A Data-Driven Historical and Comparative Analysis — Tanzania Economic Research Institute (TERI) | TICGL
Tanzania's government has long operated at the intersection of state and market — a legacy rooted in Ujamaa socialism and the Arusha Declaration of 1967. With 308 SOEs spanning every sector, the state remains one of the most dominant commercial actors in the country. The evidence is unambiguous: heavy state participation generates persistent fiscal losses, distorts competition, crowds out private investment, and constrains the inclusive growth Tanzania needs to achieve Dira 2050.
Tanzania's heavy government role in business stems directly from Ujamaa (familyhood), the African socialist vision of President Julius Nyerere. The turning point was the Arusha Declaration of February 1967, which formalised a sweeping nationalization programme.
The state took control of banks, major industries, farms, trading operations, and transport — in pursuit of self-reliance, equality, and economic sovereignty.
| Sector | Key Entities Nationalized | Year |
|---|---|---|
| Banking & Finance | National Bank of Commerce (NBC), People's Bank of Zanzibar | 1967 |
| Industry & Manufacturing | Tanganyika Packers, Tanzania Breweries (partial) | 1967–1972 |
| Agriculture | Ujamaa village cooperatives, NAFCO farms | 1970s |
| Trade & Commerce | State Trading Corporation, regional trading companies | 1967 |
| Utilities & Infrastructure | TANESCO (electricity), DAWASCO (water), TTCL (telecom) | 1960s–70s |
| Transport | Air Tanzania Corporation, Tanzania Railways, Harbour Authority | 1970s |
| Mining | STAMICO, partial interests in Williamson Diamonds | 1970s |
Facing acute foreign exchange crisis, Tanzania entered an IMF/World Bank Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1986 under President Mwinyi. Between 1992 and 2002, over 350 parastatal entities were privatized, liquidated, or restructured under the Presidential Parastatal Sector Reform Commission (PSRC).
| Period | Policy Regime | GDP Growth (Avg) | Key Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1967–1985 | Ujamaa / State Capitalism | −0.5% p.a. real p.c. | Economic stagnation, shortages, fiscal crisis |
| 1986–1995 | SAP Reform Transition | 3.1% avg | Liberalization, partial parastatal reform |
| 1996–2010 | Post-reform growth | 6.8% avg | Private sector investment surge, FDI growth |
| 2011–2020 | Mixed / Selective re-statization | 6.2% avg | Some re-nationalization, SOE expansion |
| 2021–2025 | Samia era recovery | 5.2–6.0% avg | 4Rs reform, SOE corporatization push |
As of 2026, Tanzania operates 308 state-owned companies, of which the government holds majority shares in 252. Total public investment rose from TZS 65 trillion in 2020 to TZS 86.29 trillion by 2024 — a 32.7% increase in five years.
| SOE | Sector | Financial Status | FY 2024/25 Data |
|---|---|---|---|
| TANESCO | Electricity | Chronic Losses | ~TZS 400bn annual govt subsidies; 18% cost reduction under reforms |
| Air Tanzania (ATCL) | Aviation | Heavy Losses | TZS 99.8bn in government subsidies (CAG 2025) |
| TTCL | Telecommunications | Net Loss | TZS 27.7bn net loss (CAG 2025) |
| DAWASCO | Water Supply | Chronic Losses | Ongoing losses; non-cost-reflective tariffs |
| Tanzania Railways (TRC) | Rail Transport | Losses | CAG 2025: major losses, operational inefficiencies |
| STAMICO | Mining | Mixed | Subsidies for exploration operations |
| NBM / TIB | Banking / Dev Finance | Subsidized | Below-market lending; recapitalization needs |
| Metric | FY 2022/23 | FY 2024/25 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| SOE subsidies as % of national budget | 9.8% | 12.3% | +2.5pp (+25.5%) |
| Annual subsidy growth (avg) | — | 15% per year | 3-year trend ↑ |
| Total public investment in SOEs | TZS ~75T | TZS 86.3T | +TZS 11.3T |
| SOEs dependent on Treasury | ~78% | ~82% | Worsening |
| SOE dividends collected | TZS 622bn (est.) | TZS 1.028T | +65% (record) |
| Governance Failure | Description | Consequence |
|---|---|---|
| Political Appointments | Board chairs and CEOs appointed on political criteria | Meritocracy undermined; management unaccountable |
| No Hard Budget Constraints | Bailouts anticipated; no market discipline | No incentive for efficiency or cost control |
| Conflicting Mandates | Social service + employment + profitability simultaneously | No mandate fully achieved; structural losses |
