Tanzania's economy, a lower-middle-income powerhouse with sustained 5-6% annual GDP growth since the 1990s—driven by agriculture (25% of GDP), mining (30% of exports), and tourism (17% of GDP)—faces escalating political economy risks amid deepening governance challenges. This study examines the October 29, 2025, presidential elections as a pivotal case study, where incumbent Samia Suluhu Hassan's 97.66% victory, tainted by opposition arrests, ballot stuffing, and post-election violence, triggered nationwide unrest and international condemnation. Integrating qualitative event timelines with quantitative data from the World Bank, IMF, and Bank of Tanzania, the analysis reveals pre-election momentum (6.0% 2025 growth projection) unraveling into vulnerabilities: FDI declining to 2.5% of GDP, public debt exceeding 52%, inflation surging to 5.5%+, and tourism revenues contracting 15-24%. Three amplified risks—policy instability deterring investments, donor aid suspensions (USD 500 million shortfall), and social spillovers dragging 1-2% off 2026 growth—threaten Vision 2050's upper-middle-income aspirations, potentially stagnating poverty reduction at 25.5%. Mitigation strategies emphasize opposition dialogue, digital reforms, and transparent donor re-engagement, with private-sector hedging via diversification and insurance. This data-grounded assessment underscores the imperative of inclusive governance to avert a 3.8% growth floor in adverse scenarios, transforming electoral ruptures into catalysts for resilient, equitable development. Read More: HOW ELECTION DISRUPTIONS AND TANZANIA’S IMAGE AFFECT BUSINESS AND INVESTMENT (2026–2030)

1. Introduction

Tanzania, a lower-middle-income economy with a population exceeding 69 million as of mid-2025, has demonstrated remarkable macroeconomic stability since the liberalization reforms of the 1990s. This East African nation has achieved average annual real GDP growth of 5-6% over the past three decades, propelled by a diverse economic base that includes natural resource extraction (such as gold mining and natural gas, contributing over 20% to exports), agriculture (accounting for approximately 25% of GDP and employing 65% of the workforce), and a burgeoning services sector dominated by tourism and telecommunications. In 2023, nominal GDP reached USD 85 billion, with per capita income hovering around USD 1,200, reflecting steady progress toward broader poverty reduction—from 28% in 2018 to about 26% in 2023—though challenges like youth unemployment (over 10%) and regional inequalities persist. Looking ahead, projections for 2025 indicate sustained expansion at 6.0%, driven by public infrastructure investments, foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows projected at 3.2% of GDP, and recovery in tourism visitor numbers (+20% year-on-year).

Despite these gains, Tanzania's economic trajectory is increasingly vulnerable to its political landscape, where one-party dominance under the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) has coexisted uneasily with multiparty democracy since 1992. The administration of former President John Magufuli (2015-2021) marked a troubling shift toward authoritarianism, characterized by media censorship, opposition harassment, and a 2020 internet shutdown during the COVID-19 pandemic that disrupted digital trade and remittances. His successor, President Samia Suluhu Hassan, ascended in 2021 promising reforms and economic liberalization, including eased foreign investment regulations and fiscal prudence that helped stabilize public debt at 42% of GDP in 2024. However, these overtures have been undermined by persistent governance challenges, including corruption perceptions (Tanzania ranks 94th out of 180 on the 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index) and uneven implementation of anti-corruption measures, which erode investor confidence and amplify fiscal risks.

At the heart of these intersections lies "political economy risk"—the multifaceted uncertainties stemming from governance failures, abrupt policy reversals, and sociopolitical instability that cascade into economic disruptions. These risks manifest in reduced FDI (e.g., a 15% dip in mining investments following 2017 regulatory clampdowns), heightened borrowing costs amid donor hesitancy, and supply chain interruptions from unrest, all of which can shave 1-2 percentage points off annual growth rates. In resource-dependent economies like Tanzania's, where commodities account for 30% of exports, such volatilities not only threaten short-term stability but also long-term development agendas, including the ambitious Tanzania Development Vision 2050, which envisions industrialization, technological advancement, and attainment of upper-middle-income status by 2035 through diversified growth and inclusive policies.

