

Truth and Beauty in Tanzania Diplomacy

From Liberation to Economic Ascendancy in a Multipolar World

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Abstract

This paper will discuss foreign policy in Tanzania in the light of one of the most famous aphorisms by John Keats, which is as follows: the beauty is truth, the truth is beauty, which correlates idealistic values (sovereignty, non-alignment, unification in the continent) with practical economic goals (growth, regional integration). Despite the 1967 Arusha Declaration that shifted perspectives on economic involvement, Nyerere and the 1967 liberation diplomacy marked by anti-colonial solidarity, and Mkapa and the 2001 New Foreign Policy, which shifted the United Nations aid emphasis to economic involvement, the paper highlights such fundamental principles as goodwill to neighbour, and United Nations assistance. These basics are reaffirmed by the present review of 2024, which faces new imperatives such as the New Climate Economy, the involvement of the diaspora, and environmental protection in the light of achievements in peace mediation and continuing problems such as trans-border crime. In the so-called booming economic diplomacy of President Samia Suluhu Hassan, geoeconomic potential is tapped using the 4Rs framework of Reconciliation, Resilience, Reforms, Rebuilding, and what she calls Samia-nomics, a blend of the Smithian concepts of peace, taxation, and justice, and is used to overcome the infrastructure deficit to promote inclusive growth and digital public infrastructure. Predicting 2081, the thirty-fold growth of the GDP predicts the dependence on the further policy development and fairness. Leaving off with the idea of smart power by Joseph Nye, the article is an ode to 21 st -century multilateralism based on systemic thinking, cultural sensitivity, and economic literacy to traverse the global shadows. The African agency modeled by Tanzania is thereby a prototype on how to move into a multipolar age and combine the permanence of truth with the ascendancy of beauty.

Keywords

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Tanzania foreign policy; economic diplomacy; regional hegemony; multilateralism; New Climate Economy; Samia-nomics; African unity

Introduction

Beauty is truth, truth beauty, —that is all Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know (Keats, 1819)

The eternal lines of the poem by John Keats called Ode on a Grecian Urn can be seen as an exemplification of aesthetic symmetry in which the laws of truthfulness and beauty are continually interceased. In the complex sphere of the international relations, this dualism can be observed brightly in the foreign policies of the states that sustain in the stormy waters of the global relations. Operationalization of the truth as applied to the situation of Tanzania can be seen in terms of unbroken adherence to the precepts of sound diplomacy, in terms of striving to be non-aligned, as well as, in terms of unalterable commitment to the unity of Africa and the peace of the world. These are ethical pillars that had been shaped in the wake of post colonial struggle and have been entrenched in the 1977 Arusha Declaration, which gives the moral compass through which the young republic navigated through Cold War polarities (Nyerere, 1977). In comparison, beauty is manifested in the pragmatic enticement of prosperity: the arrangement of economic growth through the strategic regional integration, the attraction of foreign investments, and the concentration of the sustainable development. This sympathetic diplomatic tune, as expressively depicted in the 2024 speech, by Shelukinda, is turning the gifts of nature into the wheels of national prosperity- into the ports of Dar es Salaam, into the fasteners of the East African Community (EAC). In this way, the Keatsian nexus, the truth as the ethical groundwork and beauty as idealistic grace, is the basis of the evolution of the foreign policy of Tanzania, and the ideologies of unilateralism are replaced by the ideologies of collaboration.

Fundamentally, foreign policy is not an introverted practice but a close intercourse with home affairs where foreign interactions resonate and influence home-based destinies. The two have a symbiotic nexus between them where foreign policy acts as the conduit, and foreign currents are directed into country ports of sustainable peace, security, and prosperity. Examples include that sustainable peace requires diplomatic prophylaxis on the spillover conflicts, such as the central role that Tanzania played in mediating the 2015 crisis in Burundi that prevented a refugee influx and maintained border security (Mthembu-Salter, 2017). Even security is reinforced by this prism; non-alignment, which is a doctrinal truth as long as independence has served Tanzania with protection against entanglements with the great powers so that it can invest in domestic resilience against transnational challenges such as terrorism and

climate-based scarcities (Kweka, 2014). The fruits of this collaboration, the so-called prosperity, are manifested through economic diplomacy: bilateral trade agreements with China and the European Union have triggered infrastructure booms, which have raised the GDP growth to 6.8 per cent in 2023 and made Tanzania the logistics centre of the East African area (World Bank, 2024). This connection, however, is not smooth. Domestic weaknesses and their impact on foreign policy effectiveness can be reciprocated because inequality or shortcomings in governance can make external advantages susceptible to internal vulnerabilities (Wehner and Thies, 2021). The situation is also the case with Tanzania with the 2001 New Foreign Policy, where economic needs were strategically placed at the core of indigenous ideals, so that the international relations strengthen, and not overtake internal equity (United Republic of Tanzania, 2001). This dynamic is also further uncovered in the nexus of religion and politics, whereby homegrown domestic secularisms shape foreign stances, as experienced in Tanzania, in terms of balanced relations with faith-based aid-givers without undermining state neutrality (Othmeni, 2024). The foreign policy, therefore, does not exist as an abstract concept but rather as blood that flows to the heart of domestic life, and requires a subtle balancing act to equip peace, borders and prosperity.