| Tariff Suppression | Energy, water, transport tariffs below cost-recovery | Losses guaranteed; blanket cross-subsidies entrenched |
| Weak Procurement | CAG identifies procurement irregularities consistently | Major driver of financial losses and waste |
| Lack of Transparency | Detailed SOE financials not publicly disclosed | No accountability; audit recommendations ignored |
| Channel | Mechanism | Tanzania Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Financial Market Crowding | Govt domestic borrowing absorbs bank liquidity, raising rates for private sector | T-bill yields historically 8–12%; private credit growth constrained |
| Regulatory Privilege | SOEs receive preferential licenses, land access & regulatory treatment | TANESCO monopoly; port exclusivity; TTCL preferential spectrum |
| Direct Market Competition | SOEs operate with subsidized cost bases in sectors private firms could serve | Air Tanzania vs private airlines; TTCL vs Airtel/Vodacom (asymmetric competition) |
| Fiscal Resource Diversion | SOE subsidies divert budget from public goods that reduce private sector costs | 12.3% of budget consumed by SOE subsidies (FY 2024/25) |
| Investor Confidence | Uncertainty about state commercial behavior deters FDI & domestic investment | US Dept. of State: "progress to improve business climate is limited" (2025) |
An ODI analysis (2025) estimated Tanzania will require approximately USD 3.7 trillion in total investment between 2025 and 2050 to achieve a trillion-dollar economy — requiring annual gross fixed capital formation at approximately 35.9% of GDP while dramatically increasing the private sector share.
A cross-country analysis reveals a spectrum of government approaches — from near-total disengagement to strategic arm's-length management — each with distinct outcomes for growth, efficiency, and fiscal health.
| Policy Feature | Hong Kong Approach |
|---|---|
| Government Spending | ~15–18% of GDP at peak; among world's lowest |
| Tax Regime | Flat, low corporate and income taxes; no capital gains tax; no tariffs |
| State Enterprises | Minimal; focused on essential infrastructure (MTR Corporation — partially listed) |
| Government's Commercial Role | None. Markets determine resource allocation |
| Regulatory Posture | Light-touch, rules-based, predictable |
| Result | Transformed from poor entrepôt to high-income territory by 1990s |
| Feature | Singapore (Temasek) | Tanzania (Current) |
|---|---|---|
| Ownership Structure | Holding company (Temasek) — independent of ministries | Ministries directly own and supervise SOEs |
| Board Appointments | Independent, merit-based; professional executives | Presidential appointees; political criteria |
| Commercial Mandate | Pure commercial return; no social subsidization | Mixed social/commercial mandates; profits secondary |
| Hard Budget Constraints | Yes — restructuring if returns inadequate | No — bailouts expected and routine |
| Transparency | Annual reports, financials publicly available | Detailed financials often not publicly disclosed |
| Budget Contribution | Temasek + GIC contribute ~20% of budget | SOEs consume 12.3% of budget (net drain) |
| Competitive Neutrality | GLCs compete on equal terms; no regulatory privilege | SOEs receive subsidies, guarantees, tariff protection |
| Country | Model Type | Govt Spending/GDP | SOE Role | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hong Kong | Minimal intervention | ~15% | Infrastructure only | High growth, high income, low fiscal risk |
| Singapore | Arm's-length strategic | ~17% | Commercial via Temasek; profit-oriented | High growth, budget surplus, strong governance |
| South Korea | Developmental state | ~22% | Chaebols (private) led; SOEs support | Rapid industrialisation, private sector dominant |
| Rwanda | Strategic enablement | ~27% | Limited; Agaciro Fund (SWF) model | High FDI, strong business climate |
| Tanzania (current) | Direct commercial | ~26% | 82% subsidized, loss-making | Fiscal drag, crowding out, slow private growth |
| Botswana | Resource-fund model | ~28% | Pula Fund (SWF); SOEs limited | Managed resource revenue, private growth |
Governments and markets have comparative advantages in different domains. Confusion of these domains produces worse outcomes than specialization in either.
