

Assessing the Effectiveness of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Frameworks in Tanzania's National Development Agenda

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Abstract

This paper evaluates critically the efficacy of the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) systems of governance in the progress of the national development agenda and how they focus on the Tanzania Development Vision 2050 (Dira 2050) and the Third National Five-Year Development Plan (FYDP III). The study is based on a convergent parallel mixed-methods design, that combines both quantitative performance indicators of 83 PPP projects (2010-2025) worth USD over 10 billion in the energy, transport, and health sectors and qualitative data, gathered through survey (n=150) and interview (n=50) of government officials, private investors, and experts. There is moderate overall effectiveness (59%) with high financial viability (65) and operational efficiency (68) e.g. 80-95% on-time accomplishment in energy but chronic shortcomings in social equity (45) such as 35-95% localisation in health in the face of urban biases. The major results indicate that institutional capacity is a critical predictor ($b = .42, p < 0.01$), which allows 70 per cent of achievement in terms of the industrialisation objectives and 40 per cent in terms of

inclusive growth. Regulatory hurdles (70 per cent common) and lack of monitoring (60 per cent common) are the barriers that hamper the trillion-dollar goals of Vision 2050, but post-2023 Act changes can bring delays down to 20-30 per cent. The research concludes that PPPs facilitate fiscal mobilisation but it is necessary to introduce reforms that would entrench equity and sustainability. Some of the policy proposals involve compulsory ESG audits, a national capacity centre, KPI-assessed FYDP assessments, and the combination of inclusive incentives to raise effectiveness by 20-30 in SDG 17 area.

Keywords

Public-Private Partnerships (PPP), Framework Effectiveness, Tanzania Development Vision 2050, Infrastructure Financing, Institutional Capacity, Social Equity

Introduction

Background of the Study

PPPs have become an essential instrument in the modern development finance, allowing governments with limited resources to enlist the capital of the private sector and technological skills and operational efficiencies to provide much-needed infrastructure and services in the public sector. PPPs across the world gained popularity in the late twentieth century as part of neoliberal reforms, replacing ad hoc concessions with formal structures aimed at reducing the fiscal costs and promoting innovation and risk sharing (World Bank, 2022). Infrastructure deficits have been resolved in most developing economies, especially throughout the sub-Saharan region, with USD10 billion of investment in PPPs growing to over USD100 billion by 2020, albeit with some regulatory disparities still being a problem (African Development Bank, 2023). The history of PPPs in Tanzania has its roots in the initial divestitures of the early 2000s within the frame of privatization programmes although it has received formal impetus with the National Public-Private Partnership Policy of 2009, which did not ignore the contribution of the private sector towards socio-economic development given fiscal constraints (United Republic of Tanzania, 2009). This policy was the precursor to the Public-Private Partnership Act No. 18 of 2010 which instituted an elaborate legal framework to institutionalise the process of project identification, procurement and execution, including the creation of a PPP Coordination Unit under the Ministry of Finance and Planning (Public Private Partnership Centre, n.d.). Later changes, such as the 2018 and 2023 versions, optimized the size of small-scale projects (cutting down USD 70million to USD 20million), and established an independent

PPP office to streamline approvals and encourage foreign direct investment (Bowmans, 2023). Tanzania currently has over 50 projects in its PPP project pipeline spanning the energy (e.g., Julius Nyerere Hydropower), transport (e.g., Dar Salaam Port development), healthcare and education sectors mobilizing investments of USD 2.5 bn and delivering infrastructure at a 15 per cent yearly rate (Public Private Partnership Centre, 2025a; Daily News, 2025). These changes are a strategic realignment to the hybrid governance but also indicate towards the examination of their alignment with the holistic developmental agendas.

Tanzania Context

The public-private partnership (PPP) policy design in Tanzania is deeply rooted in the grand development strategy of the country, that is, the Tanzania Development Vision 2050 (Dira 2050) passed in July 2025 as a follow-up to Vision 2025. It aims to put the country back in the upper-middle-income category by the mid-century horizon based on a privatisation-led industrialisation plan, building resilience infrastructure, and sound management of natural resources (President's Office, United Republic of Tanzania, 2025). Under the Dira 2050 plan, PPPs will be the key mode of financing and USD 10 billion in annual private investment is expected to be raised to mitigate a projected gap in infrastructure of USD 20 billion. Special focus is given to the energy, transport and digital connectivity sectors, where it is aiming to trigger a green revolution and inclusive growth as spelt out in the Tanzania Investment Centre (2025). The vision takes into account the sectoral priorities outlined in the Third National Five-Year Development Plan (2021/22-2025/26), and it devotes 30% of its budget to PPP-enabled initiatives, which ensures that policy is coherent with macro-economic stability and poverty-reduction goals (Ministry of Finance and Planning, 2021).

Additionally, the PPP strategy used in Tanzania is also aligned with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), specifically SDG 9-Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure, which improves connectivity and technological advancement, and SDG 17-Partnerships for the Goals, wherein it promotes multi-stakeholder partnerships that enhance the mobilisation of resources (United Nations, 2015). Integrating the principles of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) in the procurement process, and supported by the amendments of the 2023 Act, PPPs also help achieve SDG 13 (Climate Action) and SDG 8

(Decent Work and Economic Growth). An example is that since 2020, renewable-energy concessions have increased clean-power capacity by 25 percent which is an empirical measure that has been reported in The Citizen (2025). However, the differences across sectors are still present: energy and transport sectors are considerably better at achieving the projected rates of implementation than their health and education counterparts. These differences highlight the need to make specific improvements to ensure all-sectoral growth (World Bank, 2022).

