup grace period) directly respond to the likely cause.
Structural gap / riskNew formalisation drives risk running in place rather than expanding net registration, unless the causes of the existing contraction are diagnosed first.
7.4 Tax Exemptions and Incentive Rationalisation
Tax exemptions are estimated to cost Tanzania approximately 2–3 percent of GDP in foregone revenue, with the LTPP itself noting limited demonstrated growth impact.
Strength identifiedThe clearest area of consensus between the LTPP and the Tax Reform Commission, and the single largest identified pool of recoverable revenue without raising any statutory rate on MSMEs.
Structural gap / riskIncentives tend to be allocated to larger, better-connected investors; rationalisation requires sustained political will that multiple years of similar recommendations have not yet delivered.
7.5 Digital Tax Systems and the Mobile Money Levy Precedent
Tanzania has progressively digitalised tax administration since 2013, and the LTPP plans further digitalisation to curb e-commerce tax evasion by 2040 — while the 2021 mobile money levy remains a cautionary domestic precedent.
Strength identifiedRwanda's experience shows digitalisation paired with taxpayer education can materially improve compliance, and Tanzania's 60+ million mobile money accounts provide a strong platform if designed carefully.
Structural gap / riskThe LTPP's digital-tax provisions do not reference the 2021–2022 levy experience or set out safeguards against repeating a sharp, self-defeating drop in transaction volumes.
7.6 Local Government Revenue Autonomy
The LTPP calls for strengthening LGA revenue collection through enhanced fiscal autonomy, while the Tax Reform Commission separately flags overlapping mandates between central (TRA) and local authorities.
Strength identifiedGreater LGA fiscal autonomy is consistent with the decentralised, citizen-led governance channel identified as needing strengthening.
Structural gap / riskWithout first harmonising central and local instruments, expanding LGA revenue risks adding another charge layer on the same small, already-overburdened taxpayer pool.
Tanzania's 2021–2022 Mobile Money Levy: Transaction Volume Recovery Path
Illustrative index (100 = pre-levy baseline volume) built from the reported percentage impacts and reductions at each stage; not a precise monthly series.
8. Summary of Key Findings
Synthesising the channel-level findings against the four-dimensional tax-policy framework produces the matrix below. Ratings reflect this study's assessment: Strong (well evidenced to perform on this dimension), Emerging (directed at this dimension but not yet consolidated), and Weak (does not currently address this dimension, or evidence suggests it is unlikely to).
Table 3: Synthesis matrix — six channels against the four-dimensional framework| Channel | Revenue Yield | Compliance Burden | Formalisation Incentive | Equity |
|---|
| MSME tax wing / graduated tax | Weak | Emerging | Emerging | Emerging |
| Tax-to-GDP fiscal target | Strong (aspiration) | Weak | Weak | Weak |
| Taxpayer base erosion response | Weak | Emerging | Weak | Emerging |
| Exemption rationalisation | Strong (potential) | Emerging | Weak | Emerging |
| Digital tax systems | Emerging | Emerging | Weak | Weak |
| LGA revenue autonomy | Emerging | Weak | Weak | Weak |
Synthesis Matrix Visualised: Rating Score by Channel and Dimension
Scores: Weak = 1, Emerging = 2, Strong = 3 — a visual translation of Table 3 above.
Two patterns stand out. First, the two channels rated Strong on revenue yield — the headline tax-to-GDP target and exemption rationalisation — are macro-level and administrative in nature, not MSME-focused; no MSME-targeted instrument rates above Weak on revenue yield. Second, no channel rates Strong on compliance burden, meaning the barrier comparative evidence identifies as most decisive for formalisation behaviour is not yet the primary design focus of any Tanzanian tax instrument reviewed.
9. Study Approach
This study is based on a structured desk review of the LTPP's fiscal and formalisation chapters, cross-referenced against the Presidential Commission on Tax Reforms' March 2026 report and recent Ministry of Finance and Bank of Tanzania data, combined with a comparative review of published research and policy analysis on MSME and presumptive taxation in Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda, and documented reporting on Tanzania's own 2021–2022 mobile money levy episode. The four-dimensional tax-policy framework in Section 3 was applied consistently across all six channels to produce the findings in Section 7 and the synthesis matrix in Section 8.
9.1 Basis of the Findings
- Direct textual analysis of the LTPP's fiscal sustainability and informal-sector formalisation chapters and their target tables.
- Cross-referencing against the Presidential Commission on Tax Reforms' March 2026 report and contemporaneous news coverage of its recommendations.
- Comparative analysis of published research on MSME and presumptive tax regimes in Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda, and of documented reporting on Tanzania's 2021–2022 mobile money levy.
9.2 Scope and Limitations
- This is a desk-based comparative policy analysis; it does not include new primary fieldwork or key-informant interviews with taxpayers, TRA officials, or MSME associations. The ratings in Section 8 are this study's analytical judgement based on the design of the instruments as written and on comparative evidence, not a direct measurement of Tanzanian outcomes on the ground.
