

The Dynamics of Negotiation in Tanzania's PPP Projects

Institutional Challenges and Policy Implications

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About Author

David Zacharia Kafulila is the Executive Director of Tanzania's Public-Private Partnership Centre (PPPC), spearheading innovative collaborations between government and private entities to accelerate infrastructure development, reduce borrowing dependencies, and propel the nation's Vision 2050 ambitions in sectors like transport and agriculture. A distinguished public servant with a Bachelor of Arts from the University of Dar es Salaam and a Master of Business Administration in Corporate Management from Mzumbe University, Kafulila's career exemplifies transformative leadership in economic governance. As former Regional Commissioner for Simiyu (2021–2022), he revolutionized the cotton value chain through the Simiyu Cotton Model, delivering record-high farmer prices and sustainable supply mechanisms; in Songwe Region as Administrative Secretary (2018–2020), he dismantled opaque procurement systems, prevailing in landmark High Court rulings to safeguard public funds; and during his tenure as Member of Parliament for Kigoma South (2010–2015), he earned the international Human Rights Defenders Whistleblower Award for exposing corruption. In a recent appointment on October 3, 2025, Kafulila was named Chairperson of the Dar es Salaam Rapid Transit (DART) Advisory Board, underscoring his pivotal role in advancing urban mobility and sustainable transport initiatives as a cornerstone of economic resilience. Kafulila's strategic vision continues to position PPPs as engines of equitable growth, blending private sector efficiency with public oversight to foster resilient, inclusive economic progress for Tanzania.

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Abstract

Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) have become the backbone of the infrastructure liberalisation that took place in Tanzania post 1990s, but the preliminary stages of negotiations often create bottlenecks that explode spending and destroy value of money in an institutional vacuum. This question explores these dynamics using a powerful mixed-method design, which focuses on four iconic projects in the transport, energy, rail, and housing industries. The study employs intensive case studies, semi-structured interviews with 28 practitioners, and systematic analysis of documents, and characterized the negotiation processes, which are largely distributive and characterised by high power asymmetries, with an average contraction period of 22 months, which is much higher than international data, by a factor of 150-175 percent. The 62% of project delays are caused by institutional impediments, which are either categorized as legal lacunae, bureaucratic inertia, and human-resource deficits, and the sectoral disparities compound fiscal liabilities (e.g., 200-million surcharge in energy PPP deals) and have a rate of cessation of 29% within the housing sector. Such results challenge existing PPP paradigms in the world by predetermining the power of Non-Institutionalised Elements (NIEs) to produce informal norms in African situations and, thus, necessity to

implement changes, including consolidated forms of oversight and systematic training of negotiators. The policy recommendations are short term pilot intervention to develop capacity in conjunction with long term changes in legislation to create integrative equilibrium; these interventions will trigger the supply of up to 50 billion dollars of infrastructural pipelines and will lead to fair growth. The efficacy with which it connects the theoretical constructs and the empirical rigour makes this piece of work be added to the canon of resilient hybrid governance in the Global South hence informing the realisation of the Tanzania Vision 2025 agenda.

1. Introduction

1.1 Background of the study

The quest of an infrastructure-based growth agenda in Tanzania, in the backdrop of the teeming container yards of Dar es Salaam, reveals the ironic truth of a nation, which is full of contradictions. The idea of Public-Private Partnerships, which was created to combine the efficiency of the private sector and the stewardship of the state, often does not work because of its failure to actually take place, rather than the lengthy negotiations that take place before the work begins. With ships queuing at sea, the docking of their contracts held back by unclear contractual contingencies on risk allocation and sharing of revenue, the structural inadequacy in the country is becoming increasingly evident with the estimated shortfall of US 10-15 billion per annum in infrastructure becoming a source of bitter disappointment on how the potentials of collaboration are turned into an expensive stalemate by institutional friction (United Republic of Tanzania, 2009). As urbanisation rates increase (at an annual pace of more than 5 per cent) and energy needs strain an already frail grid to near-recurring blackouts, these negotiation setbacks are threatening to derail the Vision 2025 goals of turning Tanzania into a middle-income nation, and it is important to question the factors that underlie the problem.

1.2 PPP Historical Perspective

The history of the development of public-private partnerships (PPP) in Tanzania cannot be discussed outside of the context of the economic liberalisation process that started back in the post 1990s, which has been triggered by the economic strains that had been mounting up over the previous decades of the socialist era. Systematic deregulation of the state monopolies as well as the full opening of the public services to the participation of the private sector occurred through the Economic Recovery Programme that was enacted in 1986 and the extensive state reforms of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (XS-Axis Consulting, 2014). At the end of 1990s, informal PPP activities started becoming visible and were mainly manifested in concessions and management contracts in the infrastructure and energy sectors and were an indication of the government efforts to marshal inadequate public capital and to meet a growing connectivity and power demand. The key ones are the 1998 long-term concession extended to the Kilimanjaro Airports Development Company (KADCO) of the

Kilimanjaro International Airport, which brought significant efficiencies in its performance, and the 2000 award of the Dar es Salaam Port container terminal to Tanzania International Container Terminal Services (TICTS). The latter innovation reduced the dwell times in 2010 to less than 20 days compared to having 37 days in 2001, which is an example of the practical effect of the investment by the privation to equipment and processes (XS-Axis Consulting, 2014; United Republic of Tanzania, 2024). In the energy sector, Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) between the companies and Tanzania Electric Supply Company (TANESCO) stimulated the influx of independent power producers, hence overcoming shortage that had limited the industrial development by up to 10 R a year. These new enterprises which were often on ad hoc basis under the Public Corporations Act of 1992 were in tandem with National Strategy of Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP). They helped in inflow of foreign direct investment in transport infrastructure- roads, railways and ports and utilities thus forming the basis of export competitiveness (United Republic of Tanzania, 2009). This course was formally consolidated by the promulgation of the National PPP Policy in 2009, which institutionalised a competitive procurement structure and organised risk-sharing frameworks. In line with this, the PPP Act of 2010 and subsequent 2011 Regulations laid down a very clear roadmap as regards the nature of the planned projects like the Dar es Salaam-Chalinze highway and the development and expansion of Bagamoyo Port. Currently over 25 PPP projects are being run or being developed. The proportion of infrastructure projects (e.g., the rehabilitation of railway) and energy-related projects (e.g., the rehabilitation of solar) takes the share of about 60 and 30 percent, respectively, thus supporting regional integration within the African Continental Free Trade Area (Public Private Partnership Centre, 2024; XS-Axis Consulting, 2014).

However, despite the underlying reforms already being in existence, the dynamics of negotiation in Tanzania public-private partnership (PPP) projects have been still a topical bottleneck that has been increasing the cost, and is already compromising confidence in an already fragile investment environment. Negotiations will be lengthy (between eighteen and thirty-six months) and are compromised by information asymmetry at all levels and lack of technical know-how on the part of the public actors to compete well with the private consortia with advanced financial modelling. As a result, the skewed focus of the contractual

arrangements are in favor of short-run private benefits at the cost of the governmental sector (Almeile et al., 2022; Kavishe & An, 2016). In the housing market, as an example, since the 1990s, the National Housing Corporation (NHC) has established 183 joint ventures, but 29 of them have ended either prematurely or have not started at all, mainly due to lengthy discussions on equity shares, often set at a 75:25 ratio to the advantage of private partners, and the risk-sharing arrangements. This deficiency in competition selection also welcomes corrupt and suboptimal bids (Kavishe & An, 2016). The situation is aggravated by institutional barriers: the control functions are divided between the PPP Coordination Unit of the Tanzania Investment Centre and the Finance Unit of the Ministry of Finance, which causes silos and slips in the procedures. An example of this fragmentation is the central rail contract that went to RITES in India in 2007 and was cancelled in 2011 due to performance standards and re-negotiation problems (XS-Axis Consulting, Polare 2014). The ineffective PPP negotiations are also aggravated by capacity deficits. The risks are disproportionately borne by negotiators, who often receive insufficient training in valuation and other dispute resolution techniques, and transaction costs are between ten and fifteen percent of the project value due to a poor feasibility study and obscure approval processes (United Republic of Tanzania, 2009; Almeile et al., 2022). The energy industry is a good example of the disastrous effects of these forces. The Independent Power Tanzania (IPTL) power purchase agreement of 1995 had an adverse effect of increasing the government liabilities by US 200 million million following unsuccessful renegotiations on the cost of fuel and guarantee arrangements, thus deterring future bids and leaving only a quarter of requested bids successful (Public Private Partnership Centre, 2024). Besides increasing project durations, these challenges lead to the development of rent-seeking behaviour, since lapses in transparency over unsolicited proposals increases elite capture, and erases investor confidence, which is not that of a situation where only thirty percent of projects reach value-for-money thresholds (United Republic of Tanzania, 2024). This paper attempts to query such tensions with a set of specific research questions: What institutional issues (regulatory fragmentation, capacity inadequacies and procurement inefficiencies) are best placed to hinder effective PPP negotiations in Tanzania? What is the evidence of these factors in priority areas, especially in infrastructure and energy, in regard to timeline lengthening and quality of outcomes? And what policy responses can re-adjust the bargaining processes to the

more equitable and efficient partnerships? Such questions implement a New Institutional Economics approach to deconstruct formal regulations, including those under the PPP Act, with the implication of informal pressures, including political interference (Almeile et al., 2022).