Problem Statement

In spite of the improvements to the substantive policies, such as the passing of the Public-Private Partnership Act in 2010 and the following amendments in 2018 and 2023, the PPP frameworks in Tanzania continue to demonstrate disequilibrium in the ability to transform infrastructure investments into consistent national development results. This is evidenced by ongoing delays in project completion with an average of over 40 percent in major sectors, as well as a lack of optimal social equity manifestations to the disadvantage of the low-income groups. As an example, in construction industry (where PPPs are highly concentrated) a 10 to 30 percent time overrun incursion is experienced on between 70 and 80 percent of projects, due to bureaucratic purchasing procedures, lack of problems-risks distribution and liquidity constraints. These causes lead to cascading cost increases of an average of 23.5% and a reduction in returns of the USD 2.5 billion mobilized since 2010 (Mushi, 2020; Kazungu et al., 2022; Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006). Such delays do not only create barriers to efficient delivery of services in areas where they are vital like transport and energy, but also damage the trust of investors. An example case in point is that the Tanzania City Water Services (CWS) PPP was cut short after only two years of service in operation in 2005 due to failing to achieve performance requirements and cumulative loss of USD 12.3 million, which underscore the poor design and capacity shortcoming of the systems that block the greater integration of economies (ZEPARU, 2018).

Adding to these inefficiencies of operation are deep social consequences. PPP often places financial sustainability as a priority instead of accessibility to everyone, leading to an increased level of inequity and poor access by the marginalised groups. In the health sector, non-compliance with regulatory obligations and late reimbursement of the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) have led to the situation whereby the private facilities deny services to

3040 percent of insured clients in urban municipalities such as Dar Es Salaam forcing them to spend out of pocket that disproportionately affects the poor and negatively impacts the universal health coverage objectives of SDG 3 (Kibaja et al., 2020). In the same manner, the housing and water PPPs have been criticized of poor community consultations, which create distrust and social opposition to increase the risk of displacement without the corresponding increase in jobs and skills transfer. An example of these stalemated projects is the Bagamoyo Port project due to local tensions over land (Mlinga and Luvanda, 2009; UNDESA, 2019). This discordance, that is, which financial achievements (e.g., 65 % viability in energy PPPs) and social deficits (45 % equity achievement) have co-occurred, makes it essential to rely on a multi-stakeholder analysis to find enablers, i.e., post-2023 streamlining of procurement and mitigating established bottlenecks, e.g., institutional potential capacity deficits and monitoring gaps. It is only at that time that the Vision 2050 hopes of equitable and sustainable development in Tanzania can be pushed by PPPs.

Research Objectives and Questions

General Objective

The overarching aim of this study is to critically assess the effectiveness of Tanzania's Public-Private Partnership (PPP) frameworks in contributing to the nation's development trajectory, with a particular emphasis on their alignment with the Tanzania Development Vision 2050 (Dira 2050) and sectoral imperatives under the Third National Five-Year Development Plan (FYDP III).

Specific Objectives

1. To evaluate the financial viability, operational efficiency, and social equity dimensions of PPP projects implemented since the 2010 Act, identifying key performance indicators and variances across sectors such as energy, transport, and health.
2. To analyze the degree of alignment between PPP outcomes and national development goals, including investment mobilization, infrastructure expansion, and inclusive growth targets outlined in Vision 2050.

3. To identify structural barriers to PPP effectiveness—such as regulatory hurdles, capacity constraints, and risk allocation asymmetries—and propose targeted enhancements to optimize framework implementation for sustainable national progress.

Research Questions

1. To what extent have Tanzania's PPPs demonstrated financial returns (e.g., value-for-money metrics) and operational efficiency (e.g., on-time completion rates) in delivering infrastructure and services across priority sectors?
2. In what ways do PPP frameworks contribute to or diverge from Vision 2050's objectives, such as achieving upper-middle-income status through private-led industrialization and equitable resource distribution?
3. What are the primary barriers impeding PPP effectiveness in Tanzania, and how can policy reforms, institutional strengthening, and stakeholder collaboration address these to enhance overall contributions to the national development agenda?

Significance of the Study

The paper has deep implications on the developmental discourse in Tanzania because it provides evidence-based diagnostics to fill endemic gaps on the scholarship and practice of public-private partnerships. In theory, it builds upon Institutional Theory by breaking down how organizational behaviors and outcomes are altered through regulatory evolutions, like the 2023 amendments to the PPP Act, in the context of hybrid governance models, and thus presents an African perspective, which has been largely overlooked so far in the global literature about OECD contexts (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; World Bank, 2022). Empirically, within the Vision 2050 pursuit of a trillion-dollar economy based on a USD 86 billion base, the evaluation throws light on the effectiveness gaps, including a 40 per cent delay rate which kills investor confidence and inflates expenditure. This result seals the gaps that post-2023 estimations (like Mushi, 2020) could not fill because of the time constraints (The Chanzo, 2025; Kazungu et al., 2022).

In practice, the results provide policymakers, the PPP Centre, and line ministries with blueprints to optimize structures, which could unlock an extra USD 5-10 billion of private investment in the country by 2030 following the simplified procurement and ESG incorporation, as is reflected in the expert commentaries on re-defined PPP management that protects the interests of the citizenry (Daily News, 2025; Tanzania Investment Centre, 2025). To the interests of the individual stakeholders, the paper suggests risk-reduction levers, which increase sector-specific returns or benefits, especially in skills-mismatched sectors like health and education, and thus inclusiveness in growth that promotes the SDG 17 demands of partnership (The Citizen, 2025b). In the end, with optimizations suggested to focus on the value-for-money and equity, this study protects the sustainable path of Tanzania, avoiding the traps of uneven distribution of benefits of the trillion-dollar vision and by keeping PPPs motivating the sustainable and people-centred progress (President's Office, United Republic of Tanzania, 2025).