| Government Does Well | Why | Tanzania Example |
|---|---|---|
| Rule of Law & Contract Enforcement | Non-excludable public good | Judiciary, police, land registry reform |
| Tax Collection & Fiscal Management | Coercive authority needed | TRA modernization, VAT, corporate tax |
| Macroeconomic Stability | Central bank, monetary policy | BOT inflation targeting, reserve management |
| Regulatory Oversight | Market failures: monopoly, externalities | EWURA, TCRA, CMSA regulatory functions |
| Physical Infrastructure | Public goods / natural monopoly | TANZAM Highway, TAZARA (where private fails) |
| Social Services Baseline | Equity rationale; market under-provides for poor | Primary education, basic health, water access |
| Investment Promotion | Coordination failures | TIPA, EPZs, TISEZA facilitation functions |
Achieving role clarity does not require overnight radical privatization. It requires a phased, evidence-based, and politically realistic transition grounded in subsidiarity, commercial discipline, enabling environment priority, and transparency.
Tanzania has come a long way from the Ujamaa era. Yet the current equilibrium — 308 SOEs, 82% Treasury-dependent, consuming 12.3% of the national budget — is not compatible with the ambitions of FYDP IV or Dira 2050.
Tanzania needs approximately USD 3.7 trillion in investment over the next 25 years. That capital will not come from the government alone; it must come from a vibrant, trusted, and fairly treated private sector. The fundamental reform required is conceptual before it is institutional: a shared understanding, embedded in policy and law, that the government's role is to enable business — not to be business. When governments compete with the private sector using taxpayer-subsidized capital, everyone loses: taxpayers pay for losses, investors avoid the market, consumers receive inferior services, and the economy underperforms its potential.
The Ujamaa experiment answered a real question — can the state alone drive development? — and the answer, delivered over a painful two decades, was no. Tanzania does not need to repeat that lesson. The path forward is role clarity, not retreat from governance.
Tanzania Economic Research Institute (TERI) | Tanzania Investment and Consultant Group Ltd (TICGL)
economist@ticgl.com | +255 768 699 002 | ticgl.com
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania | © 2026 TICGL. All Rights Reserved.
Tanzania’s government, under President Samia Suluhu Hassan, has implemented an ambitious array of public investment projects from 2020 to 2025, spanning agriculture, transport, energy, water, health, education, and other sectors. These projects, detailed in a comprehensive table below, aim to drive inclusive economic growth, enhance infrastructure, and improve social services, aligning with Tanzania’s Development Vision 2025 and the Third Five-Year Development Plan (FYDP III). This cases study evaluates the economic potential of these projects, calculates their total budget, assesses their fiscal burden on the government, and explores how Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) could mitigate this burden while enhancing outcomes.
Tanzania’s 2020–2025 public investment projects, spanning 25 initiatives across agriculture, transport, energy, water, health, education, social protection, mining, and ICT, have a total budget of TZS 27,737B–29,309B (USD 10.67B–11.27B). Key allocations include agriculture (TZS 900B–1,230B, e.g., TZS 600B–800B for irrigation), transport (TZS 9,730B–10,190B, e.g., TZS 7,500B for SGR), energy (TZS 8,400B–8,500B, e.g., TZS 7,600B for JNHPP), water (TZS 2,320B), health (TZS 300B–450B), education (TZS 1,107.4B–1,217.4B), social protection (TZS 3,640B), mining (TZS 50B–80B), and ICT (TZS 220B–330B). These projects drive economic growth (6% GDP in 2025), create jobs (e.g., 41,117 from new investments), and enhance exports (USD 16.7B in 2025), but strain the TZS 56.49T 2025/26 budget, consuming 9.8–10.4% annually. Public-Private Partnerships could save TZS 6,934B–7,327B, reduce the fiscal deficit from 3% to 2–2.1% of GDP, and boost growth by 0.5–1% through private sector efficiency and investment.
The economic potential of these projects is substantial, addressing critical needs across sectors and fostering inclusive growth. Below are key highlights:
Overall, these projects drive GDP growth (5.5% in 2024, projected 6% in 2025), create jobs (e.g., 41,117 from new investments in 2025), and enhance export revenues (USD 16.7B in 2025). Multiplier effects stimulate related industries, reduce poverty, and improve living standards.
Tanzania’s 2025/26 national budget is TZS 56.49T, with domestic revenue projected at TZS 31.38T (70.7%) and a fiscal deficit of 3% of GDP (TZS 4.7T). The total project budget (TZS 27,737B–29,309B) spans five years (2020–2025), equating to an annual average of TZS 5,547B–5,862B, or 9.8–10.4% of the 2025/26 budget. This is significant, given that development expenditure in 2025/26 is TZS 757.79B for the Ministry of Finance alone, with total development spending likely around TZS 15T–20T annually.