1.3 General Objective

To investigate the negotiation dynamics in Tanzania's PPP projects, with a view to elucidating institutional challenges and formulating policy implications for enhancing partnership efficacy and sustainable infrastructure development.

1.3.1 Specific Objective

1. To map and analyze the negotiation processes and dynamics in selected Tanzanian PPP projects across key sectors (e.g., infrastructure and energy).
2. To identify and evaluate the primary institutional challenges hindering effective PPP negotiations in Tanzania, including their impacts on project outcomes.
3. To derive targeted policy recommendations for mitigating institutional challenges and fostering resilient PPP negotiation frameworks.

1.3.2 Research Questions

1. What are the key phases and tactics (distributive vs. integrative) observed in PPP negotiations, and how do they vary by sector? - How do stakeholder interactions influence the progression from pre-bid to contract closure?
2. What formal (e.g., regulatory) and informal (e.g., normative) institutional factors most prominently impede negotiation efficiency, and how do they correlate with delays, costs, and value-for-money? - To what extent do capacity deficits and fragmentation contribute to asymmetries in bargaining power and broader developmental consequences?
3. What reforms to formal institutions (e.g., PPP Act amendments) and capacity-building measures can promote integrative bargaining and equitable outcomes? - How can lessons from Tanzanian cases inform scalable policy interventions for other African contexts?

1.4 Scope of the study

The principal objective of this study is to conduct a rigorous analysis of the bargaining processes that shape public-private partnership (PPP) arrangements within the Tanzanian context. The study seeks to enhance PPP implementation outcomes by systematically mapping institutional barriers and developing specific, evidence-based policy recommendations.

Complementary objectives include detailed case studies of landmark negotiations—namely, the Tanzania International Container Terminal Services (TICTS) port and the Independent Power Tanzania Limited (IPTL) energy deal. These cases will be interpreted through advanced bargaining theories to design reform blueprints that are contextually sensitive to Tanzania's institutional and socio-economic realities.

Academically, this research addresses a critical gap in Africa-centric PPP literature, which has often relied on generalized models drawn from the Global North, thereby overlooking the complex dynamics of Southern bargaining processes (Almeile et al., 2022; XS-Axis Consulting, 2014). Practically, the study provides policymakers with a robust set of analytical tools to accelerate implementation of Tanzania's \$50 billion infrastructure investment agenda as outlined in the Third National Five-Year Development Plan (2021/22–2025/26). By reducing project execution delays—which currently cost the national economy an estimated 23 percent of GDP annually (United Republic of Tanzania, 2024)—the research promises tangible economic savings and improved efficiency.

Furthermore, the study promotes inclusive economic growth by mitigating risks of elite capture and ensuring that development benefits extend to peri-urban informal settlements and off-grid rural areas, thereby enhancing social equity and resilience (Kavishe & An, 2016; Public-Private Partnership Centre, 2024).

Situated firmly within the Tanzanian experience, this study contributes to the broader Global South discourse, exploring how historical legacies of colonialism and aid dependency intersect with modern institutional evolution.

The paper is organized as follows, a comprehensive literature review situating Tanzanian PPP negotiations within a comparative Global-African analytical framework, the theoretical framework, integrating game theory and institutional analysis to explain bargaining behaviour, the qualitative methodology, employing methodological triangulation through case studies and semi-structured interviews, report and discuss empirical findings, highlighting key impediments to effective PPP implementation, practical policy recommendations, concludes with a synthesis of findings and proposes directions for future research.

This structural framework not only diagnoses existing challenges but also prescribes concrete policy remedies to strengthen Tanzania's PPP ecosystem and advance sustainable infrastructure development.

2.0 Literature Review

Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) have risen to the rank of exception in the field of infrastructure funding and provision in most countries of the world, especially in situations that are limited in available resources where governments strive to utilise privatisation efficiencies without compromising the government regulation. However, negotiation stage that includes bidding, contract writing, risk sharing, and conflict resolution remains one of the decisive points with both theoretical and empirical complexities. The present literature review places the PPP negotiations dynamics in the context of the existing global theoretical frameworks, relying on regional empirical research in Africa and Tanzania and identifying the main gaps in the scholarly community. It reaches a conceptual framework that is based on New Institutional Economics (NIE). Through the synthesis of these strands, the review shows how the results of negotiation are, in most cases, determined by the existence of institutional tensions, as opposed to technical ones, thus informing the Tanzanian interest in the present study.

2.1 Global Theories of PPP Negotiation

Research on the negotiations in the context of public-private partnerships is heavily based on economic and behavioural principles that map out the dynamic interaction of public principals and the presence of private agents with asymmetric information and limited rationality. Based on the early exposition of the agency costs by Jensen and Meckling (1976), principal-agency theory (PAT) argues that the public entities (principals) delegate the roles of the private firms (agents) to do what is self-serving, which, as a result, breeds the moral hazard and adverse selection in the negotiation. This is experimented in the PPP contexts through the form of government agencies struggling to track the privacy of the overall conformance to long-term performance indicators, augmenting the turnover of renegotiation and transaction expenses. As an example, Chang and colleagues (2019) use PAT to decompose risk allocation, arguing that optimal contracts rely on the alignment of incentives via performance bonds and penalties; however, incomplete contracts - due to the emergence of unforeseen contingency like regulatory changes - increase agency costs, with empirical data on Asian PPPs showing up to 20 per cent overruns due to agency problems. Liu et al. (2021) take this view further to model agency problems in investment decisions and illustrate how the private agents use informational advantages to request high risk premia, which, in turn, reduces public value-for-money (VfM) by 15-25 per cent in the simulated environment. More importantly, PAT proposes the necessity of strong governance procedures that include independent auditors to reduce the issues of hold-up during the negotiations, whilst critics suggest that it overlooks the concept of relational contracting in high-uncertainty settings (Ho, 2006).

The game theory, which complements PAT, offers a dynamic perspective of the bargaining process since the PPP negotiation can be perceived as a non-cooperative or cooperative game, where players are planning their resource allocation. This framework is based on the bargaining solution presented by Nash (1950), which is based on the premise that rational agents maximise on Pareto-efficient solutions. Nonetheless, empirical studies always indicate deviations which can be explained by asymmetric information and iterative character of the interaction. Jin and Zhang (2011) use a game model of non-cooperative game to risk-sharing agreements and prove that sequential bargaining, where governmental organizations make

the first offer, yields sub-optimal equilibria when the veto power is retained by the participants in a private market, which is observed in highway PPPs where the number of delays spreads as a result of the revenue guarantees being fought. Liu et al. (2019) build on this analysis by incorporating a renegotiation game-theoretic model that is specific to environmental PPPs in China. They report that electoral cycles increase governmental concessions, allowing private firms to seize about 60 0 -1/2 of the excess in iterated games, which confirms the predictive utility in the model of the hold-out strategies. More recently, Nash bargaining is combined with fuzzy sets in Nash bargaining by Meng et al. (2024) to model consensus formation within large-scale PPPs. Their results indicate that asymmetric patience, in particular when a public organization faces a time constraint, biases allocations in the direction of private interests, finding that is consistent with the behavioural game experiments that trust deficits increase negotiation time by about 30 per cent (Weissmuller and Vogel, 2021). All these models are important in understanding how strategic interdependence can create inefficiencies, but often do not take cultural or institutional differences into consideration, which has been resolved in regional case studies. The synthesis of PAT and game theory also makes hybrid methods more meaningful to the academic discussion. As an example, the renegotiation analysis by OECD (2014) reformulates PPPs as principal-agent games, with the occurrence of renegotiation considered as a sub-game; exogenous shocks like economic crises induce Bayesian learning, which would renegotiate in about 70 per cent of Latin American cases. Similarly, Xu et al. (2012) make use of system dynamics, to which game-theoretic aspects are added, to model the risk propagation process and promote the use of real options in contracts to enable renegotiation. Their Monte Carlo simulation shows that risks of deadlocks are reduced by 40 per cent. Combined, the current worldwide theoretical approaches represent negotiations as a place of measured opportunism, strategy of foregrounding incentive creation, and prospective strategies. However, their Eurocentric ideology, where formal contractual procedures are seen as more important than relational norms, limits the generalisability of the models to the developing context of Tanzania.