The key strategic posture of Tanzania is the latent but highly powerful concept of a regional hegemony. This idea does not bring to mind the forceful superiority that is traditionally linked to the hegemonic power, but the friendly custodianship of the East African region. The intellectual heritage of it has commonly been linked to the hegemonic stability theory by Stephen Krasner who argues that by the supply of such collective goods as open markets and security umbrellas, a powerful state is able to stabilize an international system (Webb and Krasner, 1989). Krasner, with his Western flavor, which had a foundation in the American primacy after World War II, focused on unilateral leadership as a means to impose stability to the regimes, at the expense of the smaller powers. Modern versions, though, modify this concept to multipolar settings and preempt, so-called benign or cooperative hegemony where regional actors such as Tanzania produce common goods without imperial ambitions (Pedersen, 2002). The manifestation of this evolution in Tanzania is evident. It is the core of the East African Community and its base in promoting infrastructural interoperability, such as the Standard Gauge Railway that connects Nairobi and Kigali, maintains peace-keeping operations in Somalia with the African Union Mission (AMISOM) and hosts the headquarters

of the bloc in Arusha (Mumma-Martinon, 2014). Instead of the extractive hegemonies of the past, Tanzania is a practical approach to stabilization neo-liberalism-strategic neutrality with a generous dose of calculated self-interest which allows it to act as a mediator in conflicts, such as Kenya-Uganda border tensions, and to enjoy the economic fruits, such as port revenues of over 1.5 billion a year (African Development Bank, 2023). This model places Tanzania as a moderating force in the region, in line with the theorist of the modern era, which puts greater focus on the networked leadership instead of individual strength (Lake, 2017). Opponents, however, warn that this type of hegemony can be easily overextended. The presence of wars such as the Democratic Republic of Congo conflicts in the region also pressures the resources in Tanzania, and there exist loopholes in the diplomatic system, which have been exposed to these wars (Shai, 2015). Although the strategies of the country are an attempt to harmonize between inclusive and strategic calculation, these issues are a manifestation of the weakness of asymmetrical power formations in a highly competitive African environment. In conclusion, as the global order is fracturing due to U.S.–China competitive dynamics and Russian increasing African incursions, Tanzania model reinvents the concept of hegemony in an inclusive ballast. It suggests a new paradigm, which appreciates the importance of cooperative leadership and joint infrastructural development, thus providing a valid counter-paradigm to the classical theories of domination and an interesting case study to theorists who study the evolving shapes of the regional power relations.

An example of a vocation of successful synthesis between idealism and realism, the foreign policy of the Tanzanian state, which began as the liberation policy of the Ujamaa period under Julius Nyerere whose Dar es Salaam was the haven of ANC exiles and frontline states, and turned into the economy of the giant in the upcoming 60 years, is the foreign policy of the new country. It gains more momentum under Hassan who was inaugurated in 2021 at the time of global turmoil with her philosophy of 4Rs (Reconciliation, Resilience, Reforms, Rebuilding) integrating ethical truth with the aesthetics of thriving, which becomes explicit in the 2024 Foreign Policy Review incorporating New Climate Economy requirements and diaspora remittances that are expected to reach at least 500million in 2024 (Minde, 2023; Shelukindo, 202 Striking the right balance between East and West relationships, which comes in the shape of the enhanced BRICS aspiration and the green deals at the EU, this policy not only demystifies neo-liberal shadows but also establishes a GDP curve towards a 30-fold growth by 2081, as far as the Keynesian foresight goes (Keynes, 1930). The diplomacy of

Tanzania, in a multipolar world, therefore speaks like a symphony of truth and beauty, in which upright non-alignment generates practical prosperity.

Overview of Tanzania's Foreign Policy

The foreign policy is the strategic plan of the country on how to relate to the other nations, the international bodies and the non-state actors, in the form of diplomacy, trade agreements, security coalitions and culture trading so as to advance national interests (Hill, 2016). In the context of Tanzania, this model has helped it to change its image as a post-colonial symbol of pan-African solidarity into a rather active participant in the global economic integration process. The history of the Tanzanian foreign policy shows a dynamic relationship between the ideological commitments and the practically oriented changes with the changing world. Following independence in 1961 (under the name Tanganyika), and the consequent union with Zanzibar in 1964, the newly independent republic under Julius Nyerere prophesied the anti-colonial liberation and made Dar es Salaam a center of African National Congress (ANC) exiles and other cadres of the struggle against colonialism (Bjerk, 2011). This phase was guided by improvised tools like Presidential Circulars, the internal directives defining diplomatic postures, and historic Declarations, the best of which was the 1967 Arusha Declaration that inculcated self-reliance (Ujamaa) and non-alignment as core values making it rejective of the superpower blocs during the Cold War (Nyerere, 1967). These processes helped Tanzania to take a leading role in supporting the liberation movements throughout southern Africa as it was involved in giving logistical support to Zimbabwean ZANU and Namibian SWAPO despite paying great domestic economic price (Nnoli, 1978).