- Tax-to-GDP figures for Tanzania vary slightly by source and year (12.8–13.7 percent across sources reviewed) depending on methodology and fiscal year; this study reports the range transparently rather than resolving it to a single figure.
- The Presidential Commission's 284 recommendations were reviewed through public reporting of the March 2026 submission rather than the full unpublished report; specific recommendation numbering and detail may be refined as the report is formally released and acted upon.
How Does Tax Policy Shape Ordinary Citizens' Direct Participation in Tanzania's Dira 2050?
Dira 2050's promise is not just macroeconomic growth, but that ordinary citizens move from mere survival to genuine economic ownership. Tax policy is one of the six participation channels through which that promise is meant to be delivered — and this study's findings speak directly to it. Formalisation is often presented as the mechanism that pulls an informal trader into the visible, protected economy: once registered, an MSME can, in principle, access credit, legal protection, and market linkages it could not reach informally.
But this study's channel-level findings (Section 7.1) and the companion 'From Survival to Ownership' report both point to the same caution: the MSME tax wing currently rates only Emerging, not Strong, on formalisation incentive — meaning the pathway from informal survival to formal ownership is directed at, but not yet consolidated for, the ordinary citizen it is meant to serve. For a smallholder trader or micro-entrepreneur, direct participation in Dira 2050 through the tax channel currently means facing simplified — but still real — compliance obligations, in exchange for a formalisation and inclusion benefit that is better evidenced than any revenue benefit to the state. Treating that trade-off honestly, rather than assuming formalisation simultaneously solves both the citizen's inclusion problem and the state's revenue problem, is what this study's separation of the two agendas (Recommendation 2) is designed to protect.
10. Contribution of This Study
- A diagnostic assessment of the strengths and structural gaps associated with each of the six tax-policy channels under Dira 2050, organised around the four-dimensional revenue–compliance–formalisation–equity framework.
- A synthesis matrix (Section 8) showing that Tanzania's MSME-focused tax instruments and its material-revenue instruments are largely distinct, contrary to the LTPP's narrative framing of formalisation as a primary revenue strategy.
- Identification of a specific, previously unreconciled inconsistency between the LTPP's 25 percent and the Presidential Commission's 22 percent tax-to-GDP targets for 2050.
- A direct link between Tanzania's own 2021–2022 mobile money levy experience and the design safeguards its future digital-tax measures should adopt.
11. Policy Recommendations
Based on the findings above, this study recommends six actions, sequenced by urgency:
- Reconcile the LTPP's 25 percent tax-to-GDP target with the Presidential Commission's 22 percent target through a single authoritative fiscal benchmark, since both cannot simultaneously anchor Five-Year Development Plan monitoring.
- Decouple the MSME formalisation agenda from the domestic-revenue agenda: treat the MSME tax wing primarily as a formalisation and financial-inclusion instrument, evaluated on registration and inclusion KPIs, and set a separate, realistic revenue path centred on rationalising the 2–3 percent of GDP lost to exemptions and strengthening administration of the existing large-taxpayer base.
- Diagnose the causes of the taxpayer-base contraction (3.3 million to 2.18 million active taxpayers, 2021/22–2024/25) before expanding new formalisation drives.
- Apply the lesson of the 2021–2022 mobile money levy explicitly to any new digital or e-commerce tax measure: pilot at a low rate, consult stakeholders in advance, monitor transaction-volume impact in real time, and set a pre-agreed reduction trigger if usage drops sharply.
- Harmonise central (TRA) and local government revenue instruments before expanding LGA fiscal autonomy, so greater local revenue-raising power does not add another layer of charges on an already overburdened taxpayer pool.
- Publish exemption-by-exemption cost-benefit data, building on the Presidential Commission's 284 recommendations, so that rationalising the 2–3 percent of GDP lost to exemptions is transparent and can be sequenced ahead of new MSME compliance requirements.
12. Recommended Implementation Roadmap
0–12 monthsPhase 1: Immediate Corrective Action
Reconcile the 22 percent / 25 percent tax-to-GDP target inconsistency (Recommendation 1); publish an exemption-by-exemption cost-benefit register (Recommendation 6).
Year 1–2Phase 2: Diagnosis and Safeguard Design
Diagnose the taxpayer-base contraction (Recommendation 3); design a consultation-and-piloting protocol for any new digital or e-commerce tax measure (Recommendation 4).
Year 2–3Phase 3: Harmonisation and Rollout
Harmonise TRA and LGA revenue instruments (Recommendation 5); roll out the MSME tax wing evaluated on formalisation and inclusion KPIs rather than revenue KPIs (Recommendation 2).
Ongoing from Year 3Phase 4: Institutionalisation
Embed transparent exemption reporting and pre-agreed levy-adjustment triggers as standing fiscal governance practice.