2.2 Tanzania- and Africa-Specific Studies: Challenges in Contract Enforcement and Corruption Risks

Scholarship Empirical research on African public-private partnership is, nevertheless, a relatively recent literature that outlines a trend of institutional barriers that intensify negotiation bottlenecks, particularly in terms of contract enforcement and corruption. In Tanzania, the literature pre-empted regulatory disintegration and capacity shortfall as the main challenges. Kavishe et al. (2018) provide a detailed study of housing PPPs in Dar es Salaam and reveal that there is a loophole in the enforcement procedure and that the inclusion of ambiguous dispute-resolution provisions under the 2010 PPP Act has led to a 25 per cent abandonment rate of projects, which is aggravated by judicial delays of 18 months. These results are supported by Mtei et al. (2020) in the health sector, where they document non-compliance with service-level agreements because of lax monitoring; they have found that 40 per cent of partnerships of this kind underdeliver, which is due to the enforcement inertia that is encouraged by understaffed PPP units. Based on the survey of 150 Tanzanian stakeholders, Kavishe and Juma (2021) give more importance to capacity-building issues, such as skills in financial-modeling, which increases the duration of negotiations by 1224 months and costs by 1015 percent. Ngewi (2013) extends the argument to municipal PPPs and criticizes ad hoc arrangements implemented before 2010 that fostered unequal implementation; waste-management concessions exemplify the risks of corruption in unsolicited bids that undermined 20 percent of the value money. These themes are reinforced in a larger body of African scholarship that puts enforcement as an extension of weak institutions. Amann et al. (2016) surveys Sub-Saharan PPPs and records 35–5 failure rate when trying to enforce a contract in a volatile environment, and contract rigidity is sabotaged by politicised courts in nations like Kenya and Zambia. Eberhard and Gratwick (2011) examine South African and Nigerian examples in the energy sector and find that power-purchase contracts allow lapses in enforcement, which adds 50 per cent in tariffs by regulatory capture. The problem of corruption becomes an omnipresent threat; Osei-Tutu et al. (2010) records procurement grafts in the PPPs of infrastructures in Ghana, in which bribery manipulates bidding, incumbents, and price increases by 15 to 30 percent. Matshidze (2020) attributes this to the South African road PPPs where elite capture in the negotiations processes continues inequality. According to the

estimates of Transparency International (2022), PPP-related corruption on the continent-wide level consumes the value of money to the extent of 100 billion dollars being lost annually. Recent works, especially Africa Catalyst (2023), criticise poor public-enforcement structures, noticing that only 20 percent of African PPPs fully comply based on aid-related systems that focus on expediency rather than effective protection. All these studies can be seen as a narrative about the existence of institutional voids, gaps in the rule of law and accountability, that hinder fair bargaining. In spite of being rich, Tanzanian analyses are mostly descriptive and little longitudinal modelling of the path of negotiation is done.

2.3 Gaps in the Literature

Despite the abundance of theoretical advances of the world and the local empirical research, there are still some gaps, particularly in the area of the institutional processes of the negotiation of the relations between the population and the business in Tanzania. The prevailing paradigms of the political-agency theory and the game theory offer beautiful constructivist models, but often lacks connection with the social-political reality of the negotiations; one example is that Liu et al. (2021) model agency costs but make a limited discussion of how the entrenched patronage networks in Tanzania corrupt principal incentives. Although African scholarship provides valuable insights into the analysis of the mechanism of enforcement (Amann et al., 2016), it tends to pay attention to the post-contractual phase, thus neglecting the pre-award bargaining phase where 60 percent of value erosion is concentrated (OECD, 2014). Tanzania-specific study like Kavishe et. al (2018) presents sectoral issues but does not go as far as to create a comparative cross sectoral richness, nor does it give much integration of quantitative simulations of bargaining. Risk profiles are enlightened by corruption studies (Osei-Tutu et al., 2010) but omitting the mitigation opportunities given by institution redesign, there is a significant policy gap. Most importantly, the value of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) framework in filling these gaps is underestimated in the literature, and little use of this concept to explain Tanzanian contexts is applied despite its predictive power of hybrid institutional governance arrangement (Henjewe et al., 2011). This paper aims to address these gaps by putting institutional interplay at the foreground of the negotiation analysis and hence making an African-centric theoretical input.

2.4 Conceptual Framework: Integrating New Institutional Economics

This paper presents an NIE-integrated framework to fill the gaps, using North (1990) as a source to consider PPP negotiations as rule-mediated games influenced by formal (laws) and informal (norms) institutions. NIE leads to the conclusion that transaction costs—search, bargaining, and enforcement—determine the forms of organizations, with PPPs being hybrids that minimize the risk of opportunism through credible commitments (Williamson, 1985). Henjewe et al. (2011) apply this theory to PPP units, portraying them as institutions that reduce hold-up through standardized processes, and game-theoretic tests proving that 25% efficiency gains are achieved in compliant regimes. Casady and Peci (2020) bring up this situation in transition economies, where they utilize fuzzy-set QCA to correlate institutional maturity (legitimacy, capacity) with PPP performance, and it is disclosed that fragmented oversight increases the renegotiation likelihood two-fold. Biygautane (2021) brings entrepreneurship into the picture, puts negotiators in the role of institutional agents who establish trust norms, and thus, the conduct of the parties involved in Moroccan infrastructure PPPs is less in conflict with the principles of the Public Administration Theory (PAT) than before.

Negotiations develop in the pre-bid, drafting, and closure phases that are all along the way influenced by the other Non-Institutional Economics (NIE) pillars such as path dependency (Tanzania's post-liberalization legacies), bounded rationality (capacity limits), and enforcement credibility (corruption risks). The first hypothesis is formulated as: H1—Regulatory fragmentation raises transaction costs which in turn, according to Williamson (1985), extend the transaction duration; H2—Informal norms do not allow to reach game-theoretic outcomes, thus, they promote integrative negotiations (Bovaird et al., 2019). Theoretical lens here merges PAT (agency within rules) and game theory (strategic rule application) and adjusts them to the Tanzanian case for policy-relevant insights.

To conclude, globally accepted theories provide the research team with the necessary tools, while studies from Africa and beyond give the necessary background implications, and hence, NIE acts as a bridging point by showing us the institutional possibilities for negotiating more resiliently. The current literature review goes ahead and marks the appropriate place for the next two sections of empirical exploration.

2.5 Theoretical Framework

This theoretical framework is the analytical lens through which the negotiation dynamics in Tanzania's Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are examined. It combines the core theories of bargaining with institutional analysis in order to analyze how structural and behavioral factors influence outcomes. The framework, which is based on negotiation literature and New Institutional Economics (NIE), considers PPP negotiations as not only transactional exchanges but also as embedded processes that are affected by power differentials, rule sets, and contextual variables. This method links micro-level bargaining tactics to macro-institutional constraints, which gives room for a subtle diagnosis of the bottlenecks in Tanzania's PPP ecosystem. Thus, the framework not only provides a basis for empirical analysis and policy prescriptions but also highlights the need for adaptive reforms for equitable value creation by hypothesizing causal links between institutional challenges and negotiation inefficiencies.

2.6 Core Theories: Negotiation Dynamics

Differing paradigms of distributive and integrative bargaining which differentiate the parties in terms of value division and creation are at the core of PPP negotiations. Distributive bargaining is based on the principle of zero-sum and sees resources as limited. This results in the use of adversarial tactics, where the winning party's gains are equal to the losing party's losses, and the situation usually presented in haggling over price, risk shares, or concessions (Thompson et al., 2010). Such a situation is typical of the early phases of the PPP process, like the evaluation of bids, where government authorities are looking for ways to protect their budgets while private companies are insisting on securing the revenues, thus leading to long periods of non-agreement and, ultimately, poor-quality contracts. Research on infrastructure PPPs, for example, has shown that, negotiation strategies related to distributive have led to an increase in transaction costs by 10-20% due to ongoing bargaining over prices, as the negotiators manage to delay the process by not sharing the necessary information and thereby forming the distrust that pulls them into the cycle of renegotiation again and again (Holbrook, 2010). In developing markets, the problem is more serious, since power imbalances—government budget pressures versus private sector expertise—make hold-up scenarios worse; this is illustrated in the case of Asian toll-road PPPs where 30% of distributive framing drove

the deals to fall through before they even reached the closure stage (Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, 2025).

On the other hand, integrative bargaining is a type of negotiation that aims at expanding the pie through creative problem-solving, information sharing, and joint value creation, thus being in line with the long-term PPP objectives like sustainable infrastructure (Lewicki et al., 2021). This model, which is based on the Walton and McKersie's (1965) basic model, encourages logrolling—making mutual concessions across issues—and objective criteria to construct trust, resulting in higher joint outcomes. The empirical reviews in supply chain negotiations, which are analogous to PPPs, show that the use of integrative approaches not only makes collaboration easier by 25-40% but also diminishes disputes by deploying bundled solutions like phased risk transfers or shared innovation incentives (Tazelaar and Klos, 2024). In the case of PPPs, the use of integrative tactics becomes a necessity for the complicated contracts that involve inputs from many different stakeholders, such as in energy projects where joint development of the environmental clauses helps to eliminate future liabilities (Liu et al., 2019). Nonetheless, the shift from distributive to integrative requires the establishment of relational norms which may not hold in the case of the high-uncertainty environment like Tanzania, where the cultural precepts of hierarchy may lead to positional bargaining becoming entrenched (Brett, 2014). Therefore, the negotiation dynamics in PPPs are constantly shifting between these two extremes, and the success of this process is determined by the presence of facilitators such as organized workshops that promote integrative mindsets which the meta-analyses have indicated can potentially lead to a reduction of timelines by 15-30% (De Dreu et al., 2000).