The end of apartheid, the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and the Washington Consensus, which characterized the dynamics in the world by the 1990s, forced a recalibration. The ideological foreign policy was limited by economic liberalization under the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) brought by IMF and World Bank, leading to the emergence of pragmatism (Minde, 2019). The result of this was the 2001 New Foreign Policy of President Benjamin Mkapa, which was a paradigm document that kept up traditional values like that of sovereignty and unity of the African continent but placed economic purpose at its center (United Republic of Tanzania, 2001). The policy clearly sought to utilize diplomacy to reduce poverty, increase trade and inflows of investments by the understanding that peace and security were precursors to economic growth (United Republic of Tanzania, 2001, p.12). It was a turn rather than the wholesale rejection of the Nyerere tradition, but a transformation: non-alignment transformed

into multi-polar relationships that gave equal importance to both the relationship with the West (e.g. EU trade agreements) and the relationship with newcomers to the global stage such as with China (through the Tanzania-Zambia Railway rebuilding). This framework was further perfected in subsequent administrations, such as the multilateral outreach of Jakaya Kikwete and the inward-looking nationalism of John Magufuli, but Magufuli's isolationism tendencies lost their influence in regional bodies like the EAC (Minde, 2019). The policy has now become aggressive in its economic diplomacy under president Samia Suluhu Hassan since 2021 as witnessed by the focus of the 2024 review of digital infrastructure and climate resilience (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation, 2024). This is a historical pathway, the liberation diplomacy to economic ascendancy, which helps to explain why the Tanzania Foreign Policy has been a potent tool, able to adjust to decolonization, globalization and multipolarity without losing the main identities.

Principles and Strategic Objectives

Tanzania's foreign policy is based on timeless principles that mirror the country's post-colonial period, contrasting with the strategic aims that are adapted to the present day. The mentioned principles—taking the 2001 framework as a guide and confirming it in the 2024 edition—are the reason for keeping consistency in the midst of changes, stressing moral diplomacy instead of transactionalism (United Republic of Tanzania, 2001; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation, 2024). The following table illustrates this interaction, showing in what ways the principles are converted into concrete goals.

Principles	Strategic Objectives
Safeguarding sovereignty	Protect national interests via economic diplomacy
Promoting democracy & good neighborliness	Build self-sustaining economy
African unity & economic cooperation	Foster regional integration (e.g., EAC, AU)
Non-alignment & UN support	Contribute to global peace & development

Sovereignty, the most fundamental principle, shields a nation from outside attacks depicted by Tanzania's strong position on maritime borders amidst the disputes in the Indian Ocean (Kweka, 2014). Democracy and neighborliness are the two main pillars that give support to the EAC customs union benefits of \$2.5 billion annual commercial exchanges among the

member countries (East African Community, 2023). African solidarity, this also includes the financial support to the African Union (AU) troops in the form of economic cooperation that is also a striking feature of Africa's unity (Vasudeo, 2024). Non-alignment, a Nyerere signature trait, gives rise to peaceable participation like, for instance, refraining from UN votes on Ukraine to hold on to Russia ties—together with UN support for peacekeeping and sustainable development goals (SDGs) public advocacy (United Nations, 2024). Upon these principles, the objectives are implemented: economic diplomacy has been the reason for the \$28 billion foreign direct investment (FDI) since 2001, which in turn has created a self-reliant economy through the mining and agriculture sectors (World Bank, 2024a). The EAC and AU regional integration provide the countries' access to larger markets, while global contributions like hosting the AU Summit in 2023 put Tanzania's soft power to an even greater use (African Union, 2023).

Policy Strategies

To realize these principles and objectives, Tanzania employs multifaceted strategies that blend internal capacity-building with external outreach. These are outlined in the 2001 and 2024 policies as adaptive tools for a volatile world (United Republic of Tanzania, 2001; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation, 2024). Key strategies include:

1. **Facilitating Internal Environments:** Strengthening domestic institutions, such as the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC), to create investor-friendly climates, including streamlined licensing that reduced business registration to two days (Tanzania Investment Centre, 2024).
2. **Forging International Partnerships:** Cultivating bilateral and trilateral ties, exemplified by the 2023 Japan-Tanzania economic forum yielding \$1.2 billion in commitments for port upgrades (Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2023).
3. **Prioritizing Economic Diplomacy:** Elevating trade and investment as diplomatic levers, with missions abroad targeting \$10 billion in annual exports by 2030 through blue economy initiatives like seaweed farming (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation, 2024).
4. **Redefining Bilateral and Multilateral Engagement:** Shifting from reactive to proactive diplomacy, such as leading EAC negotiations on the African Continental Free

Trade Area (AfCFTA), which could add 4% to Tanzania's GDP (East African Community, 2023).