System: government expenditures absorbed by debt servicing (TZS 8.2T annually). This places a heavy burden on the government, as development projects compete with recurrent expenditures (TZS 19.43T in 2025/26) and debt servicing.
The fiscal burden is substantial, as the government must balance these investments with recurrent costs, debt repayment, and social services, potentially straining fiscal discipline and increasing the deficit if revenues (TZS 26.73T from TRA in 2025/26) fall short.
Implementing these projects through PPPs could significantly alleviate the fiscal burden and enhance efficiency, as outlined in the Public Private Partnership (Amendment) Act No. 4 of 2023 and its regulations. Below, we analyze the potential impacts of PPPs, supported by figures:
If 50% of the total project budget (TZS 13,868B–14,654B) were financed through PPPs:
The TZS 27,737B–29,309B project cost over five years represents 49–52% of the 2025/26 national budget (TZS 56.49T). This heavy reliance on government funding strains fiscal resources:
PPPs could reduce this burden by shifting 30–50% of costs to private investors, saving TZS 6,934B–7,327B and narrowing the deficit to 2–2.1% of GDP, aligning with fiscal discipline goals. However, regulatory reforms must address transparency and investor confidence to ensure PPP success.
Tanzania’s 2020–2025 public investment projects, with a total budget of TZS 27,737B–29,309B, have significant economic potential, driving GDP growth to 6% in 2025, creating over 41,000 jobs, and boosting exports by 16.8%. Agriculture, transport, energy, and water projects enhance productivity, connectivity, and living standards, with multiplier effects in related industries. However, the fiscal burden is substantial, consuming 9.8–10.4% of the annual budget and risking a wider deficit. PPPs could save TZS 6,934B–7,327B, accelerate growth by 0.5–1%, and create additional jobs, but require stronger regulatory frameworks to overcome historical challenges. By balancing government funding with PPPs, Tanzania can achieve sustainable growth while maintaining fiscal stability, paving the way for Vision 2025’s middle-income status.
Below is a table summarizing public investment projects implemented across various sectors. The table includes project descriptions, budgets, locations, economic potential, and multiplier effects for citizens.
| Sector | Project Description | Budget (TZS) | Location | Economic Potential | Multiplier Effects |
| Agriculture | Increased availability of improved seeds by 41.9% (from 50,747 tons in 2021 to 72,031.9 tons in 2024). | TZS 100B–150B (estimated, ~10–12% of TZS 1.24T agriculture budget for 2025). | Nationwide (TOSCI Seed Quality Control Institute mentioned). | Enhances crop yields, improves food security, and increases farmers' incomes through better-quality produce. | Stimulates agro-processing industries, boosts local markets, and supports rural economies. |
| Agriculture | Increased fertilizer availability to boost agricultural productivity. | TZS 150B–200B (estimated, ~12–15% of TZS 1.24T agriculture budget for 2025). | Nationwide. | Improves agricultural output, supports smallholder farmers, and enhances food self-sufficiency. | Encourages growth in agribusiness, transport, and retail sectors due to increased agricultural output. |
| Agriculture | Expansion of sugar production (Kilombero factory: +271,000 tons; Mibwaa: 4,700 ha; Kagera: 8,072 ha). | TZS 50B–80B (estimated, based on similar agro-industrial projects). | Kilombero, Mibwaa, Kagera. | Increases domestic sugar supply (from 311,588 tons in 2020 to 392,724 tons in 2024), reducing imports. | Creates jobs in sugar processing, supports local farmers, and boosts export potential. |
| Agriculture | Irrigation projects expanded from 13 in 2020 to 780 in 2025, increasing irrigated land from 561,333 ha to 983,466.06 ha. | TZS 600B–800B (estimated, ~50–60% of TZS 1.24T agriculture budget, given irrigation’s priority). | Nationwide, with major projects using Lake Victoria and Tanganyika water. | Enhances agricultural productivity, supports year-round farming, and improves food security. | Stimulates agro-industries, creates jobs in irrigation infrastructure, and supports rural development. |