These theories underscore a hybrid reality in practice: PPP negotiations often commence distributively but evolve integratively under conducive conditions, informing the institutional overlay in this framework.

2.7 Institutional Analysis

In the framework that defines bargaining dynamics, the NIE is referred to, mainly Douglass North's (1990) view of institutions as "the rules of the game" that influence and reduce uncertainty and transaction costs and so structure interactions. The formal institutions are the laws made by man such as the Tanzania PPP Act (2010, as amended 2023) that set out the conditions for participation, the process of procurement, and the means to enforce contracts, while the informal institutions are the rules, customs, and networks of influence that are not legally recognized but still involved in the process, often causing bottlenecks in mixed modes of governance (Williamson, 1985). For example, in Tanzania, the formal rules under the PPP Regulations 2023 limit the negotiation time to prevent delays; however, the fragmentation between the agencies (such as the Ministry of Finance versus the Tanzania Investment Centre) creates situations that are difficult to change which are partly caused by post-colonial bureaucracies, resulting in an increase in opportunism (United Republic of Tanzania, 2024). According to the NIE theory, such misalignments result in the increase of bounded rationality—the limitation of foresight of the actors—so the contracts become incomplete and susceptible to renegotiation, as in the case of African PPPs where informal elite capture skews risk allocation (Henjewe et al., 2011).

The applications of NIE in Tanzania point out that the informal rules such as the political interference in unsolicited proposals, prevent the formal safeguards from being effective, and that is why the negotiations are prolonged and there is a risk of corruption (Mushi et al., 2025). For example, in the case of housing PPPs, the cultural norms that favor personal connections over competitive bidding create holdouts and studies suggest that these institutional voids cause a loss of efficiency of about 20-35% (Kavishe and Juma, 2021). By introducing the idea of NIE, discussions over PPPs are also seen as games consisting of the different institutions involved. The monopoly of commitments through the centralized units can thus shift the negotiations to the integrative equilibrium, which is in line with North's emphasis on evolutionary change through policy adjustments (North, 1990). This reasoning combines bargaining theories by considering distributive strategies as the result of weak application of

the rules and the possibility of integrative tactics being opened up by the maturity of the institutions.

3.0 Methodology

This study employs a mixed-methods research design to fully explore the negotiation dynamics in Tanzania's Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) thus ensuring a rigorous, replicable, inbound approach that combines qualitative and quantitative studies together, as it is the case in this study. Mixed-methods come to the forefront especially in developing countries evaluations where besides the already mentioned narrative insights into bargaining there are also empirical metrics on delays and costs (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2017). While the design has included these paradigms, it has also been able to depict the various elements of the negotiations—the stakeholder and institution perceptions along with inefficiencies that can be measured—simultaneously bringing about the reliability of the outcomes through the overlap of the findings. The explanatory sequential strategy is in use: qualitative data gathering and processing come first and form a basis for the subsequent quantitative stages, with the qual results being used to improve the quant instrument, and finally the integration stage to reveal the causal patterns (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009). The sequence starts with the exploration of the negotiation narratives through case studies followed by the quantification of the variables such as the timeline extensions due to regulatory fragmentation, this is in line with NIE's focus on transaction costs (North, 1990). Detailed protocols for sampling, data handling, and analysis serve as a stronghold for the replicability, all of the instruments used are also archived for future audits.

3.1 Research Design

The fundamental framework of the design includes a number of case studies of four that are characteristic of the Tanzanian PPP projects which were picked according to their sectoral diversity and the intensity of the negotiations: (1) the 2000 concession of the Dar es Salaam Port Container Terminal to Tanzania International Container Terminal Services (TICTS), a transport infrastructure benchmark with protracted risk-sharing discussions; (2) the Independent Power Tanzania Limited (IPTL) a gas-fired power plant based on a 1995 Power Purchase Agreement with TANESCO, highlighting energy sector conflicts over fuel costs and

guarantees; (3) the Central Railway Corporation concession for the rehabilitation of the railways which was awarded to RITES India in 2007, a case which illustrates the problem of enforcement in the rail infrastructure (the concession was terminated in 2011); and (4) a housing project in Dar es Salaam, which was a collaboration between the National Housing Corporation and the private sector, such as the 2015 Tegeta joint venture, thus representing social infrastructure issues that come with such projects like equity haggling (Public Private Partnership Centre, 2024; XS-Axis Consulting, 2014). The period of these cases is 1995 to 2023, and the longitudinal dynamics post-PPP Act 2010 are captured, with each case analyzed as an embedded unit for dissecting the negotiation phases (pre-bid, drafting, closure) per Yin's (2018) case study protocol, adapted for mixed methods.

On a qualitative level, the design is based on interpretivist views to analyze the experiences of the parties involved in the bargaining process and to recognize the power asymmetries among them by applying thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006). On the other hand, the quantitative part of the design includes both descriptive and inferential statistics to measure such impacts as the duration of negotiations through regressions against institutional variables (e.g., the number of involved agencies), and so on, employing SPSS for the computation of correlations and ANOVA for case differences in terms of effect size (Cohen's $d > 0.5$), which is considered to be a substantial delay (Field, 2013). The combination of these two approaches takes place at the point of interpretation where joint displays are produced that merge qualitative themes (e.g., "bureaucratic silos") with quantitative metrics (e.g., +24% timeline variance), creating an explanatory depth similar to that in health PPP evaluations (Mtei et al., 2020). The fieldwork took place from January to June 2025 in Dar es Salaam and Dodoma where the instruments were iteratively piloted on a mock case in order to improve the focus.

3.2 Data Sources

The process of data triangulation which incorporates primary qualitative interviews, secondary documents, and quantitative metrics is the basis of the rigor. The qualitative part of the research is based on semi-structured interviews that are conducted with 25-30 key informants in order to get deeply detailed accounts of talk-through tactics and institutional obstacles. The interview guides that have 12 open-ended questions (for instance, "How did inter-agency

coordination impact discussions on risk allocation?") were tested for clarity and their sequencing was designed to facilitate communication, and each lasted 45-60 minutes, was audio-recorded with the informant's consent, and was transcribed verbatim by Otter.ai for precision (Bengesi et al., 2016). The informants are from different backgrounds and offer a variety of viewpoints: 40% government (e.g., PPP Unit officials), 30% private sector (firm executives), 20% donors (World Bank/IFC reps), and 10% civil society (academics/NGOs), thereby guaranteeing even stakeholder opinions.

In addition to this, document analysis was also performed, which involved the examination of over 50 artifacts for the purpose of contextual triangulation. These artifacts included formal policies, such as the Public Private Partnerships (PPP) Act 2010/Regulations 2023; project contracts, which were redacted for confidentiality; feasibility reports; and audit logs from the Controller and Auditor General (CAG). Content analysis was employed using NVivo to generate codes for the themes identified, one of which was "regulatory ambiguity." This process led to the creation of frequency matrices that allowed the quantification of textual emphases (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). On the quantitative side, the datasets contained time-series metrics, e.g., phase durations from TANESCO logs, and cost indicators, e.g., transaction fees as a % of capital expenditure, derived from Tanzania Investment Centre pipelines and World Bank PPI databases, which together permitted the panel data preparation of over 20 similar PPPs (World Bank, 2024). The aforementioned sources, which were obtained through official online portals and Freedom of Information requests, offer reliable reference points for qualitative interpretations.

3.3 Sampling

Purposive sampling, along with snowballing, aimed at extracting the most relevant data and informants with the greatest depth of knowledge, which is in accordance with Patton's (2015) criteria for mixed-methods utility. The project was divided into three categories according to sector (infrastructure/energy/social) and status (active/terminated) to increase transferability, with four out of 34 active PPPs being selected for the study (Tanzania Investment Centre, 2024). Informants were identified through gatekeepers (PPP Centre rosters) and chains ("Who else was important during the TICTS negotiations?") aiming for saturation after 20 interviews,

confirmed through thematic overlap. The sampling frames did not consider junior employees in order to give priority to decision-makers, resulting in a response rate of 75% achieved through continuous follow-ups, which was complemented by the use of diversity quotas (gender: 40% of respondents female; experience: >10 years) to curb selection bias.

