01 — OverviewThe Four Questions This Report Answers
Tanzania's Local Government (District Authorities) Act and Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act, both 1982, give Halmashauri wide service-delivery responsibilities — primary education, primary healthcare, local roads and drainage, water supply coordination, solid waste, markets and land administration — funded overwhelmingly by central transfers. FYDP IV now asks the same councils to raise own-source revenue from roughly 12% to 25% of total LGA revenue by 2030/31, with 10% of own-source revenue specifically directed toward business parks and economic hubs. TICGL/TERI's research, drawn from a ten-council capacity assessment and international comparison, answers the four questions that determine whether this is achievable.
Can LGAs have commercial, investment-oriented projects while remaining service providers?
Yes, with conditionsInternational and domestic precedent (Namibia, South Africa, Kenya; Tanzania's own market and terminal PPPs) shows it is possible — provided commercial activity sits in a legally and financially separate structure from the service mandate.
Must LGA projects be bankable?
Only some of themAn estimated 60–70% of LGA projects are pure public or merit goods that should stay grant- and transfer-funded. Only the 30–40% that are genuinely revenue-generating need to meet bankability standards to access commercial finance.
Are LGAs currently ready to bear the cost of such projects?
Mostly not yetEven the largest councils generate own-source revenue of TZS 12–52 billion a year, carry indicative credit ratings between CCC and B+, and have only one to four projects that could be considered bankable. Preparation costs and capacity are the binding constraint, not appetite.
Can a project be commercially viable while still serving the community?
Yes — by design, not by accidentCross-subsidisation and hybrid structures — subsidised space for small traders alongside market-rate commercial space in the same development — allow a single project to meet both objectives, if the split and ring-fencing are built in from the start.
Halmashauri can become both better service providers and credible revenue generators, but only through deliberate structural separation — a Municipal Finance Act, a funded project-preparation facility, and hybrid project design — not by simply instructing councils to "raise more revenue" from the same undifferentiated budget.
Read this alongside the Tanzania Policy Reform Agenda, 2026–2031
LGA own-source revenue and urban-finance reform (R7) is one of 25 reforms in TICGL/TERI's scored diagnostic of what could hold back FYDP IV. This report develops that single reform in full depth.
Read: Tanzania Policy Reform Agenda, 2026–2031 →1. The Core Tension: Service Mandate vs. Revenue Mandate
Expenditure responsibilities exceed revenue authorityUnder the 1982 Local Government Acts, Halmashauri carry two distinct mandates that were never designed to be measured against each other the way FYDP IV now measures them.
What LGAs are required to deliver
Primary education; primary healthcare (dispensaries, health centres, district hospitals); local roads and drainage; water-supply coordination with DAWASA/DAWASCO; solid-waste management; markets and public infrastructure; land administration and planning.
What LGAs are authorised to collect
Property rates; service levies (markets, bus terminals, parking); business licences (jointly with BRELA/TRA); land rent and development charges; fines and penalties.
LGAs carry far more expenditure responsibility than revenue authority — a textbook vertical fiscal imbalance. The consequences compound: dependency on central transfers exceeds 90% of most LGA budgets; services are under-provided relative to need; and councils come under pressure to raise property rates and licence fees aggressively, which itself risks squeezing the small businesses formalisation policy is trying to attract.
| Indicator | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| LGA own-source revenue, budgeted FY2026/27 | TZS 1.966–1.97 trillion | Ministry of Finance |
| Own-source revenue as % of domestic revenue | ≈4% | TICGL/TERI |
| Central transfers as % of LGA budget | >90% | Ministry of Finance |
| Property-tax collection efficiency | <50% of potential | World Bank LGFRP |
| LGAs with at least one bankable project | <10% | TICGL Assessment, 2025 |
| FYDP IV target: own-source share of total LGA revenue | ~12% → 25% by 2030/31 | FYDP IV |
| Share of own-source revenue directed to business parks/economic hubs | 10% (target) | FYDP IV |
LGA own-source revenue figures are cross-checked against the Ministry of Finance's 2026/27 Budget as passed by Parliament (TZS 1,966,193 million).
2. Can LGAs Run Commercial Projects?
Yes — with the right legal and institutional structureInternational experience — South Africa, Namibia, Rwanda, Kenya — and Tanzania's own emerging practice show that local governments can operate commercial arms or revenue-generating projects without abandoning their core service role, provided the commercial activity is structurally separated from the service budget.