Organization of the Paper

The paper is written so that it questions the research issue in a systematic way starting with a carefully constructed literature review in Section 5, which connects theoretical frameworks and empirical precedents and outlines gaps in the discussion on PPP efficacy. Section 6 outlines the mixed-methods design, which includes the stakeholder questionnaires, semi-structured interviews, and archival data analysis to reach a methodological triangulation. Section 7 presents the empirical data in the form of descriptive statistics, sectoral tables, and the commentary to the data which are directly in line with the stated research objectives. Section 8 develops a critical discussion, comparing the findings with available literature, elaborates upon theoretical and policy implications, and clearly addresses limitations to the study. Section 9 of the paper summarizes the main lessons, draws conclusions based on them and provides specific and practical suggestions to enhance PPP structures. Additional materials and academic frameworks are availed in the form of appendices and reference list in due course.

Literature Review

Theoretical Framework (Key Models or Theories)

The effectiveness of the public-private partnerships (PPPs) in advancing the national development purposes may be strictly considered by a common theoretical background, where the governance reforms are merged with institutional interactions and economic exchange principles. Primarily, this question is pegged on the New Public Management (NPM) theory that alludes to the fact that introducing market-driven mechanisms, namely competition, performance-based contracting, and efficiency in the private sector, in the process, enhances the allocation of resources and the quality of services provided and at the same time decreases bureaucratic inefficiencies (Hood, 1991). In the framework of PPP, NPM stresses the validity of hybrid models in the context of developing economies, where the fiscal limitations require the inclusion of the private sector to ensure value-for-you results, but it also cautions against the overreliance on the market logic that will obscure the notion of accountability on the part of the government (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2017).

In addition to NPM, the Institutional Theory explains that PPP adoption and performance are influenced by a combination of regulatory and normative pressures and mimetic isomorphism that affect organisational behaviours and perceptions of legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Such an outlook is especially relevant to settings of transition as in the case of Tanzania, where changing legal tools, as exemplified by the 2023 PPP Act, are interacting with institutionalized state-centric practices, either enabling or hindering the maturation of PPP, as underscored by literature that identifies institutional voids that sustain adoption barriers (Hou, 2008).

In order to further deconstruct risk-sharing and responsibility, the viewpoint of the Principal-Agency Theory is also considered in the analytical paradigm, which models the PPPs as a contractual structure aimed at reducing information asymmetries between the state principals (governments) and individual agents (investors), and focuses on incentive alignment to curtail the moral hazard and adverse selection (Eisenhardt, 1989). This prism throws light on how the misplaced incentives in developing settings often lead to poor results, including the slow reimbursements in health-sector PPPs (Demirag and Khadaroo, 2018). Taken together, these theories, which include NPM as the efficiency drivers, Institutional Theory as structural enablers, and Principal-Agency as the relational dynamics, provide a holistic framework of

evaluating PPP structures in Tanzania, which in turn find the way of reconciling the ingenuity of the privates with the demands of the public in achieving Vision 2050.

Empirical Review (Past Studies Globally and in Tanzania)

Empirical observations of PPP success transcend international and domestic geographies and capture patterns of conditional success tempered by local vulnerabilities, particularly in developing economies where infrastructure deficits overlap with governance deficits. Globally, Estache and Wren-Lewis (2009) conducted a meta-analysis of 140 PPPs in 20 developing countries and found that while PPPs enhanced the efficiency of infrastructure by 20-30% in telecom and energy sectors by simplifying rollout and lowering costs, equity was failed in 60% of cases through tariff rises excluding poor users, reinforcing the need for redistributive protection (Estache and Wren-Lewis, 2009). On a broader review, Opawole and Windapo (2021) looked at 137 low- and middle-income nations' macroeconomic drivers, using panel regressions to show how stable fiscal policy and institution quality are linked with 15-25% PPP investment inflow growth, but exchange rate and debt volatility result in 40% failure rates, as experienced by Latin American transport concessions (Opawole and Windapo, 2021).

Similarly, Almeile et al. (2022) meta-analyzed 85 project reports based on developing settings and found PPPs in water and sanitation to have achieved 55% operation improvement but only 35% social inclusion increase, with the gaps due to weak monitoring and elite capture (Almeile et al., 2022). A follow-up 2024 systematic review protocol by Mthombeni et al. then questioned sub-Saharan African education PPPs, with initial 50% greater access but continuing quality shortfalls, calling for longitudinal impact measures (Mthombeni et al., 2024). A 2025 panel study by Adebayo et al. across BRICS countries also assessed energy PPP poverty

alleviation impacts, reporting a 10-15% reduction in unemployment in the host region but biased allocation favoring urban enclaves (Adebayo et al., 2025).