This study employs the October 29, 2025, general elections as a critical case study to dissect these dynamics. Incumbent President Samia Suluhu Hassan secured a resounding re-election with 97.66% of the vote, according to the National Electoral Commission, in a contest overshadowed by credible allegations of ballot stuffing, voter intimidation, and the arbitrary detention of over 500 opposition supporters. The opposition Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA) rejected the results, boycotting the vote in several regions and mobilizing nationwide protests that escalated into deadly clashes, resulting in at least many reported deaths (including a prominent CHADEMA leader), thousands of arrests, and a five-day nationwide internet blackout to suppress dissent. International observers, including the African Union (AU) and Southern African Development Community (SADC), condemned the process as lacking transparency, prompting threats of aid suspensions from Western donors (Tanzania receives ~USD 2 billion annually) and travel advisories that could curb tourism revenues by 10-15% in early 2026. In response, President Hassan announced a government-led probe into the violence on November 14, 2025, though skepticism abounds given the state's role in the crackdown.

By weaving qualitative insights from this electoral episode—such as protest timelines and policy responses—with quantitative economic indicators from sources like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and Bank of Tanzania, this analysis evaluates how political repression exacerbates economy-wide risks.

Key objectives include: (1) quantifying potential growth downgrades (e.g., from 6% to 4.5-5% in 2026); (2) mapping spillover effects on FDI, debt sustainability, and poverty metrics; and (3) proposing mitigation strategies aligned with Vision 2050.

The study proceeds with a detailed case study, data-driven assessment, risk evaluation, and concluding recommendations, underscoring the imperative for inclusive governance to secure Tanzania's economic future.

2. Case Study: The 2025 Presidential Elections

The October 29, 2025, general elections in Tanzania represented a flashpoint in the country's deepening political polarization, underscoring the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party's entrenched dominance since independence in 1961. Under President Samia Suluhu Hassan's leadership, the polls were intended to affirm her reformist agenda following her 2021 ascension amid the COVID-19 crisis. Instead, they exposed systemic frailties in democratic institutions, with the National Electoral Commission (NEC) declaring Hassan the victor with 97.66% of the vote—up from her predecessor's margins but amid historically low turnout estimated at under 40% in urban opposition strongholds like Dar es Salaam. The main opposition party, Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA), boycotted the vote in protest, labeling it a "premeditated fraud," while its leader, Tundu Lissu, had been imprisoned on treason charges since April 2025, confined to a "death cell" in a high-security facility.

This case study dissects the election's chronology, highlighting how pre-existing governance tensions—rooted in media controls and civil society restrictions—escalated into widespread violence, with economic repercussions including disrupted trade routes and a 15-20% drop in short-term tourism bookings.

Pre-Election Repression: Shrinking Civic Space

Building on the authoritarian legacies of John Magufuli's 2015-2021 tenure, the run-up to the elections saw intensified clampdowns on dissent, eroding the multiparty framework established in 1992. Key incidents included:

• Opposition Disqualifications and Arrests: CHADEMA candidates were excluded through administrative procedures from races on technicalities, with over 200 opposition figures detained in the three months prior. Lissu's April 9 arrest on treason charges described by critics as politically motivated—allegedly for "inciting unrest"—symbolized the regime's preemptive strategy, drawing condemnation from human rights groups as politically motivated.
• Media and Digital Restrictions: Independent outlets faced suspensions, with the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (TCRA) issuing gag orders on election coverage. Social media influencers were targeted for "hate speech," resulting in a 30% drop in online political discourse, per digital rights monitors.
• Economic Intimidation: Businesses linked to opposition donors reported audits and license revocations, chilling FDI in sectors like mining, where CCM-aligned firms gained preferential access.

These measures fostered an environment of fear, with voter registration rates plummeting to 55% nationally—down from 72% in 2020—particularly among youth (aged 18-35, 40% of the electorate).

Election Day Irregularities: A Contested Process

Polling day unfolded amid chaos, with irregularities documented by domestic and international observers, including the African Union's mission, which deemed the process "fundamentally flawed." Notable violations included:

• Ballot Stuffing and Intimidation: Eyewitness accounts from regions like Zanzibar and Arusha reported CCM agents distributing pre-marked ballots, with security forces—deployed at 80% of stations—intimidating voters through checkpoints and ID seizures. CHADEMA documented over 1,500 such incidents via smuggled footage.
• Low Turnout and Boycotts: CHADEMA's nationwide boycott reduced participation, but isolated voting occurred under duress, with turnout in CCM heartlands like Dodoma exceeding 90%. The NEC's opaque tallying process fueled fraud claims, as results were announced without independent audits.
• Initial Violence: Sporadic clashes erupted, with at least 15 deaths on election day alone, primarily in urban centers, linked to voter suppression tactics that disrupted supply chains and caused a 10% spike in food prices overnight.

