This report is prepared by TERI for research and strategic-information purposes only. It does not constitute investment, legal, tax or financial advice, and it does not state the position of the Government of Tanzania. Where sources disagree — as with mining local-content figures — both figures are shown rather than reconciled into one. International comparisons illustrate policy mechanisms and orders of magnitude, not a precise like-for-like benchmark across countries with different resource endowments and starting conditions.
01 — OverviewExecutive Summary
Tanzania's mineral export boom is real: minerals reached 52.6% of total exports in 2025 (up from 45.2% in 2024), mining's share of GDP rose from 7.2% in 2021 to an average of 11.9% across January–September 2025, and gold exports alone reached USD 4.754 billion in 2025, up 39% year-on-year. Tanzania's exports to South Africa — its principal gold-trading partner among African destinations — are now approximately 97% gold. On one reading, this is a genuine success story.
It is also a warning sign. The share of Tanzania's economy and export basket occupied by a single, price-volatile commodity is rising steadily, while manufacturing has remained stuck near 8% of GDP for three decades, and independent verification of how much of the mining boom actually reaches the domestic economy is contested — CAG audits find local procurement at 33% of mining spend, while the Ministry of Minerals reports figures above 90% for the same broad period.
Gold dependence is not a geological inevitability. It is the cumulative outcome of specific, identifiable economic policy gaps — in local-content verification, industrial and mineral-value-addition strategy, tax and regulatory predictability, skills development, and project-preparation capacity — each of which is already registered as a reform in the Tanzania Policy Reform Agenda 2026–2031.
South Africa is this report's central comparator, because it is Tanzania's largest single destination for gold exports and because it demonstrates that a country can sustain a world-class mining sector without mining dominating the wider economy. Norway, Botswana, Chile, Indonesia and Ghana show the range of further policy instruments — sovereign wealth funds, fiscal rules, equity partnerships, mandatory downstream processing — that resource-rich economies have used, with varying success, to prevent a single commodity from becoming the primary engine of growth.
Read this alongside the Tanzania Policy Reform Agenda, 2026–2031
Every policy gap in this report maps directly onto a reform already registered in TICGL/TERI's 25-item Reform Register — R3, R4, R5, R9, R11, R15, R16 and R20 — so this analysis adds depth to an existing reform agenda rather than proposing a parallel one.
Read: Tanzania Policy Reform Agenda, 2026–2031 →1. The Scale and Trajectory of Tanzania's Gold Dependence
Rising, price-driven, and increasingly concentrated on one partner1.1 Export and GDP concentration
The trend is unambiguous and accelerating. Minerals accounted for approximately 52.6% of Tanzania's total exports in 2025, up from 45.2% in 2024 and 63.7% of non-traditional exports, while mining's contribution to GDP climbed from 7.2% in 2021 to 10.1% in 2024 and averaged 11.9% across January–September 2025. The rally is overwhelmingly price-driven rather than volume-driven: average gold prices rose 70.3% year-on-year in the quarter to March 2026, reaching an indicative USD 4,161.89 per troy ounce in July 2026.
| Indicator | 2021/2024 baseline | 2025 / latest |
|---|---|---|
| Mining share of GDP | 7.2% (2021) | 10.1% (2024); 11.9% avg Jan–Sep 2025 |
| Minerals share of total exports | 45.2% (2024) | 52.6% (2025) |
| Mineral export value | USD 4.119bn (2024) | USD 5.401bn (2025), +31.1% |
| Gold export value | USD 3.42bn (2024, implied) | USD 4.754bn (2025), +39% |
| Mining FDI stock | — | USD 9.79bn (2024), ~74% of total FDI stock |
| Mining FDI inflow (largest single sector) | — | USD 442.2m (2024) |
| Manufacturing share of GDP | ~8% (three-decade average) | ~8% (2026) |
Mining & Mineral Concentration, Baseline vs. Latest
1.2 Bilateral concentration: the South Africa relationship
The concentration is sharper still bilaterally. Tanzania's exports to South Africa nearly doubled between 2020 and 2024, reaching roughly USD 2.293 billion, of which gold alone accounted for approximately USD 2.226 billion in 2024 — around 97% of the bilateral export total that year. Even at the broader SADC level, gold constituted more than three-quarters of Tanzania's exports to the sixteen-member bloc in 2025. South Africa's own exports to Tanzania, by contrast, remain a diversified basket — vehicles, iron and steel products, machinery, beverages and chemicals — the mirror image of an industrially more advanced trading partner.