5. **Promoting Good Neighborliness:** Resolving border disputes amicably, e.g., the 2022 Malawi-Tanzania Lake Nyasa mediation, to underpin cross-border trade (International Crisis Group, 2022).
6. **Enhancing Regional Peace and Security:** Deploying 1,000 troops to Mozambique's Cabo Delgado against insurgency, stabilizing trade routes (Kabendera, 2024).
7. **Supporting International Organizations and Agreements:** Active participation in UN climate talks, ratifying the Paris Agreement and advocating for loss-and-damage funds at COP28 (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2023).

These strategies underscore a holistic approach, where economic gains reinforce security, as in the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) project linking to Rwanda, boosting intra-EAC freight by 30% (African Development Bank, 2023).

On-Going Policy Review

With the passage of more than twenty years after the enacting of the New Foreign Policy in 2001, Tanzania took up a wide-ranging review in 2021 that brought about the 2024 edition in May 2025 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation, 2024). The whole process was a strong stakeholder-driven one that included the consultation of more than 500 people through ministries, civil society, and diaspora, and it was meant to reposition Tanzania with the geopolitical changes such as the Russia-Ukraine war, US-China tensions, and climate crises (Chatham House, 2024). The review measured its effectiveness with factors like the increase in foreign direct investment (up 15% annually after 2001) and peacekeeping support (more than 50,000 troops since 2000), and recognized the separation of the domestic and foreign agendas (Rethinking Tanzania's Foreign Policy Paradigm, 2024). The results concluded that the basic principles—sovereignty, non-alignment—had not lost their validity but at the same time they had fresh ideas coming from them. These new principles include protecting the social and cultural values, such as making Kiswahili the diplomatic lingua franca to outbalance the Anglophone's dominance in the AU forums (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation, 2024). Apart from that, the issues that were taking shape were: New Climate Economy (NCE) which is the combination of the green growth principle and the renewable energy target of 30% by 2030 with collaboration like the EU's Global Gateway (\$1 billion

promised in 2024); diaspora participation that makes the most of remittances (\$600 million in 2023) through online consulates; and environmental challenges that look at the loss of biodiversity in the Selous Game Reserve as a partner in UN SDG 15 (World Bank, 2024b; International Union for Conservation of Nature, 2024). The review is a turning point in the practice of policy making from a rigid framework to a responsive one, reinforcing gender/youth participation and digital public infrastructures (DPIs) such as e-visas, that processed 2 million tourists in 2024 (Tanzania Tourism Board, 2024).

Targeted Achievements and Challenges/Gaps

Achievements Tanzania's foreign policy has yielded tangible gains, leveraging diplomacy for multifaceted progress:

- **Bilateral, Regional, and Multilateral Cooperation:** Secured \$5 billion in Chinese loans for Bagamoyo Port, enhancing EAC connectivity (China-Africa Research Initiative, 2023).
- **Advances in Peace, Democracy, and Human Rights:** Mediated South Sudan's 2018 peace accord, earning AU commendations and stabilizing refugee flows (African Union, 2018).
- **Hosting Regional and International Entities:** Arusha hosts EAC headquarters and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), generating \$100 million annually in economic spillovers (United Nations, 2024).

These milestones have elevated Tanzania's global standing, with UN voting alignment scores rising 20% since 2001 (United Nations, 2024).

Challenges/Gaps Despite successes, persistent hurdles undermine efficacy:

- **Underutilization of Kiswahili:** Limited to AU observer status, hindering cultural diplomacy in non-English forums (East African Community, 2023).
- **Trans-Border Crimes:** Smuggling and trafficking along porous borders with DRC cost \$500 million yearly in lost revenue (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2024).
- **Policy Gaps in New International Issues:** Inadequate frameworks for cyber threats and AI governance, exposing vulnerabilities in DPIs (Chatham House, 2024).

- **Regional Conflicts:** Spillover from Somalia and DRC strains resources, with peacekeeping budgets exceeding 5% of defense spending (Minde, 2019).
- **Gaps in Coordinating International Agreements:** Over 200 treaties ratified but poorly domesticated, leading to implementation lags in SDGs (World Bank, 2024a).

Addressing these requires enhanced inter-ministerial coordination and capacity-building.

Implementation Strategy and Stakeholders

The updated Foreign Policy for 2024-2034 is sustained by a serious commitment of the ten-year period implementation plan (2025-2035) that includes the review process every two years to take into account the changes in the world such as AI geopolitics and pandemics (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation, 2024). The strategy aims to reach defined targets with an example of growing foreign direct investment by 20% through the establishment of 50 new missions and further assigning specific roles to different entities: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for the overall monitoring supported by annual reports to Parliament. Periodic audits are essential for the process of adopting the changes since the lessons learnt from the COVID-19 disruption that caused a 50% drop in tourism revenues are invaluable (Tanzania Tourism Board, 2024).