Post-Election Unrest: Escalation to Crisis

Results announced on November 1 ignited mass protests, transforming peaceful demonstrations into a sustained uprising that persists as of December 2025, with calls for nationwide action on Independence Day (December 9). The government's response amplified the toll:

• Lethal Force and Casualties: Security forces deployed live ammunition, resulting in many deaths (estimates vary, with Amnesty International citing mass graves in Dar es Salaam's Kondo Cemetery holding over 500 bodies) and 5,000+ arbitrary detentions. Gen Z-led protests, amplified via VPNs despite restrictions, focused on economic grievances like unemployment (13% youth rate).
• Internet Blackout: A five-day nationwide shutdown from October 30 targeted platforms like X and WhatsApp, costing the digital economy USD 50 million in lost transactions and remittances.
• Curfews and Nepotism Backlash: Imposed curfews in major cities stifled commerce, while Hassan's November appointments—including her daughter as deputy minister—fueled nepotism accusations amid the crisis.

International Response: Diplomatic and Economic Pressure

Global actors swiftly mobilized, viewing the events as a regression from Hassan's initial liberalization promises:

• Regional and Continental Rebuke: The AU and SADC urged reforms, with the AU's November 6 report highlighting "ballot stuffing and abductions" as integrity breaches. EALA blocked a Ugandan motion congratulating Hassan, citing procedural flaws.
• Western Donors' Actions: The EU froze the Tanzania Annual Action Plan 2025 (USD 150 million in aid) on November 27, demanding investigations into killings and Lissu's release; potential sanctions target political leadership. The US issued travel advisories, impacting tourism (a 12% revenue dip projected for Q1 2026).
• Business and Civil Society: Multinationals like Barrick Gold paused expansions, citing policy unpredictability, while NGOs petitioned the ICC for crimes against humanity probes.

This electoral saga illustrates a perilous shift from Magufuli's "security-focused governance approach"—which stifled growth through isolation—to overt instability under Hassan, where short-term authoritarian control exacts long-term developmental costs. Echoing the 2019 Zanzibar polls and 2020 shutdowns, the 2025 crisis occurs amid global economic recovery, heightening stakes: unrest has already contributed to a 0.5% downward revision in 2025 GDP forecasts, underscoring the interplay of politics and prosperity. As protests loom, the case demands urgent reforms to avert deeper economic entrenchment.

3. Data Analysis

Economic data underscores Tanzania's pre-election momentum, characterized by resilient growth and controlled macroeconomic indicators, but reveals acute post-election vulnerabilities exacerbated by the October 29, 2025, unrest. As of December 2025, preliminary assessments from the Bank of Tanzania (BoT) and international bodies indicate disruptions in supply chains, investor sentiment, and fiscal inflows, potentially eroding up to 1.5 percentage points from baseline growth projections. This analysis draws on harmonized data from the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), African Development Bank (AfDB), and BoT, integrating historical trends with forward-looking estimates. Pre-election forecasts, buoyed by infrastructure investments and commodity exports, contrasted sharply with post-event adjustments, where donor aid suspensions (e.g., the EU's freeze on USD 150 million) and a 12-15% dip in tourism bookings signal cascading risks. The following table summarizes core macroeconomic indicators, highlighting the divergence.

Sources: World Bank (2025 Tanzania Overview); IMF World Economic Outlook (Oct 2025); AfDB Country Focus Report (2024); BoT Monetary Policy Report (Oct 2025).

Nominal GDP reached USD 85.2 billion in 2024 (up 9.2% from USD 78.0 billion in 2023), with per capita income at USD 1,186—reflecting modest gains but trailing regional peers like Kenya (USD 1,428). For 2025, pre-election estimates pegged expansion at USD 92.5 billion (6.0% real growth), driven by agriculture (25% of GDP) and services (45%). However, post-election volatility— including a 5-7% contraction in Dar es Salaam port throughput due to protest blockades—has prompted IMF staff to flag a 10-12% nominal GDP shortfall if unrest persists into Q1 2026.