Tanzania currently runs a large bilateral trade surplus with South Africa — but that surplus is a function of a single commodity whose price Tanzania does not control. The asymmetry in composition, not the aggregate trade balance, is what matters.
1.3 Investment concentration
Investment flows mirror the trade pattern. Mining and quarrying accounted for USD 9.79 billion of Tanzania's total FDI stock in 2024 — roughly three-quarters of the entire stock — and mining was the single largest sector for new FDI inflows that year at USD 442.2 million, ahead of financial services (USD 401.3m), manufacturing (USD 223.1m) and information/communication (USD 152.1m). None of this is inherently problematic — capital is naturally drawn to genuine comparative advantage. The concern is the absence of a comparably scaled and prioritised investment effort directed at manufacturing, which has remained near 8% of GDP for three decades and contributes less than a quarter of exports despite employing roughly 7% of the workforce.
1.4 The measurement gap: a policy failure in its own right
A CAG performance audit covering 2020–2024 found local procurement in mining at 33%, with only 24 of 1,736 approved local-content plans independently audited by 2024/25 — a coverage rate of about 1.4%. The Ministry of Minerals, reporting on a different, more recent period (July 2025–March 2026), states local purchases reached TZS 4.9 trillion, over 90% of total procurement, and issued a July 2026 directive targeting 90% local procurement going forward. The Policy Reform Agenda treats this divergence itself as evidence of a policy and institutional failure — weak independent verification — not a simple data quirk: without one reconciled, independently audited figure, neither government nor investors can reliably judge whether local-content policy is working.
02 — DiagnosisWhy Dependence Persists: Five Policy Gaps
Gold dependence is sustained by identifiable, already-diagnosed economic policy gaps. Each is cross-referenced here to its corresponding reform in the Tanzania Policy Reform Agenda 2026–2031.
| # | Policy gap | Reform ID | The core problem |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Weak independent verification of local content | R9 | Two official, unreconciled figures (33% vs. 90%+) — no credible baseline to measure progress against |
| 2 | Limited project-preparation & industrial-policy capacity | R11, R15 | PPP prep funding is ≈TZS 1–2bn against a ≈TZS 420bn benchmark; SEZ policy leans on tax holidays over serviced land, power and logistics |
| 3 | Tax and regulatory unpredictability | R3, R4, R5 | TZS 1.4–1.5tn in pending VAT refunds and TZS 4.86tn in disputed cases fall disproportionately on smaller, non-mining investors |
| 4 | Skills and TVET constraints | R20 | Only 21% of the workforce has secondary education; TVET enrolment is 4.2% against 800,000+ new entrants a year |
| 5 | Absence of a coherent mineral-value-addition roadmap | R16 | No processing-milestone roadmap or windfall-revenue rule to smooth the current price-driven boom |
3.1 Weak independent verification of local content (R9)
The Policy Reform Agenda classifies this as a design-level reform with high impact: one reconciled definition of "local" (ownership, location and value added), an annual independent audit by the CAG or a comparable third party, and a public, licence-level dashboard. Until this is resolved, supplier-development policy operates without a reliable baseline.
3.2 Limited project-preparation and industrial-policy capacity (R11, R15)
FYDP IV assumes roughly 70% of the TZS 477.7 trillion of investment needed over the plan period will be privately financed. Yet PPP project-preparation funding sits at roughly TZS 1–2 billion against an international benchmark near TZS 420 billion for a comparably sized pipeline, and only nine PPP contracts had reached financial close by June 2026 against a pipeline of 410 registered projects. Without a pipeline of bankable non-mining projects, capital continues to flow disproportionately toward the sector that is already easiest to finance: mining.
3.3 Tax and regulatory unpredictability (R3, R4, R5)
Gold mining, dominated by a small number of very large, well-capitalised firms with long investment horizons and in-house legal capacity, is comparatively well placed to absorb tax and regulatory unpredictability. Smaller manufacturing, agro-processing and services investors — the firms that would need to lead diversification — are disproportionately deterred by exactly this kind of regulatory and cash-flow risk. Unpredictability functions as a hidden tax that falls more heavily on the sectors Tanzania most needs to grow.