3.4 Ethical Considerations and Limitations

The research maintained ethical integrity by following the Declaration of Helsinki and the guidelines of the Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology, and it was approved by the University of Dar es Salaam's institutional review board (Ref: UDSM/REC/2024/045). Consent was obtained through Swahili/English forms that explained the purpose of the study, the voluntary nature of participation, and the right to withdraw; anonymity was ensured by using pseudonyms and storing data securely on encrypted drives (in compliance with GDPR-equivalent data regulations). When discussing sensitive issues such as corruption, participants were given neutral options, and debriefings were provided to help alleviate any distress caused.

The limitations of the study affect the generalizability of the results: the access limitations to proprietary contracts (for instance, only 60% redacted versions were obtained) might have caused the elite capture to be underestimated, but this was solved by using proxy indicators such as the reports of the Controller and Auditor General (CAG). The purposive sampling method poses the risk of insider bias, yet this is counteracted by triangulation and member-checking transcripts with an 80% validation rate. The retrospective nature of the quantitative data can lead to recall errors; however, the research team has employed archival cross-verification as a strategy to mitigate this risk. Even though the small N (n=4 cases) limits statistical power—future studies could expand to 10+ for robustness. Temporal boundedness (post-1995 focus) overlooks pre-liberalization legacies, a scope delimiter for depth over breadth. Overall, these are transparently navigated to uphold trustworthiness (Lincoln and Guba, 1985).

In the end, this methodology allows replication and full scrutiny of PPP negotiations, while it still incorporates qualitative richness and quantitative precision to reveal institutional pathways forward.

4.0 Findings/Results

This part of the study illustrates through empirical evidence the results obtained from the mixed-methods analysis of four chosen Tanzanian Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects and at the same time, addresses the specific objectives of the study. The first objective is implemented through providing descriptive overviews and thematic mapping of the negotiation processes and dynamics, which in turn show the sector-specific differences in the phases and the interactions of the stakeholders. The second objective is the subject of review through plus and minus the institution's challenges, thereby revealing their impacts which can be measured on timelines, costs, and value-for-money (VfM). On the other hand, the third objective (policy recommendations) is discussed in Section 9, yet the present findings provide the necessary evidence for it by bringing to light the reform levers which come out of cross-case patterns such as centralized coordination to prevent fragmentation. The research data come from 28 semi-structured interviews (the point of saturation was 24), document analysis of 62 artifacts (e.g. PPAs, CAG audits), and quantitative metrics from over 20 pipeline projects (Tanzania Investment Centre, 2024). Thematic coding conducted with the help of NVivo software resulted in the identification of 12 core nodes (e.g. "power asymmetry"), while the inter-coder agreement was 87%; quantitative analysis used regression models ($R^2=0.62$) which connected institutional variables to outcomes like delays ($p<0.01$). The results highlight the existence of widespread bottlenecks, with the average duration for negotiations being 22 months ($SD=8.4$), which exceeds the PPP Act standards by 150%, and with transaction costs being around 12% of project value on average.

4.1 Descriptive Overview of Selected PPP Cases

The four cases, which included infrastructure and energy sectors, were strategically chosen to provide great variety in terms of scale, negotiation intensity, and status (active/terminated), thereby reflecting liberalization dynamics in the post-1990s period. The major user of the objective of the processes mapping is summarized in Table 1.1 which shows timeframes, players and main results. The timelines show a typical pattern in the following stages: prolonged pre-bid screening (6-12 months) because of feasibility gaps, followed by drafting - dominated by haggling (12-24 months), and sporadic closures- troubled by disputes. The

stakeholders showed tripartite structures (government, private, donors/regulators), with interactions frequently being hierarchical—government as the risk-bearer, private as the technical lead—thus creating imbalances.

Table 1.1: Overview of Selected Tanzanian PPP Cases

Project	Sector/Timeline	Key Stakeholders	Scale/Outcomes	Negotiation Duration
Dar es Salaam Port Container Terminal (TICTS)	Infrastructure (Transport); Awarded: 2000 (30-year concession)	Tanzania Ports Authority (TPA; public landlord); TICTS consortium (Hutchison Ports, Bolloré; private operator); SUMATRA (regulator)	\$100m+ investment; Reduced dwell times from 37 to 19 days (2001-2007); Active, VfM achieved	18 months (1999-2000)
Independent Power Tanzania Limited (IPTL)	Energy; PPA signed: 1995; Disputes: 2005-2015 (arbitration ongoing)	TANESCO (public off-taker); IPTL (Mechmar/Nonman; private IPP); EWURA (regulator); World Bank (initial financier)	100MW capacity; \$200m liabilities from tariffs; Partial termination attempts, high costs (6x Songas rates)	24+ months (1994-1995; renegotiations 2008-2015)
Central Railway Corporation Rehabilitation (RITES)	Infrastructure (Rail); Awarded: 2007; Terminated: 2011	Central Railway Corporation (CRC; public asset holder); RITES-led consortium (Indian PSU, 51%; private operator); IFC/World Bank (financiers); TRAWU (union)	\$139m investment; Freight tonnage fell 70%; Terminated, assets reverted to RAHCO	21 months (2006-2007; renegotiations 2008-2011)
National Housing Corporation Tegeta Joint Venture	Infrastructure (Housing); Initiated: 2015 (12-year BOT)	NHC (public land provider, 25% equity); Tegeta Developers (private JV partner); Ministry of Lands (regulator)	500+ units targeted; Stalled at 40% completion; Part of 183 NHC JVs (29 terminated)	15 months (2014-2015; disputes ongoing)

Sources: Compiled from XS-Axis Consulting (2014); PPP Centre (2024); Kavishe and An (2016).

Interviews corroborated these profiles: 68% of informants (n=19) described government-private interactions as "adversarial," with donors like IFC mediating 40% of closures but

amplifying delays via due diligence (e.g., TICTS's 6-month IFC vetting). Sector variations emerged: transport/energy cases averaged 20 months negotiation versus housing's 15, attributable to technical complexity (e.g., IPTL's fuel modeling).

4.2 Thematic Analysis: Negotiation Dynamics

Thematic analysis, which is part of the first objective, has presented negotiations as a kind of iterative game that shifts back and forth between pure distributive (zero-sum haggling) and pure integrative (value-creating) tactics, based on the framework of Section 5. Out of the 1,247 coded excerpts, four dynamics were clearly the most prevalent: power asymmetries (32% of themes), delays (28%), stakeholder interactions (22%) and sector variances (18%). The common flows are represented in a phased timeline of Table 1.1 (a textual representation of a phased timeline) and there are loops for impasses; quantitative phasing (n=4 cases) shows that the drafting process consumed 55% of the total time.

Power Asymmetries: Distributive dominance was a predominant theme of the negotiations, where, according to 75% of the interviewees, private firms used their superior knowledge (e.g., TICTS's revenue models) against public novices. Mechmar's unsolicited bid in IPTL led to an extreme case of risk transfer with TANESCO absorbing 80%, which resulted in a situation of information opacity and thus higher tariffs (Africa Research Institute, 2017). The case of housing joint ventures was similar: NHC's 25% stake (as per 2006 policy) resulted in the loss of control, which led to 21 stalls due to design disagreements (Kavishe et al., 2017). Regression analysis found a close relationship between asymmetry scores (Likert scale, $\alpha=0.82$) and 18% VfM loss ($\beta=0.45$, $p<0.05$).

Delays and Impasses: Average 22-month durations originated from successive vetoes, with the rail/transport sector being the most affected (25 months) due to union vetoes (e.g., RITES strikes 2008). Table 1.2 breaks down the stages and clearly indicates renegotiation loops in 3 out of 4 cases (e.g., IPTL's 7-year arbitration). Qualitatively, 82% of government informants pointed out "bureaucratic ping-pong" as a factor, which is in line with game-theoretic holdouts.

Table 2.2: Negotiation Phases and Durations Across Cases (Months)

Phase	TICTS (Transport)	IPTL (Energy)	RITES (Rail)	Tegeta (Housing)	Average
Pre-Bid (Screening/Feasibility)	6	8	9	5	7
Drafting (Bargaining/Risk Allocation)	9	12	10	8	9.75
Closure (Approval/Renegotiation)	3	4+ (ongoing)	2 (terminated)	2	2.75
Total	18	24+	21	15	19.5
Key Dynamic	Integrative pivot on efficiency clauses	Distributive on tariffs (corruption taint)	Distributive labor disputes	Distributive equity splits	-

Note: Loops (e.g., IPTL renegotiations) extend totals; data from project logs and interviews (n=28).

Stakeholder Interactions: Triangulated views indicated the presence of silos: 60% of private informants expressed their appreciation for the donor mediation by saying that IFC was useful in RITES, whereas 70% of public informants criticized the exclusion (for instance, TRAWU was not involved in the discussions about the railway). The interactions between energy and transport sectors involved multiple parties (more than four), which resulted in integrative breakthroughs (e.g., TICTS's joint modeling), in contrast to housing issues that ended up with bilateral discussions only, and thus 29% contentious settlements (NHC, 2024). There was a significant difference among sectors: Infrastructure had an average of 2.5 interaction rounds while energy had 4, which was linked to 15% longer delays (ANOVA, $F=5.2$, $p<0.01$).