Sectoral Contributions to Growth

Tanzania's economy remains diversified yet exposed, with agriculture, mining, and tourism as pillars. The table below details sectoral GDP shares and growth rates, illustrating pre- and post-election shifts. Mining and construction sustained momentum through Q3 2025, but services—hit hardest by travel advisories and urban disruptions—face the steepest downgrades.

Sources: BoT Economic Bulletin (Q3 2025); AfDB (2024); World Bank Sectoral Analysis (2025). Gold exports, comprising 30% of total, rose 12% year-on-year in H1 2025, but post-election mining halts in Arusha (due to clashes) contributed to a 8% output dip in November.

Tourism Sector Vulnerabilities

Tourism, contributing 17% to GDP and 12% of exports (USD 3.8 billion in 2024), exemplifies the unrest's toll. Arrivals surged 24.3% to 1.81 million in 2023 and 17.5% to 2.20 million in 2024, fueled by safari demand from Europe and the US. Pre-election 2025 projections anticipated +20% growth to 2.64 million visitors, boosting revenues to USD 4.5 billion. Yet, US and EU advisories post-October triggered cancellations: Zanzibar hotel occupancy fell 25% in November, and Serengeti bookings dropped 18% for Q1 2026. The table below tracks arrivals and revenue trends.

Sources: Tanzania Tourism Board (Exit Survey 2024); UN Tourism Barometer (2025). This sector's fragility could amplify fiscal pressures, as tourism taxes fund 8% of government revenue.

Labor Market and Social Indicators

Post-election urban areas, particularly Dar es Salaam (home to 7 million), report heightened social strains. Official unemployment remains low at 2.6% in 2024, but youth rates (ages 15-24) climbed to 8.1% amid informal sector layoffs from business slowdowns. Protests displaced 50,000 workers in retail and transport, spiking informal unemployment by 5-7% in affected regions, per ILO estimates. The table highlights labor dynamics.

Sources: National Bureau of Statistics (ILFS 2024); ILOSTAT (2025); World Bank Labor Report. These shifts risk entrenching inequality, with Gini coefficient projected to widen from 0.38 to 0.40 by mid-2026 if aid flows stall.

In aggregate, while Tanzania's buffers—such as USD 6.5 billion in reserves (6 months of imports)—mitigate immediate collapse, the elections' fallout threatens Vision 2050 targets. Sustained unrest could elevate the current account deficit beyond 4.2% of GDP, per AfDB scenarios, underscoring the need for data-informed stabilization measures.

4. Risk Assessment

The October 2025 elections have sharply amplified Tanzania's political economy risks, where governance failures and social fractures intersect with economic dependencies, potentially reversing years of hard-won stability. Pre-election optimism—fueled by 5.6% GDP growth in 2025 and FDI inflows topping USD 3 billion—has given way to heightened uncertainty, as evidenced by a 15% spike in country risk premiums on Tanzanian sovereign bonds since November. This assessment evaluates three core risks: policy instability deterring foreign investment, donor and trade disruptions widening fiscal gaps, and social unrest spillovers curbing key revenue streams. Grounded in data from the IMF's October 2025 World Economic Outlook update, World Bank scenarios, and regional consultancies like TICGL, it employs baseline (mild unrest resolution by Q1 2026) and adverse (prolonged protests into mid-2026) scenarios to quantify impacts. Collectively, these could reduce 2026 GDP growth from a baseline 5.8% to as low as 3.8%, echoing the 1.5% growth drag during the 2020 COVID-induced shutdowns but with added political contagion risks.

Policy Instability: Undermining Reform Credibility and FDI

The election's repressive tactics— including opposition arrests and media blackouts—signal a retreat from President Hassan's post-2021 liberalization pledges, fostering perceptions of policy unpredictability that disproportionately affect capital-intensive sectors. Mining and energy, which underpin 30% of exports (gold alone at USD 2.8 billion in 2024), are particularly vulnerable, as investors like Barrick Gold and Equinor have signaled project delays amid fears of regulatory reversals akin to the 2017 mining law disputes that halved FDI in that sector. Post-election, FDI commitments for Q4 2025 plunged 25% from Q3 levels, per Tanzania Investment Centre data, with energy tenders (e.g., LNG pipelines) facing 40% fewer bids due to elevated political risk scores (now at "C" from Allianz Trade). In an adverse scenario, sustained instability could erode USD 800 million in annual FDI, equivalent to 0.9% of GDP, by deterring greenfield investments in renewables and gas.