Tanzania: current examples
| Example | Revenue basis | Key challenge | Lesson |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kariakoo Market Redevelopment (Dar es Salaam) | Stall rentals (TZS 50,000–200,000/month), parking, storage | Informal traders; political resistance to rate increases | Revenue potential is high, but requires political will to enforce |
| Arusha Central Market | ≈TZS 800 million/year (estimated) | Maintenance costs; allocation governance | Governance matters more than the infrastructure itself |
| Mwanza Bus Terminal | Ticketing commissions, stall rentals, advertising | Competition from informal terminals | Bylaw enforcement is critical to protect revenue |
| Dodoma Commercial Plots | Land leases, development charges | Slow uptake; infrastructure delays | Location and timing decide viability |
TICGL research on LGA-initiated PPPs found that of 32 projects assessed (2021–2025), 56% reverted from PPP to public funding — mainly due to funding gaps, regulatory delay and weak preparation capacity.
International precedent
Rundu Town Council
Established a commercial company (Pty Ltd) for land development, housing and terminals, generating revenue without directly touching the service-delivery budget.
Municipal trading services
Cities run "trading services" (electricity, water) that generate a surplus used to cross-subsidise other municipal services.
V&A Waterfront, Cape Town
Mixed-use development (retail, residential, tourism) under a long-term PPP lease; commercial revenue subsidises public infrastructure.
Nairobi City Market redevelopment
Ground floor kept as a subsidised public market; upper floors let as market-rate commercial offices; parking run as a dedicated revenue centre — via a municipal development corporation.
3. Must LGA Projects Be Bankable?
Only the revenue-generating minority — not the whole portfolio"Bankable" has a specific meaning: positive net present value; a debt-service coverage ratio above 1.2–1.5; a clear, collectible and enforceable revenue model; a proper legal structure (SPV, PPP agreement or concession); allocated construction, operational, demand and political risk; identifiable collateral or security; audited financial statements; and confirmed technical and environmental feasibility. Financiers — banks, DFIs, private investors — will not fund a project that cannot show these on paper, however socially valuable it is.
Roads, drainage, street lighting, primary schools and health centres are pure public or merit goods: no direct, collectible revenue stream, high social value, and they should stay financed through central transfers and grants — not commercial debt. Roughly 60–70% of a typical LGA capital programme falls into this category and should never be pushed to meet bankability tests.
| Project type | Bankable? | Financing source | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pure public goods (roads, drainage, street lights) | No | Central transfers, grants | No direct revenue; social benefit |
| Merit goods (primary schools, health centres) | No | Central transfers, donor funds | Social priority; low/no user fees |
| Revenue-generating infrastructure (markets, terminals) | Yes | Commercial loans, PPP, municipal bonds | Has cash flow; can service debt |
| Commercial real estate (offices, industrial parks) | Yes | Commercial loans, equity, REITs | Pure commercial, profit motive |
| Utility services (water kiosks, mini-grids) | Partially | Blended finance (grant + loan) | Social tariff plus some revenue |
| Waste management | Partially | PPP, performance-based grants | Some revenue, mostly a public service |
LGA Capital Programme: Bankable vs. Non-Bankable Share
4. Are LGAs Ready to Bear the Cost of Commercial Projects?
Mostly not yet — preparation and capacity are the binding constraint10-council capacity assessment (TICGL, 2025)
| LGA | OSR collection (TZS bn/yr) | Bankable projects | Indicative credit rating |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dar es Salaam (Kinondoni) | 52 | 4 | B+ |
| Dar es Salaam (Ilala) | 45 | 3 | B |
| Dar es Salaam (Temeke) | 38 | 2 | B- |
| Mwanza City Council | 32 | 3 | B |
| Arusha Municipal Council | 28 | 3 | B |
| Dodoma City Council | 25 | 2 | B- |
| Tanga City Council | 20 | 2 | B- |
| Mbeya City Council | 18 | 1 | CCC+ |
| Morogoro Municipal Council | 15 | 1 | CCC |
| Zanzibar (Mjini) | 12 | 1 | CCC |
Own-Source Revenue Collection by Council
Observation: even the largest councils have only one to four projects that could be considered bankable, and indicative credit ratings cluster between CCC and B+ — low enough to make commercial borrowing expensive.