In Tanzania, empirical findings uncover system barriers with sector-based potentials. Mushi (2016) assessed transport PPPs based on stakeholder questionnaires (n=100), with 55% success in city road projects in terms of time savings but 45% of the delays caused by procurement bottlenecks, proposing digital tracking for synchronization with FYDP goals (Mushi, 2016). Kibaja et al. (2020) analyzed Dar es Salaam health PPPs using qualitative interviews (n=32), recording 60% service increases but 70% delayed reimbursement crippling viability, blaming these on NHIF inefficiencies and advocating for hybrid financing (Kibaja et al., 2020). Mushi (2020) stretched readiness assessment across all sectors, polling 150 practitioners to reveal 52% institutional readiness but gaps in risk assessment, with transport doing slightly better at 65% adoption rates (Mushi, 2020). Komu and Ngowi (2023) qualitatively explored private finance constraints on infrastructure (n=25 experts), citing 75% regulation transparency as a hindrance, but also referencing post-2018 Act rises in energy bids (Komu and Ngowi, 2023). In higher education, Mwaikusa (2016) studied 10 PPP institutions, with reported 40% enrollment hikes but differences in quality due to oversight deficiencies, necessitating performance covenants (Mwaikusa, 2016). Ndandiko (2018) examined project management in 15 PPPs and established 50% termination risk due to mismatched practices, and recommended adaptive frameworks for integrating Vision 2025 (Ndandiko, 2018). In total, these studies verify PPPs' catalytic position and disclose equity and implementation gaps in Tanzania.

Gaps Identified in Previous Literature

Although reviewed studies provide informative sectoral summaries as well as global benchmarks, various gaps restrict a full understanding of Tanzania's PPP landscape, particularly since the post-2023 Act era. Empirically, worldwide, research like Estache and Wren-Lewis (2009) and Almeile et al. (2022) note efficiency measures but indirectly explore intersections of social equity and macroeconomic volatility within low-income settings, which tends to pool data without decomposing transitional economies like Tanzania (Estache and Wren-Lewis, 2009; Almeile et al., 2022). At sub-national scales, studies such as Mushi (2020) and Kibaja et

al. (2020) offer pre-2023 status updates on preparedness and health issues without incorporating national-level syntheses with Vision 2050 alignments, rural-urban divisions, and longitudinal post-implementation impact mostly unmapped (Mushi, 2020; Kibaja et al., 2020). Besides, there is scarce mixed-methods assessments of the effectiveness of the 2023 amendments on investment inflow and equity, as observed in Komu and Ngowi (2023), restricting analysis to finance barriers without broader developmental linkages (Komu and Ngowi, 2023). This research fills the aforementioned gaps by conducting a comprehensive, post-reform assessment of PPP effectiveness in financial, operational, and social aspects, in alignment with Vision 2050, to inform adaptive policy directions.

Methodology

Research Design (Quantitative, Quantitative, or Mixed)

This study employs convergent parallel mixed-methods design, where quantitative data based on PPP performance datasets is supplemented by qualitative insights from stakeholder consultations to present a combined analysis of framework effectiveness. This approach is particularly suited for studying intricate phenomena like PPP outcomes, wherein quantifiable metrics yield quantifiable indicators of financial and performance success (e.g., cost overrun, percentage of completion), while qualitative accounts describe hidden inhibitors like institutional incompatibilities and perception gaps (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2018). By collecting and analyzing both strands concurrently, the design allows for triangulation to enhance validity and richness in complying with the development of context PPP evaluation protocols that give weight to comprehensive judgments over single measures (Opawole and Windapo, 2021; World Bank, 2017). The quantitative side borrows secondary performance measures to quantify effectiveness in sectors, whereas the qualitative stream goes into lived experiences using interpretive prisms, integrating findings on interpretation to inform Vision 2050 fit. Such a practical framework, whose tenet is that "what works" dominates paradigmatic purity, suits Tanzania's transitional PPP environment, supporting robust policy conclusions (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009).

Study Area and Population

The study adopts a national scope, addressing Tanzania's mainland policy and implementation context to capture the extent of PPP arrangements under the 2010 Act and 2023 amendments with sectoral focus on energy (e.g., hydropower and renewable energy), transport (e.g., ports and high-speed expressways), and health (e.g., facility upgrading) as priority sectors based on FYDP III. These industries represent over 70% of the PPP pipeline, triggering USD 1.8 billion in investment and having a direct influence on country aspirations like industrialization and universal access (Public Private Partnership Centre, 2025b). The target audience is composed of powerful stakeholders that are at the centre of PPP ecosystems: government officials (e.g., from the PPP Centre, Ministry of Finance, and line ministries like TANESCO for electricity), private sector operators and investors (e.g., Chinese and local company contractors), and independent experts (e.g., academics, TIC and World Bank affiliate consultants). This diverse pool of 2,000-3,000 active members nationwide, according to PPP Centre registries, ensures representation of decision-makers, implementers, and evaluators whose perspectives influence outcomes (Mushi, 2020). Peripheral stakeholders like end-users are not included to ensure that perspective is maintained on framework efficacy, not micro-level impacts.

Sampling Techniques and Sample Size

A stratified purposive sampling strategy was used to enrol participants, stratifying by stakeholder category (government: 25%, private: 50%, experts: 25%) and industry sector (energy: 30%, transport: 40%, health: 30%) to align PPP portfolio allocations and secure proportional representation of key voices. Within strata, purposive selection criteria ordered by priority were engagement and expertise—e.g., 5+ years of PPP procurement officials, project investor participants, and policy brief authors with established policy expertise—maximizing information richness and minimizing selection bias through diversity quotas (gender: 40% female; geography: 60% mainland, 40% regional) (Palinkas et al., 2015). This non-probability strategy, standard in PPP stakeholder research for the purpose of eliciting elite networks, was supplemented by snowball referrals to achieve 10% hard-to-reach private actors, achieving theoretical saturation after 45 interviews (Etikan et al., 2016). Total sample was 200, of which 150 were structured questionnaires (stratified to match population proportions) and 50 semi-structured interviews (15 government, 25 private, 10 experts), sized based on benchmarks where 30-50 interviews are sufficient for thematic depth in policy

evaluations (Guest et al., 2006; Ndandiko, 2018). This is a measure of generalizability against feasibility, yielding 80% confidence powering for regression analyses.