| Cooperatives | Establishment of Cooperative Bank with initial capital of TZS 58B. | TZS 58B (stated in document). | Nationwide (cooperative societies). | Provides affordable credit to cooperative societies, enhancing economic empowerment of members. | Boosts cooperative-based businesses, supports small-scale farmers, and stimulates local economies. |
| Fisheries | Provision of 1,636 fish cages and 280 boats, plus 160 boats worth TZS 11.51B, creating 13,180 jobs. | TZS 11.51B (for boats, stated in document). | Nationwide (coastal and inland fisheries). | Increases fish production (from 473,188 tons in 2021 to 543,589.91 tons in 2025), supports livelihoods. | Stimulates fish processing, transport, and market chains, boosting coastal and inland economies. |
| Transport (Roads) | Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) Phase 2 (20.3 km), Phase 3 (23.3 km, 80% complete), Phase 4 (30.1 km, 22.3% complete). | TZS 1.2T (estimated, based on Phase 1 costs and urban transport budgets). | Dar es Salaam (Mbagala to City Center, Gongo la Mboto, Tegeta). | Improves urban mobility, reduces transport costs, and enhances access to economic opportunities. | Stimulates commerce, reduces congestion-related losses, and supports urban economic growth. |
| Transport (Roads) | Dodoma Outer Ring Road (112 km, 80% complete). | TZS 200B–300B (estimated, based on similar road projects in Tanzania). | Dodoma. | Enhances connectivity in the capital, supports urban development, and facilitates trade. | Boosts local businesses, supports construction sector, and improves access to services. |
| Transport (Roads) | TANZAM Highway expansion (Uyole to Songwe Airport, 36 km, 23.5% complete). | TZS 80B–120B (estimated, based on highway construction costs). | Mbeya. | Improves regional connectivity, supports trade, and enhances access to Songwe Airport. | Stimulates trade with neighboring countries, supports logistics, and boosts Mbeya’s economy. |
| Transport (Airports) | Nduli Airport Phase 1 completion. | TZS 50B–70B (estimated, based on regional airport development costs). | Iringa. | Enhances air connectivity, supports tourism, and facilitates cargo transport. | Boosts tourism-related businesses, supports agricultural exports, and creates jobs in aviation. |
| Transport (Railways) | Standard Gauge Railway (SGR): Mwanza–Isaka (341 km, 63.16% complete), Makutupora–Tabora (384 km, 14.53% complete), Tabora–Isaka (163 km, 6.65% complete), Tabora–Kipoma (500 km, 7.41% complete). | TZS 7.5T (estimated, based on reported SGR costs for 2025/26). | Mwanza, Isaka, Tabora, Kipoma. | Reduces transport costs, enhances trade efficiency, and connects Tanzania to Burundi. | Stimulates logistics, trade, and industrial growth along rail corridors; supports job creation. |
| Transport (Airlines) | Air Tanzania (ATCL) expansion with new cargo plane routes to India, Kenya, Dubai, DRC, and planned routes to Nigeria, Mozambique, Oman, Angola. | TZS 200B–300B (estimated, based on airline fleet expansion and operations). | Nationwide (international routes). | Reduces losses for producers, enhances export capacity, and promotes Tanzania globally. | Boosts tourism, agriculture exports, and aviation-related industries; creates jobs. |
| Transport (Ports) | Port improvements reducing ship waiting time from 46 days to 7 days, container handling up 35% (from 159,807 to 215,286 containers). | TZS 500B–700B (estimated, based on port modernization budgets). | Dar es Salaam. | Increases port efficiency, reduces trade costs, and boosts revenue collection. | Stimulates trade, logistics, and port-related services; supports economic growth in Dar es Salaam. |
| Energy | Julius Nyerere Hydropower Project (JNHPP, 2,115 MW). | TZS 7.6T (reported cost for JNHPP). | Nationwide (Coast Region). | Increases electricity supply (from 1,601.84 MW in 2020 to 4,031.71 MW in 2025), supports industrial growth. | Stimulates manufacturing, reduces energy costs for businesses, and supports rural electrification. |
| Energy | Kinyerezi I Extension (185 MW, natural gas) and Rusumo Project (26.67 MW, shared with Burundi and Rwanda). | TZS 500B (Kinyerezi I: ~TZS 400B; Rusumo: ~TZS 100B, estimated based on regional energy projects). | Kinyerezi, Rusumo (Kagera River). | Enhances energy reliability, supports industrial and household needs. | Boosts industrial productivity, supports small businesses, and improves quality of life. |