The table below tracks FDI trends, highlighting the post-election inflection.

Sources: Tanzania Investment Centre (Q4 2025 Preliminary); IMF Balance of Payments (Oct 2025); TICGL Economic Outlook (Nov 2025). This instability not only starves infrastructure funding but also amplifies import reliance, pushing the current account deficit toward 5% of GDP in adverse cases.

Donor and Trade Disruptions: Fiscal Strain from Aid Suspensions

Tanzania's fiscal position, already stretched with a 3.2% GDP deficit in 2024, faces acute pressure from donor backlash to the election violence. The country relies on ~USD 2.0 billion in annual official development assistance (ODA), comprising 15% of budget revenues and financing 40% of social spending. The EU's November 27, 2025, freeze of €156 million (USD 170 million) under the 2025-2026 Multi-Annual Indicative Programme—adopted by 539 votes in the European Parliament—marks the sharpest rebuke, citing "democratic backsliding" and demanding probes into 200+ protest deaths. The US has followed with a USD 100 million aid review, while the UK and Germany signaled similar holds, potentially totaling USD 500 million in withheld funds for 2026. Trade disruptions compound this: Port of Dar es Salaam throughput fell 12% in November due to protest blockades, echoing 2020's USD 1.2 billion COVID trade losses and risking a 0.7% GDP fiscal widening.

Historical and projected ODA flows illustrate the vulnerability.

Sources: OECD DAC Aid Statistics (2025 Update); EU External Action Service (Nov 2025); World Bank Debt Report (Dec 2025). In adverse scenarios, this could balloon public debt beyond 55% of GDP, forcing domestic borrowing that crowds out private credit and elevates inflation to 7%+.

Social Unrest Spillover: Growth Drag from Tourism and Remittances

Repression's "control at any cost" approach risks entrenching social divisions, spilling over into economic contraction via reduced tourism (17% of GDP) and remittances (4% of GDP, USD 758 million in 2024). Protests have triggered widespread travel advisories from the US, UK, and EU, slashing Zanzibar hotel occupancy by 25% in November and projecting a 20-30% bookings drop for Q1 2026—equating to USD 100-150 million in foregone revenues. Remittances, vital for 10 million households, dipped 8% in November due to the five-day internet blackout halting platforms like Nala and WorldRemit, with diaspora fears potentially sustaining a 5-10% annual decline. Youth-led unrest, amplified by 13% unemployment, could prolong these effects, dragging GDP by 1-2% through multiplier impacts on services and consumption.

Sectoral exposure is detailed below.

Sources: Bank of Tanzania Remittance Report (Nov 2025); Tanzania Tourism Board (Q4 2025); TICGL Sector Analysis. These losses exacerbate poverty, potentially reversing the 1% rate decline to 2024's 25%.

Overall Scenarios: Navigating Uncertainty

While baseline growth remains positive at 5.8% for 2026—supported by agriculture's resilience and reserves covering 6.5 months of imports—prolonged unrest scenarios portend contractionary pressures, with analyst outlooks converging on a 4% floor if aid flows halve and FDI stalls. The table synthesizes integrated impacts.

Sources: IMF Scenario Modeling (Dec 2025 Update); World Bank Risk Matrix; TICGL Projections. Mitigation hinges on swift dialogue and transparency to restore confidence, averting a vicious cycle of stagnation.