Stakeholders span government and society, fostering whole-of-nation diplomacy. The table below categorizes key actors:

Stakeholder Category	Examples
Government (Mainland & Zanzibar)	Ministries (e.g., Foreign Affairs, Trade)
Private Sector & Politics	Businesses (e.g., Tanzania Chamber of Commerce), politicians
Civil Society	Religious institutions, NGOs, special interest groups
Diaspora & Academia	Overseas Tanzanians, universities (e.g., University of Dar es Salaam)
Media & Partners	Press (e.g., The Citizen), development partners (e.g., USAID)

This inclusive model—echoing Samia's 4Rs—amplifies voices, with diaspora forums contributing policy inputs (Minde, 2023).

Significance in Resource Transformation

Tanzania's foreign policy is pivotal in converting abundant natural resources—minerals, gas, arable land—into economic assets, averting the "resource curse" through value addition (African Development Bank, 2023). Below is illustrates transformative flowchart:

Figure 1: Foreign Policy-Driven Resource Transformation [Conceptual Diagram: A central node "Natural Resources" (e.g., gold, natural gas) branches to six pathways:

- **Trade Promotion** → Export diversification (e.g., AfCFTA integration).
 - **Investment Attraction** → FDI in mining (e.g., \$2 billion Barrick Gold deal).
 - **Infrastructure Development** → SGR and ports (\$10 billion pipeline).
 - **Technology Transfer and Capacity Building** → Skills via Chinese scholarships (5,000 annually).
 - **Regional Integration** → EAC single market access.
 - **Development Aid and Assistance** → Grants for green tech (e.g., EU \$500 million).
- Arrows converge on "Economic Resources" (GDP growth, jobs).]

This mechanism has tripled resource exports since 2001, funding 40% of the budget while mitigating Dutch disease via local content laws (World Bank, 2024a). In sum, Tanzania's foreign policy overview reveals a policy maturing from ideological fervor to economic vanguard, primed for 21st-century challenges.

The Past 60 Years

The updated Foreign Policy for 2024-2034 is sustained by a serious commitment of the ten-year period implementation plan (2025-2035) that includes the review process every two years to take into account the changes in the world such as AI geopolitics and pandemics (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation, 2024). The strategy aims to reach defined targets with an example of growing foreign direct investment by 20% through the establishment of 50 new missions and further assigning specific roles to different entities: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for the overall monitoring supported by annual reports to Parliament. Periodic audits are essential for the process of adopting the changes since the lessons learnt from the COVID-19 disruption that caused a 50% drop in tourism revenues are invaluable (Tanzania Tourism Board, 2024).

Nyerere's tenure marked the period of the "liberation diplomacy" and set the moral paradigm of Africa with the position of Tanzania. The first Prime Minister of Tanganyika and then the first President of Tanzania, Nyerere's international policy was a reflection of Ujamaa socialism: he was anti-imperialist, pan-Africanist, and non-aligned. He cut relations with Portugal in 1965 in protest of Mozambique's independence, hosted various liberation movements such as the ANC, ZANU, and SWAPO in Dar es Salaam—thus gaining the title "Mecca of African Liberation"—and was at the UN providing them with military training camps, logistical support, and diplomatic cover (Bjerk, 2011; Rodney, 2022). The period's 'truth' was the 1967 Arusha Declaration that turned back the clock on neocolonialism while the 1977 Foreign Policy guidelines that made African unity through OAU (now AU) and solidarity with the oppressed against apartheid South Africa the top priority (Nyerere, 1967). Pragmatism was evident in strategic neutrality—staying away from alignment with either the Warsaw Pact or NATO—which enabled Tanzania to draw support from both camps without being dominated. The self-interest drove the building of regional infrastructure such as the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA), which was funded by China, in order to circumvent the Rhodesian ports, thus achieving economic sovereignty during the liberation period that depleted the budget to 20% of GDP by the year 1980 (Nnoli, 1978). Nyerere's foreign policy brought Tanzania closer to the world: he was a co-founder of the Non-Aligned Movement and also a mediator in the 1979 Rhodesia Lancaster House talks, but to the overextension—by receiving 100,000 refugees—our weaknesses were exposed, which made it necessary to undertake an economic recalibration (Mthembu-Salter, 2017).

The economic diplomacy transition got a boost with the appointment of Mkapa (1995–2005), who received a debt-laden economy after the socialist Nyerere and the multiparty Ali Hassan eras. Mkapa's period was a substantive change marked by a pragmatic move; he incorporated self-interest into market-based dealings while maintaining neutrality. The IMF-imposed Structural Adjustments Programs (SAPs) forced Tanzania to take steps like liberalizing trade, privatizing state enterprises, and attracting foreign investments, thus, by the year 2005 the country's exports rose by a staggering 150% as per World Bank data (2005). The Mkapa's policy of "Economic Diplomacy" laid down the foundation on which the economics and foreign relations were to be built, which allowed the government to diversify its partnerships, hit the \$1 billion mark in EU aid, and attract Japanese investments in the fishery sector (Minde, 2019). The 'charm' of the period was seen in the cross-border trade as the East African Community (EAC) revival that was started under Mkapa's leadership stimulated intra-bloc trade amounting