| Energy | Electricity transmission lines (e.g., Singida–Arusha–Namanga: 414 km, Geita–Nyakanazi: 144 km). | TZS 300B–400B (estimated, based on transmission infrastructure costs). | Singida, Arusha, Namanga, Geita, Nyakanazi, Tabora, Urambo. | Improves electricity access, connects Kigoma and Katavi to the national grid. | Supports industrial growth, reduces energy poverty, and stimulates local economies. |
| Water | 2,331 urban and rural water supply projects benefiting 5,985,500 people. | TZS 1.3T (stated for 28 urban projects; total estimated at TZS 1.8T including rural). | 28 urban areas, rural regions (e.g., Arusha, Coast, Dar es Salaam). | Improves access to clean water (urban: 84% to 91.6%; rural: 70.1% to 85%), enhances health outcomes. | Reduces healthcare costs, boosts productivity, and supports water-related businesses. |
| Water | Arusha water supply project increasing water production from 40M liters to 200M liters daily. | TZS 520B (stated in document). | Arusha. | Enhances water availability, supports urban growth, and improves public health. | Stimulates local businesses, supports construction, and improves quality of life. |
| Health | Procurement of advanced diagnostic equipment (MRI: 7 to 13, CT scans: 13 to 45, Digital X-Ray: 147 to 491, Ultrasound: 476 to 970). | TZS 100B–150B (estimated, based on health sector budgets for 2025/26). | Nationwide (national and referral hospitals). | Improves diagnostic capacity, reduces mortality, and enhances healthcare quality. | Supports medical tourism, creates jobs in healthcare, and stimulates medical supply industries. |
| Health | Increased availability of medicines and medical supplies from 73% in 2020 to 86.2% in April 2025. | TZS 200B–300B (estimated, based on health sector allocations). | Nationwide (public health facilities). | Enhances healthcare access, reduces treatment costs, and improves patient outcomes. | Boosts pharmaceutical supply chains, supports local suppliers, and improves public health. |
| Education | Construction of 1,992 teachers’ houses, 638 laboratories, 1,284 latrines, and 1,008 dormitories. | TZS 300B–400B (estimated, based on education infrastructure budgets). | Nationwide. | Improves educational infrastructure, enhances learning environments, and attracts qualified teachers. | Stimulates construction sector, supports local economies, and improves educational outcomes. |
| Education | Free education program expansion (primary to secondary), budget increased from TZS 304B to TZS 787.4B. | TZS 787.4B (stated in document). | Nationwide. | Increases school enrollment (students with loans: 142,170 in 2020 to 436,332 in 2025), enhances literacy. | Boosts human capital, supports long-term economic growth, and stimulates education-related industries. |
| Education | SAMIA Scholarship for 1,343 students in STEM and health fields. | TZS 20B–30B (estimated, based on scholarship program costs). | Nationwide. | Builds skilled workforce in critical sectors, supports innovation and healthcare. | Enhances industrial and health sectors, creates high-skill jobs, and supports technological advancement. |
| Social Protection | TASAF and other programs (e.g., 10% Halmashauri revenue loans for women, youth, and disabled). | TZS 3.64T (stated in document). | Nationwide. | Empowers vulnerable groups, supports small businesses, and reduces poverty. | Stimulates local economies, supports entrepreneurship, and enhances social inclusion. |
| Mining | Increased mineral trading centers (61 to 109) and markets (41 to 43). | TZS 50B–80B (estimated, based on mining sector investments). | Dodoma, Dar es Salaam, Geita, Chunya. | Increases mineral revenue contribution (6.8% to 10% of GDP), supports small-scale miners. | Stimulates mining-related industries, supports local economies, and boosts export revenues. |
| ICT | National Fiber Optic Network expansion (8,319 km to 13,820 km), communication towers (754 to 9,278). | TZS 200B–300B (estimated, based on ICT budget allocations for 2025/26). | Nationwide (109 LGAs connected). | Enhances connectivity, reduces communication costs, and supports digital economy. | Stimulates tech startups, supports e-commerce, and improves access to information and services. |
| ICT | SAMIA Innovation Fund for startups and 464 innovation projects from MAKISATU. | TZS 20B–30B (estimated, based on innovation fund allocations). | Nationwide. | Fosters innovation, supports tech startups, and creates jobs in the digital economy. | Stimulates tech industry growth, enhances competitiveness, and attracts investment. |
Notes