Arusha's own-source revenue is ≈TZS 28 billion/year against operating expenditure of ≈TZS 35 billion/year, leaving an optimistic surplus of TZS 5–8 billion/year for debt service. At 12% interest over a 10-year tenor, that supports a maximum loan of roughly TZS 28–30 billion — enough for one project. But Arusha has three projects that could be bankable, requiring TZS 60–90 billion in total: a gap of TZS 30–60 billion that must come from equity, grants or blended finance, not debt alone.
What a bankable project actually costs to prepare
| Pre-construction cost component | Estimated cost (TZS) | % of total project cost |
|---|---|---|
| Feasibility study | 50–200 million | 1–3% |
| Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) | 30–100 million | 0.5–2% |
| Detailed engineering design | 100–500 million | 2–5% |
| Land survey & titling | 20–100 million | 0.5–2% |
| Legal & transaction advisory | 50–200 million | 1–3% |
| Financial structuring | 30–100 million | 0.5–2% |
| Total pre-construction | 280–1,200 million | 5–15% |
| Project type | Cost per unit | Example scale |
|---|---|---|
| Public market (medium) | TZS 5–15 billion | 500–1,000 stalls |
| Bus terminal | TZS 10–30 billion | Regional hub |
| Commercial building (5 floors) | TZS 3–8 billion | 2,000–5,000 m² |
| Industrial park (50 hectares) | TZS 20–50 billion | Serviced plots |
| Waste-to-energy plant | TZS 15–40 billion | 50–100 tonnes/day |
- Weak financial management: outdated accounting systems, delayed audits, development-budget execution below 70%.
- Low revenue-collection efficiency: property-tax collection under 50% of potential, with leakage and political resistance to rate increases.
- Thin technical capacity: most LGAs have no dedicated project-development team, no PPP expertise, and no financial-modelling skills in-house.
- Legal constraints: LGAs cannot borrow without Ministry of Finance approval; there is no clear municipal-bond framework yet; land-ownership complications persist.
5. Can Projects Be Commercially Viable While Serving the Community?
Yes — through deliberate cross-subsidisation, not by accidentThe evidence says yes, but only when the social and commercial components are designed into the same project from the outset, with the pricing split, accounting separation and revenue ring-fencing made explicit rather than assumed.
Five ways to structure a hybrid project
| Approach | How it works | Example |
|---|---|---|
| User-fee + subsidy | Those who can pay cover the full cost; low-income users receive a subsidy | Water kiosks, modern markets, bus terminals |
| Cross-subsidy | Revenue from commercial space (shops, offices, advertising) funds the service component | Market complex with trading stalls plus community space |
| PPP with viability-gap funding | Private sector finances the commercial portion; government tops up the service portion | Bus terminals, affordable housing |
| Separate commercial arm | LGA establishes an independent company; dividends flow back to fund services | Rundu Town Council, Namibia |
| Land value capture | LGA uses its own land (plots, rights-of-way) to attract private capital | Mixed-use housing plus commercial development |
Illustrative model: public market + commercial complex
| Component | Purpose | Indicative pricing | Revenue role |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stalls for small traders | Social service | ≈TZS 50,000/month (below market) | Cross-subsidised by commercial income |
| Stalls for medium traders | Cost recovery | ≈TZS 150,000/month (market rate) | Self-sustaining |
| Office / retail space | Revenue generation | TZS 500,000–2 million/month | Profit centre |
| Parking | Service + revenue | TZS 2,000–5,000/day | Revenue centre |
| Storage / warehousing | Revenue generation | TZS 100,000–500,000/month | Revenue centre |
Indicative revenue mix: ≈40% from subsidised stalls (social mandate), ≈60% from commercial space (revenue generation) — net result: the project is commercially viable and the social mandate is met.
Four financing models for Tanzania
1Municipal Development Corporation
- Each LGA establishes a separate legal entity that can access loans, bonds and equity
- Profit split: 50% reinvestment, 30% dividend to the LGA for services, 20% reserve fund
2PPP Concession
- LGA contributes land as equity; a private partner brings capital and expertise
- Revenue sharing typically 60–70% private, 30–40% LGA; asset reverts to the LGA after 20–25 years
3Municipal Bond (Pooled)
- 3–4 LGAs combine into a single "pooled bond" issued on the DSE
- Proceeds fund revenue-generating projects; debt service comes from own-source revenue plus project revenue
4Blended Finance
- Grant (≈40%) from development partners/central government
- Concessional loan (≈30%) from development banks
- Commercial loan (≈30%) from local banks — lowering the overall cost of capital
- Clear separation between service delivery and commercial operations — in accounting and governance alike.