to \$4 billion by 2005, while Tanzania continued to play the role of a mediator as in the case of the Burundi's Arusha Accords of 2000 (East African Community, 2005). On the other hand, Magufuli's rule (2015–2021) marked the start of a period of conflicts: his "bulldozer" nationalism praised the concept of resource sovereignty, which in the case of mining contracts led to the Acacia's \$190 billion tax dispute and infrastructure being totally dependent on self-reliance, thus, aligning the whole drama with the economic diplomacy's self-interest (Panafrican Review, 2021). At the same time, the president's inward focus—where he would not attend AU summits and would have strong disagreements with donor countries because of his denial of COVID-19—was one of the factors that diminished regional influence and resulted in a 10% drop in foreign direct investment (FDI) as isolationist rhetoric flourished (Kujenga Amani, 2019). Magufuli's diplomacy was shadowed by pragmatism: he balanced the Chinese Belt and Road loans (\$10 billion for SGR) with the Western green energy pacts, but his death in 2021 left behind a policy that was waiting to be revived (Chatham House, 2024a).

Foreign Policy Strategy 2001: Strengthening Economic Diplomacy

The New Foreign Policy of 2001, to which Mkapa gave birth, was the last step in this evolution; it changed the character of diplomacy from being an ideological bulwark to an economic accelerator while managing the "shadows" of post-Cold War globalization. Tanzania's strategy under the neoliberal imperatives of the SAPs—deregulation, privatization, and market access—reaffirmed the core principles but prioritized prosperity: "to become an effective promoter of Tanzania's economic and other national interests abroad" (United Republic of Tanzania, 2001, p. 1). Strengthening diplomatic-economic ties was its guiding principle: embassies turned from political reporting to trade promotion, and missions were assigned to secure \$5 billion in investment annually by 2010—a target met through 200+ bilateral agreements (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation, 2024). This involved public-private partnership, such as the case of the Tanzania Investment Centre's one-stop facilitation, which has attracted \$28 billion in FDI since its inception, mainly in mining and tourism (Tanzania Investment Centre, 2024).

The global economic shadows required great political self-interest: they criticized WTO's unfairness that supported the North with subsidies (\$300 billion a year compared to \$50 billion in aid for Africa), and proposed the South-South cooperation like the AGOA for the African textiles (United Republic of Tanzania, 2001). The policy-maker's pragmatism was evident in non-alignment—joining the Commonwealth in 2002 to have access to the British market while

not cutting off China—while his/her diplomacy revealed that "free markets" do not necessarily mean equal competition; rather, they pointed to the need for capacity building to prevent dependency (Kweka, 2014). GDP growth averaged 7% by 2005, thus proving the 'beauty' of the strategy: regional agreements like the EAC Customs Union reduced tariffs by up to 40% for Tanzanian exports (East African Community, 2005). However, there were still the dark sides—fluctuations in commodity prices and debt repayment taking 15% of the country's exports—calling for more diplomatic moves that combined neoliberal methods with pan-African protection (Minde, 2019).

Under President Samia Suluhu Hassan: Booming Economic Diplomacy

The elevation of Samia Suluhu Hassan to the presidency in March 2021 was a sign of a new beginning, which brought the economic diplomacy with the very inclusive and the very multilateral spirit. Her address at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) was a good summary of this situation: "Unilateralism will not get us anywhere when it comes to challenges that transcend our national boundaries" (Hassan, 2021), a call for collaboration to rise above these problems created by the COVID pandemic and the inequality in vaccine distribution. Her leadership has turned "booming economic diplomacy" into a proactive instrument of geo-economic potential: using the port of Dar es Salaam as the entrance of East Africa, with the upgrades of \$3.5 billion leading to 20% increase in trade volume by 2024 (African Development Bank, 2024). Harming no one but gaining the goodwill of the East and the West, as in the case of deepening China's \$2 billion SGR extensions along with EU's €1 billion Global Gateway for renewables, and the US AGOA renewals resulting in a rise of apparel exports to \$500 million (China-Africa Research Initiative, 2024; European Commission, 2024).

The 4Rs Philosophy-Reconciliation, Resilience, Reforms, Rebuilding-is the foundation of this whole process. It was formulated for stability and prosperity. Reconciliation mends the rift caused by the late president Magufuli and promotes national unity through dialogues that have brought down political tensions by 30% (так называемые исследования Афробарометра); Resilience has 'shock-absorbers' built against pandemics and droughts, besides \$1 billion in health diplomacy securing COVAX doses; Reforms are simplifying and accelerating, with the processing of business permits getting reduced from 12 to 3 days; Rebuilding spends on human capital, giving training in digital skills to 50,000 youths (Tanzania European Union, 2024; The Chanzo, 2024a). This whole scheme makes self-interest operational, establishing a connection between inner peace and external power - think of AU

mediation in Ethiopia's Tigray conflict which has put Tanzania's peacekeeping capability on a higher pedestal (African Union, 2023).