Data Collection Methods (Survey, Interview, Secondary Data, etc.)

Primary data were gathered using structured questionnaires and semi-structured interviews supplemented by rigorous secondary sourcing to enable contextual triangulation. Surveys (n=150) used a 5-point Likert-scale questionnaire (1=ineffective, 5=highly effective) adapted from World Bank PPP toolkits, surveying 25 items in the categories of financial viability (e.g., ROI indicators), operational efficiency (e.g., delay indicators), and social equity (e.g., inclusion indicators), pre-tested with 20 respondents for Cronbach's alpha reliability ($\alpha=0.87$) and then electronically collected via KoBoToolbox for 90% response rate (World Bank, 2022; Mushi, 2016). Interviews (n=50, 45-60 minutes) were semi-structured guidance on barriers (e.g., "How has the 2023 Act affected risk allocation?") and alignments (e.g., "To what extent do PPPs advance Vision 2050 targets?"), audio-recorded with consent, and virtually/in-person in Dar es Salaam, Dodoma, and regional centers to access stakeholders (Kibaja et al., 2020).

Secondary data consisted of archival summaries of PPP Centre reports (pipeline appraisals 2010-2025), FYDP III progress audits, and sectoral assessments by TIC and AfDB, yielding 150+ documents on indicators like USD investments and completion rates (Public Private Partnership Centre, 2025a; Ministry of Finance and Planning, 2021). Data collection was done within four months (June-September 2025), with two researchers ensuring consistency using inter-rater protocols, offering a 95% data completeness rate.

Data Analysis Techniques (Statistical Tools, Econometric Models, or Thematic Analysis)

Quantitative analysis employed SPSS v.28 for inferential modeling (e.g., multiple linear regression) and descriptive statistics (means, frequencies), e.g., to predict effectiveness scores (dependent variable) from predictors like regulatory compliance and sector type ($R^2 > 0.60$ aimed for), with multicollinearity testing ($VIF < 5$) and robustness via bootstrapping (Field, 2018). Sectoral crosstabs and ANOVA tested variances (e.g., energy vs. health efficiency), informing objective-matched interpretations. Qualitative data were analyzed using reflexive thematic analysis in NVivo 14, following Braun and Clarke's (2006) six steps: transcription (95% verbatim), familiarization, inductive coding (e.g., "procurement delays" as initial node), theme

clustering (e.g., "institutional barriers"), review against transcripts, and refining to axial constructs like "Vision alignment gaps." Inter-coder reliability ($\kappa=0.85$) was confirmed on 20% overlap, and word clouds represented salience (e.g., "capacity" at 45% frequency). Integration was also by collaborative exhibitions, linking regression coefficients and thematic quotes to account, for example, for the way capacity deficits explain 35% variation in social shortfalls (Fetters et al., 2013; Bazeley and Jackson, 2013). Refining econometrics were not considered, opting instead for exploratory over causal claims.

Ethical Considerations

Ethical rigor underpinned the study, with approval from the University of Dar es Salaam Institutional Review Board (IRB Protocol UDSM-REC-2025-078) and oversight from Tanzania's National Health Research Ethics Guidelines for stakeholder protections. Informed consent was obtained via dual-format forms (written/digital) describing purpose, risks (e.g., professional sensitivities), benefits, and voluntariness, with Swahili translations for accessibility and 100% affirmative rates after explanation (TCU, 2014). Confidentiality and anonymity were essential: pseudonyms, encrypted storage (AES-256), and aggregated reporting rendered identification impossible, especially for private sector criticism of government delays (Liamputtong, 2020). Bias minimization employed triangulation between methods/sources and reflexivity diaries to question researcher positionality (e.g., academic affiliations). Vulnerable subgroups (e.g., junior officials) were provided opt-out assurances, with debriefings and referral to PPP Centre support. Data retention is limited to five years post-publication, with destruction protocols, in accordance with GDPR-equivalent cross-border insights standards (Ministry of Health, Community Development, Gender, Elderly and Children, 2019). Conflicts of interest were none, and transparency statements are included as appendices.

Results and Findings

Present Descriptive Statistics or Key Qualitative Themes

The mixed-methods comparison gave a detailed description of the efficacy of Tanzania's PPP frameworks by combining quantitative performance measures from PPP Centre pipelines and stakeholder questionnaires (n=150) with qualitative themes from interviews (n=50). Across the world, PPPs had moderate success with 65% rate of financial success (on-budget achievement and ROI > 10%) in 83 projects totaling over USD 10 billion as of May 2025, while reaching only 45% success in social equity (e.g., localization of jobs > 50% and inclusion indices). There were sectoral variations: energy PPPs averaged 75% operational efficiency (e.g., Julius Nyerere Hydropower's 2,115 MW expansion), transport at 68% financial sustainability (e.g., SGR's trade increases), and health lagging at 40% because of payment delays (Public Private Partnership Centre, 2025a; Tanzania Investment Centre, 2025). Regression analyses confirmed that institutional capacity was a significant predictor ($\beta=0.42$, $p<0.01$), explaining 35% variation in performance.

Thematic coding within NVivo identified four recurring themes: "efficiency gains" (45% frequency, e.g., "PPPs cut transport times by 30-50%"), "equity shortfalls" (60%, e.g., "Health access is urban-biased"), "regulatory enablers" (35%, post-2023 Act improvements), and "capacity voids" (70%, e.g., "Negotiation skills lag behind in ministries"). These coalesced with quantitative trends, revealing Vision 2050 priorities at 55% overall, highest in industrialization (70%) and lowest in inclusivity (40%). To disaggregate, results are presented in four tables: the first general overview of sectoral performance; the subsequent tables tabled to each specific objective, collating descriptive stats and thematic excerpts for interpretive richness.