13. Conclusion
Dira 2050's financing model depends on closing a persistent, decades-long tax-to-GDP gap, and its formalisation agenda offers a genuine route to bring millions of informal MSMEs into a system that can support them with credit, market linkages, and legal protection. This study finds, however, that the same instruments cannot be assumed to deliver both formalisation and material new domestic revenue at once: comparative regional evidence and Tanzania's own recent taxpayer-base trends both indicate that MSME-focused tax measures are, at best, a modest revenue contributor, while the largest realistic domestic-revenue gains lie in exemption rationalisation and administration of the existing tax base. Recognising this distinction — and applying the direct lesson of Tanzania's own 2021–2022 mobile money levy episode to future digital-tax design — would allow the formalisation agenda to proceed on its real strength, citizen inclusion and ownership, without being asked to also close a fiscal gap it is not well suited to closing alone.
Muhtasari kwa Kiswahili
Lengo la utafiti: Utafiti huu unachunguza kama sera za kodi zinazolenga MSME chini ya Dira 2050 zinaweza kufanikisha malengo mawili kwa wakati mmoja — kurasimisha sekta isiyo rasmi na kuongeza mapato ya ndani — au kama malengo hayo yanapaswa kutekelezwa kwa hatua tofauti.
Matokeo makuu: Uwiano wa kodi kwa Pato la Taifa (tax-to-GDP) wa Tanzania ni asilimia 12.9, chini ya wastani wa Afrika Kusini mwa Jangwa la Sahara (asilimia 15–18). Malengo mawili tofauti ya mwaka 2050 yapo — LTPP inalenga asilimia 25, wakati Tume ya Rais ya Marekebisho ya Kodi inalenga asilimia 22 — bila upatanisho rasmi.
Changamoto ya walipa kodi: Idadi ya walipa kodi waliosajiliwa imepungua kutoka milioni 3.3 (2021/22) hadi milioni 2.18 (2024/25), licha ya kampeni za urasimishaji kuendelea.
Fundisho la tozo ya miamala ya simu: Tozo ya mwaka 2021 ilipunguza miamala ya pesa za simu kwa asilimia 38 ndani ya miezi mitatu, ikapunguzwa mara kadhaa, na hatimaye kufutwa kwa kiasi kikubwa 2022 — somo muhimu kwa kodi za kidijitali zijazo.
Mapendekezo: Ripoti inapendekeza hatua sita, zikiwemo kupatanisha malengo mawili ya tax-to-GDP, kutenganisha ajenda ya urasimishaji wa MSME na ajenda ya mapato ya ndani, kuchunguza sababu za kupungua kwa walipa kodi, na kutumia fundisho la tozo ya simu kwenye kodi za kidijitali zijazo.
Related TICGL Research & Tools
Frequently Asked Questions
Can MSME formalisation alone close Tanzania's tax-to-GDP gap?
No — this study finds no structural reason to expect Tanzania's MSME tax wing to raise material direct revenue, even if it succeeds as a formalisation tool. Comparable regimes in Kenya (0.002 percent of GDP in 2023) show presumptive taxes aimed at the smallest enterprises typically raise negligible revenue relative to the compliance burden they impose.
What is Tanzania's current tax-to-GDP ratio compared to its 2050 target?
Approximately 12.9 percent in 2024, against an LTPP target of 25 percent and a Presidential Commission target of 22 percent for 2050 — two unreconciled official benchmarks.
Why did Tanzania's taxpayer registry shrink between 2021 and 2025?
Active registered taxpayers fell from 3.3 million to 2.18 million, even as formalisation campaigns expanded. Officials have publicly attributed part of this to the overburdening of a small pool of existing taxpayers.
What happened with Tanzania's 2021 mobile money transaction levy?
It cut monthly peer-to-peer transaction volumes by roughly 38 percent within three months, was reduced three times, and was largely scrapped for most transfers by October 2022 following public and legal pushback.
Which tax-policy instruments generate the most realistic domestic revenue?
Exemption rationalisation (worth an estimated 2–3 percent of GDP) and stronger administration of the existing large-taxpayer base — not MSME-focused instruments.
References
- United Republic of Tanzania. Long-Term Perspective Plan (LTPP) 2026/27–2050/51: Pathways to Prosperity (Dira 2050).
- The Citizen (Tanzania). Tax commission proposes 284 changes to reform Tanzania's tax system, 18 March 2026.
- TanzaniaInvest. Presidential Commission Proposes 284 Measures to Overhaul Tanzania Tax System, March 2026.
- The EastAfrican. Tanzania tax review warns of trust erosion, proposes sweeping overhaul, March 2026.
- PwC Tanzania. Broadening Tanzania's Tax Base (press release).
- TICGL. Why Tanzania Must Expand Its Tax Base; Tanzania Tax Revenue, Government Role & Private Sector-Driven Development.
- Brookings Institution. Designing Simplified Tax Regimes to Work for Women's Economic Empowerment.
- UNU-WIDER Working Paper 2021/163. An Assessment of Presumptive Tax in Uganda.