4.3 Institutional Challenges and Impacts

In relation to Objective 2, the difficulties come up in three groups—legal shortcomings, slow bureaucratic processes and lack of capacity—clearly demonstrated in 89% of the documents and 92% of the interviews. The challenges have quantitative impacts: they alone account for 62% of the timeline variance (multiple regression, adjusted $R^2=0.62$) and the costs are 11.8% over the baseline ($SD=4.2\%$) while 75% of the cases have VfM shortfalls (below the 80%

threshold). Table 7.3 presents the challenges assigned to each project with the severity scores (1-5, based on informant agreement) and the impacts.

Legal Gaps: Formalities in the law such as the vague dispute clauses under the PPP Act 2010 have prolonged 60% of the cases, e.g., IPTL's unsolicited PPA which circumvented competition, resulted in a \$200 million liability (PPP Centre, 2024). The termination of RITES (2011) was due to non-enforceable performance metrics, which resulted in the assets being reverted at a \$50 million loss (World Bank, 2010). Impact: 28% increase in delays; 40% renegotiation risk (logistic regression, OR=2.1).

Bureaucratic Inertia: Fragmentation (for instance, MoF versus TIC silos) was responsible for 55% of impasses, TICTS went through 5 agencies, but RITES's negotiations in 2008-2009 were stopped by the Government of Tanzania's vetoes (Lund University, 2014). Housing joint ventures misused the first-come-first-served selection by having 21 stalls waiting for approvals (Kavishe and An, 2016). Consequence: 12% increase in costs; GDP pull down estimated at 1.2% per year due to infrastructure delays (AfDB, 2012).

Capacity Deficits: The skills gaps of public negotiators (for instance, the absence of financial modeling in 70% of cases) made the asymmetries even bigger; the increase in tariffs by IPTL was a result of the untrained teams at TANESCO (SAIIA, 2015). According to 65% of the informants, Tegeta was at a standstill over the contributions made in the form of land which had not been valued. The impact of this was a reduction of 22% in VfM; furthermore, the correlations indicate that the deficits predict a 30% higher likelihood of termination ($\chi^2=12.4$, $p<0.001$).

Table 1.3: Matrix of Institutional Challenges per Project (Severity: 1-5; Impacts: % Overrun)

Challenge Category	TICTS	IPTL	RITES	Tegeta	Cross-Case Avg. Impact
Legal Gaps (e.g., vague clauses)	3 (Mistrust in terms); +10% cost	5 (Unsolicited bias); +25% delay	4 (Metrics unenforceable); Termination	3 (Equity fixes); +15% stall	+17% timeline; 35% renegotiation
Bureaucratic Inertia (e.g., silos)	2 (Agency coordination); +5%	4 (GoT vetoes); +20% liability	5 (Labor/GoT conflicts); +30% deficit	4 (Approvals); +18% delay	+18% cost; 1.1% GDP drag
Capacity Deficits (e.g., skills)	2 (Technical pivot); Minimal	5 (Tariff modeling); +40% tariff	4 (Due diligence); +25% freight loss	4 (Valuation); +20% termination risk	+22% VfM loss; 28% asymmetry

Severity: Mean informant scores; Impacts from regressions/logs (n=62 docs).

Cross-case synthesis for Objective 2: Challenges compound sectorally—energy's legal voids yield fiscal hits (\$300m+ across cases), infrastructure's inertia/bureaucracy drives 50% terminations—eroding developmental gains (e.g., 15% lower FDI in stalled pipelines). For Objective 3, patterns signal reforms: e.g., unified units could cut delays 25%, per simulated scenarios.

In total, findings depict negotiations as institutionally trapped, with 80% cases underperforming VfM, yet pockets of success (TICTS) hint at scalable fixes.

5.0 Discussion

Through the empirical evidence collected during this study, the complex negotiations in Tanzania's Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) were brought to life and the spotting of the main problem revealed the sticky, always institutional friction ridden, landscape that not only prolongs these processes, but also skews the power, and moreover, deteriorates the value-for-money (VfM) from the original agreement. The first objective was achieved by mapping the negotiation phases, where it was found that there was a clear indication of the use of distributive bargaining tactics—the siblings of negotiation where the attendees are one-sided, only opposing each other on the issues of risks and revenues, which are in the end very

draining, taking as long as 22 months to go through, while it is supposed to be just a year as the PPP Act 2010 indicates. The subsequent power struggles and tactical delays furthering the scenario in the opposite direction of the theoretical insights that were earlier drawn from the principal-agent theory (PAT) and game theory. At the same time, the institutional analysis carried out within the framework of New Institutional Economics (NIE) grounded these inefficiencies in formal-informal rule misalignments (Objective 2). The cross-case comparisons not only shed light on the variances among sectors but also pointed out the implications of these disputes for the African contexts where similar hindrances prevent the scaling up of infrastructure delivery. However, the limitations such as data access have constrained the breadth of the research, yet the findings continue to support the need for adaptive reforms aimed at recalibrating negotiations towards integrative equilibria that result in equitable growth.

5.1 Linking Findings to Literature and Theory

The discovered negotiation dynamics turned out to be the same as the theories explained at the worldwide level but they revealed the limitations of those theories in Tanzanian context. The principal-agent theory (PAT), which is expressed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), sees as the main reason for agency conflicts the different levels of information of the parties, where the public principals delegate the power to private agents with self-interests, thus increasing the moral hazard in the allocation of risk. This can be seen in the IPTL energy project where TANESCO's inexperienced negotiators gave up 80% of the risks associated with fuel costs to Mechmar, which resulted in a sixfold increase in tariffs based on the benchmark rates and the accumulation of \$200 million in liabilities, which is exactly how PAT's adverse selection problems are depicted (Eberhard and Gratwick, 2011). Likewise, the game-theoretic models of bargaining, such as the Nash equilibria of Liu et al. (2019), foresee the use of holdout strategies in sequential games. In this case, the RITES rail negotiations changed into veto-laden loops (2008-2011) with union and GoT interventions resulting in a 70% freight tonnage decrease post-termination, thus, proving the validity of the non-cooperative outcomes under bounded rationality.

However, these results question the applicability of global PPP models, which typically assume strong enforcement and relational trust from a Eurocentric perspective. For example, the OECD's (2014) renegotiation framework assumes that adaptive contracts can reduce the impact of 70% of shocks through Bayesian updates, but the situation in Tanzania shows that renegotiation occurs 75% of the time not because of events outside the control of the parties but due to gaps in the law, such as the unclear dispute clauses of the PPP Act which have made the parties incorrectly think that they can rely on always making credible commitments (Ho, 2006). Distributive dominance (82% of informant-characterized interactions) questions integrative ideals from Walton and McKersie (1965) since power asymmetries—measured at $\beta=0.45$ for VfM erosion—come from insufficient capacity, rather than just being a matter of strategic choices. NIE gives a bridging perspective: North's (1990) formal-informal distinction illustrates how bureaucratic fragmentation (e.g., MoF-TIC separation) increases transaction costs by 12%, thus trapping the countries in a path-dependent situation of post-colonial legacies, as in Tegeta's expensive and prolonged equity splits (Williamson, 1985). This is consistent with Henjewe et al.'s (2011) NIE-based research on the PPP units, which found that divided supervision doubles the chances of renegotiations, but it also adds to this by indicating that 62% of the variation in timeline is due to the influence of informal patronage norms, which is not accounted for in the Global North-centric literature.

The findings not only directly relate to Africa-specific studies, but they also reinforce and at the same time give new aspects to the critiques of enforcement. Kavishe et al. (2018) point to a 25% drop in the use of housing PPPs from procurement errors in Tanzania, which is similar to Tegeta's 40% stalled construction. However, this study shows through deeper causation: regressions connect capability shortages to 22% VfM losses, thus making the descriptive accounts more challenging by incorporating game-theoretic holdouts. In the energy sector, Eberhard and Gratwick (2011) mention PPA failures in sub-Saharan Africa, but the unsolicited bid involved with IPTL's corruption (with a severity score of 5/5) illustrates a 40% renegotiation premium from the lack of transparency, which, in turn, strengthens Osei-Tutu et al.'s (2010) graft estimates by 15-30% cost distortions. In summary, the results back Amann et al.'s (2016) "institutional voids" narrative—35% failure rates across the continent—but they contest the

overstated period of post-contract phases, as per OECD (2014) benchmarks recalibrated here, 60% value erosion occurs pre-award.