- Affordability safeguards — tariffs capped relative to local incomes, with a mandatory subsidy component for vulnerable groups.
- Capacity building — a dedicated Project Preparation Facility for LGAs.
- Performance contracts — the LGA is held accountable for both service quality and revenue targets.
- Ring-fencing — commercial-project revenue is applied first to maintenance and expansion of services, not general recurrent spending.
06 — RecommendationsPolicy Reforms Needed
The recommendations below follow directly from the diagnosis: separate the two mandates in law, fund the preparation gap, and build the financial-market infrastructure that lets LGAs borrow at a reasonable cost once a project is genuinely bankable.
1Legal & Regulatory Reform
- Enact a Municipal Finance Act enabling regulated commercial borrowing, municipal bonds, PPP agreements and Municipal Development Corporations, with a borrowing-limit rule (e.g. debt service under 20% of own-source revenue) and mandatory transparency.
- Enact a Local Government Revenue Act giving LGAs authority to set property rates within national bands, collect business licences directly, impose development charges and capture land-value increases, with a clear, predictable revenue-sharing formula.
- Establish a standard PPP framework for LGAs — model templates for markets, terminals, commercial buildings and waste management, with fast-track approval under 90 days.
2Fiscal Decentralisation
- Raise own-source revenue from ≈4% to 10–12% of domestic revenue by 2031, while reducing central-transfer dependence from ≈90% to 70–75% of LGA budgets.
- Introduce performance-based grants rewarding LGAs that grow own-source revenue by more than 10%/year, improve service-delivery satisfaction, and maintain audited accounts.
- Establish an equalisation fund for poorer LGAs, weighted by population, poverty rate and revenue-collection effort.
3Capacity Building
- Establish a Project Preparation Facility (proposed at TZS 50 billion) to fund feasibility studies, environmental assessments, financial structuring and transaction advisory for LGAs.
- Launch a Municipal Finance Training Programme for LGA treasurers, project managers and elected officials, covering financial modelling, PPP negotiation, debt management and revenue collection.
- Pair LGAs with technical-assistance partners — private-sector advisors, development partners, and stronger peer LGAs.
4Financial Market Development
- Have CMSA finalise a municipal-bond framework: three years of audited statements, a minimum B- credit rating, a debt-service coverage ratio above 1.2, and public disclosure of use of proceeds — paired with tax-exempt interest income and stamp-duty exemption.
- Establish a credit guarantee facility (50–70% coverage) to lower municipal borrowing costs from ≈18% toward 12–14%.
- Use pooled financing — 3–5 LGAs combining into a single bond or loan — to cut transaction costs and improve creditworthiness through diversification.
None of the above works without accountability: public hearings on budgets and projects, citizen scorecards on service delivery, social audits, published financial statements and project dashboards, open-contracting data, e-procurement, whistleblower protection and independent audits. Arusha's own experience — where governance of stall allocation mattered more than the market infrastructure itself — is the clearest local evidence for this.
07 — DeliveryImplementation Roadmap
| Phase | Key actions |
|---|---|
| Phase 1 — Foundation (0–12 months) | Enact the Municipal Finance Act; establish the Project Preparation Facility; launch the Municipal Finance Training Programme; pilot 3–5 bankable projects (markets, terminals, commercial buildings); develop municipal-bond regulations with CMSA. |
| Phase 2 — Scale-up (12–36 months) | Issue the first pooled municipal bond (3–5 LGAs); establish Municipal Development Corporations in Dar es Salaam, Arusha and Mwanza; roll out performance-based grants; expand own-source-revenue collection through digital systems and property revaluation; launch the credit guarantee facility. |
| Phase 3 — Consolidation (36–60 months) | All major LGAs have a bankable project pipeline; the municipal-bond market is operational with TZS 50–100 billion outstanding; own-source revenue reaches 10% of domestic revenue; the majority of LGA credit ratings reach B- or higher; citizen satisfaction with service delivery improves measurably. |
Fiscal Decentralisation Targets — Baseline vs. 2031
08 — TrackingPolicy Scorecard
| Policy area | Current status | Target 2031 | Priority | Timeline |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Municipal Finance Act | Not enacted | Enacted | Critical | 0–12 months |
| Project Development Facility | Not established | Operational, TZS 50bn fund | Critical | 0–12 months |
| Municipal Bond Framework | Not established | Regulations issued, first bond | High | 12–24 months |
| Own-source revenue / domestic revenue | 4% | 10–12% | High | 36–60 months |
| LGAs with bankable projects | <10% | ≥60% | High | 24–48 months |
| LGA credit ratings (B- or higher) | <20% | ≥60% | Medium | 36–60 months |
| Performance-based grants | Pilot | Nationwide | High | 12–36 months |
| Property-tax collection efficiency | <50% | ≥80% | High | 24–48 months |
| PPP projects (LGAs) | <5 | ≥30 | Medium | 24–60 months |
| Citizen satisfaction (service delivery) | Low | Medium–High | Medium | 36–60 months |
09 — IllustrativeProject Pipeline Examples
The projects below illustrate what a realistic, bankable LGA pipeline could look like — not a commitment or an official government list.