Table 1: General Overview of PPP Performance Indicators by Sector (n=83 Projects, 2010-2025)

Sector	Number of Projects	Total Estimated CAPEX (USD Mil)	Financial Viability (%)	Operational Efficiency (%)	Social Equity (%)	Overall Effectiveness Score (1-100)
Energy	15	2,537	70	80	50	67
Transport	20	1,369	68	75	55	66
Health	8	450	55	50	35	47

Overall	83	10,200	65	68	45	59
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Note: Viability based on ROI>10% and budget adherence (survey means); Efficiency on completion rates<20% delay; Equity on job localization>50% and inclusion metrics (thematic frequency). CAPEX from pipeline data (Public Private Partnership Centre, 2025a). Score: Weighted average (Financial 40%, Operational 30%, Social 30%).

Table 2: Findings on Specific Objective 1 – Financial Viability, Operational Efficiency, and Social Equity Dimensions

Dimension	Key Metrics/Stats	Sectoral Examples	Qualitative Themes (Frequency %)	Regression Insight (β, p-value)
Financial Viability	65% projects ROI>10%; Avg. cost overrun 15%	Energy: 70% (Julius Nyerere: 31.7B TZS revenue); Transport: 68% (SGR: 5% trade efficiency gain)	"Investor confidence post-2023" (40%)	β=0.38, p<0.01 (predicts 25% variance)
Operational Efficiency	68% on-time completion; 30% delay reduction	Health: 50% (FBO expansions: 60% service growth); Energy: 80% (2,115 MW added)	"Procurement streamlining aids" (35%)	β=0.45, p<0.001 (strongest predictor)
Social Equity	45% localization>50%; 40% inclusion index	Transport: 55% (10,000 jobs, 80% private); Health: 35% (30-40% denial rates)	"Urban bias erodes benefits" (60%)	β=0.22, p<0.05 (weakest, equity lag)

Note: Metrics from surveys (n=150) and pipeline (n=83); Themes from interviews (n=50). ANOVA: F(2,147)=12.4, p<0.01 for sectoral differences.

Table 3: Findings on Specific Objective 2 – Alignment with National Development Goals (Vision 2050/FYDP III)

Alignment Area	Contribution Level (%)	Quantitative Indicators	Qualitative Excerpts (Themes)	Alignment Score (1-5 Mean)
Industrialization	70	USD 10B mobilized; 1T TZS annual output	"PPPs unlock minerals/agri via SGR" (50%)	4.2
Infrastructure Expansion	60	40% transport congestion reduction; 25% clean energy capacity	"Energy stability for FYDP targets" (45%)	3.8
Inclusive Growth	40	10,000 jobs (but 60% urban); 40% rural electrification	"Equity gaps hinder poverty reduction" (65%)	2.9
Overall Alignment	55	55% projects SDG-linked (9/17)	"Vision 2050 potential untapped in health" (55%)	3.6

Note: % from stakeholder ratings (n=150, Likert); Indicators from TIC/AfDB data (Tanzania Investment Centre, 2025; African Development Bank, 2023). Crosstabs: $\chi^2(3)=18.7$, $p<0.01$ for sectoral alignment variances.

Table 4: Findings on Specific Objective 3 – Structural Barriers and Targeted Enhancements

Barrier Category	Prevalence (%)	Examples from Data	Proposed Enhancements (Stakeholder Consensus %)	Feasibility Score (1-5 Mean)
Regulatory Hurdles	70	Poor contracts (energy: 40% delays); Reimbursement lags (health)	Mandatory ESG audits (75%)	4.1
Capacity Constraints	65	Negotiation gaps (transport: 45% skills deficit)	National PPP training hub (80%)	3.9
Risk Allocation Asymmetries	55	Public bears 80% risks (overall)	Balanced clauses in 2023 Act revisions (70%)	4.0

Monitoring Voids	60	50% projects lack KPIs	Digital dashboards (85%)	4.3
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Note: Prevalence from thematic frequency (n=50 interviews); Enhancements from open-ended responses (n=150). Chi-square: $\chi^2(3)=14.2$, $p<0.01$ for barrier-enhancement links.

Interpretation of Results in Relation to Objectives

These results directly shed light on the research goals, confirming PPP frameworks' intermediate contribution to the development of Tanzania while revealing levers for amplification. For Objective 1, Table 2 describes a triadic imbalance—financial/operational capabilities (65-68%) underpinned by post-2023 efficiencies (e.g., energy's 80%) but outweighed by social equity deficits (45%), where regression indicates capacity as significant ($\beta=0.45$), aligning with NPM's efficiency culture but pointing to equity erosions in health (35%) that Principal-Agent misalignments further reinforce (Kibaja et al., 2020). Goal 2, as shown in Table 3, reflects a 55% alignment ceiling that is powerful in industrialization (70%, that is, SGR's 1T TZS output) but weak in inclusiveness (40%), interpreting Vision 2050's hybrid intentions as viable but open to redistributive adjustments to correct urban biases (Tanzania Investment Centre, 2025). Finally, Objective 3's Table 4 recognizes regulatory/capacity barriers (65-70%) as widespread, whilst high-consensus improvements like digital monitoring (85%) are poised to counteract, in tandem suggesting that institutional sinews can be strengthened and overall scores can rise by 20-30%, with PPPs being guaranteed to propel equitable, resilient national development (World Bank, 2022; Public Private Partnership Centre, 2025a).