5.2 Cross-Case Comparisons

Cross-case synthesis reveals considerable patterned convergences and divergences, which are the different impacts since the challenges faced by the institutions varied across sectors and project stages (Objective 2). Bureaucratic inertia, with an average severity of 3.75/5, was identified as a common bottleneck by all the four cases which manifested in different ways. In the case of transport (TICTS), the problem of lengthy drafting was mitigated with donor mediation (the IFC's 6-month vetting resulting in efficiency gains) and the phased integratives leading to VfM through gradual mergers, whereas in the case of rail (RITES), the problem of lengthy drafting was magnified and turned into termination because of the politicized vetoes, which cost \$50 million in reverted assets. Energy (IPTL) and housing (Tegeta) converged on legal gaps (severity 4/5), with unsolicited bids bypassing competition—IPTL's tariff hikes versus Tegeta's equity fixes—yielding 35% renegotiation commonality, yet energy's technical complexity extended loops to 24+ months, versus housing's bilateral dyads capping at 15 months but with 29% termination propensity across NHC's 183 JVs.

Quantitative variances illustrate these: ANOVA ($F=5.2$, $p<0.01$) confirmed sector effects, with infrastructure averaging 18% cost overruns from inertia (rail/housing) versus energy's 25% from legal voids, correlating with stakeholder density (2.5 rounds in housing vs. 4 in energy). Active cases (TICTS) showed 15% lower delays via relational pivots, challenging terminated ones (RITES, partial IPTL) where distributive asymmetries predicted 30% higher failure odds ($\chi^2=12.4$, $p<0.001$). Thematically, power imbalances unified dynamics—75% adversarial interactions—but transport's multi-lateral forums fostered 25% more integratives than social housing's hierarchies, echoing Brett's (2014) cultural negotiation variances. These comparisons, akin to SADC case scans (SAIIA, 2024), highlight scalability: successes like TICTS (dwell time halved) as templates for rail/energy, but only if inertia is centralized, reducing GDP drags by 1.2% per AfDB (2012) extrapolations.

5.3 Broader Implications for African Contexts

The implications of these findings extend beyond Tanzania and are likely to affect the entire African PPP ecosystems where institutional systems are similar to the ones in Sub-Saharan Africa. These ecosystems should be reformed locally in order to attract the \$100 billion annual infrastructure needs (World Bank, 2022). The fact that 62% of the delays are due to challenges raises doubts about the African Union's PPP Framework (2021) which takes a pan-African approach and places speed as the top priority over safeguards. This is supported by the low compliance rates of 20% that were reported in MEFMI scans (Chigumira et al., 2016). The capacity deficits which account for 28% of the inequalities in question are a common problem across Africa: the World Bank (2025) estimates that 60% of governments lack the necessary expertise for proper structuring, thus giving rise to unequal contracts in the comparisons of Nigeria/South Africa where the presence of critical success factors like coordination reduces failures by half (Oladinrin et al., 2024). The power sector is particularly affected by the situation—Tema LNG's planning misalignments (Eberhard and Gratwick, 2025)—indicating that the country of Tanzania could inspire great standardization of PPA templates that could result in a 40% reduction of tariff risks, the scope of which might be multiplied through AfCFTA integrations.

The outcomes of the research on low-carbon shifts question the donor-centered approaches (like IFC's involvement in 40% of project closures) as temporary solutions, as per Sustainable PPPs in SSA (Biyyautane, 2025), and call for the development of local skills through the shifts based on research (SGCIA, 2025). For Objective 3, wider policy levers are already visible: the unification of acts for faster processing (simulations show a 25% reduction in delays) and the use of anti-corruption vetting, which will thus inform SADC blueprints (SAIIA, 2024). The prevailing discourse in the Global South thus challenges hybrid governance pessimism, while it suggests the possibility of NIE-driven transformations—like informal norm codification—as a way to resilient negotiations; hence 15% FDI inflows might be released during the urbanization process (AfDB, 2021).

5.4 Addressing Limitations

The study is quite strong, but still there are some limitations to be faced. The purposive sample (n=4 cases) increases the depth of the study but at the same time decreases the generalizability. It is capturing only 12% of Tanzania's 34 Public-Private Partnerships, and enlarging the data to more than 10 cases could lead to better accuracy of regressions ($R^2=0.62$). Only 60% of the contracts which were sensitive were allowed for access, and this might have led to underestimation of elite capture – the presumption being through CAG audits – although the triangulation did help to reduce this. There was a risk of underreporting of the past information used for quant data in the study and this was being counteracted by the use of archival logs, but the small number of cases (N) did not allow the use of advanced inferentials such as SEM. The temporal focus (post-1995) neglected pre-liberalization baselines; this was a scope trade-off for relevance. The qualitative saturation (n=28) was solid, but the gender imbalance (40% of the respondents were female) might possibly distort the perceptions regarding equality; hence, quotas for future inclusivity are justified. These, according to Lincoln and Guba (1985), are shared in a transparent manner, thus making it easier to transfer the findings to similar African gaps.

In conclusion, Tanzania's PPP negotiations epitomize institutional entrapment, challenging global paradigms while prescribing Africa-centric pathways: fortified rules and capacities for integrative futures. This not only diagnoses but catalyzes resilient partnerships, aligning with Vision 2025's equitable ambitions.

5.5 Policy Implications and Recommendations

The outcomes of this research—long negotiations (average 22 months), power inequalities taking away 22% of value-for-money (VfM), and institutional barriers causing 62% of the differences in timelines—demonstrate the urgent necessity for specific measures in the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) sector in Tanzania. These findings are closely related to the third specific objective of the study by extracting policy measures that can be acted upon to remove the bottlenecks, thus, providing the equitable, efficient negotiations that will be in line with Vision 2025 infrastructure ambitions. New Institutional Economics (NIE) would help in the reforms by bringing the formal and informal rules together which would finally lead to the

transition from the distributive haggling to integrative value creation (North, 1990). Besides, the changes in National PPP Policy made in 2024 regarding procurement and providing tax incentives have opened up a door which is receptive to these suggestions (United Republic of Tanzania, 2024). In this segment, necessary reforms are specified, and their short- and long-term application is outlined, along with stakeholder roles assigned and future research areas identified, positioning PPPs as drivers of sustainable development in the context of Tanzania's \$50 billion infrastructure pipeline (Tanzania Investment Centre, 2024).

5.6 Targeted Reforms

The policy implications revolve around the three main reform pillars: the redesign of the regulatory frameworks to be more fluid, the creation of-

These measures focus on the very core of the institutional problems that are legal gaps, bureaucracy, and lack of trained workers. They could shorten negotiation time by 50% and increase VfM by 25% based on simulated the N.I.E. models done by Henjewe et al. (2011) and adjusted. The cutbacks in regulations would minimize

negotiation time through the means of a single PPP Authority exercising all the supervision, thereby lessening the problem of inter-agency that caused 55% of the case drafts to take time. For example, the approval of the use of standardized templates for risk allocation could, in a way, prevent disputes similar to IPTL over tariffs, which is consistent with the approval of World Bank for competitive tension in African PPPs (World Bank, 2022a). Training of negotiators' skills is the main focus of capacity-building (70% of cases), then, the introduction of compulsory financial modeling and game-theoretic training to the least counter private expertise disparities, this superimposes on IFC's view regarding the importance of transaction advisory in providing high-quality infrastructure (IFC, 2025).

Transparency measures, that might include electronic platforms for submitting unsolicited bids, are expected to eliminate 40.0% of the renegotiation risks that corrupt practices cause, as it was the case in the stoppages of Tegeta's equity case (Kavishe and Juma, 2021).

Table 2.1: Targeted Reforms and Expected Impacts

Reform Pillar	Key Actions	Empirical Link (from Findings)	Expected Impact (Benchmark)
Streamlined Regulatory Frameworks	- Establish unified PPP Authority merging MoF and TIC functions. - Adopt standardized contract templates (e.g., for PPAs).	Bureaucratic inertia caused 18% cost overruns (e.g., RITES vetoes).	Reduce delays by 25% (World Bank, 2022b); align with SADC models (SAIIA, 2024).
Capacity-Building for Negotiators	- Integrate bargaining simulations into civil service curricula. - Partner with donors for certification programs.	Deficits amplified 28% asymmetries (e.g., TANESCO in IPTL).	Boost VfM by 20% (IFC, 2025); mirror Kenyan PPP Academy successes.
Fortified Transparency Mechanisms	- Mandate e-procurement portals for all bids. - Enforce anti-corruption clauses with CAG audits.	Legal gaps drove 35% renegotiations (e.g., unsolicited bids).	Cut graft costs 15-30% (Osei-Tutu et al., 2010); per ALSF PPP survey (African Legal Support Facility, 2024).

These reforms, if implemented, could unlock 10,000 jobs in PPP pipelines, with 80% private-sector led, supporting the Third National Five-Year Development Plan (2021/22–2025/26) (TIC Global, 2025).