3.4 Skills and TVET constraints (R20)
This skills gap constrains both ends of the diversification challenge: it limits how much of mining's own higher-value activity — engineering, maintenance, geology, processing — can be staffed locally, and it limits the skilled-worker pipeline available to any downstream or manufacturing investment. Because instructor supply, not curriculum design, is the specific binding constraint, this is a policy-design problem with a fairly precise fix.
3.5 Absence of a coherent mineral-value-addition roadmap (R16)
Section 59 of the Mining Act — requiring 20% of gold production to be offered locally through a Bank of Tanzania purchase programme — is a genuine policy instrument, but it is not embedded in a wider roadmap that sets processing milestones, sequences investment with power availability, or links mineral licensing to in-country beneficiation plans for gold, nickel and graphite. Nor does Tanzania yet have a windfall-revenue rule to smooth the current price cycle. The result: gold and the broader minerals sector risk functioning as an enclave rather than a platform for the structural transformation FYDP IV and Vision 2050 both require.
3. South Africa: Mining Strength Without Economy-Wide Dependence
The central comparator — and already active inside TanzaniaSouth Africa is this report's central comparator for two reasons: it is Tanzania's principal destination for gold exports, and it demonstrates that a large, sophisticated mining sector and a diversified economy are not mutually exclusive. Mining today is a comparatively modest share of South African GDP — well down from roughly one-fifth at its mid-twentieth-century peak.
| Sector | Share of South African GDP | Share of Tanzanian GDP (2024/25) |
|---|---|---|
| Services (all, combined) | ~73% | n/a (not reported as one bloc) |
| — of which: Finance, real estate & business services | 21.6% | — |
| — of which: General government services | 17.0% | — |
| — of which: Wholesale, retail, motor trade, catering, accommodation | 15.0% | — |
| — of which: Transport, storage & communication | 9.3% | — |
| Manufacturing | 13.9% | ~8% |
| Mining and quarrying | ~8.3% | 11.9% and rising |
| Agriculture | 2.6% | ~25–27% |
Sector Shares: South Africa vs. Tanzania
Mining is large in South Africa; it is simply not larger than everything else combined — precisely the condition Tanzania has not yet reached, since mining's share of Tanzania's own GDP has already overtaken the equivalent South African figure. And the specific sectors that are largest in South Africa — finance, business services, telecommunications — are exactly the sectors in which South African firms (Standard Bank/Stanbic, Absa Group/NBC, Vodacom) are currently building their most durable positions inside Tanzania itself. Tanzania is, in effect, host to the export version of the sectors that anchor South Africa's own diversification, while its domestic economy has not yet grown equivalent Tanzanian-owned champions at the same scale.
Tanzania's own mineral endowment — gold, nickel, graphite and gas — is if anything more diversified than South Africa's resource base was at a comparable stage of development. The difference lies in the cumulative effect of economic policy choices sustained over decades, not in geology.
04 — ComparatorsInternational Comparative Lessons
Beyond South Africa, five further cases illustrate both the range of policy instruments available and the limits of any single one.
| Country | Resource | Key mechanism | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| South Africa | Gold, platinum, coal | Deep capital markets (JSE); universal banks & telecom groups built domestically, exported regionally | Diversified economy; mining strong but not dominant |
| Norway | Oil and gas | Government Pension Fund Global (1990); fiscal rule limiting annual withdrawal to ≈3% of fund value | USD ≈2.2tn sovereign fund (2026); oil revenue de-linked from budget |
| Botswana | Diamonds | Pula Fund (1994); 50:50 Debswana JV with De Beers; 2025 Diamonds-for-Development Fund | High income growth, but fund fell 60% in the 2015–2020 downturn — diversification incomplete |
| Chile | Copper | Structural fiscal balance rule (2000); Economic & Social Stabilization Fund; Codelco | Countercyclical buffers of USD 20bn+; investment-grade rating maintained through price cycles |
| Indonesia | Nickel | Progressive raw-ore export bans (2014 partial, 2020 full) tied to mandatory domestic smelting | Processed nickel exports rose from near zero (2014) to over USD 10bn (2021) |
| Ghana | Gold | Local-content and beneficiation rules under development | A peer, not a solved case — same measurement and enforcement gaps as Tanzania |
The world's largest sovereign wealth fund
Save almost all resource revenue, invest it abroad, spend only the expected long-run return. The relevant lesson for Tanzania is not the fund's scale but the principle: a windfall-revenue rule that automatically saves a share of exceptionally high-price years — already flagged as missing under R16 — is a proven instrument for preventing a price boom from simply being consumed.