Discussion

Compare Findings with Previous Studies

The empirical data of this study—having Tanzania's PPP frameworks ranked at 59% overall effectiveness, with sound financial and operational success (65-68%) being surpassed by equity shortfalls (45%)—validate and complicate past research, particularly in highlighting post-2023 regulatory dynamism amidst continuing developmental disparities. Globally, moderate sectoral variations are consistent with World Bank analysis, which points to PPPs' 20-30% improvements in energy and transport infrastructure but multiple equity traps in social sectors, as noted in a review of developing-country concessions released in 2018 that detected

60% of projects to exhibit urban biases and tariff exclusion aggravating inequality (World Bank, 2018). This mirrors our health sector's 35% equity deficit, as complaints in a 2025 World Bank sustainable PPP blog lament reimbursement delay and inclusion shortfall as structural issues in low-income environments, though Tanzania's 2023 amendments reflect initial interventions by streamlined procurement that our regression identifies with a 15% viability increase (World Bank, 2025a). Similarly, Estache and Wren-Lewis (2009) meta-analysed 140 PPPs and found 55% operational success in infrastructure but merely 40% social redistributions, compared to our own 40% inclusive growth alignment under Vision 2050 but differing by stressing Tanzania's post-reform prospects in industrialization at 70% compared to world stagnation in fragile states.

Locally, the study fills Mushi (2020)'s pre-2023 preparedness assessment, which reported 55% transport efficiencies but 45% gap in monitoring, by quantifying post-Act improvements—e.g., energy's 80% operating rate via initiatives like Julius Nyerere—fueled by the 2023 Regulations' competitive bid levels reducing delays by 20-30% in benchmarked sectors (Mushi, 2020; World Bank, 2023). Kibaja et al. (2020) also set 70% health reimbursement thresholds in Dar es Salaam, duplicating our 50% efficiency but pointing to erosions in equity (35%) which recent incentives, including tax relief under the amended Act, partially counteract, in a 2024 Clyde & Co. report noting increased transparency for local government PPPs (Kibaja et al., 2020; Clyde & Co., 2024). Komu and Ngowi (2023) questioned private finance constraints, determining 75% regulatory ambiguity before 2023, in line with our thematic analysis (70% frequency) as still existing but mitigated in energy (50% risk equilibrium) by the independent PPP office, encouraging greater consistency with FYDP III's 30% PPP target (Komu and Ngowi, 2023; IPP Media, 2025). However, unlike Ndandiko (2018) 50% risk terminations because of mismanagement, our results create a post-2023 resilience with only 25% forecasted failures, diverging from priors that are urban-biased by integrating rural infrastructure markers (Ndandiko, 2018; Polity.org, 2025). Collectively, this study bridges temporal gaps, ratifying PPPs' catalytic function while accelerating equity imperatives for Vision 2050.

Explain Implications for Theory, Policy, or Practice

Theoretically, the results validate New Public Management (NPM) empirically substantiating market mechanisms' efficiency dividends—e.g., 68% operating improvement via private innovation within transport—but balance Hood's (1991) optimism with Institutional Theory's theoretical accounts of regulatory isomorphism, where Tanzania's 2023 Act generates legitimacy but institutional empty spaces (65% capacity barriers) ensure equity distortions, complementing DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) model for hybrid models in transitional economies (Hood, 1991; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Principal-Agent theory further explains our $\beta=0.42$ capacity predictor, suggesting incentive realignments to reduce moral hazards in health PPPs on the foundation of Demirag and Khadaroo's (2018) accountability propositions for value-for-money in developing contexts (Demirag and Khadaroo, 2018).

Policy implications are profound, necessitating an amendment of the 2023 PPP Regulations to mandate ESG audits (75% stakeholders' agreement) and 20% reinvestment requirements in local areas, in a bid to increase equity scores by 25% and contributing towards Vision 2050's target of USD 10 billion private inflows in 2030, as per TIC's 2025 master plan (Tanzania Investment Centre, 2025). Integrating PPP KPIs in FYDP IV monitoring, e.g., digital dashboards for real-time monitoring (85% viability), would reduce 40% delays, taking advantage of World Bank's 2022 technical guidance in sustainable frameworks to integrate SDG 17 partnerships (World Bank, 2022). In practice, the ministries and PPP Centre can first target capacity hubs—e.g., 80% of officials trained in negotiation—addressing skill shortages (45% in transport), constructing participatory ecosystems that leverage recent incentives like government indemnities to rally FDI but shield public interests, as evident from 2025 African Mining Market analyses (African Mining Market, 2025).

Identify Unexpected Results or Limitations

The counter-intuitive outcome was the high level of private sector satisfaction (80%) amidst widespread delays (30% average), accounted for by post-2023 tax allowances and streamlined approvals that mitigated perceived risk, contrary to Komu and Ngowi (2023) allegations of opacity and reaping reform dividends in investor sentiment worthy of focused exploration into retention behavior (Komu and Khadaroo, 2023).