Quick wins (0–18 months)
| Project | LGA | Est. cost | Revenue model |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kariakoo Market Redevelopment | Dar es Salaam (Ilala) | TZS 15bn | Stall rentals, parking, storage |
| Arusha Central Market Upgrade | Arusha MC | TZS 8bn | Stall rentals, offices, parking |
| Mwanza Bus Terminal PPP | Mwanza CC | TZS 12bn | Ticketing, stalls, advertising |
| Dodoma Commercial Plots | Dodoma CC | TZS 5bn | Land leases, development charges |
| Tanga Port Logistics Hub | Tanga CC | TZS 20bn | Warehousing, handling fees |
Medium-term (18–48 months)
| Project | LGA | Est. cost | Revenue model |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dar Industrial Park (SEZ) | Dar es Salaam (Temeke) | TZS 40bn | Land leases, utilities, services |
| Arusha Mixed-Use Development | Arusha MC | TZS 25bn | Retail, offices, residential |
| Mwanza Waste-to-Energy | Mwanza CC | TZS 30bn | Tipping fees, electricity sales |
| Mbeya Agro-Processing Zone | Mbeya CC | TZS 20bn | Land leases, processing fees |
| Zanzibar Tourism Infrastructure | Zanzibar (Mjini) | TZS 15bn | User fees, concessions |
"The question is not whether Halmashauri should generate more of their own revenue — every credible reform path agrees they should. The question is whether we ask them to do it inside the same undifferentiated budget that funds primary schools and dispensaries, or whether we give them a properly separated commercial vehicle, a funded route to bankability, and the governance to keep the two honest with each other. Only one of those paths actually works."
— TICGL / Tanzania Economic Research Institute (TERI)
10 — SourcesData Sources & Methodology (Summary)
Ministry of Finance, 2026/27 Budget as passed by Parliament (LGA own-source revenue); Local Government (District Authorities) Act, 1982; Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act, 1982; World Bank Local Government Finance Reform Programme (LGFRP); UN-Habitat Municipal Finance Guidelines; TICGL Internal Assessment of 10 Councils (2025); TICGL/TERI, Tanzania Business Report, September 2026.
Figures for individual councils (own-source revenue, bankable-project counts, indicative credit ratings) are TICGL's internal 2025 assessment and should be independently verified before use in a specific financing decision. Cost ranges for project preparation and construction are indicative benchmarks, not quotations.
Request the Full Policy Brief
This page summarises TICGL/TERI's research on LGAs as service providers and commercial entities. Institutions, government agencies, LGAs, banks and development partners may request the full policy brief, the complete 10-council dataset, or a tailored briefing directly from TERI.
✉️ Request via economist@ticgl.com →11 — Quick AnswersFrequently Asked Questions
Can Tanzania's local government authorities (LGAs) run commercial, revenue-generating projects?
Yes, but under strict conditions and the right structure. International experience (South Africa, Namibia, Rwanda, Kenya) and Tanzania's own examples (market and bus-terminal PPPs) show LGAs can operate commercial arms or revenue-generating projects without abandoning their service mandate, provided there is a clear legal framework, separated accounts, and adequate technical capacity.
Must every LGA project be bankable?
No. An estimated 60–70% of LGA projects are pure public or merit goods — roads, drainage, primary schools, health centres — that have no direct revenue stream and should continue to be financed through central transfers and grants, not bank debt. Only the 30–40% that are revenue-generating infrastructure, such as markets, bus terminals and commercial real estate, need to be structured as bankable to access commercial finance.
Are Tanzania's LGAs currently able to bear the cost of commercial projects?