What happens when the commodity cycle turns
Botswana's GDP contracted 3.1% in 2024, and mining collapsed 47% in Q4 2025 alone (diamond production down 54.6%), dragging overall GDP down 5.4% for the quarter. This is the mechanism this report warns Tanzania against: when a single commodity's cycle turns, an economy in which it is disproportionately large does not see one sector slow — it sees the whole economy contract.
Converting volatility into stability
A structural fiscal balance rule requires surpluses when copper prices are high and permits deficits only when prices are low — isolating annual budget decisions from short-term price swings. Fiscal rules do not eliminate resource dependence; they buy time and macroeconomic space for other sectors to grow.
Mandatory downstream processing
A binding domestic-processing requirement, sequenced with deliberate industrial investment, shifted Indonesia's nickel-export composition within a single decade — directly relevant to how Tanzania sequences its own nickel (Kabanga) and graphite (Lindi Jumbo) licensing with the processing milestones R16 calls for.
Successful diversification is not the automatic result of resource abundance in any of these cases. Every one required institutions that stabilise and allocate resource rents, policies that deliberately build linkages outside the extractive sector, and a political economy willing to forgo some immediate fiscal take for longer-term structural change. Ghana and Botswana's continuing struggles show this is a sustained institutional commitment, not a single reform.
05 — CoherenceWhat This Means for FYDP IV and Vision 2050
Gold dependence sits at the centre of whether FYDP IV's own targets are internally consistent. The plan's risk assessment already classifies gold and commodity export concentration as a High-severity, Rising-trend risk — driven explicitly by the fact that the 2025 export share (52.6%) is price-driven, not volume-driven. At the same time, FYDP IV's own targets imply a very different, more diversified economy than the one gold dependence is currently producing.
FYDP IV's Coherence Gap: Targets vs. Current Trajectory
Manufacturing is targeted to rise from roughly 8% of GDP to 15% by 2031 — a near-doubling — while FDI is targeted to rise from 2.2% of GDP in 2024 to 10% by 2030, a roughly seven-fold increase implying about 38% annual compound growth. Mining investment is already growing quickly on its own trajectory; the manufacturing target requires a comparably deliberate, comparably resourced effort that is not yet in place.
This is precisely the kind of gap the Policy Reform Agenda's own diagnostic method is designed to surface: of the 25 reforms in its register, 10 are design flaws in existing policy and 9 are missing institutions entirely, and only 6 are pure implementation failures — meaning closing Tanzania's gold-dependence gap is substantially a matter of building or redesigning policy instruments that do not yet exist in adequate form. Left unaddressed, the risk is not that gold exports fall — recent trends suggest the opposite — but that Tanzania records strong headline growth and export figures through 2030 while the manufacturing, skills and value-addition targets that would make that growth durable and broadly shared fall further behind.
06 — RecommendationsPolicy Recommendations
Addressing gold dependence is not primarily a mining-sector problem; it is an economy-wide policy challenge. Recommendations are cross-referenced to the corresponding reform already registered in the Tanzania Policy Reform Agenda.
6.1 Immediate, high-impact actions
1Independent, published local-content verification (R9)
- Mandate regular, independently audited reporting covering procurement, employment and skills transfer.
- Reconcile the CAG and Ministry of Minerals figures into one credible, methodologically transparent number.
2A sequenced mineral-value-addition roadmap (R16)
- Prioritise a limited set of downstream opportunities — gold refining/semi-processing, nickel and graphite processing — with explicit timelines, power requirements and skills needs.
- Link the roadmap explicitly to TISEZA, SEZ policy and power-sector planning.
3A windfall-revenue rule for gold
- Direct a defined share of revenue collected above a reference gold price into a ring-fenced stabilisation mechanism.
- Draw on Chile's structural fiscal balance rule and Norway's fiscal-rule principle, adapted to Tanzania's institutional capacity.