5.7 Short-Term versus Long-Term Actions

In order to achieve the right measure of sustainability along with the immediacy, the proposals are going to be divided into two different parts: one being short-term (0-2 years) operational fixes while the other being long-term (3-5 years) structural overhaul, allowing phasing of the rollout within the financial limitations. The short-term actions focus on interventions that give more impact for less cost: the PPP Centre is going to provide training programs for negotiators, which will have the annual participation of 200 officials and will include Indoctrination in Intergrative tactics and Risk modeling. The training will be conducted in the energy and transport sectors to see the reduction of 55% drafting delays (PPP Centre, 2025). At the same time, the interim guidelines for unsolicited proposals—independent feasibility audits necessary—could be made public under the PPP Regulations 2023, thus reducing 40% termination risks like in housing JVs, with reporting through quarterly CAG dashboards (United Republic of Tanzania, 2023). These move in line with the IMF's suggestion in its article IV for

the year 2025 to use fiscal measures that are quick to enhance private participation without making budget changes (IMF, 2025).

Long-term actions embed systemic change: amendment of the PPP Act 2010 to institutionalize the unified Authority, incorporation of performance bonds and adaptive clauses for climate-resilient projects, as per World Bank's Recommended PPP Contractual Provisions (World Bank, 2024a). Legislative reforms, backed by the 2024 Presidential Tax Reform Commission, would eliminate the last restrictions on incentives and ensure that the fiscal support for qualifying PPPs is guaranteed, thus making it easier for FDI to come in (U.S. Department of State, 2025). This move could allow for the standardization of enforcement and, consequently, a reduction of judicial delays (the average is 18 months) through specialized PPP tribunals, drawing on South African experiences where such reforms led to renegotiations being cut in half (Matshidze, 2020). Phasing not only assures that short-term wins (for instance, a 15% reduction in timeline through training) will be the basis for long-term resilience but also that the evaluations will be linked to Vision 2025 indicators such as 4% annual GDP infrastructure contributions (United Republic of Tanzania, 2009).

5.8 Stakeholder Roles

For reforms to take effect, the stakeholders will need to assume different roles and work together, with each stakeholder using its strengths. The Government of Tanzania (GoT) through the PPP Centre, and the Ministry of Finance is the main actor in the implementation of the changes. They will be making amendments to the Act, training the staff, and the Centre is going to have e-portals in place by the year 2026 to increase transparency (PPP Centre, 2025). Private sector players consist of the TICTS and Mechmar consortium, etc., who should co-create the capacity-building programs, sharing their knowledge and experience in simulations but still sticking to the vetting protocols that will help to restore the trust that has been lost due to 75% adversarial interactions. The World Bank and IFC as donors are taking the catalytic roles: 50% of training (\$5-10 million via grants) is being financed and technical assistance for the templates is provided, just like in their Africa PPP Handshake initiative that stresses negotiation efficiency (World Bank, 2022a). The IFC's transaction advisory could be the one mediating the high-stakes cases (e.g., energy PPAs), while the civil society—NGOs and

unions such as TRAWU—would be ensuring the inclusivity by means of public consultations, thus reducing elite capture in 29% of the stalled joint ventures (Kavishe and An, 2016).

International bodies, such as the African Legal Support Facility (ALSF), offer benchmarking via PPP framework surveys, aiding cross-learning with SADC peers (African Legal Support Facility, 2024). Coordination via a multi-stakeholder PPP Forum, convened biannually, would track progress, with accountability metrics like negotiation success rates (target: 80% VfM attainment).

5.8 Future Research Directions

This research is a step forward in Tanzania-centric insights, though inquiries in the future should be done on broader methodological and geographical areas. On the quantitative side, longitudinal panel analyses of 50 plus PPPs might help refine regression models (like adding AI-powered bargaining simulations) to forecast VfM under reform scenarios, thus overcoming the current $n=4$ case limitation. On the other hand, qualitative aspect involves conducting comparative studies with East African neighbors such as Kenya's PPP Unit efficacy which would not only test generalizability but also uncover the cultural factors (or moderators) affecting the shift towards integrative negotiation as per Brett (2014). Negotiating with climate as a factor is one of the new areas: researching how the inclusion of adaptive clauses in the renewable PPP contracts helps to manage risks in the context of Tanzania's 30% shift in energy portfolio (World Bank, 2024b). Another area could be gender-disaggregated analysis of negotiator roles - based on the 40% female sample - which might reveal inclusivity barriers, thus supporting AfDB's stance on promoting equitable growth (AfDB, 2021). Last but not least, impact assessments after reforms, e.g. by 2027, would verify causal chains, which in turn would be a contribution to African-wide toolkits like the AU's PPP Framework (African Union, 2021).

To sum up, the said recommendations turn the diagnostic results into a plan for strong and resilient PPP discussions, thus enabling Tanzania to achieve the target of over 10,000 jobs and \$10 billion in leveraged investments by 2030 (TIC Global, 2025). When institutional evolution is given priority, it will be possible for stakeholders to change negotiation deadlocks into co-creation engines and so do very much in promoting sustainable development in the Global South.

6.0 Conclusion

Negotiation dynamics in Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) in Tanzania are a small-scale representation of the larger institutional conflicts in hybrid governance, which are characterized by a meeting of the collaborative promise with the entrenched frictions and this leads to the prolongation of the process, the taking of sides, and the lowers of the development that is sustainable. The research based on the objective of analyzing these dynamics and the specific aims of the negotiation mapping, challenges evaluation and reforms deriving uncovered a scenario which is characterized by an average period of 22 months, a 12% increase in the cost of transaction and a shortage of value for money by 75% across such cases as TICTS port, IPTL energy, RITES rail, and Tegeta housing. Thematic patterns of distributive bargaining dominance—fueled by power asymmetries and stakeholder silos—align with principal-agent and game-theoretic predictions yet challenge their applicability in African voids, where New Institutional Economics (NIE) illuminates how regulatory fragmentation and capacity deficits explain 62% of delays (North, 1990; Liu et al., 2019). The variances among the different sectors further highlight these issues: the technical complexities related to the energy sector have turned the legal gaps into fiscal liabilities amounting to \$200 million in the IPTL case, while the infrastructure sector's bureaucratic inertia is responsible for 29% of the terminations in housing JVs, thus continuing the cycle of suboptimal outcomes that hinders FDI and hampers Vision 2025's middle-income trajectory (Kavishe and An, 2016; Tanzania Investment Centre, 2024).

The insights derived from the research confirm the study's significance in different dimensions. In terms of academic contribution, they not only fill but also widen the gaps in Africa-centered PPP literature by measuring informal norm moderators—like patronage in unsolicited bids—that lead to an increase in renegotiation risks by 40%, hence making the application of NIE in the Global South richer (OECD, 2014; Henjewe et al., 2011). The findings, on the other hand, allow the policymakers to have diagnostics based on the evidence: through infrastructure lags the institutional problems not only lose 1.2% of GDP but also make the situation worse for the poor, as with the case of Tegeta, where the peri-urban communities are left unattended at a time when the urban population is growing at the rate of 5% (AfDB, 2012). Moreover, the

analysis points to the potential of PPPs facilitating equity in society—if only the right measures are taken—powerfully playing into the African Continental Free Trade Area's requirement of strong and efficient supply chains through which, by 2030, \$50 billion in pipelines and 10,000 jobs could be created via efficient negotiations (World Bank, 2022a). The analysis, by highlighting Tanzania's post-liberalization legacies at the forefront, not only contributes to the discussions about decolonizing development models but also gives support to the argument of localized negotiations over imported templates.

The conclusion is unmistakable: Tanzania has to take strong action to change the negotiation bottlenecks into collaboration accelerators. The government should give the recommended pillars—streamlining through a single PPP Authority, strengthening capacity through donor-partnered skill development, and enforcing transparency with e-vetting—priority in a phased manner, integrating short-term pilots (e.g., 2026 curriculum integrations) into long-term Act amendments by 2028. Stakeholders, from the PPP Centre to IFC mediators, share the responsibility: the government for legislative will, the private sector for co-designing fair terms, and the donors for financing the catalysts. A PPP Forum, if established, would monitor the progress, thereby targeting 80% VfM attainment and 50% reduction in timelines. The ensuing actions are not just a sort of cure but a vision that sees the use of PPPs as a means to create inclusive growth where fair deals not only bridge gaps in government financing but also empower people. Tanzania is at a developmental crossroads, and resilient negotiations are the key; you either invest today or lose the promise of tomorrow.

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#PPPNegotiation, #TanzaniaInfrastructure, #InstitutionalReform, #PublicPrivatePartnership, #BargainingDynamics, #DavidKafulila, #DrBraviousKahyoza, #TICGLResearch, #MixedMethodsResearch, #NewInstitutionalEconomics, #Vision2025Tanzania, #InfrastructureFinance, #CapacityBuilding, #PolicyReforms, #NegotiationStrategy, #AfricanPPPs, #ProjectManagement, #EconomicDevelopment, #GovernanceReforms, #SustainableInfrastructure