5. Conclusion

The October 2025 elections in Tanzania serve as a important case study, illuminating how entrenched political choices—characterized by centralized governance and electoral manipulation—can precipitate cascading economic vulnerabilities in an otherwise resilient lower-middle-income economy. As detailed in this case study, the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party's overwhelming victory, marred by pre-election repression, documented irregularities, and a violent post-election crackdown resulting in hundreds of deaths and widespread detentions, has not only eroded democratic norms but also inflicted tangible blows to macroeconomic stability. Pre-election projections of 6.0% GDP growth for 2025, buoyed by FDI inflows and tourism rebounds, now face downward revisions to 4.5-5.0%, with sectoral spillovers—such as a 15-20% contraction in tourism revenues and stalled mining investments—threatening to widen fiscal deficits and entrench poverty rates at 25.5%. These events underscore a fundamental tension: the short-term allure of coercive control under President Samia Suluhu Hassan risks undermining the long-term imperatives of Tanzania's Development Vision 2050, which aspires to upper-middle-income status through diversified industrialization, inclusive growth, and technological integration by 2035. Without corrective measures, the interplay of policy instability, donor disruptions, and social unrest could shave 1-2 percentage points off annual growth trajectories through 2030, mirroring the developmental setbacks observed in peers like Zimbabwe during its 2018-2020 political crises.

Key takeaways from this analysis affirm that political economy risks are not abstract threats but quantifiable drags on prosperity. The elections' fallout has already manifested in a 12% drop in Dar es Salaam port throughput, an 8% dip in November gold exports, and a 21% shortfall in projected 2026 ODA inflows, collectively amplifying debt vulnerabilities to over 52% of GDP and youth unemployment to 9% in urban hubs. In adverse scenarios, as modeled by IMF and AfDB frameworks, prolonged instability could culminate in a 3.8% growth floor for 2026, exacerbating inequality (Gini coefficient rising to 0.40) and stalling poverty reduction efforts that have lifted 2 million out of extreme poverty since 2020. This case-based examination, blending qualitative narratives of unrest with rigorous data on sectoral and fiscal indicators, reveals a pattern: Tanzania's resource-driven economy, while buffered by USD 6.5 billion in reserves, remains perilously exposed to governance-induced shocks that prioritize regime security over inclusive development.

To mitigate these risks and realign with Vision 2050, policymakers must act decisively across multiple fronts. First, fostering genuine dialogue with opposition stakeholders, including the immediate release of figures like Tundu Lissu and reinstatement of CHADEMA's electoral participation rights, could de-escalate tensions and rebuild institutional trust—potentially restoring 50% of withheld EU and US aid within six months, per donor conditionality precedents. Second, lifting the internet blackout and enacting transparent digital regulations would safeguard remittances (USD 760 million projected loss in adverse cases) and e-commerce, which grew 25% annually pre-election, while signaling commitment to global norms amid AU and SADC scrutiny. Third, proactive donor engagement—through joint task forces on electoral reforms and anti-corruption audits—could unlock frozen funds and avert a fiscal cliff, drawing lessons from Hassan's own 2021-2023 fiscal consolidations that trimmed debt from 50% to 42% of GDP. A phased implementation roadmap, as outlined below, could guide this transition:

For the private sector, hedging strategies are imperative to navigate residual uncertainties. Diversifying supply chains away from unrest-prone urban corridors—such as routing mining logistics through Tanga Port—could minimize 10-15% throughput risks, while procuring political risk insurance from providers like MIGA (World Bank affiliate) would cover up to USD 500 million in potential losses for FDI-heavy ventures in energy and tourism. Multinationals should also prioritize local content policies, investing in youth skills programs to counter 9% unemployment spikes, thereby fostering social license and long-term market access.

Looking ahead, future research avenues abound to deepen this inquiry. Econometric simulations—leveraging vector autoregression (VAR) models on panel data from SADC peers—could forecast election-induced growth volatilities under varying repression scenarios, incorporating variables like social media sentiment indices and FDI sentiment surveys. Qualitative extensions might explore subnational variations, such as Zanzibar's autonomy dynamics, through comparative case studies with Uganda's 2026 polls. Longitudinal tracking of post-2025 indicators via platforms like the World Bank's Open Data could further validate these projections, informing adaptive policy in real time.

In essence, this data-grounded, case-centric analysis implores Tanzania's leaders to recalibrate toward a delicate equilibrium: stability not through suppression, but through inclusivity that harnesses the nation's 70 million-strong demographic dividend and abundant resources. By bridging political divides and fortifying economic safeguards, Tanzania can reclaim its trajectory as East Africa's growth vanguard, transforming the 2025 elections from a rupture into a resilient pivot point for equitable prosperity. Failure to do so risks not merely stalled development, but a profound erosion of the social contract that has underpinned three decades of progress.