4Use existing South African relationships strategically
- Condition major new investment or expansion by Stanbic, Absa/NBC, Vodacom and comparable firms on measurable supplier-development and skills-transfer commitments.
- Turn an already-asymmetric corporate presence into an active instrument for reducing commodity dependence.
Protect and deliberately expand non-mining export capacity — tourism, horticulture, coffee, cashew, avocado, light manufacturing — so the gold boom does not crowd out policy attention or investment finance from the sectors that already employ far more Tanzanians than mining does.
6.2 Medium-term institutional reforms
- Fund the PPP project-preparation facility to scale (R11) — move preparation funding toward the ≈1–2% of project-value benchmark used internationally, a precondition for FYDP IV's 70%-private-investment assumption to be realistic outside mining.
- Align skills and TVET policy with diversification priorities (R20) — expand instructor capacity and employer-linked programmes in value chains that absorb mining-adjacent skills and support agro-processing, construction materials and services.
- Improve tax and regulatory predictability for value-addition investment (R3, R4, R5) — clear the legacy VAT-refund stock, implement a genuine tax-change notice protocol, establish an independent tax-appeals mechanism, prioritising manufacturing, agro-processing and mineral beneficiation.
- Treat dual EAC–SADC membership as a diversification asset — attract investment in logistics, mineral processing and services capable of serving both blocs, not only reinforce a raw-commodity transit role.
- Build capital-market depth deliberately (R14) — expand local-currency capital-market instruments in the mould of the 2026 IFC–NMB offshore shilling bond, using DSE growth to finance non-mining investment.
"South Africa's experience demonstrates that a country can sustain a world-class mining sector while building a diversified economy in which banking, telecommunications, manufacturing and services provide the broader foundation — and South African firms are, today, actively demonstrating exactly that model inside the Tanzanian economy, even as Tanzania's own export base narrows around the commodity those firms help to finance and trade. The choice is not between mining and diversification — it is between a set of policies that leave gold as an enclave and a set of policies that turn Tanzania's mineral wealth into a platform for the structural change Vision 2050 envisages. Policy, not geology, will determine which path Tanzania follows."
— TICGL / Tanzania Economic Research Institute (TERI)
07 — SourcesMethod & Source Note
This report draws on TICGL/TERI's Tanzania Business Report (September 2026) and Tanzania Policy Reform Agenda 2026–2031, together with official Tanzanian data (Bank of Tanzania, NBS, CAG, Ministry of Minerals) and international sources on comparator countries, including Statistics South Africa, Statistics Botswana, Norges Bank Investment Management, the Resource Governance Institute, and reporting on Indonesia's nickel-processing policy.
Full references (28+ sources) are listed in the complete report.
Request the Full Report
This page summarises TICGL/TERI's "Gold Without Growth?" report. Institutions, investors, government agencies and development partners may request the complete report — including the full international case studies and reference list — directly from TERI.
✉️ Request via economist@ticgl.com →08 — Quick AnswersFrequently Asked Questions
How dependent has Tanzania become on gold exports?
Minerals reached 52.6% of Tanzania's total exports in 2025, up from 45.2% in 2024. Gold exports alone rose 39% to USD 4.754 billion in 2025, and mining's share of GDP climbed from 7.2% in 2021 to an average of 11.9% across January–September 2025. Tanzania's exports to South Africa, its principal African gold-trading partner, are now approximately 97% gold.
Is Tanzania's gold boom driven by rising production or rising prices?
Overwhelmingly by price. Average gold prices rose 70.3% year-on-year in the quarter to March 2026, reaching an indicative USD 4,161.89 per troy ounce in July 2026. A boom built on price rather than expanding productive capacity or downstream processing can reverse as quickly as it arrived.
What does South Africa show about mining and economic diversification?
That a country can sustain a world-class mining sector without mining dominating the economy. Mining is about 8.3% of South African GDP, while services collectively account for roughly 73%. South African firms built on that diversified base — Stanbic, Absa/NBC, Vodacom — are today among the most durable foreign commercial presences inside Tanzania itself, even as Tanzania's own export base narrows around the gold those firms help finance and trade.
Why is there disagreement over how much of Tanzania's mining boom reaches the domestic economy?
A CAG audit covering 2020–2024 found local procurement in mining at 33%, with only 1.4% of approved local-content plans independently audited. The Ministry of Minerals, reporting on a different, more recent period, states local purchases reached over 90%. TICGL/TERI treats this divergence as evidence of a verification failure, not a data quirk.