The newly developed "Samia-nomics" paradigm describes the application of the Smithian principles—peace as growth's precondition, simple taxation to encourage enterprise, and transparent justice to draw capital—in the form of diplomatic cooperation infused with ethical realism (Smith, 1776; The Citizen, 2025). Among the numerous developments that took place, tax reforms were the most noteworthy; VAT was simplified to 18%, so effective that compliance rose by 15%, and the digitization of the judiciary helped clear 80% of commercial cases within 6 months, which was regarded as a sign of investor confidence (World Bank, 2024c). The 2024 Foreign Policy Review, which was launched in May 2025, actually makes this the official position: it determines the fundamentals of Nyerere while not only inclusive growth but also bridging the economy-development chasm using \$15 billion in infrastructure (SGR Phase II to Burundi) that will enable 10 million people to have access to markets (Daily News, 2025; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation, 2024). The New Climate Economy (NCE) is another instance where money for peace is sought through means like green diplomacy—\$500 million in carbon credits from mangrove restoration—and the Digital Public Infrastructures (DPIs), for example, e-Government portals, facilitating 5 million services every year and development of resilience (Chatham House, 2024b; World Bank, 2024d). These actions have resulted in a significant increase in FDI, which rose by 25% to \$1.2 billion in 2024; thus, they exemplify the 'beauty' of flourishing diplomacy, alongside a GDP surge of 6.5% (International Monetary Fund, 2025).

Demystifying Global Neo-Liberal Economics

Tanzania's adaptive navigation presents a clear-cut critique of power dynamics that pushes reliance while unmasking neoliberal economics' claim that it is the only universal option. The neoliberal economic model, which in its essence is characterized by privatization, deregulation, and austerity, has been blamed for the poverty deepening in the Southern countries instead of the predicted mass wealth distribution due to reliance on it through European and American capital—SAPs in the 1980s reduced Tanzania's social spending by half, and this caused the country's debt to balloon from \$2 billion to \$10 billion in 2000, yet there was no corresponding growth (Webster, 2018; Shivji, 2017). Neoliberalism's critics point to the accompanying transfer of wealth—from the mines, for instance, as companies take back 70%, from Africa being starved of \$3 billion annually through capital flight—while the WTO's rules make it

impossible for new industries to compete (Rizzo, 2017). Tanzania's move is one of making friends through negotiation: the policy strategy of 2001 and the review of 2024 combine neoliberal means with the protection of sovereignty, such as the local content laws that require 20% of the procurement in the extractive industries to be from small and medium enterprises (United Republic of Tanzania, 2001; Legum and Mmari, 2018). Under President Hassan, this practice changes into the "neo-developmentalism" path—utilizing BRICS as a means of technology transfer in the course of G20 negotiations for debt relief—pushing such inequity aside through African Union-led reforms (The Chanzo, 2025).

Conclusion: A 21st-Century Multilateralism

Smart power means developing an integrated strategy that combines hard power resources with soft power techniques (Nye, 2011, p. 209)

Joseph S. Nye's conception of smart power, which combines the use of coercive 'hard' levers such as economic sanctions with the application of seductive 'soft' instruments like cultural diplomacy and alliance-building, is very much in line with the foreign policy of Tanzania. In the current situation where the use of force is becoming less effective and the attempt of a state to go it alone is no longer viable when the threats posed by the likes of climate migration and cyber warfare are called transnational, the changing view of Tanzania reflects this kind of hybrid approach. The country has moved from Nyerere's principled non-alignment (the soft allure of pan-African solidarity) to Hassan's 4Rs (hard-edged reforms softened by the outreach of reconciliation). The movement of troops to the Mozambique insurgency shadows and the establishment of EAC-mediated trade ties that link neighbors in shared wealth are examples of how the nation combines coercion with co-option (Kabendera, 2024; East African Community, 2024). This smart power philosophy, which was pronounced in the 2024 Foreign Policy Review, does not put Tanzania on the margins of the international scene but it does make it a key player in the vast networks of such arenas as AU peacekeeping operations and UN climate negotiations where the use of hard resources (e.g., \$200 million in AMISOM logistics) reinforces the soft messages of African self-determination (African Union, 2024; United Nations, 2024). However, as the global order disintegrates into different power centers, Tanzania has to go through the 'shadows' of 21st-century multilateralisms: hybrid threats, digital disruptions, and epistemic asymmetries that make it difficult to determine who is the real ruler. The country's diplomats and policymakers will need to develop their skills even further, incorporating both the ability to think deeply and the ability to adapt quickly.

In order to prepare the diplomats for the above mentioned difficulties, the four interlocked strategies will be the main ones of Tanzania's diplomatic corps, based on the 2024 review's focus on systemic renewal (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation, 2024). The first one is to create the broadest and global views possible and to go deep into the history, culture, and politics in the process. The Tanzanian diplomats must go beyond the limited areas of their knowledge: the understanding of the Swahili Coast's pre-colonial cosmopolitanism is helpful for negotiations with the partners in the Indian Ocean while the knowledge of the Ottoman trading routes are important for the understanding of the Turkey-Africa modern ties (Middle East Institute, 2023). The curriculum at the National Defence College should include modules of different disciplines so that the diplomats would be able to interpret cultural subtexts in BRICS forums or historical grievances in DRC peace talks, thus ensuring that Tanzania's interventions are heard not only in terms of economic metrics (Shelukindo, 2024).