Limitations accompany these findings: reliance on self-reporting questionnaires risks desirability bias, exaggerating satisfaction by 10-15%, although secondary data triangulation offset this. National scope, albeit wide, limits detailed sectoral in-depth examination (e.g., the under-examined rural health PPPs), and the four-month collection window may miss emerging 2025 pipeline activity. Non-probabilistic sampling, though stratified, constrains generalizability to elite stakeholders, and the absence of longitudinal data constrains causal inferences. Future studies could employ randomized designs or experimental pilots to validate enhancement effects, with a view of enhancing robustness for Vision 2050 implementation.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Summarize Key Findings

This study has critically evaluated the performance of policy frameworks of Tanzania's Public-Private Partnership (PPP) in propelling the national development agenda, digging a field of modest success marred by structural fissures. Across more than 83 energy, transport, and health sector projects since the 2010 Act, PPPs exhibit a 59% overall effectiveness score, underpinned by commendable financial viability (65%, i.e., ROI in excess of 10% in energy concessions mobilizing USD 2.5 billion) and operating efficiencies (68%, i.e., 30% reductions in delays following 2023 reforms), but limited by extreme social equity deficits (45%, i.e., only 35% localization in health with urban biases) (Public Private Partnership Centre, 2025a). Regression analysis reveals institutional capacity as the pivot predictor ($\beta=0.42$, $p<0.01$), elucidating how regulatory enablers like streamlined procurement undergird industrialization alignments (70%) in Vision 2050, while gaps in monitoring and risk asymmetries vitiate inclusive growth (40%). Thematic issues of stakeholder forums confirm these quanta, with "equity shortfalls" topping 60% of accounts, e.g., health's 60% reimbursement grievances, underscoring partnerships' catalytic fiscal injections—far exceeding USD 10 billion in total—but disparate translation into trillion-dollar economy goals of Vision 2050 from a USD 86 billion baseline (The Chanzo, 2025). Sectorally, transport and energy emerge as exemplars (67-66% scores), but the lag in health at 47% suggests speedy reforms to unleash PPPs' hybrid vigour for holistic, sustainable development.

Draw Conclusions Linked to Objectives

The findings distill into rational conclusions rooted in the objectives of the study, verifying the partial yet vital contribution of PPP frameworks to Tanzania's development experience while anointing pathways to transcendence. Under Objective 1—evaluating financial, operational, and social dimensions—the triadic disequilibrium (65-68% strengths versus 45% equity weaknesses) concludes that while NPM-inspired efficiencies have consolidated infrastructure delivery, Principal-Agent misalignments perpetuate social oversights, rendering PPPs viable drivers of GDP growth (intended >8% annual) but ineffective guardians of SDG 3's universal access, as equity shortfalls erode Vision 2050's poverty lines (Mushi, 2020; United Nations, 2015). Objective 2 alignment analysis makes the determination that PPPs advance 55% of national goals—industrialization leadership (70%, e.g., SGR's trade synergies) and infrastructure (60%, e.g., 25% clean energy increase)—with deficits in inclusivity (40%), interpreting Institutional Theory's isomorphism as incipient in Tanzania, wherein the 2023 Act's independent office foretells maturity but necessitates additional normative reforms to instill Dira 2050's equitable resource ethos (President's Office, United Republic of Tanzania, 2025). Culminating in Objective 3, regulatory (70%) and capacity (65%) hindrances prevalence concludes that targeted enhancement—e.g., digital KPIs and training—could boost effectiveness by 20-30%, forging a symbiotic public-private nexus not only minimizing 40% delays but also operationalizing Vision 2050's participatory financing, making PPPs transcend transactional tools to become catalysts for sustainable, people-centered prosperity (The Citizen, 2025).

Provide Actionable Policy Recommendations

For operationalizing these findings, the following suggestions—ordered by priority, feasibility, and replicability—are made to the PPP Centre, Ministry of Finance, and parliamentary committees, drawing on world class standards and Vision 2050's FYDP IV horizon. They come with timelines, lead agencies, and expected impacts, calibrated for optimizing the scaffolding from the 2023 Act for transformational dividends.

1. Amend the 2023 PPP Act to Make Social Impact Audits Mandatory: Implement every two years, third-party audits with the inclusion of ESG metrics and equity ratios (e.g.,

50% rural localization targets) in all contracts, piloted in healthcare PPPs by Q2 2026 to reduce 60% urban skews. Handled by PPP Centre in association with TIC support, it would bring social scores up by 25% and align with SDG 10's decoupling of inequalities, after Kenya's 2024 PPP audits eliminated 15% exclusions (Bowmans, 2023; World Bank, 2022). Estimated cost: TZS 500 million annually, funded by USD 1-2 billion FDI inflows.

2. Establish a National PPP Capacity Hub for Training Stakeholders: Launch a mid-2026 centralized academy under the PPP Centre and offer 80% of officials and private partners modular training (e.g., negotiation, risk modeling) to fill 65% prevalence capacity gaps through blended online/offline modalities. AfDB-grant co-financed, this will address 45% transport/health skills shortages, accelerating 20% efficiency improvements and Vision 2050's digital revolution pillar, like South Africa's 30% performance improvement of PPP Academy (African Development Bank, 2023; Mushi, 2016).
3. Integrate PPP KPIs into FYDP IV Evaluations and Digital Monitoring Platforms: Engrain pre-standardized KPIs (e.g., equity indexes, delay thresholds) into FYDP IV (2026/27-2030/31) via parliamentary decree, utilizing blockchain-enabled dashboards for real-time tracking by Q4 2026. Implemented by the National Bureau of Statistics under PPP Centre oversight, it covers 60% monitoring gaps, which could help trim terminations by 25% and industrialization realignments (70%), mirroring Indonesia's digital PPP portals that enhanced transparency by 40% (Ministry of Finance and Planning, 2021; Daily News, 2025).
4. Facilitate Promulgation of Incentives for Inclusive PPP Structures in Under-Served Sectors: Establish fiscal incentives (e.g., 10-year tax holidays for rural health/energy PPPs) and grievance mechanisms in the 2026 Budget Speech, encouraging 30% private pledges to inclusivity goals by 2027. Headed by the Attorney General's office, this redirects procurement towards "people-first" bids, mitigating 55% risk asymmetries and catalyzing Vision 2050's trillion-dollar spirit through equitable growth, as celebrated in recent expert forums (The Citizen, 2025; The BizLens, 2025).

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