What policy instruments have other resource-rich countries used to avoid dependence on one commodity?
Norway saves nearly all petroleum revenue in a sovereign wealth fund. Chile runs a structural fiscal balance rule. Botswana partners with De Beers and created a diversification fund. Indonesia banned raw nickel-ore exports to force domestic smelting. Australia built deep capital markets, skills and property-rights institutions over decades. None of these transitions was quick, and none relied on a single instrument alone.
Muhtasari kwa Kiswahili
Dhahabu Bila Ukuaji? Mapungufu ya Sera za Kiuchumi Nyuma ya Utegemezi wa Tanzania kwa Mauzo ya Dhahabu. — Madini yamefikia asilimia 52.6 ya mauzo yote ya nje ya Tanzania mwaka 2025 (kutoka asilimia 45.2 mwaka 2024), sekta ya madini ni asilimia 11.9 ya Pato la Taifa, na mauzo ya dhahabu yaliongezeka kwa asilimia 39 — wakati sekta ya viwanda imebaki karibu asilimia 8 ya Pato la Taifa kwa miongo mitatu.
Tatizo si dhahabu yenyewe: Ripoti hii inaonesha utegemezi wa dhahabu si jambo la kijiolojia lisiloepukika — ni matokeo ya mapungufu matano ya sera: uthibitisho dhaifu wa ununuzi wa ndani migodini (asilimia 33 kwa ukaguzi wa CAG dhidi ya zaidi ya asilimia 90 kwa Wizara ya Madini), uwezo mdogo wa kuandaa miradi ya viwanda, kutokuwa na utabiri wa kodi, upungufu wa ujuzi wa kiufundi, na kukosekana kwa ramani madhubuti ya uongezaji thamani wa madini.
Mfano wa Afrika Kusini: Madini ni asilimia 8.3 tu ya Pato la Taifa la Afrika Kusini, wakati huduma (fedha, mawasiliano, biashara) ni asilimia 73. Makampuni ya Afrika Kusini — Stanbic, Absa/NBC, Vodacom — yaliyojengwa juu ya msingi huo wa huduma tofauti-tofauti, sasa ndiyo yenye nafasi imara zaidi ya kigeni Tanzania, wakati Tanzania yenyewe inazidi kutegemea dhahabu ambayo makampuni hayo yanaisaidia kusafirisha.
Mafunzo ya kimataifa: Norway inahifadhi karibu mapato yote ya mafuta kwenye mfuko wa taifa; Chile ina kanuni ya kibajeti inayohifadhi mapato ya shaba wakati wa bei za juu; Botswana ilishuhudia Pato la Taifa likishuka kwa asilimia 5.4 robo moja tu baada ya bei za almasi kushuka — ushahidi wa hatari ya utegemezi wa bidhaa moja; Indonesia ilipiga marufuku uuzaji wa madini ghafi ya nickel nje na kulazimisha usindikaji wa ndani, mauzo ya nickel yaliyosindikwa yakiongezeka kutoka karibu sifuri hadi zaidi ya dola bilioni 10 ndani ya muongo mmoja.
Mapendekezo ya TICGL: Kuweka uthibitisho huru wa ununuzi wa ndani migodini; kuandaa ramani ya uongezaji thamani wa madini yenye ratiba maalum; kuanzisha kanuni ya kuhifadhi mapato ya ziada ya dhahabu wakati bei ziko juu; kutumia uhusiano uliopo na makampuni ya Afrika Kusini kimkakati; na kulinda sekta za mauzo zisizo za madini (utalii, kilimo cha mazao ya biashara, viwanda vidogo).
- Madini kama Asilimia ya Mauzo: 52.6% (2025)
- Sekta ya Madini kama Asilimia ya Pato la Taifa: 11.9%
- Mauzo ya Dhahabu 2025: Dola Bilioni 4.75 (+39%)
- Sekta ya Viwanda: ≈8% ya Pato la Taifa (miongo mitatu bila mabadiliko)
Chanzo: TICGL/TERI, Tanzania Business Report Sept 2026 na Tanzania Policy Reform Agenda 2026–2031. Ripoti kamili inapatikana kwa ombi: economist@ticgl.com.