the second approach encourages that tacitly an entire new way of looking at the παραδίά and the socioeconomic factors that might be related to it is due through the aforementioned past relationship⁶. In a world where X (previously Twitter) is the powerhouse behind micro-narratives (e.g., #EndSARS had a ripple effect on the African youth activism), the diplomatic approach of Tanzania has to be that digital sources of social media platforms are used not only for monitoring but also for fighting the negative image caused by the projections of disinformation in the areas of election manipulation or even vaccine discouragement (Pew Research Center, 2024). Historical sociology has taught that there are power relationships instead of packageable power resources (Tilly 1984); hence, the power of diplomats should not be determined by the number of influential people in their networks but by their ability to connect or disconnect an issue from another. For example, the issue of land reform may be linked to the issue of migration policy by talking about EAC (East African Community) migration pacts³. This new way of thinking that does not depend on the cause-effect relationship clarifies the situation and allows the respondents to be the trendsetters and not the victims of the cascading crises like the 2023 Horn of Africa droughts that were aggravated by global wars over grains (International Crisis Group, 2024).

The third point is about struggling against the incapacity of the outdated ethnographies. The ability to keep up-to-date and nuanced knowledge of ever shifting societies and cultures is the only way that can be used to counter the predicament of the stagnant ethnographies. For

instance, the influx of the urban population into Dar es Salaam is causing informal economies while at the same time the Tanzanian Gen-Z is mixing Afrobeat with K-Pop. As a result, policy has to be adjusted accordingly: the 2024 review's diaspora engagement department that is focusing on 5 million expatriates is already conducting virtual town halls to catch remittances and ideas as well as changing cultural mix into soft power assets (World Bank, 2024e). Therefore, diplomats that are well versed in ethnographic methods can do participant observation in AU youth forums and so on to predict cultural shifts from the feminist insurgency in Sudan to eco-activism in Kenya and bringing cultural foresight into bilateral agreements (African Studies Review, 2023).

Fourth, mastering the intricacies of the global economy is a must, with supply-chain disruptions and the path to greener economies prompting smart decisions. Tanzania's NCE is going all out with the goal of getting 60% of its energy from renewable sources by 2035, which means budgeting for IMF debt traps together with China's green Belt and Road, balancing \$2 billion in solar investments with WTO subsidy wars (International Monetary Fund, 2024; China-Africa Research Initiative, 2025). Economic literacy empowers diplomats to tap into the \$3.4 trillion market of AfCFTA, reducing neo-liberal asymmetries through AU bargaining blocs that give small-state voices a boost (Brookings Institution, 2024).

Surely, as it was to Voltaire, who remarked that the Holy Roman Empire was neither holy nor an empire, the beauty and truth of our foreign policy must align with the fact that the current international order is neither orderly nor truly global (Voltaire, 1759). This 'order' has been fragmented by the resurgence of protectionism, algorithmic echo chambers, and climate inequities that condemn the Global South to a state of constant catch-up; it is a mirage of multipolarity that hides the ghosts of hegemony. This is the conundrum: Tanzania's policy, with its Keatsian union of the truth (unfaltering principles of sovereignty and unity) and beauty (glorious visions of 30x GDP by 2081), has to deal with this dissonance directly. It does not call for grief but for alchemy—turning chaos into opportunity through clever, inclusive multilateralism that both respects Nyerere's legacy and supports Hassan's reforms.

The consequences are felt all over the place in African diplomacy: Tanzania's paradigm—pragmatic hegemony without overextension—gives the blueprint not only to its neighbors but also to the continental countries it has interacted with like Nigeria in the Sahel and South Africa in BRICS. Rather than being a behind-the-scenes player, Tanzania, like the AU reform advocating for the 2024 Peace and Security Council revamp, can be a catalyst for a truly pan-African agency that demands veto changes at the UNSC and fair climate finance at COP30 (African Union, 2024). The world seems to be waiting for such a calling: the African countries must unite in 'smart solidarity' alliances, sharing their soft power (cultural exports like Bongo Flava) and hard infrastructure (trans-African highways) to change the multilateral system from within. For Tanzania, this implies that by 2030 the country will spend 2% of its GDP on the building-up diplomacy, creating and supporting youth-led think tanks, and checking every agreement for fairness. By facing the hardship Tanzania's urn—marked with the endurance of truth and the promise of beauty—inspires to not only survive but to bring forth a new age characterized by the African voices leading the global chorus.

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#TanzaniaDiplomacy, #EconomicDiplomacy, #AfricanUnity, #SmartPower, #Multilateralism, #SamiaSuluhuHassan, #ForeignPolicy, #RegionalIntegration, #PanAfricanism, #NewClimateEconomy, #DrBraviousKahyoza, #TICGLResearch, #EACLeadership, #DiasporaEngagement, #SustainableDevelopment, #Samianomics, #4RsPhilosophy, #AfricanAgency, #MultipolarWorld, #DiplomaticExcellence