Mostly not yet. TICGL's assessment of ten major councils found even the largest generate own-source revenue of only TZS 12–52 billion a year, have just one to four projects that could be considered bankable, and carry indicative credit ratings between CCC and B+. Own-source revenue typically covers under 15% of an LGA's budget, and most lack the financial-modelling and project-preparation capacity to bring a project to bankability without support.
Can an LGA project be commercially viable while still serving the community?
Yes, through hybrid or cross-subsidisation models. A typical structure mixes subsidised space for small traders or low-income users with market-rate commercial space (offices, larger retail, advertising, parking); revenue from the commercial portion funds the social component. International examples include Cape Town's V&A Waterfront and Nairobi's City Market redevelopment.
What policy reforms would allow Tanzania's LGAs to fund commercial projects responsibly?
A Municipal Finance Act enabling regulated borrowing, municipal bonds and Municipal Development Corporations; increasing own-source revenue from about 4% to 10–12% of domestic revenue by 2031; a funded Project Preparation Facility for feasibility studies; a credit guarantee facility to lower borrowing costs; and affordability safeguards that cap user fees and ring-fence commercial revenue toward service delivery.
Muhtasari kwa Kiswahili
Halmashauri kama Watoa Huduma na Wafanyabiashara. — Halmashauri za Tanzania zina majukumu mawili yanayogongana: kutoa huduma za jamii (barabara, masoko, maji, afya, elimu ya msingi) bila lengo la faida, na wakati huo huo kuongeza mapato yao ya ndani (own-source revenue) kupitia miradi ya kibiashara, kama inavyotakiwa na FYDP IV.
Hali ya sasa: Mapato ya ndani ya Halmashauri ni TZS trilioni 1.97 tu — karibu asilimia 4 ya mapato ya ndani ya taifa — wakati utegemezi wa fedha kutoka Serikali Kuu ni zaidi ya asilimia 90 ya bajeti za Halmashauri nyingi. Chini ya asilimia 10 ya Halmashauri zina mradi hata mmoja unaokidhi vigezo vya "bankable."
Je, Halmashauri zinaweza kuwa na miradi ya kibiashara? Ndiyo — lakini kwa muundo sahihi: mgawanyo wazi kati ya huduma na biashara, kama inavyofanywa Namibia (Rundu Town Council), Afrika Kusini, na baadhi ya mifano ya ndani kama masoko ya Kariakoo, Arusha na Mwanza.
Je, miradi yote lazima iwe bankable? Hapana. Takribani asilimia 60–70 ya miradi ya Halmashauri (barabara, shule, zahanati) ni huduma za jamii zisizo na mapato ya moja kwa moja — zinapaswa kuendelea kufadhiliwa na Serikali Kuu na wafadhili. Ni asilimia 30–40 tu (masoko, vituo vya mabasi, majengo ya kibiashara) yanayohitaji kuwa bankable.
Je, Halmashauri zipo tayari? Wengi bado hawako tayari. Hata Halmashauri kubwa kama Kinondoni na Ilala zina miradi 2–4 tu inayoweza kuwa bankable, na ukadiriaji wao wa mikopo (credit rating) uko chini kati ya CCC na B+. Uwezo wa kiufundi wa kuandaa miradi ya kibiashara bado ni changamoto kubwa.
Mapendekezo makuu ya TICGL: Kutunga Sheria ya Fedha za Manispaa (Municipal Finance Act); kuanzisha Mfuko wa Kuandaa Miradi (Project Preparation Facility) wa TZS bilioni 50; kuongeza mapato ya ndani kutoka asilimia 4 hadi 10–12 ifikapo 2031; kuanzisha dhamana za mikopo ili kupunguza riba; na kuruhusu Halmashauri kubwa kuanzisha makampuni huru ya kibiashara (Municipal Development Corporations) chini ya usimamizi wa PO-RALG.
- Mapato ya Ndani ya Halmashauri: TZS Trilioni 1.97 (≈4%)
- Utegemezi wa Fedha za Serikali Kuu: Zaidi ya 90%
- Halmashauri Zenye Mradi Unaoweza Kukopesheka: Chini ya 10%
- Lengo la FYDP IV 2031: Mapato ya Ndani 10–12%
Chanzo: Wizara ya Fedha (Bajeti 2026/27); Sheria za Serikali za Mitaa, 1982; Benki ya Dunia (LGFRP); Uchambuzi wa TICGL/TERI, Septemba 2026. Ripoti kamili inapatikana kwa ombi: economist@ticgl.com.